\tDans une analyse d\u00e9sol\u00e9e sur la politique g\u00e9n\u00e9rale d’Obama vis-\u00e0-vis du monde musulman, DEBKAFiles<\/em> terminait en observant qu’il ne restait plus \u00e0 Isra\u00ebl que ses prouesses militaire. (Voir le 19 juin 2012<\/a>.)<\/p>\n<\/p>\n \t\u00abIsrael, it must be said, finds itself in a strategic pits deeper than ever before as it faces the Islamist revolution overtaking Egypt. While promising Israel every possible security perk, Obama has relentlessly pursued a policy of accommodation with revolutionary Islam, both Shiite through a nuclear deal with Iran after it progressed beyond the point of no return for building a bomb and the Sunnis, by collaborating with the Muslim Brotherhood and its branches. This policy has stripped Israel of its strategic assets barring one military prowess.<\/em>\u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n \tAu moment (18 juin) o\u00f9 cette analyse \u00e9tait r\u00e9dig\u00e9e, les \u00e9v\u00e8nements d\u00e9montraient exactement le contraire, \u00e0 la fois sur la fronti\u00e8re entre Isra\u00ebl et l’Egypte, devenue un point d’une extr\u00eame sensibilit\u00e9, et sur les fronti\u00e8res avec les Palestiniens. Une situation de d\u00e9sordre consid\u00e9rable naissait apr\u00e8s un attentat sur la fronti\u00e8re isra\u00e9lo-\u00e9gyptienne, marqu\u00e9e par le spectacle d’une arm\u00e9e isra\u00e9lienne compl\u00e8tement d\u00e9sorganis\u00e9e. Le 20 juin 2012<\/a>, DEBKAFiles<\/em> d\u00e9crit avec fureur la cascade d’erreurs, de mauvaises interpr\u00e9tations, de renseignement fautifs, de r\u00e9actions inappropri\u00e9es et tardives, qui firent prendre l’attaque terroriste du 18 juin venue d’\u00e9l\u00e9ments d’al Qa\u00efda, pour une attaque du Hamas, suivie de repr\u00e9sailles injustifi\u00e9es contre Hamas, suivies d’une riposte du Hamas et ainsi de suite<\/p>\n<\/p>\n \t\u00abAt a particularly sensitive moment in Israeli-Egyptian relations, Israel’s military leaders were caught napping by the June 18 terrorist attack from Sinai on the southern Route 10, in which an Israeli fence team worker was killed. Because they were too slow to catch on to the identity of the perpetrators, those military chiefs misdirected their reprisals at the wrong quarters and so sparked a three-day missile-for-air strike cycle in Gaza.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n \t\u00bbThat slowness of uptake was evident at the different military and defense levels of responsibility the field command, the Southern Command and the general staff. Above all, the forces under the Southern Command were not ready for action although their sector abutting the Gaza Strip and the Egyptian border of Sinai should have been on high alert. It took three days and scores of missiles from the Gaza Strip before an Iron Dome missile defense battery was finally deployed Wednesday, June 20. The battery immediately intercepted a Grad missile before it exploded in the town of Netivot.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n \t\u00bbDEBKAfile’s military sources trace the start of the downward turn of events to Monday, June 18. After word was received of a major roadside bomb-RPG-shooting attack on an Israeli team working on Route 10 on the Israel-Egyptian border fence and the death of Said Fashasha, the IDF made every possible mistake.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n \t\u00bbInstead of waiting for solid intelligence to come through on the terrorists’ identity, Israeli commanders lashed out in every direction. An unidentified officer decided that the hand behind the attack was that of the Palestinian Jihad Islami. He may have been the same wise guy who attributed to Hamas the double Grad missile attack two days earlier on two southern locations, Ovdat and Mitzpeh Ramon. Some military sources explained to Israeli media that Hamas was shooting missiles on orders from the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt in order to heat up the Egyptian-Israeli border ahead of the second round of the presidential election.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n \t\u00bbThis caused Israeli media to hare off in the wrong direction. Neither Hamas nor the Muslim Brotherhood was actually involved in either of those attacks, but since the information was not corrected, the misapprehension stood and generated more damage. The field commanders concerned were not informed by the general staff or military intelligence that the Grad missiles in southern Israel were fired by al Qaeda from Sinai<\/em>\u00bb (etc., etc.)