Que fait la Turquie d’Erdogan ? Qui le sait ? Lui-m\u00eame, Erdogan, en sait-il quelque chose ? M\u00eame l’OTAN commence \u00e0 s’interroger… Le 13 octobre 2012<\/a>, le fameux \u00ab\u00a0b\u00a0\u00bb comme il se d\u00e9signe lui-m\u00eame, \u00e9diteur et commentateur du site The Moon of Alabama<\/em>, signalait un tweet<\/em> de ce m\u00eame 13 octobre 2012<\/a> de Jon Wiliams, chef du service \u00e9tranger de la BBC : \u00ab\u00a0Des alli\u00e9s de l’OTAN de plus en plus soup\u00e7onneux vis-\u00e0-vis de la Turquie. Craignent que la Turquie ne cherche \u00e0 provoquer la Syrie. Un officiel dit que Damas est ‘tr\u00e8s raisonnable’ dans ces circonstances !\u00a0\u00bb («Some NATO allies growing suspicious of Turkey. Fear Istanbul provoking Syria. One official says Damascus \u00ab\u00a0v restrained\u00a0\u00bb in circumstances!<\/em>»)…<\/p>\n<\/p>\n Le commentateur \u00ab\u00a0b\u00a0\u00bb, de Moon of Alabama<\/em>, craint un sc\u00e9nario catastrophique du fait d’un War Party<\/em> qui s’affirmerait en Turquie, autour d’un Erdogan de plus en plus \u00ab\u00a0incontr\u00f4lable\u00a0\u00bb. Il s’agirait alors d’une \u00ab\u00a0surprise d’octobre\u00a0\u00bb intervenant dans la campagne \u00e9lectorale US et coin\u00e7ant BHO dans un coin, le for\u00e7ant \u00e0 ordonner une intervention US derri\u00e8re la Turquie, alors que Obama repousse de toutes ses forces cette perspectives. Du coup, poursuit le sc\u00e9nario-catastrophe, la s\u00e9quence October Surprise<\/em> se transmue en s\u00e9quence Guns of August<\/em> (de août 1914)… «As the military Middle East expert Pat Lang remarked: \u00ab\u00a0A ‘Guns of August’ scenario is quite possible in which Syria, Hizbullah, Russia and Iran line up against NATO, Israel and the US. The catastrophic implications of such an evolution are obvious.\u00a0\u00bb<\/em>»<\/p>\n<\/p>\n Le War Party<\/em> en Turquie, – on prenait le War Party<\/em> pour une sp\u00e9cificit\u00e9 am\u00e9ricaniste mais il semble que ce ne soit pas le cas, – est examin\u00e9 par Abdullah Bozkurt, dans un article publi\u00e9 par le quotidien proche du gouvernement turc, sur le site Today’sZamman.com<\/em> de ce journal, le 12 octobre 2012<\/a>. Malgr\u00e9 cette proximit\u00e9 du gouvernement Erdogan de l’auteur, l’article examine avec une certaine perplexit\u00e9 les bruits de guerre dont r\u00e9sonne la Turquie.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n «It should be obvious by now that there is a pro-war lobby in the Turkish capital, one that is itching for a major confrontation with Syria and one that also has considerable influence over the government decision making process. This lobby is determined to drag Turkey into an adventurous conflict with Syria, one that is certain to escalate into region-wide hostilities with traditional backers of the Bashar al-Assad regime facing off with Turkey in the proxy of the Syrian swamp.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n »When Turkish jets forced a Damascus-bound passenger plane suspected of carrying non-civilian cargo to land in Ankara, only hours after Turkish chief military commander Necdet Özel vowed to give a \u00ab\u00a0harsher response\u00a0\u00bb to Syria if shelling from the neighboring country continues to spill over the border, it became clearer that Turkey has come even closer to engaging in an open conflict with Syria. For that, it will not even hesitate to poke the eye of Russia, our major trading partner and new-found friend.<\/em>»<\/p>\n<\/p>\n Ces \u00ab\u00a0bruits de guerre\u00a0\u00bb ont une r\u00e9sonnance vraiment particuli\u00e8re. Ils s’accordent de plus en plus avec un homme, dont le destin est particuli\u00e8rement surprenant, qui est celui du Premier ministre Erdogan. Notre appr\u00e9ciation est qu’il doit \u00eatre toujours, et m\u00eame qu’il doit \u00eatre de plus en plus question, du caract\u00e8re, de la psychologie d’Erdogan, beaucoup plus que de manœuvres diverses, de plans strat\u00e9giques, d’id\u00e9ologies de conqu\u00eate, etc. Il nous semble caract\u00e9ristique qu’un auteur et historien comme Webster Griffin Tarpley, que nous connaissons comme un explorateur des arcanes des