\tL’incident du cargo russe transportant, semble-t-il, au moins deux<\/strong> ou trois<\/strong> (on h\u00e9site sur le chiffre) h\u00e9licopt\u00e8res d’attaque russe appartenant \u00e0 la Syrie et d’une utilit\u00e9 plus que douteuse dans les troubles actuels, a fait ressurgir les pires moments de la Guerre froide. Mais il s’agit d’une caricature de la chose lorsqu’on consid\u00e8re les enjeux, et d’une extension monstrueuse de la chose lorsqu’on consid\u00e8re les psychologies et les risques pris pour la caricature. (Les h\u00e9licopt\u00e8res, bien s\u00fbr, sont ceux dont il a d\u00e9j\u00e0 \u00e9t\u00e9 question lors de la sortie<\/a> d’Hillary Clinton \u00e0 ce propos.)<\/p>\n<\/p>\n \tIl s’agit du cargo russe M V Alaed<\/em>, qui a \u00e9t\u00e9 arr\u00eat\u00e9 durant le dernier weed-end au large de l’Ecosse par la d\u00e9cision de son assureur (britannique) de retirer sa couverture assurance, et qui a rebrouss\u00e9 chemin vers la Baltique et, sans doute, Kaliningrad. The Independent<\/em> rapporte, ce 21 juin 2012<\/a>, les conditions dans lesquelles David Cameron, ayant \u00e0 l’esprit le souvenir du grand anc\u00eatre churchillien, fut sur le point d’ordonner un arraisonnement de force du M V Alaed<\/em>, en eaux internationales, sous le pr\u00e9texte intraitable que la Russie ne respectait pas une d\u00e9cision de l’UE sur l’embargo des armes vers la Syrie. <\/p>\n<\/p>\n \t\u00abBritain came alarmingly close to a dangerous clash with Moscow when David Cameron was asked to consider giving an order to forcibly board a ship headed towards the English Channel carrying three Russian-made helicopters for delivery to the regime in Syria, it emerged today. Any seizure would have been carried out by members of the Special Boat Service, SBS, the only military unit authorised to performing opposed embarkations at sea. The helicopters are believed to be the same ones that prompted US Secretary of State, Hillary Clinton, recently to berate Russia for sending military hardware to Syria.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n \t\u00bbOfficials traveling with the Prime Minister on an official visit to Mexico City yesterday gave the first detailed account of a series of high-level meetings that happened at Whitehall at the end of last week as the authorities tracked the ship, the MV Alead, which was steaming southwards through the North Sea after departing from Leningrad port. Mr Cameron was briefed on a continuous basis, they said, on the results of a series of meetings of the emergency Cobra committee as the ship approached waters off Dover. Officials said that at that point \u00ab\u00a0all options were on the table\u00a0\u00bb about preventing the ship continuing its voyage towards Syria. They did not deny that those options might have included an armed boarding and seizure of the vessel, an action that surely would have elicited Russian ire.<\/em>\u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n \t\u00bbAs the Government consulted with Denmark and the Netherlands on options for stopping it, the ship abruptly turned around on Friday, they said. But by the end of the weekend it was in the Hebrides area and bound westwards apparently on a course to go around Scotland and then south again towards the Straits of Gibraltar. The crisis only eased, it seems, when an international maritime insurance firm was persuaded to withdraw coverage of the ship and its cargo. At noon on Monday, the ship had turned eastwards again. Yesterday, it was reported to be back in the Baltic seemingly headed back to Russia.<\/em>\u00bb <\/p>\n<\/p>\n \t Sur le fond de l’affaire, on doit se reporter \u00e0 Russia Today<\/em>, qui donnait, le 19 juin 2012<\/a>, des pr\u00e9cisions \u00e0 ce propos, sur l’enjeu que repr\u00e9sentent les deux ou trois h\u00e9licopt\u00e8res \u00e0 bord du navire en question, de l’\u00e9tat d’esprit dans lequel ce type d’incident va contribuer \u00e0 mettre la direction russe et ainsi de suite. Il s’agit de l’interview d’un expert sur le r\u00f4le des armements dans la strat\u00e9gie, Vassili Kachine, du Centre d’Analyse des Strat\u00e9gies et des Technologies de Moscou.