<\/p>\n<\/p>\n \tOutre d’\u00eatre particuli\u00e8rement regrettable en raison de la tension qui existe actuellement en Egypte et, par cons\u00e9quent, sur la fronti\u00e8re isra\u00e9lo-\u00e9gyptienne, dans une relation strat\u00e9gique devenue absolument vitale pour Isra\u00ebl, l’affaire est chronologiquement tr\u00e8s d\u00e9primante. Elle vient cinq jours apr\u00e8s un rapport d’une commission d’enqu\u00eate sur le comportement de la direction isra\u00e9lienne (les civils cette fois, la paire Netanyahou-Barak) durant l’attaque de la flotille pour la paix des Turcs, fin mai 2010 (voir notamment le 1er juin 2010<\/a>). Le 14 juin 2012<\/a>, AFP, via SpaceWar.com<\/em>, reprenait quelques indications du rapport, extr\u00eamement s\u00e9v\u00e8re sur la fa\u00e7on dont la direction politique a agi Avec cette conclusion facile \u00e0 imaginer, qu’on retrouve dans la presse : si ces deux-l\u00e0 ne sont pas capables de g\u00e9rer proprement une affaire aussi simple que l’affaire de la flotille de la paix, quelle catastrophe nous attend pour une attaque contre l’Iran ?<\/p>\n<\/p>\n \t\u00abA damning report that slammed Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s handling of the 2010 flotilla raid has raised fears over how a strike on Iran would be managed, press reports said on Thursday. The 153-page report by State Comptroller Micha Lindenstrauss dominated the headlines.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n \t\u00bbMost commentators heaped scathing criticism on Netanyahu and Defence Minister Ehud Barak for their handling of the raid on the Mavi Marmara, the lead ship of a Gaza-bound flotilla, in which nine Turkish nationals were killed. Most were quick to point out the deeply-flawed decision-making process exposed in the report raised serious questions about Netanyahu and Barak’s ability to make sound decisions on crucial issues like a strike on Iran’s nuclear programme. The state comptroller issued a charge sheet, wrote Shimon Shiffer in the top-selling Yediot Aharonot newspaper. It cries out to the prime ministers bureau that if this is how you manage affairs in an uncomplicated matter like how to stop the Turkish flotilla, who will believe that you will handle things differently while preparing to attack nuclear facilities in Iran?<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n \t\u00bbLindenstrauss said there were \u00ab\u00a0significant shortcomings\u00a0\u00bb in the decision-making process which was led by Netanyahu, and accused the premier of failing to hold any structured, formal discussions with a group of top ministers nor with the National Security Council about the handling of the flotilla. Instead, Netanyahu had held separate, private discussions with Barak and with Foreign Minister Avigdor Lieberman, none of which were documented.<\/em>\u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n \tCette avalanche et cette concentration de mauvaise nouvelles pour la soi-disant prouesse militaire d’Isra\u00ebl interviennent \u00e0 un moment effectivement crucial, o\u00f9 se bousculent \u00e0 la fois les projets grandioses de d\u00e9stabilisation de la paire Netanyahou-Barak (l’attaque contre l’Iran, certes), et de nouvelles menaces de d\u00e9stabilisation sur les fronti\u00e8res syrienne et \u00e9gyptienne. L’arm\u00e9e isra\u00e9lienne semble d\u00e9sormais confront\u00e9e aux limites des arm\u00e9es ultra-modernes et ultra-sophistiqu\u00e9es sur lesquelles se greffent des directions politiques avec des projets id\u00e9ologiques souvent d\u00e9structurants pour ces m\u00eames forces arm\u00e9es. Il faut se rappeler que la derni\u00e8re v\u00e9ritable prouesse de l’IDF (ex-Tsahal<\/em>, qui ne m\u00e9rite plus gu\u00e8re ce nom) remonte \u00e0 l’\u00e9t\u00e9 2006, et que ce fut un cuisant revers face au Hezbollah. (Les op\u00e9rations contre les Palestiniens, entretemps, ne sont que des missions de r\u00e9pression polici\u00e8re avec des moyens \u00e9crasants et en toute impunit\u00e9, sans aucune signification militaire mais beaucoup d’indices moraux et psychologiques sur l’emploi et l’\u00e9tat de l’arm\u00e9e.)