Les \u00e9v\u00e9nements les plus importants ne se d\u00e9roulent pas n\u00e9cessairement l\u00e0 o\u00f9 les \u00e9v\u00e9nements se d\u00e9roulent. Le printemps arabe, version \u00e9gyptienne, est plus important aujourd’hui que le rideau est tomb\u00e9 sur Moubarak et que certains craindraient de voir r\u00e9cup\u00e9r\u00e9e cette victoire d\u00e9mocratique, que lors de la charge furieuse qui eut raison de lui. Les \u00e9v\u00e9nements de Libye sont cruels mais d’une importance r\u00e9gionale ; ils ne sont importants qu’indirectement, parce qu’ils nous exposent l’\u00e9tat r\u00e9el des situations et des relations \u00e0 l’int\u00e9rieur du bloc am\u00e9ricaniste-occidentaliste (BAO), et les font \u00e9voluer dans la contrainte. Les \u00e9v\u00e9nements de Syrie prennent de l’extension, eux aussi marqu\u00e9s par des affrontements extr\u00eamement vifs, mais ils repr\u00e9sentent une tension et un potentiel de d\u00e9sordre sur lesquels tout le monde s’accorde pour l’instant pour tenter de les contenir le plus possible.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n
\tBien plus importante que tout, en v\u00e9rit\u00e9, voici la position de l’Arabie Saoudite. Contrairement \u00e0 la narrative<\/em> inusable de la permanence indestructible de l’h\u00e9g\u00e9monie US sur le monde, l’Arabie n’est pas une marionnette des USA ; ou bien, si l’on veut, elle n’est plus du tout<\/strong> ce qu’elle sembla \u00eatre parfois, une marionnette des USA, ce qui serait faire beaucoup d’honneur aux USA Aujourd’hui, ce serait plut\u00f4t le contraire.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n \t Lisons l’avis\u00e9 Jim Lobe, le 23 avril 2011<\/a>, sur IPS.News<\/em>. Lobe d\u00e9crit une situation o\u00f9 l’Arabie conduit la politique qui lui pla\u00eet, tenant fort peu compte des avis US. En fait, Lobe montre les USA comme oblig\u00e9s de suivre la trajectoire saoudienne bien plus que le contraire. L’explication de Jim Lobe, du point de vue des facteurs objectifs du c\u00f4t\u00e9 US :<\/p>\n<\/p>\n \t\u00abThe deference shown to the Saudi kingdom, the clear leader of the region’s counter-revolutionary wave, is explained by a number of factors, not least of which is its role as the world’s swing oil producer at a time when the price of petrol at the pump here has hit the four-dollar-a-gallon level. Political analysts here warn that Obama’s chances of re-election which are currently considered pretty favourable could be reduced in politically significant ways unless the price comes down by this time next year. My poll numbers go up and down depending on the latest crisis, and right now gas prices are weighing heavily on people, Obama himself noted at a fund-raising event in California earlier this week.<\/em> <\/p>\n<\/p>\n \t\u00bbIn addition to its great influence over oil prices, Saudi Arabia and the UAE, for that matter buys tens of billions of dollars in advanced U.S. weapons systems whose manufacturers are worried about the implications of a declining defence budget at home, and the risks of strained ties between Washington and their big clients overseas, for their bottom lines.<\/em> [] <\/p>\n<\/p>\n \t\u00bbFinally, Saudi Arabia, eagerly backed by the UAE, Bahrain, Kuwait and Jordan, has emerged as the principal regional rival of Iran in what Riyadh and its allies are increasingly depicting as an existential conflict between the Mideast’s Sunni and Shia communities. Their eagerness to charge Tehran with foreign interference in the Arab world’s internal affairs is music to the ears of the powerful Israel Lobby whose patient cultivation of the idea of a strategic consensus uniting Israel with the Sunni-led states against Iran finally appears to be bearing fruit over their shared anxieties about the possibly dire consequences of the region’s democratisation.<\/em> <\/p>\n<\/p>\n \t\u00bbThus, Congressional reluctance to provide substantial aid or even debt relief to the wounded and sinking Egyptian economy at such a critical moment in that country’s political evolution is due as much to the desire for assurances that its future government will remain faithful to the Camp David Accords and co-operate with Israel on Gaza as it is to the budget-cutting mania that has seized Washington. Cairo’s decision last week to begin normalising ties with Tehran will bolster those who believe that a democratic Egypt may not be such a good investment.<\/em>\u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n \t La situation de ce point de vue des relations entre l’Arabie et les USA est r\u00e9sum\u00e9e par cette observation du colonel \u00e0 la retraite Pat Lang, ancien analyste sp\u00e9cialis\u00e9 dans les affaires du Moyen-Orient, \u00e0 la Defense Information Agency (DIA) : \u00abMost Americans, to the extent that they think of it, do not understand how little leverage the U.S. has with the Saudis. They have decided to change the basic nature of their relationship to the U.S., taking from now on a much more independent course and encouraging resistance to revolutionary groups throughout the region.<\/em>\u00bb (Voir son site Sic Semper Tyrannis<\/em>, au 22 avril 2011<\/a>.)<\/p>\n<\/p>\n \tPour autant, cette position de force de l’Arabie n’est pas n\u00e9cessairement appr\u00e9ci\u00e9e comme avantageuse, dans tous les cas au niveau de la politique qu’elle permet de d\u00e9velopper. Ce serait plut\u00f4t le contraire, et diverses observations notent ou analysent des tendances jug\u00e9es d\u00e9favorables, produites par cette politique saoudienne.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n \t Elliott Abrams, grand sp\u00e9cialiste du Moyen-Orient et ancien du NSC de George Bush, actuellement au Council of Foreign Relations, analyse la politique de r\u00e9pression maximale du Bahre\u00efn (le 22 avril 2011<\/a>, sur le site du CFR). Il l’attribue sans aucune h\u00e9sitation aux pressions de l’Arabie, \u00e0 laquelle Bahre\u00efn semble tenu pieds et poings li\u00e9s. Abrams juge insens\u00e9e cette politique maximaliste et il pr\u00e9voit une issue catastrophique pour Bahre\u00efn et, partant, dans ses cons\u00e9quences, pour l’Arabie elle-m\u00eame. Ce jugement mesure le peu d’estime dans lequel Abrams tient la politique saoudienne en g\u00e9n\u00e9ral.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n \t\u00abWhy has the King taken this disastrous path? Clearly he has been urged and pressured to do so by his Sunni neighbors in the UAE and especially Saudi Arabia. The contempt for Shia and Shiism in Saudi Arabia is undoubtedly a key factor here, and the Saudis were concerned that an uprising by Bahraini Shia could spread across to the Shia in their own oil-rich Eastern Province. But the actions being taken in Bahrain now make it far more likely that this will be the outcome: Saudi Shia who see the Saudi government repressing Shia in Bahrain will become more, not less, embittered toward their own government. The Saudis also worried about opportunities for Iran to meddle in Bahrain and ultimately in Saudi Arabia itself. But here again, the policy being followed will only create new chances for Iran by assuring enmity and political volatility in Bahrain.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n