yankees<\/em> par la d\u00e9cision indienne.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n\t\u00abIs India being its old prickly non-aligned self again? Is appeasement of India’s notoriously anti-American politicians more important to a beleaguered Indian government than winning over the US? Will India’s traditional obsession with preserving its strategic autonomy always limit its usefulness as a partner to the US?<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n\t\u00bbSuch questions are unfair. Surely, India-US relations transcend any single arms purchase. Why should the financial value of one deal be the barometer of a strategic partnership? It is simply narrow-minded to reduce US foreign policy towards India to the bottom lines of American defence salesmen.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n\t\u00bbNor is there any military estrangement between the two countries. Even if this deal didn’t work out for the US, it remains a leading arms supplier to India, having won bids to provide ships, reconnaissance aircraft, and advanced transport planes. The Indian army, navy, and air force still conduct more exercises with US defence forces than with those of any other power.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n\t\u00bbAnd the strategic relationship is not one-way. The US, too, has a strong interest in Indian strategic autonomy, which would be buttressed by a wider range of external partnerships, including with the European states that will benefit from the aircraft tender. Though India is rightly allergic to being seen as a US-supported counterweight to a rising China, in practise it is avidly courted by Southeast Asian countries anxious to balance the Chinese, a development that suits American interests. Obama’s visit to India last November reinforced a perception that the two countries share an increasingly convergent worldview, common democratic values, and thriving trade. None of this will cease to be relevant if India buys a European fighter plane.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n\t\u00bbIn fact, the potential for Indian-US collaboration in a variety of military and non-military areas could be enhanced by this decision. Turning the US down this time actually frees India’s hands to pursue other aspects of the partnership, immune from the charge that it is too responsive to American pressures. India has not foreclosed its options; it has enlarged them.<\/em>\u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n\tD’une fa\u00e7on convenue pour le courant, mais tout \u00e0 fait inattendue pour qui s’adresse \u00e0 des interlocuteurs am\u00e9ricanistes, c’est-\u00e0-dire \u00e0 l’hubris<\/em> am\u00e9ricaniste, Shashi Tharoor s’est employ\u00e9 auparavant (avant l’extrait ci-dessus) \u00e0 les rassurer en les assurant que ce qui \u00e9tait en cause, justement, n’\u00e9tait pas les liens strat\u00e9giques entre l’Inde et les USA, mais la qualit\u00e9 du mat\u00e9riel am\u00e9ricaniste, d\u00e9testable et d\u00e9pass\u00e9, et les pratiques habituelles des USA dans ce genre de march\u00e9, inacceptables et peu loyales. Ce qui est \u00e9trange dans ce propos, notamment \u00e0 la lumi\u00e8re \u00e0 la fois de ce qui suit et de ce qu’on a cit\u00e9, c’est que Tharoor semble croire que cela va raccommoder l’Inde avec ses amis am\u00e9ricanistes. Il ne les conna\u00eet gu\u00e8re, car ce qu’il dit ci-apr\u00e8s, au contraire, ne les fera que s’\u00e9trangler un peu plus profond de fureur Imagine-t-on cela ? Mettre en cause la vertu exceptionnelle et inatteignable du technologisme am\u00e9ricaniste, de la pratique et du brio am\u00e9ricanistes dans ce domaine, et tutti quanti<\/em> ? Crime de l\u00e8se-majest\u00e9, Tharoor<\/p>\n<\/p>\n\t\u00abThe notion that a major arms purchase should be based on broader strategic considerations the importance of the US in India’s emerging Weltpolitik – rather than on the merits of the aircraft itself, strikes Indian officials as unfair. Some deny that the decision reflects any political bias on the part of India’s taciturn, left-leaning defence minister, AK Antony. The choice, they aver, is a purely professional one, made by the Indian Air Force, and only ratified by the ministry.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n\t\u00bbThe two European fighters are generally seen as aerodynamically superior, having outperformed both US-made aircraft in tests under the adverse climatic conditions in which they might have to be used, particularly in the high altitudes and low temperatures of northern Kashmir. Experts suggest that the American planes are technologically ten years behind the European ones, and it doesn’t help that Pakistan, India’s likely adversary if the aircraft were ever pressed into combat, has long been a regular US client for warplanes.