{"id":73428,"date":"2012-10-04T18:28:59","date_gmt":"2012-10-04T18:28:59","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/2012\/10\/04\/la-defaite-exemplaire-de-saakachvili\/"},"modified":"2012-10-04T18:28:59","modified_gmt":"2012-10-04T18:28:59","slug":"la-defaite-exemplaire-de-saakachvili","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/2012\/10\/04\/la-defaite-exemplaire-de-saakachvili\/","title":{"rendered":"La d\u00e9faite exemplaire de Saakachvili"},"content":{"rendered":"<p><h2 class=\"titleset_b.deepblue\" style=\"color:#0f3955;font-size:1.65em;font-variant:small-caps;\">La d\u00e9faite exemplaire de Saakachvili<\/h2>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>Le 16 ao&ucirc;t 2008, Michael Binyon \u00e9crivait dans le Times : &laquo;<em>Modern wars normally follow a familiar pattern. When the fighting is over, diplomats negotiate a ceasefire, troops retire, peacekeepers are inserted and negotiations begin to prevent renewed hostilities. Georgia&rsquo;s war over a mountain enclave seems to ignore the trend. This conflict threatens to trigger a struggle that, if badly handled, could consume an entire continent.<\/em>&raquo; (Voir <em>dedefensa.org<\/em>, <em>F&#038;C<\/em> du <a class=\"gen\" href=\"http:\/\/www.dedefensa.org\/article-la_m_che_est-elle_allum_e_22_08_2008.html\">22 ao&ucirc;t 2008<\/a>.) La \u00ab\u00a0guerre de G\u00e9orgie\u00a0\u00bb \u00e9tait boucl\u00e9e depuis cinq jours, apr\u00e8s que la Russie, avec son arm\u00e9e antique et d\u00e9class\u00e9e, ait envahi sans coup f\u00e9rir, avec une rapidit\u00e9 logistique qu&rsquo;aucune arm\u00e9e du bloc BAO form\u00e9e aux normes de l&rsquo;OTAN n&rsquo;est capable d&rsquo;\u00e9galer, une bonne moiti\u00e9 du territoire g\u00e9orgien, \u00e0 partir du 7 ao&ucirc;t 2008. Pourtant, la tension subsistait, les Russes ne reculaient pas malgr\u00e9 l&rsquo;accord de cessez-le-feu qui leur demandait ce retrait. Au moins jusqu&rsquo;au 25-31 ao&ucirc;t 2008, le conflit g\u00e9orgien couva sous une cendre encore bien rouge, mena\u00e7ant de se rallumer en une v\u00e9ritable guerre europ\u00e9enne. Ni les USA, ni l&rsquo;OTAN n&rsquo;avaient boug\u00e9, parce qu&rsquo;ils n&rsquo;avaient rien \u00e0 faire bouger, les USA se contentant d&rsquo;agir dans leur mode provocateur et <a class=\"gen\" href=\"http:\/\/www.dedefensa.org\/article-l_infraresponsabilit_soumission_psychologique_inconsciente_29_08_2012.html\">infraresponsable<\/a> habituel, en imposant \u00e0 la Pologne la signature d&rsquo;un accord antimissiles BMDE dont les Polonais sont rudement <a class=\"gen\" href=\"http:\/\/www.dedefensa.org\/article-le_bloc_bao_fr_mit_sur_son_est_14_08_2012.html\">revenus<\/a> depuis.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>&hellip;A la base de tout ce remue-m\u00e9nage : le pr\u00e9sident g\u00e9orgien Misha Saakachvili, ami de toutes les officines <em>neocons<\/em> et autres relais du parti des salonards, et l&rsquo;un des favoris de la strat\u00e9gie dynamique des \u00ab\u00a0r\u00e9volutions de couleur\u00a0\u00bb (G\u00e9orgie, 2003). La guerre europ\u00e9enne issue de la guerre g\u00e9orgienne n&rsquo;a pas eu lieu, faute de combattants, \u00e9ventuellement, du c\u00f4t\u00e9 du bloc BAO o&ugrave; l&rsquo;on roule des m\u00e9caniques et o&ugrave; l&rsquo;on est bien lent lorsqu&rsquo;il s&rsquo;agit de tenir et d&rsquo;aligner des forces. On pr\u00e9f\u00e8re la com&rsquo;, les droits de l&rsquo;homme et l'\u00a0\u00bbagression douce\u00a0\u00bb. Ces derniers temps, on annon\u00e7ait que Saakachvili aurait bien voulu relancer une nouvelle tension avec la Russie, avec soutien US et tout le bataclan. En un sens, on le comprend, car s&rsquo;il avait une chance d&rsquo;\u00e9chapper au mauvais sort des urnes, c&rsquo;\u00e9tait celle-l\u00e0&hellip; Depuis lundi, donc, Misha Saakachvili est, sinon sur le d\u00e9part, au moins sur la d\u00e9fensive, pour un jour ou pour un autre&#8230; Justin Raimondo est moyennement optimiste, ce <a class=\"gen\" href=\"http:\/\/original.antiwar.com\/justin\/2012\/10\/02\/deflowering-the-rose-revolution\/\">3 octobre 2012<\/a>, sur <em>Antiwar.com<\/em>.