\tDes indications de plus en plus pr\u00e9cises montrent que la Turquie serait en train de r\u00e9viser radicalement sa strat\u00e9gie et sa politique dans la crise syrienne, vieilles de 14 mois, mises sur la m\u00eame ligne que le bloc BAO. D\u00e9j\u00e0, au d\u00e9but mai 2012, le 7 mai 2012<\/a>, M K Bhadrakumar jugeait qu’il y avait des signes convaincants de l’\u00e9volution de la Turquie<\/p>\n<\/p>\n \t\u00abWhat gives cautious optimism is also that Turkey has been retreating. Notably, FM Ahmet Davitoglu has retracted from his rhetoric. He probably sensed that he crossed a red line and there has been adverse reaction in the Arab world, which is historically very sensitive about the Ottoman legacy. Besides, within Turkey itself, the government’s Syria policy has come under heavy fire. A Turkish intervention in Syria can be safely ruled out in the absence of a national consensus within Turkey.<\/em>\u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n \tLe 3 juin 2012<\/a>, une analyse de DEBKAFiles<\/em> tend \u00e0 confirmer cette \u00e9volution turque. Elle confirme par ailleurs, plus pr\u00e9cis\u00e9ment, une sensation ressentie durant la semaine qui a suivi le massacre de Houla, o\u00f9 la Turquie s’est montr\u00e9e extr\u00eamement discr\u00e8te, voire dispensatrice d’un silence assourdissant. Dans le concert humanitariste g\u00e9n\u00e9ral des Amis de la Syrie, dont elle \u00e9tait un des membres les plus actifs (jusqu’\u00e0 accueillir le club en mars \u00e0 Istanboul), la discr\u00e9tion de la Turquie a constitu\u00e9 un \u00e9v\u00e8nement remarquable DEBKAFiles<\/em> \u00e9crit :<\/p>\n<\/p>\n \t\u00abIn an astonishing about face, Turkey has just turned away from its 14-month support for the anti-Assad revolt alongside the West and made common cause with Russia, i.e. Bashar Assad.<\/em> []<\/p>\n<\/p>\n \t\u00bbWashington, London and Paris began rushing forward contingency plans for this eventuality upon discovering that Ankara had secretly notified leaders of the rebel Free Syrian Army Thursday, May 31 that it had withdrawn permission for them to launch operations against the Assad regime from Turkish soil. It was then realized that Turkish Prime Minister Tayyip Erdogan and his Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu had stabbed Western-Arab Syrian policy in the back and moved over to help prop Assad up at the very moment his regime was on the point of buckling under international after-shocks from the systematic massacres of his own people.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n \t\u00bbThat day, Erdogan’s betrayal was confirmed when Davutoglu announced over Turkish NTV: We have never advised either the Syrian National Council or the Syrian administration to conduct an armed fight, and we will never do so. He added: The Syrian people will be the driving force that eventually topples the Syrian regime. Assad will leave as a result of the people’s will. This was precisely the view voiced this week by Russian President Vladimir Putin, when he spoke out against violent rebellion, military intervention and sanctions to topple the Syrian ruler.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n \t\u00bbFor the time being, the pro-Assad Moscow-Tehran front, bolstered now by Ankara, has got the better of Western and Arab policies for Syria<\/em>\u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n \tAvant le texte cit\u00e9 plus haut, le 30 avril 2012<\/a>, le m\u00eame M K Bhadrakumar, lors d’un s\u00e9jour en Turquie, appr\u00e9ciait s\u00e9v\u00e8rement la position turque dans la crise syrienne, jugeant catastrophique pour ce pays de suivre la voie des USA, et s’interrogeant sur les choix d’Erdogan (\u00abIsn’t Turkey following<\/em> the footsteps of the US<\/em><\/strong> getting bogged down in quagmires some place else where angels fear to tread, and somewhere along the line losing the plot? I feel sorry for this country and its gifted people. When things have been going so brilliantly well, Erdogan has lost his way.