{"id":73432,"date":"2012-10-06T12:00:23","date_gmt":"2012-10-06T12:00:23","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/2012\/10\/06\/des-nouvelles-de-prince-bandar\/"},"modified":"2012-10-06T12:00:23","modified_gmt":"2012-10-06T12:00:23","slug":"des-nouvelles-de-prince-bandar","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/2012\/10\/06\/des-nouvelles-de-prince-bandar\/","title":{"rendered":"Des nouvelles de Prince Bandar\u2026"},"content":{"rendered":"<p><h3 class=\"titrebloc\">Des nouvelles de Prince Bandar<\/h3>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\tOn se rappelle (voir le <a href=\"http:\/\/www.dedefensa.org\/article-prince_bandar_et_un_silence_de_mort_01_08_2012.html\" class=\"gen\">1er ao\u00fbt 2012<\/a>) que Prince Bandar avait \u00e9t\u00e9 donn\u00e9 pour mort \u00e0 la suite de ce qu&rsquo;on d\u00e9crivait comme un attentat syrien contre le si\u00e8ge des services de renseignement saoudien. Bandar, personnage important et particuli\u00e8rement belliciste, tr\u00e8s li\u00e9 aux Anglo-Saxons (il est notamment l&rsquo;homme des contrats <em>Yamamah<\/em> avec BAE, et de <a href=\"http:\/\/www.dedefensa.org\/article-o_yamamah_o_bae_o_britannia_15_02_2008.html\" class=\"gen\">la corruption<\/a> qui va avec), venait d&rsquo;\u00eatre nomm\u00e9 \u00e0 la t\u00eate de ces services.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\tDes nouvelles de Prince Bandar viennent, le 5 octobre, de l&rsquo;<a href=\"http:\/\/www.gulfinstitute.org\/\" class=\"gen\">IGF<\/a> de Washington D.C., l&rsquo;Institute for Gulf Affairs, <a href=\"http:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/Institute_for_Gulf_Affairs\" class=\"gen\">pr\u00e9sent\u00e9<\/a> comme un organisme d&rsquo;opposition au r\u00e9gime saoudien. Elles sont tr\u00e8s succinctes et demandent \u00e0 \u00eatre confirm\u00e9es et explicit\u00e9es, mais pr\u00e9sentent en attendant Bandar comme mentalement d\u00e9rang\u00e9 et ne jouant plus aucun r\u00f4le dans le renseignement saoudien. Le d\u00e9tail est inscrit dans une courte nouvelle rendant compte d&rsquo;une reprise en mains des services de renseignement saoudiens par le roi Abdallah.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\t\u00ab<em>Saudi king Abdullah fires his nephew, second man in charge of intelligence, and replaces him with a commoner. AbdulAziz Ben Bandar was fired today and replaced by Yousf AlAdrissi, a longtime intelligence officer.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\t\u00bb<em>The move was apparently initiated by the king&rsquo;s trusted advisor and right-hand man Khaled Attwaijeri, AKA King Khaled who has been blamed for removing powerful princes from his path using his position with the King. This also means that the intelligence are now firmly at the hands of the king, or his trusted advisor Khaled. Bandar, the president of the intelligence is mentally unwell and plays no role whatsoever.<\/em>\u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><\/p>\n<p><p>\tMis en ligne le 6 octobre 2012 \u00e0 11H52<\/p><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>Des nouvelles de Prince Bandar On se rappelle (voir le 1er ao\u00fbt 2012) que Prince Bandar avait \u00e9t\u00e9 donn\u00e9 pour mort \u00e0 la suite de ce qu&rsquo;on d\u00e9crivait comme un attentat syrien contre le si\u00e8ge des services de renseignement saoudien. Bandar, personnage important et particuli\u00e8rement belliciste, tr\u00e8s li\u00e9 aux Anglo-Saxons (il est notamment l&rsquo;homme des&hellip;&nbsp;<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"","ping_status":"","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"neve_meta_sidebar":"","neve_meta_container":"","neve_meta_enable_content_width":"","neve_meta_content_width":0,"neve_meta_title_alignment":"","neve_meta_author_avatar":"","neve_post_elements_order":"","neve_meta_disable_header":"","neve_meta_disable_footer":"","neve_meta_disable_title":"","_jetpack_memberships_contains_paid_content":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[2],"tags":[3324,4721,5667,6275,6052,3923,2807,10137,4364],"class_list":["post-73432","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-bloc-notes","tag-abdallah","tag-affairs","tag-bandar","tag-for","tag-gulf","tag-institute","tag-renseignement","tag-roi","tag-yamamah"],"jetpack_featured_media_url":"","jetpack_sharing_enabled":true,"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/73432","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=73432"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/73432\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=73432"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=73432"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=73432"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}