{"id":73700,"date":"2014-02-13T03:50:24","date_gmt":"2014-02-13T03:50:24","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/2014\/02\/13\/mesure-de-la-catastrophe-nsa-pour-les-usa\/"},"modified":"2014-02-13T03:50:24","modified_gmt":"2014-02-13T03:50:24","slug":"mesure-de-la-catastrophe-nsa-pour-les-usa","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/2014\/02\/13\/mesure-de-la-catastrophe-nsa-pour-les-usa\/","title":{"rendered":"Mesure de la catastrophe NSA pour les USA"},"content":{"rendered":"<p><h4 class=\"breve-de-crise\">Mesure de la catastrophe NSA pour les USA<\/h4>\n<p>McClartchy.<em>News<\/em> publie le <a href=\"http:\/\/www.mcclatchydc.com\/2014\/02\/12\/217738\/us-share-of-cloud-computing-likely.html#storylink=cpy\" class=\"gen\">12 f\u00e9vrier 2014<\/a> un long article sur les cons\u00e9quences de la crise-Snowden\/NSA pour les USA, et notamment par rapport \u00e0 ce qui \u00e9tait la certitude des USA d&rsquo;une domination absolue du march\u00e9 du <em>cloud computing<\/em>. Il s&rsquo;agit d&rsquo;une catastrophe de la sorte dont peu de branches industrielles avanc\u00e9es ont eu \u00e0 subir de tels effets dans l&rsquo;histoire \u00e9conomique. L&rsquo;index principal de cette catastrophe s&rsquo;appelle confiance (confiance dans les USA), et cet index s&rsquo;est compl\u00e8tement effondr\u00e9&#8230; <\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\t\u00ab<em>German Interior Minister Thomas de Maiziere summed up the fears of Germans, asking whether the Internet can be made secure again or whether this is an illusion. But there was less to wonder about in his conclusion: We are dealing with a crisis of confidence.<\/em>\u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\tLisant cela, comme le reste du reportage de McClatchy, on devrait se d\u00e9couvrir, si l&rsquo;exp\u00e9rience n&rsquo;\u00e9tait d\u00e9j\u00e0 l\u00e0, absolument stup\u00e9fait devant le spectacle d&rsquo;un pr\u00e9sident de la r\u00e9publique (fran\u00e7aise) osant dire (voir le <a href=\"http:\/\/www.dedefensa.org\/article-hollande_dans_les_bras_d_honneur_de_bho_12_02_2014.html\" class=\"gen\">12 f\u00e9vrier 2014<\/a>) cette extraordinaire \u00e9normit\u00e9,  l&rsquo;exception fran\u00e7aise, dans toute sa splendeur invertie : Monsieur Obama et moi-m\u00eame, nous avons clarifi\u00e9 les choses, et maintenant c&rsquo;est du pass\u00e9. La confiance mutuelle a \u00e9t\u00e9 restaur\u00e9e. <\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\tOn comprend que les affirmations d&rsquo;Obama durant sa conf\u00e9rence de presse lors de la visite de Hollande, selon laquelle les USA n&rsquo;ont pas et n&rsquo;auront pas d&rsquo;accord de non-espionnage avec aucun pays sonneront m\u00e9chamment aux oreilles des Allemands, qui exigent un tel engagement. Dans son analyse, McClatchy donne une place massive \u00e0 l&rsquo;Allemagne, qui m\u00e8ne la contre-offensive de r\u00e9sistance \u00e0 la NSA, qui ne se remet absolument pas de ce qui appara\u00eet comme une d\u00e9couverte sensationnelle de la duplicit\u00e9 am\u00e9ricaniste. Certains, des esprits forts sans nul doute, souriront devant ce qu&rsquo;ils jugeront \u00eatre de la na\u00efvet\u00e9, ou de la duplicit\u00e9 inconsciente, mais peu importe. Les faits, par contre, importent et chaque nouvelle analyse, chaque nouvelle enqu\u00eate amplifie la sensation d&rsquo;un effondrement de la confiance qui, quoi qu&rsquo;on en pense, \u00e9tait un des ciments de la proximit\u00e9 transatlantique, notamment entre l&rsquo;Allemagne et les USA. Les mesures suivent&#8230;<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\t\u00ab<em>When the German version of the FBI needs to share sensitive information these days, it types it up and has it hand-delivered. This time last year, it would have trusted in the security of email. But last year was before Edward Snowden and the public revelations of the scope of the National Security Agency&rsquo;s PRISM electronic intelligence-gathering program. After Snowden, or post-PRISM, is a new digital world.