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n \t\u00abThey started to use this information to pressure Russia on the Syrian issue. They are deliberately misleading the media; they were manipulating this information, says Vasily Kashin from the Centre for Analysis of Strategies and Technologies. This really open pressure is combined with a propaganda campaign and data manipulations, he says.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n \t\u00bbThe US never mentioned that these helicopters already belonged to Assad, but said simply that Russia is sending some helicopters to Syria, without elaborating. But in fact these were just old helicopters repaired in Russia. And is far as we know, it was a very limited and cheap repair. The price was really low; Syria could not even afford to replace engines. So, you can’t even say that Russia upgraded these old Soviet helicopters or expanded their capabilities, Kashin said.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n \t\u00bbThe shipment halted by the UK, Kashin says, was the fulfillment of contact obligations agreed between Russia and Syria in 2009, long before all this Syrian unrest started.The contract covered the repair of Soviet MI25 helicopters, which Syria owed. The county initially had more than 30 of them, but the inventory was in such a bad shape that they could not be repaired anymore. So now, it is about sixteen helicopters which were supposed to be repaired and sent back to Syria.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n \t\u00bbWhat we see now is a huge exaggeration and huge manipulation with data, and the Americans are probably doing this in order to make some point for, probably, establishing some kind of no-fly zone and just making an impression that there are some terrible aircraft killing civilians which need to be stopped, Kashin suggests. But do these helicopters really have the importance the US portrays?<\/p>\n<\/p>\n \tKashin says that none of these helicopters have much value, and basically can’t really change<\/em> [anything<\/em>] in the Syrian situation. In fact these are very old, Soviet machines and they can be very limitedly repaired just to keep them barely working, he says.<\/em> <\/p>\n<\/p>\n \t\u00bbSo now, this move may really have an impact on the prospects of an agreement between the West and Russia over the situation in Syria. If previously Russia agreed that everything is negotiable, now it is unlikely that the Russian government would show weakness.<\/em>\u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n \t Il para\u00eet que les finauds service de renseignement britanniques, qui ont l’habilet\u00e9 de leurs comp\u00e8res du bloc BAO pour rep\u00e9rer les choses, soup\u00e7onnaient qu’il y a avait plus que deux ou trois Mi-25 remontant aux ann\u00e9es 1970, peut-\u00eatre un ou deux missiles, quelques caisses de Kalachnikov ; peut-\u00eatre, peut-\u00eatre, car, depuis l’Irak et les armes de destruction massive, la confiance illimit\u00e9e qu’on peut faire dans les renseignements des SR du bloc BAO est extr\u00eamement \u00e9rod\u00e9e. Par contre, les explications de Vassili Kachine ont tout pour nous satisfaire, \u00e0 la fois de l’expertise sur l’\u00e9tat, l’usage et l’utilit\u00e9 des armements impliqu\u00e9s, \u00e0 la fois du simple bon sens pour en juger. Par cons\u00e9quent, on observera que cette affaire du M V Alaed<\/em> porte sur un sujet absolument d\u00e9risoire, \u00e0 c\u00f4t\u00e9 de l’enjeu impliqu\u00e9 ; car l’enjeu impliqu\u00e9 ne fut pas loin de l’intervention arm\u00e9e par arr\u00eater le navire en eaux internationales, au nom d’une l\u00e9gislation (l’embargo de l’UE sur les armes vers la Syrie) dont la Russie n’a rien \u00e0 faire en plus de n’\u00eatre li\u00e9e en rien par cette l\u00e9gislation ; et la cause de cette intervention si risqu\u00e9e pour un motif si d\u00e9risoire fut due, \u00e0 c\u00f4t\u00e9 de la conscience churchillienne de Cameron qui joue un grand r\u00f4le, \u00e0 la suggestion de la bureaucratie du d\u00e9partement d’\u00c9tat qui n’entendait pas le c\u00e9der aussi ais\u00e9ment apr\u00e8s la sottise initiale de Clinton (o\u00f9 cette bureaucratie avait la part essentielle sinon exclusive) annon\u00e7ant l’envoi d’h\u00e9licopt\u00e8res russes des ann\u00e9es 1970, et flambants neufs, et si meurtriers en Syrie qu’on n’en use pratiquement pas.