{"id":73361,"date":"2012-09-04T08:23:14","date_gmt":"2012-09-04T08:23:14","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/2012\/09\/04\/soft-power-iran-arabie-et-brahimi-en-syrie\/"},"modified":"2012-09-04T08:23:14","modified_gmt":"2012-09-04T08:23:14","slug":"soft-power-iran-arabie-et-brahimi-en-syrie","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/2012\/09\/04\/soft-power-iran-arabie-et-brahimi-en-syrie\/","title":{"rendered":"Soft power<\/em>, Iran, Arabie et Brahimi en Syrie"},"content":{"rendered":"

Soft power<\/em>, Iran, Arabie et Brahimi en Syrie<\/h3>\n<\/p>\n

\tFlynt Leverett et Hillary Mann Leverett forment la particularit\u00e9 d’\u00eatre un couple d’experts d’excellent niveau et d’une lucidit\u00e9 inhabituelle aux USA, sur les questions du grand Moyen-Orient, ou ce que l’on a l’habitude de nommer l’arc de crise englobant les pays allant du Pakistan et de l’Afghanistan jusqu’\u00e0 la Somali, et aujourd’hui les cha\u00eenes<\/a> crisiques<\/a> en action dans cette r\u00e9gion. Depuis 2009, les Leverett publient un blog<\/em> sous le titre de The Race for Iran<\/em>, particuli\u00e8rement consacr\u00e9 \u00e0 la crise autour de ce pays, de la Syrie, etc., ce que nous avons commun\u00e9ment l’habitude de d\u00e9signer comme faisant fondamentalement partie de la crise haute<\/a>.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tNous nous attachons ici \u00e0 de r\u00e9centes interventions de Hillary Mann Leverett, notamment sur CNN (le 31 ao\u00fbt 2012<\/a>) et Aljazeera<\/em>, telles qu’elles sont pr\u00e9sent\u00e9es et mises en situation sur The Race for Iran<\/em> le 2 septembre 2012<\/a> (ce texte pr\u00e9sente \u00e9galement la vid\u00e9o de l’interview d’Aljazeera<\/em>). Il est \u00e9vident que ces interventions doivent \u00eatre appr\u00e9hend\u00e9es avec l’arri\u00e8re-plan du sommet du NAM de T\u00e9h\u00e9ran (dont il n’est pas question ici), qui a constitu\u00e9 un \u00e9v\u00e9nement important du point de vue du soft power<\/em> dont il sera abondamment question (On peut voir sur leur blog<\/em> les biographies de Flynn<\/a> Leverett et Hillary<\/a> Mann Leverett : il s’agit de carri\u00e8res tr\u00e8s fournies, dans le gouvernement US, dans le circuit universitaire et dans l’expertise ind\u00e9pendante, sur les questions signal\u00e9es ici.)<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tNous pr\u00e9sentons trois extraits de cette pr\u00e9sentation, l’un portant sur le concept, ou la conception op\u00e9rationnelle, ou la strat\u00e9gie dite de soft power<\/em>, ou les trois \u00e0 la fois, de l’Iran dans la r\u00e9gion ; le second portant sur la politique de l’Arabie Saoudite dans le m\u00eame domaine de la communication active, voire agressive, \u00e0 pr\u00e9tention de soft power<\/em> \u00e9galement, sur le terrain de la g\u00e9opolitique ; le troisi\u00e8me sur le successeur de Kofi Annan pour l’ONU, Lakhdar Brahimi, et sa mission en Syrie. Les trois parties de l’intervention sont \u00e0 consid\u00e9rer effectivement par rapport au concept de soft power<\/em>, notamment sur le fait de savoir qui l’applique et comment, ou qui ne l’applique pas certes, dans sa signification juste Le terme de soft power<\/em> vient d’une intervention fameuse du professeur de Harvard Joseph S. Nye<\/a>, inventeur de la formule, il y a une vingtaine d’ann\u00e9es, plus tard suivie d’un livre sur le sujet, recommandant l’emploi d’une nouvelle m\u00e9thode politique de conviction et d’influence par la communication, contrastant avec la m\u00e9thode dite de hard power<\/em> portant sur la pression et la coercition par l’action directe des moyens militaires et de pression \u00e9conomique (\u00abJoseph Nye famously defined soft power as the ability to get others to want what you want, which he contrasted with the ability to compel others via hard military and economic assets<\/em>\u00bb). Il s’agit d’un contraste, ou d’un antagonisme de moyens d’action, rejoignant notre classification entre le syst\u00e8me de la communication (par o\u00f9 passe le soft power<\/em>) d’une part, le syst\u00e8me du technologisme (par o\u00f9 passe le hard power<\/em>) d’autre part. <\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t Sur l’Iran et le soft power<\/em>, Hillary Mann Leverett d\u00e9veloppe une approche extr\u00eamement favorable \u00e0 la politique poursuivie par l’Iran. Il s’agit de soft power<\/em>, dans l’acceptation fondamentale du terme, notamment caract\u00e9ris\u00e9 par le peu d’int\u00e9r\u00eat pour la disposition de moyens de force (technologisme) pour exercer une influence. Politiquement, il s’agit d’une approche int\u00e9gratrice et recherchant l’apaisement des tensions, ce qui est une vision de l’Iran compl\u00e8tement antagoniste de