<\/em>\u00bb). La surprenante et assez incompr\u00e9hensible politique syrienne de la Turquie depuis le printemps 2011 (expliqu\u00e9e par certains, et \u00e0 notre sens d’une fa\u00e7on tr\u00e8s acceptable, par des traits de caract\u00e8re et d’humeur des deux principaux dirigeants turcs, Erdogan et Davutoglu , voir le 29 f\u00e9vrier 2012<\/a>) serait ainsi en train de changer et l’on pourrait \u00e0 nouveau applaudir \u00e0 la politique de ce pays, parce qu’Erdogan aurait retrouv\u00e9 sa voie un instant \u00e9gar\u00e9.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n \tDEBKAFiles<\/em> parle de la trahison d’Erdogan, ce qui est un bon signe d’une certaine assurance qu’on pourrait avoir de la r\u00e9alit\u00e9 de ce tournant. Il y a eu, ces derniers jours, un regain de d\u00e9clarations officielles turques fortement en faveur de l’Iran (voir PressTV.com<\/em>, le 31 mai 2012<\/a>), et ceci va \u00e9videmment avec cela.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n \tDans tous les cas, on observera le caract\u00e8re de volatilit\u00e9 extr\u00eame de la crise syrienne, avec l’apparente affirmation de lignes tr\u00e8s affirm\u00e9es (pro ou anti Assad), mais plut\u00f4t comme \u00e9l\u00e9ments de communication. Du point de vue de la politique suivie, il existe une r\u00e9elle fluctuation pour la plupart des pays dont la politique n’est pas fond\u00e9e sur des choix politiques clairs et explicit\u00e9es par des arguments convaincants, cela montrant qu’il n’y a pas non plus de leadership<\/em> politique imp\u00e9ratif (notamment, rien de ce point de vue, pour le parti anti-Assad de la part des USA) mais des d\u00e9cisions suivant les perceptions g\u00e9n\u00e9rales, les int\u00e9r\u00eats, les humeurs et les influences temporaires, et les r\u00e9actions des uns et des autres vis-\u00e0-vis de la pression constante et tr\u00e8s puissante du Syst\u00e8me. Cela rend compte de la manufacture particuli\u00e8re de la crise syrienne, o\u00f9 les facteurs d’id\u00e9ologies de communication (humanitarisme, lib\u00e9ralisme interventionniste) et d’artificialit\u00e9 de certains groupes (nombre de groupes rebelles form\u00e9s de toutes pi\u00e8ces, sans racines int\u00e9rieures) tiennent une place tr\u00e8s sp\u00e9cifique, o\u00f9 le caract\u00e8re politique principal est la cr\u00e9ation du d\u00e9sordre et l’opposition<\/a> aux principes structurants. Au reste, il s’agit bien d’une situation tr\u00e8s caract\u00e9ristique, d’une \u00e9poque \u00e9videmment crisique, faite quasi exclusivement de crises diverses, o\u00f9 domine la dynamique d’autodestruction du Syst\u00e8me.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n <\/p>\n \tMis en ligne le 4 juin 2012 \u00e0 16H31<\/p><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":" Volte-face de la Turquie sur la Syrie ? Des indications de plus en plus pr\u00e9cises montrent que la Turquie serait en train de r\u00e9viser radicalement sa strat\u00e9gie et sa politique dans la crise syrienne, vieilles de 14 mois, mises sur la m\u00eame ligne que le bloc BAO. D\u00e9j\u00e0, au d\u00e9but mai 2012, le 7 mai… <\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"","ping_status":"","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"neve_meta_sidebar":"","neve_meta_container":"","neve_meta_enable_content_width":"","neve_meta_content_width":0,"neve_meta_title_alignment":"","neve_meta_author_avatar":"","neve_post_elements_order":"","neve_meta_disable_header":"","neve_meta_disable_footer":"","neve_meta_disable_title":"","_jetpack_memberships_contains_paid_content":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[2],"tags":[4202,5474,3015,9591,11461,14866,14853,9160,3090,2773,2730,3867,2613],"class_list":["post-73179","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-bloc-notes","tag-assad","tag-bhadrakumar","tag-communication","tag-davutoglu","tag-debka","tag-erdoigan","tag-houla","tag-humanitarisme","tag-influence","tag-iran","tag-russie","tag-syrie","tag-turquie"],"jetpack_featured_media_url":"","jetpack_sharing_enabled":true,"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/73179","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=73179"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/73179\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=73179"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=73179"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=73179"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}