{"id":73454,"date":"2012-10-19T05:14:24","date_gmt":"2012-10-19T05:14:24","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/2012\/10\/19\/suites-de-lincursion-du-drone-iranien-en-israel\/"},"modified":"2012-10-19T05:14:24","modified_gmt":"2012-10-19T05:14:24","slug":"suites-de-lincursion-du-drone-iranien-en-israel","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/2012\/10\/19\/suites-de-lincursion-du-drone-iranien-en-israel\/","title":{"rendered":"Suites de l’incursion du drone<\/em> iranien en Isra\u00ebl"},"content":{"rendered":"

Suites de l’incursion du drone<\/em> iranien en Isra\u00ebl<\/h3>\n<\/p>\n

\tLes Isra\u00e9liens ont abattu, le 7 octobre, un drone<\/em> de construction iranienne qui avait fait une incursion dans leur espace a\u00e9rien. (Voir notre texte du 7 octobre 2012<\/a>.) Il se confirme que cet incident a mis en \u00e9vidence, d’une part les capacit\u00e9s technologiques nouvelles iraniennes, relay\u00e9es par le Hezbollah<\/em> qui a \u00e9t\u00e9 l’op\u00e9rateur de l’engin ; d’autre part, les faiblesses de la d\u00e9fense isra\u00e9lienne, qui a rencontr\u00e9 de grandes difficult\u00e9s dans la d\u00e9couverte, l’interception et la destruction de l’intrus.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t Il est remarquable que les Iraniens aient eux-m\u00eames d\u00e9voil\u00e9 officiellement que le drone<\/em>, nomm\u00e9 Hussein Ayoub<\/em> et disposant de capacit\u00e9s furtives, \u00e9tait produit par eux et qu’il avait \u00e9t\u00e9 livr\u00e9 au Hezbollah<\/em> pour \u00eatre utilis\u00e9 par ce groupe libanais. (Le 16 octobre, le ministre de la d\u00e9fense iranien Ahmad Vahidi d\u00e9voilait la chose : \u00abGiven the Zionist regime’s frequent incursions into the Lebanese airspace, we see it as the natural right of Lebanon’s Hezbollah to fly its drone above the Occupied Territories.<\/em>\u00bb) Le 18 octobre 2012<\/a> (PressTV.com<\/em>), le chef des Gardiens de la R\u00e9volution, le brigadier g\u00e9n\u00e9ral Hossein Salami, a comment\u00e9 la situation de cette affaire en exposant effectivement le r\u00f4le du Hezbollah<\/em> et en exposant le r\u00f4le de la guerre psychologique conduite par Ira\u00ebl contre l’Iran, qui avait men\u00e9 au d\u00e9veloppement de technologiues guerri\u00e8res avanc\u00e9es par l’Iran \u00abIsrael had been engaged in a campaign of psychological warfare and a game of political bluff against the Islamic Revolution<\/em> Following the infiltration of Hezbollah’s drone into the<\/em> [airspace of the<\/em>] occupied lands, the Zionist regime came to the understanding that such psychological warfare has not yielded any result but instead led to the strengthening of the determination of its enemies and now the Islamic Revolution has the upper hand over the Zionist regime<\/em>\u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tLe Hezbollah<\/em> affirme que Ayoub<\/em> a vol\u00e9 pendant plusieurs centaines de kilom\u00e8tres sans \u00eatre d\u00e9tect\u00e9, qu’il a approch\u00e9 le site nucl\u00e9aire isra\u00e9lien de Dimona, qu’il a pris des photographies et que ces documents seraient rendus publics prochainement.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t Le quotidien libanais Al Akhbar<\/em>, anti-occupation et proche du groupe libanais comprenant le Hezbollah<\/em>, publie un article de son commentateur des affaires isra\u00e9liennes Yahya Dbouk, le 16 octobre 2012<\/a>. Apr\u00e8s avoir fait un parall\u00e8le entre la situation actuelle, \u00e0 la lumi\u00e8re de l’affaire Ayoub<\/em> salu\u00e9e comme un grand succ\u00e8s, et celle de 2006 o\u00f9 eut lieu la guerre de juillet-ao\u00fbt entre le Hezbollah<\/em> et Isra\u00ebl, Yahya Dbouk expose quatre enseignements principaux de l’incursion du drone<\/em> en Isra\u00ebl. Il met notamment en \u00e9vidence l’absence de riposte d’Isra\u00ebl apr\u00e8s l’incident, contre le Hezbollah<\/em> et le Liban, alors que cette sorte de r\u00e9action constitue un article fondamental de la politique de s\u00e9curit\u00e9 d’Isra\u00ebl en cas d’attaque, terroriste, de gu\u00e9rilla, etc., contre le pays. Selon Dbouk, cela marque une crainte nouvelle des Isra\u00e9liens des capacit\u00e9s du Hezbollah<\/em>.