celle que le bloc BAO propage. (Les passages soulign\u00e9s de gras dans les textes cit\u00e9s le sont dans le texte original.) <\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00abIn the interview, Hillary notes that<\/em> the rise of Tehran’s regional influence over the last decade has little to do with hard power<\/em><\/strong>. (As CNN’s Nicole Dow documents, the numbers would certainly seem to bear this out. Last year, Saudi Arabia reportedly purchased as much as six times as much military equipment from the United States as Iran’s entire official defense budget.) Rather, as Hillary points out,<\/em> Iran’s rise is fundamentally about soft power<\/em><\/strong>. We always think of Iran as a military dictatorship, but the Iranian message is clear: they want free and fair elections in countries like Egypt, Afghanistan, and Iraq.<\/em> The Iranian message and belief isif a country has free and fair elections, it will pursue independent policies that are in that country’s national interest. The Iranian belief is that if they pursue independent policies, they will inevitably be unenthusiastic about pursuing U.S. or Western policies.<\/em><\/strong><\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00bbHillary argues that Tehran can apply this approach even in Syria. Saeed Jalili, the secretary-general of the Islamic Republic’s Supreme National Security Council, has made clear that Iran will not allow the axis of resistance, of which it considers Syria to be an essential part, to be broken in any way. But, as Hillary points out,<\/em> The two big points of the Iranian push [on how to deal with the Syrian situation] were for there to be a ceasefire in Syria for three months at the end of Ramadan, and that there should be free and fair elections.<\/em><\/strong><\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00bbIranian policymakers are willing to roll the dice on elections in Syria because, first of all, they judge (correctly) that Syrian President Bashar al-Assad appears to retain the support of at least half of Syrian society. Thus, it is not at all clear that he would lose an election. But Hillary underscores that, even if Assad were to leave office as part of a democratic transition, a free and fairly elected successor to Assad would not be interested in strategic cooperation with the U.S. and would not be interested in aligning itself with Israel. That would be completely against the views and histories of the people.<\/em>\u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t L’approche de l’Arabie Saoudite est compl\u00e8tement antagoniste de celle de l’Iran, m\u00eame si l’on peut admettre qu’elle pourrait pr\u00e9tendre se r\u00e9f\u00e9rer au soft power<\/em> puisqu’il n’y a pas (sauf dans le cas extr\u00eame et peu d\u00e9monstratif du Bahrain) intervention directe et emploi direct des moyens du hard power<\/em> dans leur usage le plus effectif et le plus brutal qui caract\u00e9rise l’op\u00e9rationnalit\u00e9 du la m\u00e9thode. Elle est bas\u00e9e effectivement sur une vision antagoniste, notamment et principalement de l’Iran, mettant en \u00e9vidence les oppositions, recherchant l’exclusion selon des r\u00e9f\u00e9rences religieuses, sectaires, id\u00e9ologiques, etc. L’activit\u00e9 politique porte sur le financement et l’armement de groupes d\u00e9stabilisateurs dans le but de modifier les \u00e9quilibres, les pouvoirs, etc., et d’amener les uns et les autres aux vues de l’Arabie. Bien entendu, cette approche est compl\u00e8tement compl\u00e9mentaire, sinon similaire, \u00e0 celle des USA et du bloc BAO. Cette compl\u00e9mentarit\u00e9 et cette similitude sont d’ordre politique et op\u00e9rationnel, mais nous sugg\u00e9rerions \u00e9galement qu’elles sont d’ordre psychologique d’une part, qu’elles r\u00e9pondent aux impulsions fondamentales du Syst\u00e8me d’autre part.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00abOn the other side of the Middle East’s geopolitical and sectarian divide,<\/em> Saudi Arabia is pursuing a very different strategy, in Syria and elsewhere in the region. The Saudi strategy emphasizes the funding and training of fundamentalist Sunni groups ideologically aligned with Al-Qa’ida<\/em><\/strong> groups that, in contrast to mainstream Sunni Islamists who are not interested in killing other Muslims, take a strongly anti-Shi’a stance.<\/em> This is, of course, the strategy that Saudi Arabia followed when it joined with the United States to fund largely Pashtun cadres among the mujahideen fighting the Soviet occupation of Afghanistanand then fueled the rise of the Taliban during the 1990s, after the Soviet withdrawal.