{"id":73591,"date":"2013-12-17T06:42:56","date_gmt":"2013-12-17T06:42:56","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/2013\/12\/17\/la-libye-base-arriere-des-islamistes\/"},"modified":"2013-12-17T06:42:56","modified_gmt":"2013-12-17T06:42:56","slug":"la-libye-base-arriere-des-islamistes","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/2013\/12\/17\/la-libye-base-arriere-des-islamistes\/","title":{"rendered":"La Libye, base-arri\u00e8re des islamistes"},"content":{"rendered":"<p><h2 class=\"common-article2\">La Libye, base-arri\u00e8re des islamistes<\/h2>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\tIl y a un texte \u00e9clairant de McClatchy.<em>News<\/em>, datant du <a href=\"http:\/\/www.mcclatchydc.com\/2013\/12\/12\/211488\/benghazi-libya-has-become-training.html#storylink=cpy\" class=\"gen\">12 d\u00e9cembre 2013<\/a>, un reportages sur les conditions de vie en Libye sous ce qui semble \u00eatre une belle et bonne domination, en influence et en organisation, du groupe islamiste extr\u00e9miste Ansar al Shariah.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\tCe que nous montre surtout ce reportage, c&rsquo;est l&rsquo;organisation, qui semble fonctionner avec toute la souplesse voulue, de la Libye en une sorte de base-arri\u00e8re du terrorisme islamiste, particuli\u00e8rement en Syrie. Il y a un flot continu de combattants islamistes venant de divers pays pour un stage d&rsquo;entra\u00eenement, avant de partir vers les divers th\u00e9\u00e2tres d&rsquo;op\u00e9ration disponibles&#8230; Il y a dans le texte un extrait d&rsquo;un \u00e9change \u00e0 peine surr\u00e9aliste mais dans tous les cas \u00e9difiant entre la journaliste de McClatchy, Nancy A. Youssef, et le ministre de la justice du gouvernement officiel libyen, Salah al Marghani, qui joue \u00e0 la fois l&rsquo;\u00e9tonnement devant la question sur ces rebelles circulant librement, et qui r\u00e9clame avec une ing\u00e9nuit\u00e9 parfaitement jou\u00e9e des informations de la journaliste pour tenter d&rsquo;agir contre ces rebelles, ou faire comme si, tout en reconnaissant qu&rsquo;avec les moyens et l&rsquo;autonomie d&rsquo;action dont il dispose il aura bien des difficult\u00e9s \u00e0 emp\u00eacher leur d\u00e9placement en Libye.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\tIl s&rsquo;agit d&rsquo;une description hyperr\u00e9aliste et \u00e0 peine surr\u00e9aliste de la situation libyenne, par rapport \u00e0 ce que les adversaires de l&rsquo;intervention craignaient de voir se produire. En fait, le r\u00e9sultat de l&rsquo;intervention du bloc BAO est tellement pire que le pire qu&rsquo;on craignait, qu&rsquo;on croirait lire une description caricaturale des pr\u00e9visions presque caricaturales que faisaient les adversaires de l&rsquo;intervention des effets de cette intervention.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\t\u00ab<em>Every week, about a dozen Syrians arrive at Benghazi&rsquo;s airport for what&rsquo;s described as insurgent training. When they fly out, they&rsquo;re carrying fake Libyan passports, according to three officials familiar with the comings and goings of foreigners at the airport. The accounts of the officials, who asked to remain anonymous because of the sensitivity of the topic, are more evidence that this city in Libya has become a regional hub for Islamist extremists seeking to hone their combat skills.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\t\u00bb<em>Fighters from Tunisia and Algeria also are thought to be training here, driving across Libya&rsquo;s borders to reach Benghazi, the birthplace of the uprising that, with NATO&rsquo;s help, toppled Moammar Gadhafi two years ago. But the Syrians&rsquo; routine arrival and departure by air indicates that the training process is better organized and financed than had been realized.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\t\u00bb<em>It also raises questions about the role of Libya&rsquo;s homegrown militia, Ansar al Shariah, in the global jihadi movement. Ansar al Shariah has its roots in the anti-Gadhafi uprising and it&rsquo;s thought to have participated in the attack last year on U.S. facilities in Benghazi that killed the U.S. ambassador and three other Americans. Any effort to train al Qaida-linked fighters here is unlikely to have gone forward without the backing of Ansar al Shariah, experts in the organization say.