{"id":73541,"date":"2012-12-07T05:59:00","date_gmt":"2012-12-07T05:59:00","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/2012\/12\/07\/rapport-sur-un-desastre-libye-qatar-al-qaida-usa\/"},"modified":"2012-12-07T05:59:00","modified_gmt":"2012-12-07T05:59:00","slug":"rapport-sur-un-desastre-libye-qatar-al-qaida-usa","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/2012\/12\/07\/rapport-sur-un-desastre-libye-qatar-al-qaida-usa\/","title":{"rendered":"Rapport sur un d\u00e9sastre : Libye, Qatar, al Qa\u00efda, USA"},"content":{"rendered":"<p><h3 class=\"titrebloc\">Rapport sur un d\u00e9sastre : Libye, Qatar, al Qa\u00efda, USA <\/h3>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\tL&rsquo;article du <a href=\"http:\/\/www.nytimes.com\/2012\/12\/06\/world\/africa\/weapons-sent-to-libyan-rebels-with-us-approval-fell-into-islamist-hands.html\" class=\"gen\">6 d\u00e9cembre 2012<\/a> du New York <em>Times<\/em> (NYT) sur le soutien et l&rsquo;armement en Libye des extr\u00e9mistes djihadistes et autres, qu&rsquo;il s&rsquo;agisse d&rsquo;al Qa\u00efda ou de son double, apporte un sceau d&rsquo;officialit\u00e9 \u00e0 la catastrophe que fut en r\u00e9alit\u00e9 l&rsquo;affaire libyenne pour le Syst\u00e8me. On sait que le New York <em>Times<\/em> est une sorte d&rsquo;officieux du pouvoir washingtonien, lui-m\u00eame relais op\u00e9rationnel central du Syst\u00e8me ; une sorte de <em>Pravda<\/em> locale, si l&rsquo;on veut, dont certaines interventions ont un caract\u00e8re essentiel dans le syst\u00e8me de la communication, pour informer tous les mandants du Syst\u00e8me. Ce sera le cas pour cet article, qui a manifestement re\u00e7u le soutien de l&rsquo;administration au niveau de l&rsquo;information, et l&rsquo;<em>imprimatur<\/em> qui importe. (Lorsqu&rsquo;on trouve, dans un article de cette importance, une phrase telle que \u00ab<em>The White House and State Department declined to comment<\/em>\u00bb, on peut \u00eatre assur\u00e9 qu&rsquo;il s&rsquo;agit du cas d\u00e9crit ici, \u00e0 savoir qu&rsquo;il est dit officieusement par le NYT ce que Washington ne veut pas dire officiellement mais veut faire savoir aux mandants du Syst\u00e8me d\u00e9j\u00e0 mentionn\u00e9s.)<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\tNous disposons donc d&rsquo;un bon r\u00e9sum\u00e9 de ce que furent la politique officielle US vis-\u00e0-vis de la question de l&rsquo;armement des rebelles libyens, la position du Qatar (et des EAU) comme interm\u00e9diaire(s) op\u00e9rationnel(s) notamment pour les livraisons d&rsquo;arme, l&rsquo;absence compl\u00e8te \u00e0 la fois de contr\u00f4le et de <strong>compr\u00e9hension<\/strong> de la situation, y compris du comportement du Qatar, de la part des divers services US. Nous pouvons lire \u00e9galement combien l&rsquo;administration Obama fut passive dans cette affaire, au contraire des diverses descriptions de manigances \u00e0 cet \u00e9gard, combien elle ne fit que suivre avec comme seule pr\u00e9occupation la panique constante de l&rsquo;implication dans un conflit terrestre. Il y eut d&rsquo;abord une requ\u00eate des \u00c9mirats Arabes Unis pour livrer des armes de fabrication US aux rebelles libyens, avec refus initial de Washington (crainte d&rsquo;\u00eatre impliqu\u00e9), tandis que le Qatar avait d\u00e9j\u00e0 commenc\u00e9, de sa propre autorit\u00e9, \u00e0 livrer des armes dont il disposait, de fabrication fran\u00e7aise et russe. Finalement, Washington entra dans le circuit, livrant des armes US \u00e0 ses amis du Golfe, pour les rebelles libyens. Quant au contr\u00f4le exerc\u00e9 par les USA sur ces livraisons : \u00ab <em>The administration has never determined where all of the weapons, paid for by Qatar and the United Arab Emirates, went inside Libya, officials said.<\/em> [] <em>Nobody knew exactly who they were, said the former defense official. The Qataris, the official added, are supposedly good allies, but the Islamists they support are not in our interest.