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>&laquo;<em>&hellip;The final blow against Saakashvili was delivered by a video showing disgusting abuse of prisoners in a Georgian prison. An arrest warrant was issued for the prison guard who leaked the video: he has since sought political asylum abroad. In spite of official acclaim for the \u00ab\u00a0democratic reformer\u00a0\u00bb Saakashvili, the horrific conditions in Georgia&rsquo;s prisons was well-known to human rights groups: that didn&rsquo;t stop the US government from sending billions to their \u00ab\u00a0democratic\u00a0\u00bb sock puppet, however.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>&raquo;<em>During the campaign, the regime&rsquo;s refrain was that Ivanishvili and his supporters are \u00ab\u00a0traitors,\u00a0\u00bb \u00ab\u00a0Russian agents\u00a0\u00bb who want to deliver Georgia to Putin&rsquo;s tender mercies: this, indeed, has been his response to any and all internal critics who dared speak up. Georgian voters weren&rsquo;t buying it: yet it would be a mistake to think Saakashvili is going to fold up his tent and go quietly. He&rsquo;s still the President, and while governmental reforms mean the powers of his office are slated to be reduced, with the switch to a parliamentary system, the transition has yet to take place.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>&raquo;<em>Ivanishvili is calling on Saakashvili to resign, but that isn&rsquo;t going to happen. \u00ab\u00a0Misha\u00a0\u00bb will put every obstacle in the new government&rsquo;s way, and is doubtless at this moment planning his revenge. In the meantime, however, the oppressed people of Georgia mean to have their revenge &mdash; paving the way for a long, drawn out drama.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>&raquo;<em>Saakashvili will always have his American apologists, including this creep, who dismissed Ivanishvili&rsquo;s exposure of Georgia&rsquo;s authoritarian regime as \u00ab\u00a0stories of pro-government voter suppression and opposition rhetoric that seemed to reject the institutions of government itself.\u00a0\u00bb Yes, the screams of the tortured dissidents coming from Georgia&rsquo;s dungeons are just the yelps of miscreant anarchists and Ron Paul supporters, according to this oily little neocon. Expect to hear more from Saakashvili&rsquo;s well-compensated American fan club as the deflowering of the \u00ab\u00a0Rose Revolution\u00a0\u00bb continues apace.<\/em>&raquo;<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>Bien entendu, les Russes sont tr\u00e8s satisfaits du r\u00e9sultat des \u00e9lections ; Ils esp\u00e8rent un geste important de la G\u00e9orgie, pour d\u00e9tendre les relations, notamment concernant les Jeux Olympiques d&rsquo;hiver de Sotchi en 2014, proche du territoire g\u00e9orgien et que Saakachvili voudrait voir boycott\u00e9s. Les Russes attendent donc le nouveau Premier ministre, le chef de \u00ab\u00a0R\u00eave G\u00e9orgien\u00a0\u00bb qui a emport\u00e9 les \u00e9lections (<em>Russia Today<\/em>, le <a class=\"gen\" href=\"http:\/\/rt.com\/politics\/russia-re-building-ties-georgia-577\/\">3 octobre 2012<\/a>) : &laquo;<em>Georgian Dream&rsquo;s leader, Bidzina Ivanishvili is a billionaire businessman with most of his assets located in Russia. In his elections program he had repeatedly stated that the normalization of relations with Russia is a key priority in his planned political course. Currently a French citizen, Ivanishvili is seeking to restore his Georgian passport in order to assume the post of prime minister.