Tea Party<\/em> dont il doit se sentir fort proche. Lind propose plusieurs mesures r\u00e9volutionnaires, dont la suppression de tous les grands programmes type-Guerre Froide pour les grandes guerres conventionnelles, pour se concentrer sur les possibilit\u00e9s type G4G. Cela le conduit \u00e0 proposer un budget du Pentagone passant de pr\u00e8s de $600 milliards \u00e0 $100 milliards Lind n’a pas chang\u00e9.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n\t\u00abWe refuse to plan for wars against other states, including China, because the real winners are likely to be the 21st century’s main danger, nonstate elements. The defeated state in a war between nations is likely to collapse, like Iraq, creating a Petri dish for nonstate entities. If the price of victory is too high, the winner may go the same route. Our strategic preference, in a time when the main division will be between centers of order and centers of disorder, should be for strong, orderly states, including China.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n\t\u00bbA third source of savings arises from the fact that we have far too many support elements for our relatively few combat units. Called the tooth-to-tail ratio, Congress has investigated it for years, with small results. The reason is that Congress sees it as an efficiency issue, when it is actually a doctrinal one. Our armed forces remain structured for Second Generation warsthink World War I on the Western Frontwhere the guiding assumption is that almost all combat units are engaged most of the time. Each therefore requires a large, dedicated tail. If we shift to Third Generation doctrine, maneuver warfare, the new assumption is that most of the time most combat units are in reserve, waiting to maneuver. Dedicated tails are small; logistical support is given mainly to the few units in contact. The tooth-to-tail ratio rises dramatically.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n\t\u00bbAs the defense budget is cut, it will be important to insist that all reductions come from the tail. Combat units, especially ground combat, are few enough already. The Pentagon will want to do the opposite, mothballing front-line units while preserving the bureaucracy. The Tea Party must say No.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n\t\u00bbWhat would all this add up to? An achievable target would be a defense budget of around $100 billion. That would still be the largest in the world. But the Pentagon’s welfare queens would have to look for real jobsnot just the vast surplus of field grade and senior officers, but the DOD civilians, hordes of contractors, and best of all the lobbyists of Gucci gulf. Fear not, boys, there are lots of houses that need cleaning. Starting with yours.<\/em>\u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n\n
dedefensa.org<\/em><\/p><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"Le retour de William S. Lind Depuis d\u00e9cembre 2009 et ses derni\u00e8res analyses publi\u00e9es, William S. Lind avait disparu de l’univers du commentaire libre sur l’Internet. Son alacrit\u00e9 et son tranchant, autant que ses vues originales, nous manquaient. Lind est le grand th\u00e9oricien de la guerre de 4\u00e8me g\u00e9n\u00e9ration (G4G) et son commentaire s’appuie toujours… <\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"","ping_status":"","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"neve_meta_sidebar":"","neve_meta_container":"","neve_meta_enable_content_width":"","neve_meta_content_width":0,"neve_meta_title_alignment":"","neve_meta_author_avatar":"","neve_post_elements_order":"","neve_meta_disable_header":"","neve_meta_disable_footer":"","neve_meta_disable_title":"","footnotes":""},"categories":[14],"tags":[8104,5701,7069,3194,7421,8256],"class_list":["post-72880","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-ouverture-libre","tag-budgetaires","tag-g4g","tag-party","tag-pentagone","tag-reductions","tag-tea"],"jetpack_featured_media_url":"","_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/72880","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=72880"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/72880\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=72880"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=72880"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=72880"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}