<\/p>\n<\/p>\n \tIl semble bien que l’\u00e9tablissement de s\u00e9curit\u00e9 nationale isra\u00e9lien dans tous ses composants, \u00e0 l’exemple mim\u00e9tique de son grand cousin am\u00e9ricaniste, \u00e9touffe sous les poids additionn\u00e9s de la super-sophistication, des concurrences de commandements et des bureaucraties, des certitudes appuy\u00e9es sur des r\u00e9putations de moins en moins justifi\u00e9es des services de renseignement, etc. Il s’agit d’un appareil postmoderne classique (si l’on peut dire), \u00e0 l’intersection antagoniste des syst\u00e8mes du technologisme et de la communication, souffrant \u00e0 la fois de centralisations extr\u00eames dans certains domaines du technologisme, et de capacit\u00e9s consid\u00e9rables (au niveau de la communication) de d\u00e9centralisation. En plus de cela, une atmosph\u00e8re de constante mobilisation et d’hyst\u00e9rie \u00e0 la fois antiterroriste et contre certaines entit\u00e9s voisines, am\u00e8ne \u00e0 des surr\u00e9actions, \u00e0 des initiatives individuelles prises dans l’improvisation, etc., ce dernier aspect psychologique d\u00e9pendant de la politique de la direction politique fond\u00e9e sur l’affectivit\u00e9<\/a> et sur l’hyst\u00e9rie. Ces derniers incidents nous font comprendre que l’hypoth\u00e8se d’un malaise profond qui s’est faite jour dans l’appareil de s\u00e9curit\u00e9 national isra\u00e9lien depuis un an (voir le 4 juin 2011<\/a>), dans le chef de plusieurs prestigieux dirigeants des services de s\u00e9curit\u00e9, \u00e0 la retraite ou encore actifs, peut \u00eatre \u00e9tendue \u00e0 tout cet appareil de s\u00e9curit\u00e9 nationale, pour des raisons diff\u00e9rentes, et plus vari\u00e9es.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n \tOn peut donc d\u00e9sormais parler d’une crise g\u00e9n\u00e9rale de l’appareil de s\u00e9curit\u00e9 nationale isra\u00e9lien, qui est effectivement, comme l’\u00e9crit DEBKAFiles<\/em>, le dernier atout d’Isra\u00ebl, et qui n’est d\u00e9sormais plus tout \u00e0 fait, et m\u00eame plus du tout une prouesse Cela, au moment o\u00f9 les dangers ne cessent de s’accumuler autour d’Isra\u00ebl, et m\u00eame sur ses fronti\u00e8res les plus proches et les plus strat\u00e9giques, que ce pays jugeait jusqu’alors compl\u00e8tement s\u00e9curis\u00e9es (la Syrie et l’Egypte, certes).<\/p>\n<\/p>\n <\/p>\n \tMis en ligne le 21 juin 2012 \u00e0 15H18<\/p><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":" Que reste-il de la prouesse militaire d’Isra\u00ebl ? Dans une analyse d\u00e9sol\u00e9e sur la politique g\u00e9n\u00e9rale d’Obama vis-\u00e0-vis du monde musulman, DEBKAFiles terminait en observant qu’il ne restait plus \u00e0 Isra\u00ebl que ses prouesses militaire. (Voir le 19 juin 2012.) \u00abIsrael, it must be said, finds itself in a strategic pits deeper than ever before… <\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"","ping_status":"","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"neve_meta_sidebar":"","neve_meta_container":"","neve_meta_enable_content_width":"","neve_meta_content_width":0,"neve_meta_title_alignment":"","neve_meta_author_avatar":"","neve_post_elements_order":"","neve_meta_disable_header":"","neve_meta_disable_footer":"","neve_meta_disable_title":"","_jetpack_memberships_contains_paid_content":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[2],"tags":[3936,14915,3525,3015,9636,2631,11461,4479,2651,9550,3955,14916,2773,2774,2622,2790,4242,4205,11414,3867,3014,4268],"class_list":["post-73212","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-bloc-notes","tag-al","tag-appareil","tag-attentat","tag-communication","tag-dagan","tag-de","tag-debka","tag-destabilisation","tag-du","tag-egypte","tag-gaza","tag-hypersophistication","tag-iran","tag-israel","tag-la","tag-netanyahou","tag-qaida","tag-securite","tag-sinai","tag-syrie","tag-systeme","tag-technologisme"],"jetpack_featured_media_url":"","jetpack_sharing_enabled":true,"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/73212","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=73212"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/73212\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=73212"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=73212"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=73212"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}