\tUne affaire de composants contrefaits, essentiellement chinois et \u00e9quipant des syst\u00e8mes de l’USAF, avait il y a peu attir\u00e9 l’attention. Une de nos lectrices nous avait signal\u00e9 la chose en parlant de termites \u00e0 l’uvre et en signalant l’article de Russia Today<\/em> du 22 mai 2012<\/a>.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n \t\u00abBootleg electronic components have found their way onto the US Air Force’s aircraft. An investigation by the Congress has exposed counterfeit electronic parts being used by major aircraft corporations Boeing, Lockheed Martin and Sikorsky. The two-year probe was conducted by the US Senate Armed Services Committee. Overall, 1,800 cases of counterfeit electronic parts being used have been exposed. The Committee concluded that a huge number of fake electronic parts being used in the production of military aircraft, night vision devices, radio stations and GPS navigation modules pose a serious threat to national security.<\/em> []<\/p>\n<\/p>\n \t\u00bbAbout 70 per cent of the fake electronic microchips were traced as being produced in China; the rest came from Canada and Great Britain. The investigation revealed a scheme whereby large-scale producers bought counterfeit electronic chips from subcontractors who have established links with pirates.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n \t\u00bbElectronic counterfeit is a multibillion business in China. This has led to counterfeit electronic parts flooding the market and being traded openly. The American administration attempted to make Chinese authorities pay closer attention to the issue, but has failed so far<\/em>\u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n \tIl nous faut ajouter une pr\u00e9cision des plus int\u00e9ressantes Termites il y a certes, mais elles seraient plut\u00f4t am\u00e9ricanistes que chinoises pour ce qui concerne l’initiative de la chose. Un article de AOL Defense<\/em>, du 2 juin 2012<\/a> pr\u00e9sente l’analyse de deux sp\u00e9cialistes de l’\u00e9lectronique, Michael Pecht et Len Zuga, qui pr\u00e9cise l’affaire et lui donne une coloration tr\u00e8s diff\u00e9rente, et bien plus int\u00e9ressante encore que la version initiale. Pour eux, les v\u00e9ritables coupables de cette atteinte \u00e0 la s\u00e9curit\u00e9 nationale se trouvent au cur m\u00eame de l’industrie de d\u00e9fense US, et les Chinois ne sont que des ex\u00e9cutants parmi d’autres. Les deux auteurs ont \u00e9tudi\u00e9 avec attention les d\u00e9positions des t\u00e9moins appel\u00e9s \u00e0 une audition du S\u00e9nat sur cette affaire<\/p>\n<\/p>\n \t\u00abListening to the witnesses’ testimony at the hearing, anyone who worked in the defense electronics industry could not help but wonder what happened to the robust quality assurance and parts management systems that were mandated by government specifications during the Cold War.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n \t\u00bbThe team at the Center for Advanced Life Cycle Engineering (CALCE) at the University of Maryland is routinely asked to investigate counterfeit electronics. CALCE has found that the responsibility for counterfeiting most often lies with unauthorized US suppliers (distributors and other mid-tier suppliers), as well as the prime contractors who fail to properly vet their suppliers and ascertain the sources of the parts that they buy.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n \t\u00bbThese unscrupulous US companies often commission the counterfeiting of parts from foreign suppliers in Vietnam, the Philippines, Thailand, and China. Add to this mix the fact that the US off-shores its scrapped electronics to Chinese parts reclamation mills, and you have a supply source of obsolete electronics components coveted by US military suppliers.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n \t\u00bbMarket forces have created a demand for counterfeit parts for US military systems, and, not surprisingly, suppliers have arisen to serve that market. The military market, with its constant demand for obsolete parts, the cost and schedule pressures placed on manufacturers, and the overall degradation of its supply chain management and supplier controls, has a created an environment that has allowed counterfeiting to flourish. Semiconductor industry analysts at IHS iSuppli found a fourfold increase in incidences of counterfeit parts from 2009 to 2011, with US-based military and aerospace electronics firms reporting the bulk of these incidents. This marked the first time that the number of reported incidents in a single year exceeded 1,000 – a total that when you take into all the equipment involved, could include millions of purchased parts. If any of these counterfeit parts were to find their way into systems fielded by the US military, the results could potentially be catastrophic.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n \t\u00bbFor example, Raytheon Missile Systems purchased some 1,500 Intel flash memory (semiconductor) devices for incorporation into the Harm Targeting Systems (HTSs) installed in F-16 aircraft to take out enemy radar systems. Raytheon purchased those parts from a U.S. broker, rather than from the original device manufacturer or its authorized distributor. Without checking the devices ahead of time, Raytheon installed those Intel chips on 28 circuit boards destined for HTS modules.