manœuvres secr\u00e8tes et des structures clandestines, s’attache particuli\u00e8rement, dans une interview \u00e0 TVPress.com<\/em>, le 13 octobre 2012<\/a>, \u00e0 ces aspects psychologiques d’Erdogan conduisant aux \u00e0-coups de la politique turc, beaucoup plus qu’\u00e0 des hypoth\u00e8ses de montages ou de manoeuvres. A la diff\u00e9rence des deux analyses pr\u00e9c\u00e9dentes, Tarpley semble montrer moins d’inqui\u00e9tude pour la possibilit\u00e9 d’un conflit d\u00e9clench\u00e9 par Erdogan… En r\u00e9ponse \u00e0 la premi\u00e8re question de cette interview («First of all, I’d like to have your first impression on Turkey’s move with this civilian aircraft…<\/em>»), Tarpley observe :<\/p>\n<\/p>\n «I guess Prime Minister Erdogan of Turkey will not be happy if I have to quote a Greek tragedy, but the old saying is ‘whom the gods will destroy, they first drive mad’. Erdogan has climbed out very far on the limb. He was told by the United States, he was told repeatedly by Obama in their private telephone conversations that the Syrian government would collapse like a house of cards and he could then emerge as the hero of that regime change. It would be like Libya. It would be like Tunisia, Egypt and Libya, and, of course, that has not come true.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n »Instead of having the good sense to cut his losses and pull back, Erdogan is doubling down. He’s doing double-or-nothing; ‘vabonk’, as we say. He’s now gotten himself into this really terrible fix which, of course, could be potentially tragic for the world. The idea that you’re going to interfere with a Russian cargo on a Syrian commercial airliner is really outside of the normal realm, and it makes Erdogan look like an unstable, erratic, mercurial kind of leader and not at all what he wanted to be.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n »Now, of course, he’s got a diplomatic row with Russia. The Russian foreign minister has called in the Turkish ambassador. They’ve demanded explanations. That’s a pretty tense scene going on there. It seems to me now, the great hope, there might be time for rational forces inside Turkey of which there are a lot… A majority, right?, 82 percent, according to one poll, don’t want this to go any further. They could restrain Erdogan, tell him to cool it, just drop it, chalk that up to experience. It’s a failure, but better a failure for Erdogan than a tragedy for Turkey…<\/em>»<\/p>\n<\/p>\n Un autre auteur grand connaisseur des arcanes de l’histoire secr\u00e8te, essentiellement europ\u00e9enne dans son cas, nous donne des pr\u00e9cisions int\u00e9ressantes sur le \u00ab\u00a0couple\u00a0\u00bb de direction de la Turquie qui semble \u00eatre devenu antagoniste, Erdogan-Gul (Premier ministre-Pr\u00e9sident). Cet auteur est Richard Cottrell, ancien parlementaire europ\u00e9en (conservateur britannique), sp\u00e9cialiste de la \u00ab\u00a0guerre secr\u00e8te\u00a0\u00bb de l’OTAN (les r\u00e9seaux Gladio<\/em>) et, dans ce cadre, tr\u00e8s bon connaisseur de l’histoire secr\u00e8te de la Turquie. Cottrell publie un tr\u00e8s long texte sur le site End of the Lie<\/em>, le 10 octobre 2012<\/a>. Nous en extrayons ce passage concernant Erdogan-Gul, qui montre que, m\u00eame \u00e0 l’int\u00e9rieur du parti au pouvoir existent des possibilit\u00e9s s\u00e9rieuses d’affrontement, et que la crise syrienne y joue un r\u00f4le tr\u00e8s important.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n «The partnership of Abdullah Gul (president) and Erdogan, the twin drivers of the AK locomotive, has transformed Turkey from a languid backwater, perpetual ward of the IMF, to a humming economy, 17th in the world GDP league. Istanbul looks like Manhattan with minarets.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n »The economic miracle was just one side of what became a rolling revolution. The other was the resurrection of the old Ottoman spirit as the gleaming New Ottoman Turkey. Turkey was not just a honeypot for hungry western investors drawn by her huge population of seventy-five million, many of them baby boomers with a soaring appetite for consumer wares; she was bent on becoming the dominant military and political wheeler and dealer throughout the Middle East. That’s exactly where we are today. In the circumstances it is unthinkable that Turkey could allow the resolution of the Syrian affair with herself being the principal player.