\tIl y a eu, la semaine derni\u00e8re, des d\u00e9clarations importantes de parlementaires US, habituellement faucons et guerriers sans mesure, pour un d\u00e9part rapide d’Afghanistan, des forces US. John McCain est l’une des deux personnalit\u00e9s cit\u00e9es. Les op\u00e9rations conjointes entre les forces alli\u00e9es et les forces afghanes sont stopp\u00e9es \u00e0 cause des incidents nombreux ayant co\u00fbt\u00e9 la vie \u00e0 des soldats alli\u00e9s. L’attaque de Camp Bastion<\/a> est \u00e9galement un \u00e9l\u00e9ment nouveau, concernant la tactique<\/a> et les capacit\u00e9s des talibans, qui p\u00e8se beaucoup sur les jugements. Le site Moon of Alabama<\/em> (MoA, sous la plume de son \u00e9diteur qui se d\u00e9signe sous l’initiale de b) estime, le 22 septembre 2012<\/a>, qu’il s’agit d’un d\u00e9veloppement d\u00e9cisif, effectivement, vers un retrait acc\u00e9l\u00e9r\u00e9 des USA.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n \t\u00abThe green on blue attacks in Afghanistan led to the collapse of the exit strategy in Afghanistan. Joint operations with Afghan forces on the most important lower level are halted. This and the recent audacious Taliban attack on the joined British U.S. Camp Bastion have changed the mind of even the most hawkish U.S. politicians. I think all options ought to be considered, including whether<\/em> we have to just withdraw early<\/em><\/strong>, rather than have a continued bloodletting that won’t succeed, [Sen. John McCain (R-Ariz.)] said Wednesday.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n \t\u00bbMc Cain was joined by on of the leading warmongers in the House: [Rep. C.W. Bill Young, R-Fla., who chairs the House Defense Appropriations Subcommittee, ] is the longest-serving Republican member of Congress, and he has continuously voted against troop drawbacks from Afghanistan, or even for setting a timetable for troop withdrawal. But after Sitton’s death, Young noted a change of heart. I think we should remove ourselves from Afghanistan<\/em> as quickly as we can<\/em><\/strong>, Young told the Tampa Bay Times this week. I just think we’re killing kids that don’t need to die.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n \t\u00bbWith even the hawks calling for an early withdrawal I expect the Obama administration to reveal its plan for an accelerated retreat from Afghanistan immediately after the November election. The implementation of such a plan will face some difficulties.<\/em>\u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n \tUne analyse similaire est faite par Tom Engelhardt, le 23 septembre 2012<\/a>, concernant effectivement une situation US en Afghanistan au bord de la d\u00e9sint\u00e9gration. Ce constat se place dans un texte d’Engelhardt sur les chances de r\u00e9\u00e9lection d’Obama, et sur l’\u00e9lection du 7 novembre, ces deux th\u00e8mes tendant \u00e0 \u00eatre int\u00e9gr\u00e9s par Engelhardt tant les chances de Romney lui paraissent r\u00e9duites \u00e0 n\u00e9ant En fait, c’est le th\u00e8me de son analyse, une des questions majeures, sinon la<\/strong> question majeure de cette \u00e9lection du 7 novembre est de savoir si la politique ext\u00e9rieure des USA (celle du bloc BAO par cons\u00e9quent) tiendra jusque l\u00e0<\/strong>, tant elle se trouve sur la voie de la d\u00e9sint\u00e9gration Le passage sur l’Afghanistan rejoint donc le constat fait par b dans MoA. <\/p>\n<\/p>\n \t\u00abWhen it comes to the disintegrating American position in Afghanistan, almost 11 years after victory was declared and the Bush administration decided to occupy the country rather than go home, the news is grim. The whole mission on which the withdrawal of U.S. combat troops is ostensibly based – to train the Afghans to stand up and fight for their country has essentially been put on hold. That’s hardly surprising, since Washington’s Afghan allies are now regularly standing up and, with the weapons and training U.S. mentors have given them, blowing those mentors away.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n \t\u00bbMeanwhile, the actual enemy, the Taliban, supposedly surged into near nonexistence in its southern homeland, has just launched the most devastating attack on a military base of the war, resulting in at least $200 million in allied loses. (It’s their first attack that might even faintly be compared to those the Vietnamese launched against American bases in the 1960s.) The question once again is: Can Washington hang on in Afghanistan until November 7th, even if it has to put every Afghan training mission and joint operation on hold and confine American troops to their bases? The great advantage the Obama administration holds in this regard is that the American public has generally been paying next to no attention to the Afghan War. This, nonetheless, is a situation in which an American mission has a possibility of imploding (and unexpected voices are finally being raised on the issue of early withdrawal). And we haven’t even mentioned Afghanistan’s unsettled and unsettling nuclear neighbor Pakistan.