<\/em>&raquo;<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>Le <a class=\"gen\" href=\"http:\/\/blogs.rediff.com\/mkbhadrakumar\/2012\/10\/02\/dreamers-capture-power-in-georgia\/\">2 octobre 2012<\/a>, sur son site <em>Indian PunchLine<\/em>, M K Bhadrakumar se montre beaucoup plus offensif dans son appr\u00e9ciation. Il conna&icirc;t bien la r\u00e9gion et les diff\u00e9rents acteurs et il pense que l&rsquo;affaire est un ma&icirc;tre coup en faveur des Russes. &laquo;<em>The citadel of the West in the post-Soviet space is falling &mdash; Georgia. A sad epilogue is being written to the epic story of the \u00ab\u00a0color revolution\u00a0\u00bb.<\/em> [&hellip;] <em>Of far greater significance, though, is that the Dreamers are led by the billionaire tycoon Bidzina Ivanishvilli. The point is not about his vast wealth, but as to where and how he made it? Simply put, he made it all in Russia in those halcyon days of the early 1990s when Boris Yeltsin put Russia&rsquo;s vast riches on sale and introduced the Russians to the infinite possibilities of crony capitalism. Suffice to say, the oligarchs made hay when the sun shined &mdash; and BI was one of them. President Vladimir Putin is reputed to get along splendidly well with BI. Moscow seems enthralled as the TV images come in from Tbilisi.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>&raquo;<em>Washington will feel uneasy that Moscow might begin to pull strings in Tbilisi all over again. Georgia is a vital chip in the mean geopolitical games being played out in the post-Soviet space between Washington and Moscow. There is added poignancy insofar as the chill is rapidly descending on the US-Russia ties, as Moscow&rsquo;s decision to boot out the USAID testifies. The US-Russia rivalry is erupting all over the Eurasian heartland and its outlying peripheries. Putin is pushing his Eurasia Union project and, equally, the US is keenly ensuring that it is going to be a long haul for the Kremlin&hellip;<\/em>&raquo;<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>Le destin de <em>Misha<\/em> Saakahvili est, jusqu&rsquo;ici, une belle parabole des m\u00e9thodes employ\u00e9es par le Syst\u00e8me, o&ugrave; la communication massive est utilis\u00e9e pour tenter de suppl\u00e9er \u00e0 l&rsquo;absence de substance principielle. On sait bien comment Saakachvili est parvenu au pouvoir, par le concours ineffable de la \u00ab\u00a0r\u00e9volution des roses\u00a0\u00bb, pur produit de la coop\u00e9ration du monde de la relations publique et de l&rsquo;aide officielle (USAID) am\u00e9ricaniste dont le projet politique est \u00e9vident. Il a fait l&rsquo;usage qui \u00e9tait attendu de lui, avec le paroxysme d&rsquo;ao&ucirc;t 2008 qui devait conclure victorieusement l&rsquo;entreprise, d&rsquo;une fa\u00e7on ou l&rsquo;autre. Le triomphe n&rsquo;\u00e9tait pas au rendez-vous.