\tLes guillemets s’imposent parce qu’il ne s’agit pas d’une politique russe durcie mais d’une r\u00e9affirmation de plus en plus dure de leur politique inchang\u00e9e par les Russes, face au bloc BAO qui continue \u00e0 interpr\u00e9ter le comportement russe en voyant dans chaque phrase de chaque d\u00e9claration officielle une \u00e9volution vers la position de ce m\u00eame bloc BAO. C’est une situation diplomatique (les guillemets, toujours n\u00e9cessaires) qui n’a certainement aucun pr\u00e9c\u00e9dent dans la dur\u00e9e, dans l’ent\u00eatement d’une interpr\u00e9tation d’une politique, par ailleurs constamment r\u00e9p\u00e9t\u00e9e comme diff\u00e9rente de cette interpr\u00e9tation.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n
\tOn notera donc, dans ce sens, deux interventions du ministre russe des affaires \u00e9trang\u00e8res Lavrov, hier. L’on s’attardera sur celle faite pour Russia Today<\/em> sous forme d’une interview d\u00e9taill\u00e9e.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n \t Tass signale, ce 21 juin 2012<\/a>, une interview de Lavrov \u00e0 la radio lib\u00e9rale Echo de Moscou<\/em>. Lavrov y d\u00e9taille le mod\u00e8le libyen pour y d\u00e9noncer l’intervention de l’OTAN comme facteur pr\u00e9pond\u00e9rant. (It wasn’t the Libyan people who decided Gaddafi’s fate, it was NATO. Nothing would have happened there without NATO’s bombings. \t L’interview pour Russia Today<\/em> est donn\u00e9e sur le site de la cha\u00eene TV ce 21 juin 2012<\/a>, et elle m\u00e9rite d’\u00eatre reprise int\u00e9gralement dans ses passages les plus int\u00e9ressants. En effet, Lavrov d\u00e9taille le cas du cargo M V Alaed<\/em> (voir le 21 juin 2012<\/a>) et s’attache particuli\u00e8rement au comportement du bloc BAO, notamment du gouvernement britannique, non pas pour ce qui est de sa politique, mais pour ce qui est de sa lecture de la politique russe. Les termes employ\u00e9s sont fermes et m\u00eame rudes.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n \tRT<\/em><\/strong>: \u00abThe Western media this week has been frenzied about Russia sending warships and helicopters to Syria. How do you react to that?<\/em>\u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n \tLavrov<\/em><\/strong>: \u00abIt was part of a campaign and not a very decent campaign, I would say.<\/em>\u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n \t\u00bbWe are sending no battleships to Syria. We have been saying publicly that we have been implementing contracts under which we have to supply arms to Syria. Those armaments are entirely defensive and they mostly consist of air defense systems, which cannot be used against the population and can only be used to respond to outside aggression.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n \t\u00bbThe ship which is being discussed these days was indeed carrying air defense systems. It was carrying three helicopters which had been repaired in Russia under contracts signed in 2008. Those are Soviet helicopters. They have been in Syria from Soviet days. In 2008 there was a contract to repair them. They are still to be assembled after delivery. The entire process will take no less than three months. So to speak about something we have just sold to Syria and which is being used in action is not true at all.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n \t\u00bbBut this story has another twist with the British insurance company, which decided to withdraw insurance from this particular ship. This is a testimony that the insurance system of Great Britain is not reliable, because they were citing sanctions imposed on Syria unilaterally by the EU. This means that anyone any country or any company who is not violating any international rules, who is not violating any UN Security Council resolutions might be subject to extra-territorial application of somebody else’s unilateral sanctions. This is a very slippery slope. I do believe we have to discuss the issue of unilateral sanctions in a systematic manner: what they mean and what can be done to make those who faithfully implement international law, including UNSC resolutions, not be subject to application of somebody else’s rules.