lib\u00e9ral hawk<\/em>, anxieuses de d\u00e9clencher l’intervention humanitaire qui comblera leurs vux divers. Cela fut fait, BHO \u00e9tant tomb\u00e9 sous le charme.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n\t Du c\u00f4t\u00e9 fran\u00e7ais, Cockburn accorde effectivement la place qui se doit \u00e0 l’action du g\u00e9nie diplomatique parisien-Rive Gauche, BHL soi-m\u00eame, \u00abin his habitual uniform immaculate white shirt with upturned collar, black suit coat, and disheveled ha\u00efr<\/em>\u00bb, et aux enthousiasmes pr\u00e9-\u00e9lectoraux de Sarkozy, l’une et l’autre d\u00e9marches formant la circonstance d\u00e9clencheuse directe de la guerre. Cela, jusqu’\u00e0 la reconnaissance du gouvernement rebelle par Sarko, et la France par cons\u00e9quent, le 11 mars, sous les applaudissements de qui de droit (\u00abBack in Benghazi, people screamed in relief and cheered Sarkozy’s name. Popularity at last for Sarko, whose approval ratings in France have been hovering around the 20 per cent mark<\/em>\u00bb). Effectivement, du c\u00f4t\u00e9 anglo-saxon, on commence \u00e0 accorder une importance d\u00e9cisive dans l’\u00e9volution g\u00e9n\u00e9rale de la crise aux gesticulations fran\u00e7aises, facteur d\u00e9cisif pour l’\u00e9volution tr\u00e8s rapide dans la p\u00e9riode qui conduisit au vote de l’ONU et \u00e0 l’intervention, \u00e9galement ultra-rapide, de la coalition en Libye, dans le chef des m\u00eames Fran\u00e7ais.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n\t Cette guerre, conclut Cockburn, est donc absolument, \u00e0 l’origine, une guerre de l’ego<\/em> am\u00e9ricaniste-occidentaliste (US et fran\u00e7ais), et nullement le produit de vastes plans myst\u00e9rieux du Syst\u00e8me, ou de notre app\u00e9tit bien connu pour le p\u00e9trole \u00abSo much for the circumstances in which intervention was conceived. It has nothing to do with oil; everything to do with ego and political self-protection. But to whom exactly are the interveners lending succour? There’s been great vagueness here, beyond enthusiastic references to the romantic revolutionaries of Benghazi, and much ridicule for Gaddafi’s identification of his opponents in eastern Libya as al-Qaeda.<\/em>\u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n\tCe dernier point de la citation permet \u00e0 Cockburn d’encha\u00eener sur l’aspect qui commence \u00e0 faire du bruit, et qui fera entrer cette guerre dans le Panth\u00e9on de l’extraordinaire d\u00e9sordre intellectuel de la postmodernit\u00e9 sur le pied de guerre : la pr\u00e9sence, de plus en plus confirm\u00e9e et de plus en plus document\u00e9e d’Al Qa\u00efda parmi les rebelles libyens. Ainsi BHL, qui s’informe r\u00e9guli\u00e8rement \u00e0 l’ambassade d’Isra\u00ebl, est-il sur le point d’ajouter Al Qa\u00efda parmi ses relais privil\u00e9gi\u00e9s. L’ubiquit\u00e9 de ce personnage est sans fin, comme le reste.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n
\tCockburn donne \u00e0 son tour des d\u00e9tails sur la situation des extr\u00e9mistes islamistes en Libye, qui fait de l’aventure actuelle une illustration charmante de l’h\u00f4pital psychiatrique o\u00f9 s’\u00e9labore la politique de puissance du bloc am\u00e9ricaniste-occidentaliste (BAO). Cockburn d\u00e9taille notamment deux documents qui substantivent la chose (qui apparaissent avec d’autres sources).<\/p>\n<\/p>\n
\t\u00abThe first is a secret cable to the State Department from the US embassy in Tripoli in 2008, part of the WikiLeaks trove, entitled Extremism in Eastern Libya, which revealed that this area is rife with anti-American, pro-jihad sentiment.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n\t\u00bbAccording to the 2008 cable, the most troubling aspect … is the pride that many eastern Libyans, particularly those in and around Dernah, appear to take in the role their native sons have played in the insurgency in Iraq [and the] ability of radical imams to propagate messages urging support for and participation in jihad.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n\t\u00bbThe second document, or rather set of documents, are the so-called Sinjar Records, captured al-Qaeda documents that fell into American hands in 2007. They were duly analysed by the Combating Terrorism Center at the US Military Academy at West Point. Al-Qaeda is a bureaucratic outfit and the records contain precise details on personnel, including those who came to Iraq to fight American and coalition forces and, when necessary, commit suicide.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n\t\u00bbThe West Point analysts’ statistical study of the al-Qaeda personnel records concludes that one country provided far more foreign fighters in per capita terms than any other: namely, Libya.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n\t\u00bbThe records show that the vast majority of Libyan fighters that included their home town in the Sinjar Records resided in the country’s northeast. Benghazi provided many volunteers. So did Dernah, a town about 200 kms east of Benghazi, in which an Islamic emirate was declared when the rebellion against Gaddafi started.