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n \t\u00bbThe military can be grateful that the boards immediately failed, because Raytheon had to examine the boards to determine the root cause of the problem. Only then did they learn that the parts were all counterfeit. The broker that Raytheon bought the parts from has since been charged with the selling of counterfeit parts, and the guilty parties have been sentenced. The broker had literally given instructions to its Chinese suppliers on how to counterfeit, re-label, and ship parts to the U.S. Thus, the counterfeit parts were actually commissioned by an American company.<\/em>\u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n \tParlant de termites<\/a> et relevant qu’elles sont sans aucun doute am\u00e9ricanistes, on est conduit \u00e0 observer combien cette affaire r\u00e9v\u00e8le l’effondrement des r\u00e9f\u00e9rences et des valeurs qui formaient le cadre strict des questions de s\u00e9curit\u00e9 nationale, notamment durant la Guerre froide et avant. Un seul responsable, le march\u00e9 (le mot market<\/em> est r\u00e9p\u00e9t\u00e9 plus qu’\u00e0 son tour dans le texte ci-dessus), c’est-\u00e0-dire l’ultralib\u00e9ralisme et la doctrine du libre \u00e9change qui va avec, notamment avec le d\u00e9veloppement du processus de globalisation et le d\u00e9clin de la souverainet\u00e9 et de l’identit\u00e9 nationales qui va avec. (Cette \u00e9volution radicale a commenc\u00e9 sous l’administration Clinton, avec des initiatives d\u00e9cisives de privatisation de larges pans du secteur de la s\u00e9curit\u00e9 nationale, notamment \u00e0 partir du Pentagone, sous la direction du vice-pr\u00e9sident d’alors, Al Gore.) Cet ensemble de pressions absolument d\u00e9structurantes, sinon dissolvantes, mine et d\u00e9truit toutes les valeurs structurantes qui constituaient l’architecture de protection du bien public, notamment et particuli\u00e8rement en mati\u00e8re de s\u00e9curit\u00e9 nationale. Les Fran\u00e7ais qui ne cessent de s’en alarmer pour leur compte, en g\u00e9n\u00e9ral comme s’ils \u00e9taient seuls \u00e0 subir ces effets, pourront trouver dans cette affaire une satisfaction am\u00e8re et catastrophique en constatant que le processus est g\u00e9n\u00e9ral et universel.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n \tLe fait remarquable, quoique pas nouveau mais jamais consid\u00e9r\u00e9 sur une \u00e9chelle aussi vaste et d’une fa\u00e7on aussi syst\u00e9matique, est que l’industrie de d\u00e9fense US, industrie par essence li\u00e9e aux imp\u00e9ratifs principiels de la s\u00e9curit\u00e9 nationale, est elle-m\u00eame l’instigatrice consciente et manipulatrice de la destruction de ces divers principes. Les forces du march\u00e9 emportent tout, les imp\u00e9ratifs de s\u00e9curit\u00e9 nationale, les privil\u00e8ges du bien public, l’engagement tacite de la fourniture de qualit\u00e9 pour les syst\u00e8mes produits, etc. Les complices de ces pratiques, faites au nom du profit et de la rentabilit\u00e9 \u00e9rig\u00e9es en objectifs quasiment intouchables, apparaissent comme des individus et des soci\u00e9t\u00e9s extr\u00eamement douteux, \u00e0 la limite des structures proches du crime organis\u00e9. Tout y est pour d\u00e9crire une situation de compl\u00e8te dissolution, contre laquelle les autorit\u00e9s publiques aux USA ne pourront pas grand’chose, puisque d\u00e9pendant absolument des forces du corporate power<\/em> qui conduisent ces pratiques, et le corporate power<\/em> infiltrant souvent des hommes \u00e0 lui dans les organismes de surveillance. Il s’agit d’un cas de plus d’autodestruction du Syst\u00e8me, et une d\u00e9monstration que la haine du principe du Pr\u00edncipe’<\/a>, qui n’a pas de plus grand moteur que les USA, d\u00e9vore les USA eux-m\u00eames. <\/p>\n<\/p>\n \tSans surprise, tout cela.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n <\/p>\n \tMis en ligne le 5 juin 2012 \u00e0 16H44<\/p><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":" Il y a donc termites et termites Une affaire de composants contrefaits, essentiellement chinois et \u00e9quipant des syst\u00e8mes de l’USAF, avait il y a peu attir\u00e9 l’attention. Une de nos lectrices nous avait signal\u00e9 la chose en parlant de termites \u00e0 l’uvre et en signalant l’article de Russia Today du 22 mai 2012. \u00abBootleg electronic… <\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"","ping_status":"","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"neve_meta_sidebar":"","neve_meta_container":"","neve_meta_enable_content_width":"","neve_meta_content_width":0,"neve_meta_title_alignment":"","neve_meta_author_avatar":"","neve_post_elements_order":"","neve_meta_disable_header":"","neve_meta_disable_footer":"","neve_meta_disable_title":"","_jetpack_memberships_contains_paid_content":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[2],"tags":[3977,14868,8039,3907,10119,6410,2632,3557,3715,2937,11603,3964,4205,7794,41],"class_list":["post-73181","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-bloc-notes","tag-chine","tag-composants","tag-crime","tag-destructuration","tag-dissolution","tag-electronique","tag-globalisation","tag-libre-echange","tag-marche","tag-nationale","tag-organisee","tag-raytheon","tag-securite","tag-termites","tag-usaf"],"jetpack_featured_media_url":"","jetpack_sharing_enabled":true,"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/73181","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=73181"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/73181\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=73181"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=73181"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=73181"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}