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00abFirst of all, the Ayoub incident indicates that any action Lebanon takes to deter Israel or prevent Israeli aggression is directly related to the struggle of mutual deterrence between the two sides. This is, in turn, linked to the fact that the Lebanese Resistance now has the ability to inflict unprecedented damage on Israel if the latter decides to attack Lebanon. This background helps explain Israel’s failure to respond antagonistically to Ayoub as it backpedaled from the initial threats issued by its war minister Ehud Barak in the aftermath of the incident.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00bbSecondly, the Ayoub drone was an indicator for Israel especially of how advanced the military, security and technological abilities of the Resistance are. This serves to further deter Israel from attacking Lebanon militarily. If Ayoub were, until very recently, one of the secret surprises of the next war, then Israelis should await the surprises that have not been revealed by Hezbollah yet. Surely, many of these surprises will only be revealed in case of a direct military confrontation between the two sides, if Israel were to decide to launch a war or do something that would ultimately result in war.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00bbThirdly, Israel’s strategic environment is going through a transitional period characterized by uncertainty and open to several possibilities. As such, any aggression towards Lebanon, whether limited or far reaching, would lead to a wide-scale military confrontation. Such a confrontation might mobilize Arab public opinion, which is no longer controlled by dictators as it was in the past, and redirect it against Israel. The next confrontation with Hezbollah is expected to witness unprecedented victories on the part of the Lebanese party, accomplishments that will be seized upon by Arab public opinion as the street fixes its gaze on Israel. This might explain Israeli self-restraint, specifically with regards to resistance forces, including its failure to respond to the Ayoub operation despite its negative impact on Israel.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00bbFourth, the Ayoub operation is in line with Hezbollah’s defensive strategy. The drone penetration is a response to repeated Israeli violations of Lebanese sovereignty towards which some Lebanese parties have become complacent. If Hezbollah is to be questioned about the Ayoub drone, the question should not be about sending the drone but rather what took them so long.<\/em>\u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t Il est \u00e0 noter qu’un expert libanais, le g\u00e9n\u00e9ral Hisham Jaber, pr\u00e9sident du Middle East Center for Studies (Beyrouth), est intervenu deux fois sur PressTV.com<\/em>, changeant d’appr\u00e9ciation entre les deux, et d’ailleurs insistant lui-m\u00eame sur ce changement d’opinion de lui-m\u00eame, pour conclure \u00e0 des capacit\u00e9s significatives de l’Iran et du Hezbollah<\/em>. Le 7 octobre 2012<\/a>, Jaber d\u00e9clarait : \u00ab [The drone must have come<\/em>] from an American aircraft carrier or from<\/em> [air force and military bases in<\/em>] Saudi Arabia, also American bases. That’s the only possibility so far until we know after investigation<\/em>\u00bb. Le 12 octobre 2012<\/a>, il modifiait son analyse en fonction des \u00e9l\u00e9ments apparus depuis, et concluait effectivement \u00e0 un important \u00e9v\u00e9nement strat\u00e9giques avec ces nouvelles capacit\u00e9s iraniennes et du Hezbollah<\/em> :<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00ab I do believe that if Hezbollah is capable to send such a drone and to fly over Israel and will not be detected before 20 or 25 minutes it’s very dangerous and it was flying very close to Dimona. If this aircraft was not for reconnaissance or to spy or to get information, if it was offensive for example and had explosives what do you think it can do?… the Israelis are very worried about this and also if you go to the Israeli defense website they pretend that Hezbollah has many of those drones and some of them are made in Iran, others in Russia. So now a new file has been opened.