<\/em>\u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\tAucune r\u00e9elle surprise dans tout cela, parce que tout ce que nous dit le NYT fut exprim\u00e9 par les auteurs dissidents du Syst\u00e8me et diffus\u00e9 \u00e0 profusion dans la presse alternative, essentiellement sur l&rsquo;Internet. Les pires appr\u00e9ciations sur la politique US sont confirm\u00e9es : incompr\u00e9hension, inculture, aveuglement, incapacit\u00e9 de contr\u00f4le des \u00e9v\u00e9nements, h\u00e9sitations avec tendance d&rsquo;aller toujours au plus extr\u00eame et au plus douteux, absence totale de strat\u00e9gie. Le caract\u00e8re incontr\u00f4lable et maximaliste du comportement du Qatar, <a href=\"http:\/\/www.dedefensa.org\/article-notes_sur_un_monstrueux_avatar_de_la_postmodernit__23_10_2012.html\" class=\"gen\">ses ambitions grotesques<\/a> \u00e9galement, apparaissent largement au gr\u00e9 des pr\u00e9cisions apport\u00e9es par l&rsquo;article.  <\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\t\u00ab<em>The Obama administration did not initially raise objections when Qatar began shipping arms to opposition groups in Syria, even if it did not offer encouragement, according to current and former administration officials. But they said the United States has growing concerns that, just as in Libya, the Qataris are equipping some of the wrong militants.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\t\u00bb<em>The United States, which had only small numbers of C.I.A. officers in Libya during the tumult of the rebellion, provided little oversight of the arms shipments. Within weeks of endorsing Qatar&rsquo;s plan to send weapons there in spring 2011, the White House began receiving reports that they were going to Islamic militant groups. They were more antidemocratic, more hard-line, closer to an extreme version of Islam than the main rebel alliance in Libya, said a former Defense Department official.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\t\u00bb<em>The Qatari assistance to fighters viewed as hostile by the United States demonstrates the Obama administration&rsquo;s continuing struggles in dealing with the Arab Spring uprisings, as it tries to support popular protest movements while avoiding American military entanglements. Relying on surrogates allows the United States to keep its fingerprints off operations, but also means they may play out in ways that conflict with American interests.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\t\u00bb<em>To do this right, you have to have on-the-ground intelligence and you have to have experience, said Vali Nasr, a former State Department adviser who is now dean of the Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies, part of Johns Hopkins University. If you rely on a country that doesn&rsquo;t have those things, you are really flying blind. When you have an intermediary, you are going to lose control. He said that Qatar would not have gone through with the arms shipments if the United States had resisted them, but other current and former administration officials said Washington had little leverage at times over Qatari officials. They march to their own drummer, said a former senior State Department official. The White House and State Department declined to comment.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\tLe <a href=\"http:\/\/www.dedefensa.org\/article-notes_sur_l_effet-benghazi__12_11_2012.html\" class=\"gen\">12 novembre 2012<\/a>, nous donnions des extraits d&rsquo;une chronique concernant une intervention de l&rsquo;expert US Flynt Leverett, notamment sur l&rsquo;affaire de Benghazi du 11 septembre 2012 (assassinat de l&rsquo;ambassadeur Stevens) : \u00ab<em>Amidst the controversy in Washington over the chronology and extent of the CIA and U.S. military response to the attack on the U.S. consulate in Benghazi on September 11, 2012, there is a critical point which pundits, for the most part, have not raised, but of which the Obama administration is very mindful: that the U.S. ambassador to Libya may have been killed by a group which was armed, supported by the United States or its allies [Administration officials] know that jihadi groups are playing an increasingly important role on the ground in the Syrian opposition and Washington wants to get in front of this problem.