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n »The relations of the ‘royal families’ of these two countries, al-Assad and his wife Asma, President Gul and his Islam-cool First Lady Hayrunnisa, had long been recognized as immensely intimate on the personal scale, forever flitting between their respective capitals. More like kissing cousins than friends. All that bonhomie dissipated practically overnight when the trouble started with Syria.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n »The devil always lurks in the details. So did Erdogan, who is widely suspected of ordering the president to put an end to these affectionate fraternal displays. Certainly no sudden spat between happy families could possibly account for the breach. Behind the scenes, Erdogan was readying for a war which he had decided – and of which Gul was much less convinced – was inevitable, and moreover, desirable, if Turkey was to fulfill her New Ottoman destiny.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n »For years the pair played the good guy\/tough guy act with great aplomb. All this came to a sudden halt when Gul bridled at the enforced rupture with the Assads. Erdogan responded by threatening to run for president himself, and started to appear at mass rallies reminiscent of Hitler on his finest form. I suspect that Gul is the leader of the peace party so far as Syria is concerned, but does not have sufficient backing either in the rank and file of the party or the cabinet to stop the drift to war…<\/em>»<\/p>\n<\/p>\n …Il y a \u00e0 peine plus d’un an (voir le 14 septembre 2011<\/a>), on pouvait encore appr\u00e9cier Erdogan comme le cr\u00e9ateur potentiel d’une grande politique qui pouvait embrasser le Moyen-Orient et s’affirmer comme une sorte de proposition d’institutionnalisation du \u00ab\u00a0printemps arabe\u00a0\u00bb, avec une forte dominante anti-BAO, sinon antiSyst\u00e8me, voire m\u00eame une dimension gaullienne<\/a>. A cette \u00e9poque, la crise syrienne ne s’\u00e9tait pas affirm\u00e9e et les relations entre la Turquie et la Syrie, la premi\u00e8re conseillant \u00e0 la seconde de faire des r\u00e9formes pour d\u00e9samorcer la crise, restaient encore acceptables. Aujourd’hui, la situation a compl\u00e8tement bascul\u00e9, litt\u00e9ralement cul par-dessus t\u00eate. Erdogan apparaît comme une sorte de dirigeant super-neocon<\/em>, encore plus extr\u00e9miste que les USA et Isra\u00ebl, et que l’OTAN sans aucun doute, – au point qu’il commence \u00e0 poser un s\u00e9rieux probl\u00e8me \u00e0 ses alli\u00e9s am\u00e9ricanistes-occidentalistes tandis que sa popularit\u00e9 dans le monde musulman et le monde arabe s’est totalement \u00e9vapor\u00e9e. Dans ses actes, il bafoue les principes et toutes les forces structurantes, alors qu’il en \u00e9tait n\u00e9cessairement le d\u00e9fenseur sans concession de 2003 \u00e0 2011.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n Il nous semble assur\u00e9<\/strong> que le facteur personnel, chez ce personnage au caract\u00e8re tr\u00e8s fort et aux tendances autoritaires, a jou\u00e9 un grand r\u00f4le dans l’\u00e9volution d’Erdogan \u00e0 l’encontre de la Syrie d’Assad (voir le 29 f\u00e9vrier 2012<\/a>). Il nous semble aussi qu’Erdogan est victime, comme d’autres dirigeants de diff\u00e9rentes fa\u00e7ons, \u00e0 la fois de la rapidit\u00e9 des \u00e9v\u00e8nements correspondant \u00e0 l’acc\u00e9l\u00e9ration de l’Histoire, \u00e0 la fois de ses propres narrative<\/em>, ou des narrative<\/em> de son camp, \u00e0 la fois et d’une fa\u00e7on plus g\u00e9n\u00e9rale du caract\u00e8re de plus en plus insaisissable des \u00e9v\u00e8nements et de leurs significations, de leur force et de leur influence irr\u00e9sistible, cela correspondant au caract\u00e8re \u00ab\u00a0maistrien\u00a0\u00bb des temps, ou \u00ab\u00a0n\u00e9o-maistrien\u00a0\u00bb si l’on fait allusion aux affirmations<\/a> de George Friedman. C’est le moment de reprendre la m\u00eame citation d\u00e9j\u00e0 faite dans ce Bloc-Notes<\/em> sur Friedman, de Guy Bechor, sur Erdogan : « …There is nothing new about that. The Middle East doesn’t like it when someone has designs to seize control over it. Many have tried and failed: Gamal Nasser tried, Saddam Hussein tried, Ariel Sharon tried and Hassan Nasrallah tried. They all fell flat and paid dearly. Recep Tayyip Erdogan also tried, and instead of Turkey entering Syria, Syria ended up entering Turkey.