<\/em>\u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n \tL’un des points mis en \u00e9vidence dans ces deux analyses est le poids que font peser sur les op\u00e9rations le r\u00f4le et l’\u00e9volution des forces afghanes, et le recul d\u00e9cisif qui en d\u00e9coule de tout espoir d’aboutir \u00e0 une situation contr\u00f4lable permettant un retrait gradu\u00e9 selon les plans initiaux. Ces forces afghanes r\u00e9guli\u00e8res en sont d\u00e9sormais au point d’\u00eatre consid\u00e9r\u00e9e comme une unit\u00e9 g\u00e9n\u00e9rale hostile, une arm\u00e9e ennemie au coeur du dispositif, et le nombre d’incidents, voire d’attaques des forces afghanes contre des alli\u00e9, n’a cess\u00e9 \u00e9videmment d’augmenter ces derni\u00e8res semaines jusqu’\u00e0 instaurer une situation de blocage et de rupture. Cela a conduit effectivement \u00e0 une halte<\/a> des op\u00e9rations combin\u00e9es et \u00e0 un repli des forces alli\u00e9es sur elles-m\u00eames, dans les camps et les bases qu’on esp\u00e8re assez prot\u00e9g\u00e9s des incursions ennemies. Un des lecteurs du texte de b signale un texte du site Military.com<\/em>, faisant rapport (le 18 septembre 2012<\/a>) d’un s\u00e9minaire du Carnegie Endowment for Peace, le 16 septembre, o\u00f9 parlait notamment l’ancien (jusqu’en juillet 2012) ambassadeur US \u00e0 Kaboul, Ryan Crocker. Le th\u00e8me, \u00e9vident pour notre propos, \u00e9tait l’infiltration des forces afghanes par les talibans. L’estimation de cette infiltration est fix\u00e9e officiellement \u00e0 25%, ce qui est d\u00e9j\u00e0 un chiffre impressionnant ; Crocker la juge nettement minor\u00e9e, si bien qu’on peut estimer que quasiment la moiti\u00e9 des forces afghanes r\u00e9guli\u00e8res sont compos\u00e9es de talibans ou de sympathisants actifs des talibans en missions sp\u00e9cifiques. Il s’agit d’agents dormants qui attendent une occasion propice pour attaquer les forces alli\u00e9es. Ce facteur a \u00e9tabli \u00e9videmment une compl\u00e8te rupture de confiance, et par cons\u00e9quent de coop\u00e9ration, entre forces alli\u00e9es et forces r\u00e9guli\u00e8res afghanes. Les forces alli\u00e9es se retrouvent dans la singuli\u00e8re situation de se trouver assi\u00e9g\u00e9es en Afghanistan, dans le syst\u00e8me militaire qu’elles ont cr\u00e9\u00e9 elles-m\u00eames pour pouvoir se lib\u00e9rer en toute s\u00e9curit\u00e9 et \u00e0 leur avantage de leur engagement en Afghanistan.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n \t\u00abTaliban infiltration of the Afghan army and police is much worse than the U.S. military and NATO have admitted and was the main factor in the surprise move to limit contacts with Afghan security forces to curb insider attacks, former ranking U.S. officials in Afghanistan said. I would put the percentage rather higher than the 25% figure for enemy infiltrators and sympathizers that U.S. commanders have estimated, said Ryan Crocker, who stepped down as U.S. Ambassador to Afghanistan in July.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n \t\u00bbCrocker, who said he held secret meetings with the Taliban in fruitless efforts at a peace settlement, described Taliban leaders as tough, smart and resilient, and noted that they have embraced infiltration as a main tactic. I think we underestimate at our peril the number of Taliban sleepers in the ranks of the Afghan National Security Forces that the allies have been pressing to take the lead security role, Crocker said in remarks Monday to the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n \t\u00bbA former senior advisor to the U.S. military in Afghanistan lined up with Crocker’s assessment that Taliban insurgents were more widespread in the Afghan military and police than NATO would have it. So do I. There was an explicit announcement by the Taliban that they were planning to infiltrate, said Sarah Chayes, a senior associate at the Carnegie Endowment and a former advisor to the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. When insider attacks increased sharply some months after that announcement (by the Taliban earlier this year), there is no reason to dismiss the idea that they executed their strategy, Chayes said.