<\/em>\u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t Du c\u00f4t\u00e9 isra\u00e9lien, divers commentateurs continuent \u00e0 mettre en \u00e9vidence les faiblesses de l’IDF (Isra\u00ebl Defense Force<\/em>) d\u00e9couvertes \u00e0 l’occasion de l’incident Ayoub<\/em>. Des r\u00e9actions tr\u00e8s critiques sont enregistr\u00e9es, quant au comportement de l’IDF du point de vue de la communication, et \u00e0 la performance des forces de d\u00e9fense. Le 17 octobre 2012<\/a>, sur son site Tikun Olam<\/em>, l’opposant de gauche et pacifiste Richard Silverstein publie un texte critique sur cet incident, o\u00f9 il cite diverses r\u00e9actions d’experts, notamment les analystes de d\u00e9fense Reuven Pedatzur (Haaretz<\/em>) et Alex Fishman (Yedioth<\/em>). Silverstein note \u00e9galement que des rapports de presse ont signal\u00e9 que les Isra\u00e9liens n’avaient pas r\u00e9cup\u00e9r\u00e9 tous les d\u00e9bris de Ayoub<\/em>, dont une partie avait \u00e9t\u00e9 prise et emport\u00e9e par une tribu de b\u00e9douins pr\u00e9sente sur place, ce qui montre une absence suppl\u00e9mentaire du contr\u00f4le de l’op\u00e9ration, et une faiblesse technologique suppl\u00e9mentaire pour l’examen des restes du drone<\/em> qui n’a de r\u00e9elle valeur que si l’ensemble de l’engin est reconstitu\u00e9. Sur le comportement de l’IDF, Silverstein \u00e9crit : \u00abI’ve often noted the parallel between the IDF’s public statements and Kabuki-style Japanese theater. Everyone wears a costume (or uniform) and mask, everyone plays a role, no one’s actual role or anything they say bears any resemblance to reality. So the Iranian drone incident is in the same vein. Israel’s leadership high-fived each other over the stellar performance of the air defense command in shooting down the craft without causing injury to any Israeli. Story over, case closed<\/em>\u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tSilverstein cite d’abord Pedatzur, de Haaretz<\/em>, qui est un ancien pilote de chasse isra\u00e9lien pendant un service militaire prolong\u00e9. C’est un v\u00e9t\u00e9ran du combats a\u00e9rien que Silverstein d\u00e9signe comme un as (sans pr\u00e9ciser s’il s’agit d’une d\u00e9nomination de convenance ou de la d\u00e9nomination sp\u00e9cifique de l’aviation de chasse, signifiant cinq victoires a\u00e9riennes homologu\u00e9es).<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00abWhen people start praising failures, it’s time to worry. And that’s exactly what happened a week and a half ago: Defense Minister Ehud Barak praised the chief of staff and the air force commander for the sharp, effective performance in which a drone was intercepted and shot down in the area south of Hebron. Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu also praised the drone’s interception.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00bbIn reality, this incident was anything but a sharp, effective performance. By any professional standard, the penetration of an unmanned aerial vehicle into Israeli territory, apparently after it had flown for more than two hours over the sea, and its subsequent flight clear across the country over the course of another half hour, are an embarrassing failure for the Israel Defense Forces.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00bbThe UAV made its way over the sea from Lebanon to the coast of Gaza. During its long flight parallel to the coast, it was not discovered by a single one of the various detection devices that look westward. If this wasn’t due to negligence on the part of someone manning these detection systems, who wasn’t alert to what was happening out at sea, then it points to gaps in the IDF’s radar coverage of the western sector. Moreover, during its flight, the UAV passed over Israeli naval vessels without anyone noticing it. It also passed over the drilling platforms at the Leviathan natural gas site a point worth noting for those who are supposed to defend our gas production sites in the future. Those who launched it could very easily have loaded it with explosives and then blown it up over one of these platforms.