<\/em>»<\/p>\n<\/p>\n Erdogan s’est sans doute laiss\u00e9 aveugler par son temp\u00e9rament, c’est-\u00e0-dire par les traits les plus excessifs de son caract\u00e8re, – sa sûret\u00e9 de soi, sa confiance dans sa force et dans sa popularit\u00e9, \u00e9ventuellement son arrogance, etc. Pire encore, comme le remarque Cottrell : effectivement prisonnier d’une psychologie soudain r\u00e9v\u00e9l\u00e9e comme affaiblie, Erdogan n’a pas su reculer ne serait-ce que tactiquement lorsqu’il s’est aper\u00e7u, ou lorsqu’il aurait pu et du s’apercevoir, qu’il faisait fausse route. Aujourd’hui, il se retrouve seul par rapport \u00e0 des \u00ab\u00a0alli\u00e9s\u00a0\u00bb prompts aux invectives mais de plus en plus contraints quant \u00e0 leurs possibilit\u00e9s, oblig\u00e9 \u00e0 la radicalisation permanente dans la crise syrienne, pouss\u00e9 au risque supr\u00eame du conflit dont le c\u00f4t\u00e9 aventureux n’a d’\u00e9quivalent que dans la vacuit\u00e9 totale de ses causes fondamentales, sinon l’absence de telles causes, et enfin confront\u00e9 \u00e0 la gravit\u00e9 potentielle tr\u00e8s \u00e9lev\u00e9e des effets et des cons\u00e9quences d’un tel conflit \u00e9ventuel. La rapidit\u00e9 du retournement de fortune et, surtout, de la d\u00e9gradation vertigineuse de la qualit\u00e9 de l’orientation du Premier ministre turc Erdogan d’une politique ind\u00e9pendante et tr\u00e8s populaire vers une politique align\u00e9e sur le Syst\u00e8me et extr\u00eamement impopulaire, offrent un exemple remarquable de l’effet sur un destin politique, et sur l’orientation d’une politique essentielle, de la volatilit\u00e9 et de l’insaisissabilit\u00e9 de ce temps m\u00e9tahistorique. Occurrence compl\u00e8tement maistrienne, ou \u00ab\u00a0n\u00e9o-maistrienne\u00a0\u00bb, \u00e0-la-Friedman…<\/p>\n<\/p>\n Mis en ligne le 15 octobre 2012 \u00e0 06H06<\/p><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":" La Turquie selon Erdogan, ou la trag\u00e9die-bouffe Que fait la Turquie d’Erdogan ? Qui le sait ? Lui-m\u00eame, Erdogan, en sait-il quelque chose ? M\u00eame l’OTAN commence \u00e0 s’interroger… Le 13 octobre 2012, le fameux \u00ab\u00a0b\u00a0\u00bb comme il se d\u00e9signe lui-m\u00eame, \u00e9diteur et commentateur du site The Moon of Alabama, signalait un tweet de ce… <\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"","ping_status":"","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"neve_meta_sidebar":"","neve_meta_container":"","neve_meta_enable_content_width":"","neve_meta_content_width":0,"neve_meta_title_alignment":"","neve_meta_author_avatar":"","neve_post_elements_order":"","neve_meta_disable_header":"","neve_meta_disable_footer":"","neve_meta_disable_title":"","_jetpack_memberships_contains_paid_content":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[2],"tags":[6536,11996,2631,3737,7725,4595,4596,584,7069,3099,3867,2613,4128],"class_list":["post-73447","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-bloc-notes","tag-caractere","tag-cottrell","tag-de","tag-erdogan","tag-gul","tag-joseph","tag-maistre","tag-otan","tag-party","tag-psychologie","tag-syrie","tag-turquie","tag-war"],"jetpack_featured_media_url":"","jetpack_sharing_enabled":true,"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/73447","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=73447"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/73447\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=73447"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=73447"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=73447"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}