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>Le point int\u00e9ressant dans ce sch\u00e9ma est celui du <strong>reflux<\/strong>, qui illustre par ailleurs l&rsquo;absence de l\u00e9gitimit\u00e9 du personnage usag\u00e9. Le Syst\u00e8me, ayant utilis\u00e9 Saakachvili s&rsquo;est trouv\u00e9 sans alternative apr\u00e8s l&rsquo;\u00e9chec de 2008, parce qu&rsquo;il ne pr\u00e9voit simplement pas d&rsquo;alternative, parce que <a class=\"gen\" href=\"http:\/\/www.dedefensa.org\/article-_how_could_this_happen__17_09_2012.html\">les principes<\/a> d&rsquo;inculpabilit\u00e9 et d&rsquo;ind\u00e9fectibilit\u00e9, qui s&rsquo;expriment sous ce nom comme des comportements psychologiques fondamentaux, guident effectivement la strat\u00e9gie du Syst\u00e8me. (\u00ab\u00a0&lsquo;Ind\u00e9fectibilit\u00e9\u00a0\u00bb signifie l&rsquo;incapacit\u00e9 de concevoir le fait d&rsquo;\u00eatre battu, comme \u00ab\u00a0inculpabilit\u00e9\u00a0\u00bb signifie l&rsquo;incapacit\u00e9 de se concevoir comme coupable.) Saakachvili a donc subsist\u00e9 en place, bien que sa d\u00e9faite aurait d&ucirc; \u00eatre, dans l&rsquo;am\u00e9nagement strat\u00e9gique des \u00ab\u00a0r\u00e9volutions de couleur\u00a0\u00bb, un motif d&rsquo;\u00e9limination sans h\u00e9sitation, avec la recherche d&rsquo;autres voies politique, \u00e9ventuellement d&rsquo;autres dirigeants pouvant suivre ces voies. A partir du moment de la d\u00e9faite, Saakachvili ne pouvait qu&rsquo;entra&icirc;ner le syst\u00e8me de la \u00ab\u00a0r\u00e9volution de couleur\u00a0\u00bb dans son d\u00e9clin et sa chute. Aujourd&rsquo;hui, il se trouve pris au pi\u00e8ge des r\u00e8gles instaur\u00e9es par cette \u00ab\u00a0r\u00e9volution de couleur\u00a0\u00bb, soit les r\u00e8gles d\u00e9mocratiques qui ne b\u00e9n\u00e9ficient plus \u00e0 la dynamique activ\u00e9e par le Syst\u00e8me. L&rsquo;incapacit\u00e9 de Syst\u00e8me, soit de tenter d&rsquo;amener l&rsquo;opposition aux conceptions qu&rsquo;il favorise, soit d'\u00a0\u00bbinventer\u00a0\u00bb une opposition qui soit une alternative \u00ab\u00a0d\u00e9mocratique\u00a0\u00bb, marque effectivement les limites de la strat\u00e9gie mise en place.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><\/p>\n<p>`<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>Mis en ligne le 4 octobre 2012 \u00e0<\/p><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>La d\u00e9faite exemplaire de Saakachvili Le 16 ao&ucirc;t 2008, Michael Binyon \u00e9crivait dans le Times : &laquo;Modern wars normally follow a familiar pattern. When the fighting is over, diplomats negotiate a ceasefire, troops retire, peacekeepers are inserted and negotiations begin to prevent renewed hostilities. Georgia&rsquo;s war over a mountain enclave seems to ignore the trend.&hellip;&nbsp;<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"","ping_status":"","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"neve_meta_sidebar":"","neve_meta_container":"","neve_meta_enable_content_width":"","neve_meta_content_width":0,"neve_meta_title_alignment":"","neve_meta_author_avatar":"","neve_post_elements_order":"","neve_meta_disable_header":"","neve_meta_disable_footer":"","neve_meta_disable_title":"","_jetpack_memberships_contains_paid_content":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[2],"tags":[4906,11897,2604,11898,3613,15130,5519,15131,2879,15132,15133,7430],"class_list":["post-73428","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-bloc-notes","tag-4906","tag-agression","tag-des","tag-douce","tag-dream","tag-georgian","tag-georgie","tag-ivanishvilli","tag-revolution","tag-roses","tag-saakachvikli","tag-usaid"],"jetpack_featured_media_url":"","jetpack_sharing_enabled":true,"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/73428","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=73428"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/73428\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=73428"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=73428"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=73428"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}