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00bbAccording to official IDF sources, the UAV was discovered only as it was about to cross the coastline near the Gaza Strip, and at that point, fighter planes were scrambled. Someone in the IDF needs to explain why it was discovered so belatedly. After all, had the drone been laden with explosives, its operators could have aimed it at the coastal city of Ashkelon, the nearby power plant, or Ashdod port<\/em>\u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tConcernant Fishman, Silverstein cite un passage int\u00e9ressant du commentaire de l’expert qui concerne l’aspect psychologique de l’op\u00e9ration Ayoub<\/em>. Fishman observe justement que l’incursion de Ayoub<\/em> constitue de toutes les fa\u00e7ons, quels que soient ses r\u00e9sultats op\u00e9rationnels, une importante victoire psychologique pour le Hezbollah<\/em> et l’Iran, \u00e0 cause de son aspect de haute technologie du v\u00e9hicule et des param\u00e8tres de la mission. L’op\u00e9ration met l’Iran et Hezbollah <\/em> sur un m\u00eame pied qu’Isra\u00ebl \u00e0 cet \u00e9gard.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00abIn Israel, some members of the security establishment have been infected withblindness. When the Iranian drone was shot down some 30 kilometers from Dimona, Israel cheered: The plot has been thwarted. In Western language, which Israel uses as well, the presence of a hostile drone is supposed to have some sort of operational purpose. Someone had sent it to take pictures, check the alertness of Israel’s defense systems and send back data. In short: It was supposed to carry out a practical mission with tangible results. Since these results were not achieved, the mission failed.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00bbBut in the language of the Iranians and Nasrallah, the fact that the unmanned aircraft penetrated Israeli airspace is a huge achievement on a psychological level. As far as they are concerned, this was the purpose of the mission.<\/em>\u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tL’ensemble du dossier conduit \u00e0 la conclusion que l’incident Ayoub<\/em> est un \u00e9v\u00e9nement d’une r\u00e9elle importance, et d’une importance qu’on peut qualifier, du point de vue militaire et technologique, de strat\u00e9gique. L’aspect de communication, qui donne tout son poids \u00e0 un \u00e9v\u00e9nement aujourd’hui, a tent\u00e9 d’\u00eatre \u00e9touff\u00e9 par l’IDF par le silence, ce qui est une r\u00e9action inhabituelle des services de s\u00e9curit\u00e9 isra\u00e9liens qui font en g\u00e9n\u00e9ral une grande publicit\u00e9 sur les attaques dont Isra\u00ebl est l’objet et sur la fa\u00e7on dont ils annihilent ces attaques. Cette fois, le silence La conclusion d’un grand \u00e9v\u00e9nement strat\u00e9gique semble donc justifi\u00e9e. Le silence officiel, type-Syst\u00e8me, est aujourd’hui le signe d’une d\u00e9faite et d’un embarras du Syst\u00e8me.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

\tMis en ligne le 19 octobre 2012 \u00e0 05H22<\/p><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

Suites de l’incursion du drone iranien en Isra\u00ebl Les Isra\u00e9liens ont abattu, le 7 octobre, un drone de construction iranienne qui avait fait une incursion dans leur espace a\u00e9rien. (Voir notre texte du 7 octobre 2012.) Il se confirme que cet incident a mis en \u00e9vidence, d’une part les capacit\u00e9s technologiques nouvelles iraniennes, relay\u00e9es par… <\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"","ping_status":"","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"neve_meta_sidebar":"","neve_meta_container":"","neve_meta_enable_content_width":"","neve_meta_content_width":0,"neve_meta_title_alignment":"","neve_meta_author_avatar":"","neve_post_elements_order":"","neve_meta_disable_header":"","neve_meta_disable_footer":"","neve_meta_disable_title":"","footnotes":""},"categories":[2],"tags":[3020,15158,7359,3019,2932,12755,4655,4472,15159,2773,2774,15160,3068],"class_list":["post-73454","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-bloc-notes","tag-aerienne","tag-ayoub","tag-barak","tag-defense","tag-drone","tag-evenement","tag-furtivite","tag-hezbollah","tag-incursion","tag-iran","tag-israel","tag-silverstein","tag-strategique"],"jetpack_featured_media_url":"","_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/73454","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=73454"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/73454\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=73454"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=73454"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=73454"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}