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n \t\u00bbBad examples are contagious. It was until recently the US which was resorting to unilateral sanctions to punish countries every now and then, including sanctions with extra-territorial application. Now unfortunately the EU is taking the cue, beginning to use sanctions in a unilateral manner more and more against Syria, but also against some other cases. This is a trend which is counter-productive. In principle dealing with any international issue you need to include partners with whom you have difficulties, not isolate them. Isolation never works.<\/em>\u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n \tRT<\/em><\/strong>: \u00abWe are hearing reports of a clemency for President Assad from the West if he steps down, some kind of immunity, how would Russia react to that?<\/em>\u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n \tLavrov<\/em><\/strong>: \u00abI would just repeat what I said: it’s for the Syrian people to decide who should rule them, how they should live. The main thing for the external players is to ensure that they all sit down at the negotiating table to discuss their future, where the minority and the majority will feel safe and included into the political system, otherwise the groups that now support president Assad, and there are quite a number who do so, would be in the opposition to the ruling majority and the war and violence would continue, but the positions of the participants would be shifted. This is something that might happen if people insist on one-sided approaches to the crisis and on imposing something on the Syrians.<\/em>\u00bb []<\/p>\n<\/p>\n \tRT<\/em><\/strong>: \u00abBritish Prime Minister David Cameron says that in Los Cabos at the G20 meeting President Vladimir Putin shifted his view on the situation in Syria. Is that true?<\/em>\u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n \tLavrov<\/em><\/strong>: \u00abIt is not true. The meetings with UK PM David Cameron and US President Barack Obama did discuss Syria. Both our partners said President Bashar Al-Assad must go and external players must develop a transition plan for the Syrians to agree. We expressed our position that we cannot accept a policy which would aim at changing regimes from the outside. This has been our position all along.<\/em> <\/p>\n<\/p>\n \t\u00bbWe also cannot prejudge for the Syrians what the outcome of the political dialogue would be. We strongly support a political dialogue and efforts to stop the violence. We suggest for this purpose that all external players should lean on the Syrian party on which they have influence and thus persuade them to withdraw from cities both the government and opposition to sit down and have a dialogue. But there should be no prejudging from outside what the substance and result of this dialogue might be. It’s for the Syrians to decide.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n \t\u00bbI have seen the statement made by PM Cameron that President Putin shifted his position after meetings in Los Cabos. It is not true at all. President Putin was asked in Los Cabos himself at his press conference about his position on Syria. He expressed it exactly the way he did with David Cameron and Barack Obama.<\/em>\u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n \tOn a ici un exemple frappant de la tension<\/strong> qui pr\u00e9vaut aujourd’hui dans le domaine de la communication. On lit en effet \u00e0 deux reprises que Lavrov, en des termes \u00e0 peine voil\u00e9s, juge et dit que Cameron et son gouvernement sont des menteurs. Lorsqu’il parle des rencontres entre les Russes et les Britanniques (en plus des USA) et qu’il \u00e9voque le compte-rendu qu’en fait Cameron selon lequel les Russes ont modifi\u00e9 leur position, Lavrov r\u00e9p\u00e8te : \u00abIt is not true<\/em> It is not true at all.