<\/em><\/strong><\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00bbIn Hillary’s assessment, The Saudis cannot call for a ceasefire or for free and fair elections because the Saudis haven’t had free and fair elections in their own country. It doesn’t sound genuine, so they can’t do it, and they don’t want to do it. No precedent has been set to have everyone else doing it except them. More fundamentally, though,<\/em> the Saudis aren’t interested in an outcome in Syria that leads to a government that carries out the interests of the people of Syria. What the Saudis are interested in is a head of state who will be on their side. And their side is against Iran and its influence in the region.<\/em><\/strong> This is a big albatross that Saudi Arabia has on its neck.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00bbHillary elaborates on the point: The Saudis want to convince others in the region that the Iranians don’t stand for Muslim causes, beliefs, independence or nationalism. The Saudis want others in the region to see the Iranians as Shiite, Persian, non-Arab, non-Sunni, and that what the Iranians are doing has nothing to do with democracy or freedom, but rather promoting a narrow sectarian visionthe Saudi message is that the Shiites are infiltrating Arab affairs to undermine the Sunni community and Sunni states. They see the Shiites as heretical, non-believing, non-Arab Persians. Some Sunnis believe thatand some Saudis try to play on that with a tremendous amount of money and weapons.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00bbBut polls and other objective indicators suggest that regional publics are not buying the Saudi message. As Hillary concludes, That’s where the conflict is today. It’s a battle today between this message that Iran has to promote of freedom, in the sense of real independence, and the Saudis that are really trying to fight that message.<\/em>\u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t Le troisi\u00e8me point est donc le r\u00f4le que pourrait ou voudrait jouer le successeur de Koffi Annan, l’Alg\u00e9rien Lakhdar Brahimi. L’int\u00e9r\u00eat du propos est que Hillary Mann Leverett a travaill\u00e9 avec Brahimi sur l’Afghanistan, ce qui lui permet de donner un t\u00e9moignage psychologique (surtout) et politique direct. Il est manifeste que, dans le d\u00e9bat autour de la question du soft power<\/em>, elle classe implicitement Brahimi dans la cat\u00e9gorie des partisans et des op\u00e9rateurs du vrai soft power<\/em>, tel qu’elle le d\u00e9finit \u00e0 propos de l’Iran, et tel qu’il est compl\u00e8tement d\u00e9voy\u00e9 dans le cas de l’Arabie Saoudite. Bien \u00e9videmment, il s’agit d’une approche th\u00e9orique, quoique bas\u00e9e sur l’exp\u00e9rience de l’homme pour Leverett, et il reste \u00e0 voir si Brahimi pourra et voudra d\u00e9velopper cette m\u00e9thode avec la Syrie. De ce point de vue, il n’y a gu\u00e8re de diff\u00e9rence avec Annan ; ce qui est similaire, \u00e9galement, et qui joua effectivement un r\u00f4le important dans le cas de Annan, c’est le contexte politique avec notamment la position faussaire des pays du bloc BAO, les pressions des uns et des autres \u00e0 cet \u00e9gard, les diverses suggestions et affirmations sur les connexions \u00e9voqu\u00e9es \u00e0 propos de Brahimi, qui est naturellement l’objet de toutes les interpr\u00e9tations et de tous les soup\u00e7ons possibles. Cette similitude g\u00e9n\u00e9rale doit \u00eatre pourtant tr\u00e8s fortement nuanc\u00e9e par le fait que la situation g\u00e9n\u00e9rale, en Syrie et autour de la Syrie, a tr\u00e8s rapidement et fortement chang\u00e9 entre le moment de la nomination et de la mission d’Annan, et l’\u00e9pisode qui commence avec Brahimi. (Voir aussi la tr\u00e8s r\u00e9cente interview de Brahimi sur Aljazeera<\/em>, le 2 septembre 2012<\/a>. On observe par exemple que si Brahimi estime que des changements importants sont n\u00e9cessaires en Syrie, il rejette le pr\u00e9alable du d\u00e9part d’Assad.)<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00abIn Hillary’s reading,<\/em> dealing with the contrast between the Iranian and Saudi approaches to Syria will be crucial to Lakhdar Brahimi’s chances of success in stabilizing the conflict there<\/em><\/strong>. n Al Jazeera, she highlights two critical points that Brahimi has made since taking over from former Secretary-General Kofi Annan as the U.N.\/Arab League Syria envoy.<\/em> <\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00bbFirst,<\/em> Brahimi has come out clearly against foreign military intervention<\/em><\/strong>. That is critically important because that could prevent the escalation of the civil war in Syria, and it could even start to dial back some of the armed support for opposition fighters. Second,<\/em> Hillary highlights Brahimi’s refusal to simply parrot the White House talking point that Assad has to go and that Assad has lost all legitimacy. That is really a ridiculous point that is not going to lead to a negotiated outcome,<\/em><\/strong> and he has stood up courageously and refused to parrot it.