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n \tLa Guerre froide ? Au temps de Kennedy, de Kissinger ou de Brzezinski, et quelque mal qu’on puisse penser avec bien des raisons de ces oiseaux, on ne tombait pas dans de telles affaires d’\u00e9piciers mal inform\u00e9s, en les faisant presque d\u00e9pendre d’une agression militaire en mer absolument infond\u00e9e. (En 1962, lorsque Kennedy ordonnait un blocus militaire autour de Cuba, au moins les navires sovi\u00e9tiques transportaient des missiles balistiques \u00e0 moyenne port\u00e9e avec leurs t\u00eates nucl\u00e9aires en place, c’\u00e9tait du s\u00e9rieux, et l’on parlait et l’on finissait par s’entendre.) Effectivement, le plus effrayant dans le chef du bloc BAO et de ses acteurs agit\u00e9s, c’est leur extraordinaire incomp\u00e9tence, la nullit\u00e9 des informations qui leur sont donn\u00e9es pour orienter et justifier leur action, l’ignorance professionnelle de ceux qui, dans les bureaucraties, les utilisent, et l’atmosph\u00e8re hyst\u00e9rique dans quoi baigne tout cela. Une seule chose marche donc \u00e0 tr\u00e8s haut r\u00e9gime, c’est l’affectivit\u00e9<\/a> utilis\u00e9e \u00e0 la place de la raison pour conduire la r\u00e9flexion, la raison \u00e9tant r\u00e9duite \u00e0 \u00eatre l’idiote utile qui habille ces agitations hyst\u00e9riques d’un manteau \u00e9lim\u00e9 de s\u00e9rieux apparent et de pompes diverses, celles-ci et celui-l\u00e0 qui si\u00e9ent aux grandes puissances responsables et \u00e0 la diplomatie traditionnellement si respectable. L’affaire du M V Alaed<\/em> est un petit exemple, sans importance sur le fond puisque d\u00e9risoire, mais d’une profonde signification quant \u00e0 la d\u00e9marche, de la bassesse abyssale o\u00f9 est tomb\u00e9e l’intelligence am\u00e9ricaniste-occidentaliste, du bloc BAO en question, plus bloc que jamais, l’esprit aussi souple et adaptable qu’un bloc de pierre<\/p>\n<\/p>\n <\/p>\n \tMis en ligne le 21 juin 2012 \u00e0 06H24<\/p><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":" La Guerre froide ranim\u00e9e comme une caricature d’elle-m\u00eame L’incident du cargo russe transportant, semble-t-il, au moins deux ou trois (on h\u00e9site sur le chiffre) h\u00e9licopt\u00e8res d’attaque russe appartenant \u00e0 la Syrie et d’une utilit\u00e9 plus que douteuse dans les troubles actuels, a fait ressurgir les pires moments de la Guerre froide. Mais il s’agit d’une… <\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"","ping_status":"","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"neve_meta_sidebar":"","neve_meta_container":"","neve_meta_enable_content_width":"","neve_meta_content_width":0,"neve_meta_title_alignment":"","neve_meta_author_avatar":"","neve_post_elements_order":"","neve_meta_disable_header":"","neve_meta_disable_footer":"","neve_meta_disable_title":"","_jetpack_memberships_contains_paid_content":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[2],"tags":[14911,5315,9978,3106,2645,3916,5135,14914,14913,2786,14912,3867,9892],"class_list":["post-73211","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-bloc-notes","tag-alaed","tag-cameron","tag-dattaque","tag-froide","tag-guerre","tag-helicopteres","tag-hysterie","tag-kachin","tag-kachine","tag-m","tag-mi-25","tag-syrie","tag-v"],"jetpack_featured_media_url":"","jetpack_sharing_enabled":true,"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/73211","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=73211"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/73211\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=73211"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=73211"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=73211"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}