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\t\u00bb<em>The Benghazi airport officials said that in the face of weak government forces and Ansar al Shariah supporters among their personnel, there&rsquo;s little they can do to stop fighters from arriving or from leaving illegally, even though their fake passports are easily detected. By leaving on Libyan passports, they avoid legal requirements that they report their activities while they&rsquo;re in the country, the airport officials told McClatchy. It is easier to leave Libya that way. They fly to Istanbul and sneak back into Syria, one airport employee said. They use the Libyan passport once. The three airport officials said they saw anywhere from 10 to 15 fighters each week.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\t\u00bb<em>Airport authorities can&rsquo;t stop them because they themselves fear the repercussions of confronting militants. As one employee explained, pointing to an immigration official: He is with Ansar al Shariah. There is nothing we can do to stop it, a second official told McClatchy. But everyone knows who they are. Libya&rsquo;s minister of justice, Salah al Marghani, told McClatchy that the government is unaware of fighters coming to the country for training, but he acknowledged that Libya&rsquo;s security situation would allow such groups to move freely. I would not be surprised if foreign fighters are involved like this&#8230; We have a lot of challenges, he said. Thank you for letting me know so we can investigate this.<\/em> [&#8230;]<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\t\u00bb<em>What is clear, however, is that in the months since U.S. Ambassador Christopher Stevens and three others died here in the Sept. 11, 2012, attacks on U.S. facilities, Ansar al Shariah&rsquo;s presence in Benghazi has grown, despite the initial public reaction, which drove it from its headquarters into hiding in the days immediately after Stevens&rsquo; death.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\t\u00bb<em>Beyond Benghazi, where it was founded, the group has spread to eastern cities that were key to the 2011 uprising, including Ajdabiya and Derna. Residents told McClatchy that the difference now is that rather than operate as an open organization from a headquarters, the group has melted into the population. They have created cells in Benghazi, said Mohammed Idreesi, a political activist here. They can gather themselves in seconds. . . . Ansar al Shariah is stronger now. The group also is working hard to provide services such as health care in a push to earn the support of residents&#8230;<\/em>\u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p>\n<p class=\"signature\"><em>dedefensa.org<\/em><\/p><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>La Libye, base-arri\u00e8re des islamistes Il y a un texte \u00e9clairant de McClatchy.News, datant du 12 d\u00e9cembre 2013, un reportages sur les conditions de vie en Libye sous ce qui semble \u00eatre une belle et bonne domination, en influence et en organisation, du groupe islamiste extr\u00e9miste Ansar al Shariah. Ce que nous montre surtout ce&hellip;&nbsp;<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"","ping_status":"","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"neve_meta_sidebar":"","neve_meta_container":"","neve_meta_enable_content_width":"","neve_meta_content_width":0,"neve_meta_title_alignment":"","neve_meta_author_avatar":"","neve_post_elements_order":"","neve_meta_disable_header":"","neve_meta_disable_footer":"","neve_meta_disable_title":"","footnotes":""},"categories":[14],"tags":[15466,15465,5788,6902,7556,3867,13795],"class_list":["post-73591","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-ouverture-libre","tag-alshariah","tag-ansar","tag-islamistes","tag-libye","tag-mcclatchy","tag-syrie","tag-terririsme"],"jetpack_featured_media_url":"","_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/73591","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=73591"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/73591\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=73591"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=73591"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=73591"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}