<\/em>\u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\tEffectivement, on retrouve \u00e0 plusieurs reprises, dans l&rsquo;article du NYT, le poids de la pr\u00e9occupation que fait peser l&rsquo;effet-Benghazi (l&rsquo;assassinat de Stevens) sur l&rsquo;administration Obama. (\u00ab<em>No evidence has emerged linking the weapons provided by the Qataris during the uprising against Col. Muammar el-Qaddafi to the attack that killed four Americans at the United States diplomatic compound in Benghazi, Libya, in September.<\/em>\u00bb) Un r\u00e9cit plus pr\u00e9cis sur l&rsquo;implication d&rsquo;un marchand d&rsquo;armes US dans l&rsquo;affaire libyenne nous permet de tirer nos propres conclusions sur le climat r\u00e9gnant dans cette affaire, sur l&rsquo;implication de l&rsquo;ambassadeur Stevens pr\u00e9cis\u00e9ment, sur les connexions serr\u00e9es entre les actions clandestines qu&rsquo;affectionnent les USA, les groupes extr\u00e9mistes, le trafic d&rsquo;armes, le crime plus ou moins organis\u00e9 et de mieux en mieux organis\u00e9, etc. C&rsquo;est ainsi, que se d\u00e9finit, aujourd&rsquo;hui, la politique ext\u00e9rieure g\u00e9n\u00e9rale, et il faut bien les tr\u00e8s nombreux discours d&rsquo;Hillary sur les droits de l&rsquo;homme et de la femme, sur la d\u00e9mocratie et tout le reste, pour tenter de blanchir au moins la fa\u00e7ade Voici donc le cas de Marc Turi.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\t\u00ab<em>The case of Marc Turi, the American arms merchant who had sought to provide weapons to Libya, demonstrates other challenges the United States faced in dealing with Libya. A dealer who lives in both Arizona and Abu Dhabi in the United Arab Emirates, Mr. Turi sells small arms to buyers in the Middle East and Africa, relying primarily on suppliers of Russian-designed weapons in Eastern Europe.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\t\u00bb<em>In March 2011, just as the Libyan civil war was intensifying, Mr. Turi realized that Libya could be a lucrative new market, and applied to the State Department for a license to provide weapons to the rebels there, according to e-mails and other documents he has provided. (American citizens are required to obtain United States approval for any international arms sales.)<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\t\u00bb<em>He also e-mailed J. Christopher Stevens, then the special representative to the Libyan rebel alliance. The diplomat said he would share Mr. Turi&rsquo;s proposal with colleagues in Washington, according to e-mails provided by Mr. Turi. Mr. Stevens, who became the United States ambassador to Libya, was one of the four Americans killed in the Benghazi attack on Sept. 11.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\t\u00bb<em>Mr. Turi&rsquo;s application for a license was rejected in late March 2011. Undeterred, he applied again, this time stating only that he planned to ship arms worth more than $200 million to Qatar. In May 2011, his application was approved. Mr. Turi, in an interview, said that his intent was to get weapons to Qatar and that what the U.S. government and Qatar allowed from there was between them.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\t\u00bb<em>Two months later, though, his home near Phoenix was raided by agents from the Department of Homeland Security. Administration officials say he remains under investigation in connection with his arms dealings. The Justice Department would not comment. Mr. Turi said he believed that United States officials had shut down his proposed arms pipeline because he was getting in the way of the Obama administration&rsquo;s dealings with Qatar. The Qataris, he complained, imposed no controls on who got the weapons. They just handed them out like candy, he said.