<\/em> <\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00bbRecalling her own experience working with Brahimi on post-9\/11 Afghanistan, <\/em> Hillary notes that his track record in the various civil wars and conflicts where he has been a mediatorLebanon, Afghanistan, Iraq, Haitiis to focus on power sharing. He focuses on getting together all of the critical players inside a country that need to be part of a solution. That’s power sharing. That’s not saying who goes and who leaves.<\/em><\/strong> That’s putting everybody into the same pot and having them work together. And then<\/em> it’s critically important for him to work with the outside players.<\/em> <\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00bbWhen challenged with an assertion that neither the Assad government nor the opposition is willing to talk, Hillary pushes back by observing<\/em> that, just as the Islamic Republic supports a political solution in Syria, President Assad has been willing to talk with opponents since virtually the beginning of unrest back in March 2011<\/em><\/strong>. (So just who is it that it really blocking movement toward a possible political solution?) Furthermore, she underscores that<\/em> it is largely the external Syrian opposition that has demanded Assad’s ouster up front; the internal opposition has not insisted on that.<\/em><\/strong> <\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00bbIn this context, she points out,<\/em> Brahimi’s track record suggests that he will focus on the players that are in SyriaHe doesn’t actually have much time or patience for expatriates who sit in cafes in London or Paris. He doesn’t really think they’re players. He focuses on people who are in country.<\/em><\/strong>\u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tCes diverses interventions, outre leur int\u00e9r\u00eat sp\u00e9cifique \u00e9vident, ouvrent une perspective int\u00e9ressante sur le soft power<\/em> (dans le cadre du syst\u00e8me de la communication) dont on fait si grand cas dans notre \u00e9poque. On observe que diverses situations existent et que diverses interpr\u00e9tations sont possibles, qui ont d’ailleurs toutes \u00e0 voir avec la situation du syst\u00e8me de la communication par rapport aux moyens et aux tendances de notre \u00e9poque de crise haute et de cha\u00eenes crisiques. Nous nous promettons de revenir rapidement sur le sujet pour \u00e9claircir ces diff\u00e9rences et enqu\u00eater sur leur signification, par rapport \u00e0 notre propre classification de la situation g\u00e9n\u00e9rale et des forces en action. Les remarques de Hillary Mann Leverett serviront d’excellente base pour le propos, \u00e0 la fois dans le champ op\u00e9rationnel, \u00e0 la fois dans le champ th\u00e9orique.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

\tMis en ligne le 4 septembre 2012 \u00e0 08H26<\/p><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

Soft power, Iran, Arabie et Brahimi en Syrie Flynt Leverett et Hillary Mann Leverett forment la particularit\u00e9 d’\u00eatre un couple d’experts d’excellent niveau et d’une lucidit\u00e9 inhabituelle aux USA, sur les questions du grand Moyen-Orient, ou ce que l’on a l’habitude de nommer l’arc de crise englobant les pays allant du Pakistan et de l’Afghanistan… <\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"","ping_status":"","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"neve_meta_sidebar":"","neve_meta_container":"","neve_meta_enable_content_width":"","neve_meta_content_width":0,"neve_meta_title_alignment":"","neve_meta_author_avatar":"","neve_post_elements_order":"","neve_meta_disable_header":"","neve_meta_disable_footer":"","neve_meta_disable_title":"","footnotes":""},"categories":[2],"tags":[3259,15065,3015,2631,2773,2622,6463,3614,3571,3615,3867,3014],"class_list":["post-73361","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-bloc-notes","tag-arabie","tag-brahimi","tag-communication","tag-de","tag-iran","tag-la","tag-leverett","tag-nye","tag-power","tag-soft","tag-syrie","tag-systeme"],"jetpack_featured_media_url":"","_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/73361","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=73361"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/73361\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=73361"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=73361"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=73361"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}