<\/em>\u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n \tDans un autre article parall\u00e8le qui prend en compte les r\u00e9cents \u00e9v\u00e8nements, le New York Times<\/em> rapporte que les talibans ont l’habitude de dire, d’une fa\u00e7on r\u00e9v\u00e9latrice de leur perception subtile de l’antagonisme des cultures et des psychologies : Les Am\u00e9ricains ont les montres, nous avons le temps. Tout se passe comme si nous arrivions au bout du temps imparti par les talibans \u00e0 la coalition du bloc BAO pour mettre un terme \u00e0 cette improbable mission. La marque de ce temps soudain acc\u00e9l\u00e9r\u00e9 \u00e0 l’avantage des talibans est \u00e9videmment la compl\u00e8te absence de sens de cette guerre du c\u00f4t\u00e9 du bloc BAO, et la compl\u00e8te inculture de l’entreprise, tant des caract\u00e8res de cette entreprise que de la population concern\u00e9e elle-m\u00eame, et caract\u00e9risant notamment l’initiative paradoxale par aveuglement de la formation par ce bloc d’une force suppos\u00e9e amie et qui se d\u00e9couvre hostile \u00e0 lui-m\u00eame, c’est-\u00e0-dire aux envahisseurs du pays. Le bloc BAO a engendr\u00e9 ce qui est, de son point de vue, son propre monstre promis \u00e0 le d\u00e9vorer : une haute le\u00e7on de morale politique et d’appr\u00e9ciation des facteurs culturel et psychologique.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n \tDans son analyse, b envisage les conditions d’un retrait pr\u00e9cipit\u00e9 et conclut que ce sera facile pour les hommes, mais une toute autre paire de manches pour le colossal empilement de mat\u00e9riels que suppose une invasion am\u00e9ricaniste. Qui prot\u00e9gera alors les convois de v\u00e9hicules et de mat\u00e9riels divers \u00e9voluant dans le d\u00e9sordre d’une retraite pr\u00e9cipit\u00e9e, sinon d’une d\u00e9route ? Pas de r\u00e9ponse, certes, parce qu’il n’y en a pas, sinon celle d’images de convois en flammes et du r\u00e9\u00e9quipement des talibans en mat\u00e9riel de grand poids du bloc BAO. Se profile alors la possibilit\u00e9 d’une fin d’intervention ressemblant au d\u00e9sastre vietnamien de 1975, avec l’ambassade US \u00e9vacu\u00e9e dans la panique g\u00e9n\u00e9rale, par des h\u00e9licopt\u00e8res venus des porte-avions en position au large des c\u00f4tes vietnamienne. C’est d\u00e9sormais l’image qui hante Washington, alors que, selon Engelhardt qui se r\u00e9f\u00e8re \u00e9galement, bien entendu, aux \u00e9v\u00e9nements de la troisi\u00e8me vague du printemps arabe, le syst\u00e8me que repr\u00e9sente la politique ext\u00e9rieure militariste des USA et du bloc BAO, \u00abis, politely put, in transition, but possibly simply in a state of collapse<\/em>\u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n <\/p>\n \tMis en ligne le 24 septembre 2012 \u00e0 06H04<\/p><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":" Cr\u00e9puscule afghan Il y a eu, la semaine derni\u00e8re, des d\u00e9clarations importantes de parlementaires US, habituellement faucons et guerriers sans mesure, pour un d\u00e9part rapide d’Afghanistan, des forces US. John McCain est l’une des deux personnalit\u00e9s cit\u00e9es. Les op\u00e9rations conjointes entre les forces alli\u00e9es et les forces afghanes sont stopp\u00e9es \u00e0 cause des incidents nombreux… <\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"","ping_status":"","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"neve_meta_sidebar":"","neve_meta_container":"","neve_meta_enable_content_width":"","neve_meta_content_width":0,"neve_meta_title_alignment":"","neve_meta_author_avatar":"","neve_post_elements_order":"","neve_meta_disable_header":"","neve_meta_disable_footer":"","neve_meta_disable_title":"","_jetpack_memberships_contains_paid_content":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[2],"tags":[9598,3236,14980,10372,3109,4147,15107,1381,14795,9426,15106,5522,1010],"class_list":["post-73404","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-bloc-notes","tag-9598","tag-afghanistan","tag-agents","tag-alabama","tag-b","tag-deroute","tag-dormants","tag-engelhardt","tag-evacuation","tag-infiltration","tag-moa","tag-taliban","tag-vietnam"],"jetpack_featured_media_url":"","jetpack_sharing_enabled":true,"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/73404","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=73404"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/73404\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=73404"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=73404"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=73404"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}