<\/em>\u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\tMonsieur Turi  nous donne parfaitement la morale de cette histoire, ou de ce pi\u00e8tre morceau d&rsquo;une histoire toujours en cours, \u00e0 propos des Qataris et des armes livr\u00e9es pour la d\u00e9mocratie et les droits de l&rsquo;homme : \u00ab<em>They just handed them out like candy<\/em>\u00bb  Effectivement, histoire toujours en cours, puisque la m\u00eame chose se poursuit aujourd&rsquo;hui en Syrie. Il y a donc une saisissante le\u00e7on de choses sur le fonctionnement du Syst\u00e8me et le niveau de r\u00e9flexion du <em>sapiens<\/em>-collabo (du Syst\u00e8me) courant,  le journaliste moyen et sup\u00e9rieur du NYT,  dans le fait que cet article fleurit, on dirait peut-\u00eatre comme une rose au milieu des ordures, au milieu de commentaires et d&rsquo;\u00e9ditoriaux courants du m\u00eame NYT, exhortant l&rsquo;administration \u00e0 armer et \u00e0 encore armer les h\u00e9ro\u00efques rebelles syriens, \u00e0 soutenir le Qatar dans ses entreprises, \u00e9ventuellement \u00e0 faire affaire avec les Marc Turi du moment,  pour parvenir enfin \u00e0 l&rsquo;\u00e9tablissement de la d\u00e9mocratie,  en Syrie, comme en Libye. Au moins \u00e0 ce niveau et dans cette entreprise-l\u00e0, la Syrie est l&rsquo;exacte r\u00e9plique de la Libye, avec une fid\u00e9lit\u00e9 presque \u00e9mouvante apr\u00e8s tout, et une sorte de r\u00e9pulsion extraordinairement puissante pour tout ce qui peut avoir affaire avec l&rsquo;exp\u00e9rience et la m\u00e9moire des choses et des actes : incompr\u00e9hension, inculture, aveuglement, incapacit\u00e9 de contr\u00f4le des \u00e9v\u00e9nements, h\u00e9sitations avec tendance d&rsquo;aller toujours au plus extr\u00eame et au plus douteux, absence totale de strat\u00e9gie. La feuille de route est \u00e9crite, type copi\u00e9-coll\u00e9,  destination : le bordel,  tragique et d\u00e9risoire comme sont tous ces pauvres <em>sapiens<\/em>, emport\u00e9s par leurs faiblesses et l&rsquo;arrogance de s&rsquo;en croire dispens\u00e9s.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\t`<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\tMis en ligne le 7 d\u00e9cembre 2012 \u00e0 05H59<\/p><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>Rapport sur un d\u00e9sastre : Libye, Qatar, al Qa\u00efda, USA L&rsquo;article du 6 d\u00e9cembre 2012 du New York Times (NYT) sur le soutien et l&rsquo;armement en Libye des extr\u00e9mistes djihadistes et autres, qu&rsquo;il s&rsquo;agisse d&rsquo;al Qa\u00efda ou de son double, apporte un sceau d&rsquo;officialit\u00e9 \u00e0 la catastrophe que fut en r\u00e9alit\u00e9 l&rsquo;affaire libyenne pour le&hellip;&nbsp;<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"","ping_status":"","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"neve_meta_sidebar":"","neve_meta_container":"","neve_meta_enable_content_width":"","neve_meta_content_width":0,"neve_meta_title_alignment":"","neve_meta_author_avatar":"","neve_post_elements_order":"","neve_meta_disable_header":"","neve_meta_disable_footer":"","neve_meta_disable_title":"","_jetpack_memberships_contains_paid_content":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[2],"tags":[3759,3992,6249,8039,12428,11054,8173,6463,6902,10072,3256,8040,5637,4859,4359,3867,2852,15260,15261,3257],"class_list":["post-73541","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-bloc-notes","tag-arabes","tag-armes","tag-aveuglement","tag-crime","tag-djihadistes","tag-emirats","tag-intervention","tag-leverett","tag-libye","tag-marc","tag-new","tag-organise","tag-pravda","tag-qatar","tag-stevens","tag-syrie","tag-times","tag-turi","tag-unis","tag-york"],"jetpack_featured_media_url":"","jetpack_sharing_enabled":true,"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/73541","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=73541"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/73541\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=73541"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=73541"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=73541"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}