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n\t\u00bbMoreover, Indian decision-makers could not help but be aware that the US has not, over the years, proved to be a reliable supplier of military hardware to India or other countries. It has frequently cut off contracted supplies, imposed sanctions on friends and foes alike (including India), and reneged on delivering military goods and spare parts, in addition to being notoriously unwilling to transfer its best military technologies.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n\t\u00bbThe current Indian fleet of mainly Russian and French planes has suffered from no such problems, and the existing ground-support and maintenance infrastructure would have needed major changes to handle US aircraft. (It is likely that the eventual winner of the bid will be required to enter into a joint-production arrangement with India, which US companies would not have done.)<\/em>\u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n\tCette plaidoirie pour l’amiti\u00e9 strat\u00e9gique Inde-USA, malgr\u00e9 l’expulsion des avions US de la comp\u00e9tition MCRA, est donc singuli\u00e8rement maladroite parce qu’elle s’adresse \u00e0 la psychologie am\u00e9ricaniste. (Sans cela, elle serait correcte et acceptable.) Du point de vue indien, au contraire, certes, elle repr\u00e9sente une d\u00e9marche qui ressort probablement d’une consigne g\u00e9n\u00e9rale du gouvernement indien, de tenter par tous les moyens de raccommoder les relations entre les USA et l’Inde.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n
\tCela implique, indirectement, la confirmation que ces relations sont gravement endommag\u00e9es par cette affaire. Pour nous, c’est sans aucun doute le cas, alors que les Indiens, \u00e0 l’image de Tharoor, s’\u00e9tonnent de voir les USA mettre en cause ces relations pour un march\u00e9 d’armement rat\u00e9. Mais le fait est plut\u00f4t que les r\u00e9actions US montrent qu’effectivement les USA sont pr\u00eats \u00e0 mettre en cause ces relations avec l’Inde, au nom de leurs exigences imp\u00e9ratives. Ces r\u00e9actions US, dont on a eu l’\u00e9cho public, ont \u00e9t\u00e9, dans les \u00e9changes informels, d’une extr\u00eame violence. Vivant \u00e0 l’heure toujours retard\u00e9e par eux, par rapport \u00e0 la v\u00e9rit\u00e9 du monde, de leur toute puissance et selon l’id\u00e9e qu’une relation strat\u00e9gique implique n\u00e9cessairement la soumission de l’autre \u00e0 la ligne am\u00e9ricaniste, et l’\u00e9quipement militaire de l’autre constitu\u00e9 de quincailleries US, dont les avions de combat US sont le plus prestigieux fleuron, la direction am\u00e9ricaniste ne peut souffrir aucune d\u00e9rogation \u00e0 ces principes sacr\u00e9s. Les r\u00e9actions indiennes, \u00e0 l’image de celle de Tharoor, ne feront qu’aggraver cet emportement.`<\/p>\n<\/p>\n
<\/p>\n
\tMis en ligne le 12 mai 2011 \u00e0<\/p><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"
Par couleuvre, nous entendons le bel avion de combat US F\/A-18 Super Hornet brutalement \u00e9ject\u00e9, avec son comp\u00e8re le F-16, de la comp\u00e9tition indienne pour un nouvel avion de combat, march\u00e9 dit MRCA calibr\u00e9 autour de $11 milliards pour 126 exemplaires. On sait donc (voir notre commentaire du 2 mai 2011) que c’est une formidable… <\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"","ping_status":"","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"neve_meta_sidebar":"","neve_meta_container":"","neve_meta_enable_content_width":"","neve_meta_content_width":0,"neve_meta_title_alignment":"","neve_meta_author_avatar":"","neve_post_elements_order":"","neve_meta_disable_header":"","neve_meta_disable_footer":"","neve_meta_disable_title":"","footnotes":""},"categories":[2],"tags":[9387,3192,464,4711,3378,11109,2766,5770,3487,11110],"class_list":["post-73000","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-bloc-notes","tag-a-18","tag-boeing","tag-f","tag-hornet","tag-inde","tag-mrca","tag-relations","tag-strategiques","tag-super","tag-tharoor"],"jetpack_featured_media_url":"","_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/73000","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=73000"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/73000\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=73000"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=73000"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=73000"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}