<\/em>\u00bb Il y a une diff\u00e9rence entre Il se trompe (He is wrong<\/em>) et ce n’est pas vrai (\u00abIt is not true<\/em>\u00bb). Dans le second cas, qui est celui de l’interview, Lavrov affirme que Cameron n’a pas dit la v\u00e9rit\u00e9 alors que celle-ci est \u00e9vidente, donc Lavrov dit implicitement que Cameron a \u00e9cart\u00e9 la v\u00e9rit\u00e9 pour donner sa propre version qui en est le contraire. Cela s’\u00e9nonce en termes clairs de cette fa\u00e7on : Cameron est un menteur. C’est l\u00e0 qu’on peut mesurer la duret\u00e9, voire la rudesse des mots, qui indique une exasp\u00e9ration croissante des Russes, et un durcissement effectivement. (Cela illustre le jugement de Vassili Kachine, hier<\/a>, \u00e0 propos de l’affairte du M V Alaed<\/em> : \u00abIf previously Russia agreed that everything is negotiable, now it is unlikely that the Russian government would show weakness.<\/em>\u00bb)<\/p>\n<\/p>\n \tIl est tr\u00e8s probable que les d\u00e9clarations de Lavrov, qui sont pourtant si cat\u00e9goriques, ne feront pas la une de la presse du bloc BAO. Il est probable que Cameron ne s’affectera gu\u00e8re d’\u00eatre trait\u00e9 in fine<\/em> de menteur. On n’en est pas \u00e0 ces babioles. Pour le bloc BAO, une seule chose compte, qui est la poursuite, non de sa propagande, non de sa campagne de d\u00e9sinformation (contrairement au terme qu’emploie Lavrov), mais de sa narrative<\/em> totalement<\/strong> virtualiste, c’est-\u00e0-dire la bonne continuation d’un univers qui n’a aucune consid\u00e9ration particuli\u00e8re pour la r\u00e9alit\u00e9 et aucun rapport avec elle par cons\u00e9quent, et qui ignore sans aucun doute le sens, voire l’existence du mot v\u00e9rit\u00e9, qui ne s’int\u00e9resse qu’\u00e0 la poursuite d’une aventure o\u00f9 les Russes finiront n\u00e9cessairement<\/strong> par s’aligner sur le bloc BAO Car l’on doit remarquer ceci, qui est plus d’ordre religieux que politique, selon l’hypoth\u00e8se que le bloc BAO est plus une institution d’affirmation p\u00e9remptoire d’une sorte de foi<\/strong> qui renvoie effectivement au religieux, que sa position dans cette circonstance rel\u00e8ve effectivement plus d’une religion o\u00f9 l’id\u00e9e de r\u00e9demption est essentielle que d’une politique : on ne condamne pas tant les Russes, on ne les vilipende pas, on attend simplement qu’ils voient enfin la lumi\u00e8re et qu’ils se rallient \u00e0 la source de cette lumi\u00e8re, qui ne peut \u00eatre que le bloc BAO Ainsi soit-il (ou, disons, pour sacrifier aux contingences chronologiques : sera-t-il).<\/p>\n<\/p>\n <\/p>\n \tMis en ligne le 22 juin 2012 \u00e0 08H26<\/p><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":" Durcissement russe sur la Syrie Les guillemets s’imposent parce qu’il ne s’agit pas d’une politique russe durcie mais d’une r\u00e9affirmation de plus en plus dure de leur politique inchang\u00e9e par les Russes, face au bloc BAO qui continue \u00e0 interpr\u00e9ter le comportement russe en voyant dans chaque phrase de chaque d\u00e9claration officielle une \u00e9volution vers… <\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"","ping_status":"","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"neve_meta_sidebar":"","neve_meta_container":"","neve_meta_enable_content_width":"","neve_meta_content_width":0,"neve_meta_title_alignment":"","neve_meta_author_avatar":"","neve_post_elements_order":"","neve_meta_disable_header":"","neve_meta_disable_footer":"","neve_meta_disable_title":"","_jetpack_memberships_contains_paid_content":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[2],"tags":[14911,10900,6039,5315,3916,2830,2786,2702,4321,13387,2884,11448,3867,6925,9892],"class_list":["post-73213","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-bloc-notes","tag-alaed","tag-bao","tag-bloc","tag-cameron","tag-helicopteres","tag-lavrov","tag-m","tag-mensonge","tag-narrative","tag-position","tag-russe","tag-russia","tag-syrie","tag-today","tag-v"],"jetpack_featured_media_url":"","jetpack_sharing_enabled":true,"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/73213","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=73213"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/73213\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=73213"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=73213"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=73213"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}