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n\t\u00bbNew York Times reporter Anthony Shadid even spoke with Abdul-Hakim al-Hasadi who promulgated the Islamic emirate. Al-Hasadi praises Osama bin Laden’s ‘good points’, Shadid reported, though he prudently denounced the 9\/11 attacks on the United States. Other sources have said that this keen admirer of Osama would be most influential in the formation of any provisional government.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n\t\u00bbThe West Point study of the Sinjar Records calculates that of the 440 foreign al-Qaeda recruits whose home towns are known, 21 came from Benghazi, thereby making it the fourth most common home town listed in the records. Fifty-three of the al-Qaeda recruits came from Darnah, the highest total of any of the home towns listed in the records. The second highest number, 51, came from Riyadh, Saudi Arabia. But Darnah (80,000) has less than two per cent the population of Riyadh. So Darnah contributed far and away the largest per capita number of fighters.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n\t\u00bbAs former CIA operations officer Brian Fairchild writes, amid the apparent absence of any plan for post-Gaddafi governance, an ignorance of Libya’s tribal nature and our poor record of dealing with tribes, American government documents conclusively establish that the epicentre of the revolt is rife with anti-American and pro-jihad sentiment, and with al-Qaeda’s explicit support for the revolt, it is appropriate to ask our policy makers how American military intervention in support of this revolt in any way serves vital US strategic interests.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n\t\u00bbAs I wrote here a few weeks ago, It sure looks like Osama bin Laden is winning the Great War on Terror. But I did not dream then that he would have a coalition of the US, Great Britain and France bleeding themselves dry to assist him in this enterprise.<\/em>\u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n\tLe facteur de l’hypoth\u00e8se d\u00e9sormais largement document\u00e9e de la pr\u00e9sence d’Al Qa\u00efda parmi les forces rebelles prend de plus en plus d’importance dans la communication interpr\u00e9tative \u00e0 propos de cette guerre. Une \u00e9volution nouvelle de l’interpr\u00e9tation pourrait ainsi appara\u00eetre, qui tendrait \u00e0 nuancer, puis modifier l’interpr\u00e9tation officielle initiale de l’intervention (intervention humanitaire \u00e0 100% du c\u00f4t\u00e9 des rebelles). C’est l’interpr\u00e9tation dite de stabilisation, qui avancerait l’id\u00e9e que l’intervention a pour but de stabiliser la Libye, la pr\u00e9sence de Al Qa\u00efda \u00e9tant \u00e9videmment un facteur de d\u00e9stabilisation. Cette \u00e9volution pose un probl\u00e8me puisqu’il s’agirait alors que l’intervention apparaisse beaucoup moins, si plus du tout, comme une action en faveur des rebelles, alors que cette intervention est elle-m\u00eame tr\u00e8s favorable aux rebelles et qu’elle constituerait le facteur qui aurait largement favoris\u00e9, par d\u00e9finition, cette pr\u00e9sence d’Al Qa\u00efda. S\u00e9mantiquement et logiquement, il s’agit donc d’entreprendre le d\u00e9licat travail de la transformation d’une cause (intervention renfor\u00e7ant les rebelles, et Al Qa\u00efda par cons\u00e9quent) en un effet (intervention pour contenir le facteur d\u00e9stabilisant du renforcement d’Al Qa\u00efda).<\/p>\n<\/p>\n
<\/p>\n
\tMis en ligne le 28 mars 2011 \u00e0 04H28<\/p><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"
Effectivement, question pos\u00e9e avec r\u00e9ponse d\u00e9j\u00e0 pr\u00eate par Alexander Cockburn, \u00e9diteur et r\u00e9dacteur en chef de CounterPunch (et fr\u00e8re de Patrick, de The Independent), \u00e0 propos de l’affaire libyenne : \u00abThe war on Libya now being waged by the US, Britain and France must surely rank as one of the stupidest martial enterprises, smaller in… <\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"","ping_status":"","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"neve_meta_sidebar":"","neve_meta_container":"","neve_meta_enable_content_width":"","neve_meta_content_width":0,"neve_meta_title_alignment":"","neve_meta_author_avatar":"","neve_post_elements_order":"","neve_meta_disable_header":"","neve_meta_disable_footer":"","neve_meta_disable_title":"","footnotes":""},"categories":[2],"tags":[2857,10969,3417,934,1135,10970,3308,6902,3571,3306,4590],"class_list":["post-72878","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-bloc-notes","tag-alexander","tag-amazones","tag-bhl","tag-clinton","tag-cockburn","tag-ego","tag-humanitaire","tag-libye","tag-power","tag-rice","tag-sarkozy"],"jetpack_featured_media_url":"","_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/72878","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=72878"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/72878\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=72878"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=72878"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=72878"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}