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\t\u00bb<em>We&rsquo;re now carrying our information to our allies on foot, said Peter Henzler, the vice president of the Bundeskriminalamt, known as the BKA. He was speaking recently at a German Interior Ministry panel on the country&rsquo;s digital future. The focus of the panel was how to counter U.S. surveillance measures and what it will take for Germans to be safe again on the Web. We&rsquo;re no longer using the open Internet.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\t\u00bb<em>The message is clear: The United States no longer can be trusted not to spy on any and every facet of German life and policy. Henzler&rsquo;s concerns might sound extreme, but he was hardly alone on his panel, and the worries appear to be an accurate reflection of the wider German, and even European, concern about the reach of the NSA&rsquo;s surveillance program.<\/em> [&#8230;]<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\t\u00bb<em>The American dream of total cloud domination might just be drifting away now. The predictions, at least, see signs of that: By 2016, U.S. companies are expected to miss out on $21 billion to $35 billion in new contracts that they&rsquo;d been expected to collect, according to some estimates. German cloud companies are posting better-than-expected earnings. There have been signs that some U.S. tech companies might be suffering. Network equipment maker Cisco, for instance, noted government issues when it predicted a revenue drop for the current quarter.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\t\u00bb<em>The new reality is simply that data that passes through the United States isn&rsquo;t safe. A year ago, a German cloud was a bad idea, said Daniel Castro, a senior analyst for the Information Technology &#038; Innovation Foundation in Washington. German business didn&rsquo;t want a German product to help them in a global market, they wanted the best product. Today, even if businesses still believe a German cloud is a bad idea, they&rsquo;re accepting it as a necessary idea. There&rsquo;s even a new initiative, German Cloud, backed by a variety of German tech companies. The motto is My company data stays in Germany. The group offers a German Cloud stamp of approval to imply safe data.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\t\u00bb<em>Castro noted that this is a bad time for the American brand to lose luster. The market is growing, rapidly. Castro is looking for hard evidence that confirms his earlier predictions that the international market share of U.S. cloud providers should fall by 5 percent this year, and up to 20 percent by 2016, because of the spying allegations. The reaction we&rsquo;re seeing from the administration appears to be that they&rsquo;re hoping these concerns will blow over, he said. They&rsquo;re not blowing over. We see long-term problems because once a consumer picks a provider, they tend to stay with that provider.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\t\u00bb<em>The news could be even worse for American companies. Castro put together his predictions before the news reached the current level. The recent Interior Ministry panel showed just how paranoid Germany has become. Reinhold Achatz, the head of technology and innovation at the German steel giant ThyssenKrupp, noted that whoever can read data is also likely to be able to change data. For example, they could switch off a power station, he said. So from my point of view, it wouldn&rsquo;t be surprising if someone came up with the idea of switching off Germany. I&rsquo;m serious about that.<\/em>\u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><\/p>\n<p><p>\tMis en ligne le 13 f\u00e9vrier 2014 \u00e0 03H36<\/p><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>Mesure de la catastrophe NSA pour les USA McClartchy.News publie le 12 f\u00e9vrier 2014 un long article sur les cons\u00e9quences de la crise-Snowden\/NSA pour les USA, et notamment par rapport \u00e0 ce qui \u00e9tait la certitude des USA d&rsquo;une domination absolue du march\u00e9 du cloud computing. Il s&rsquo;agit d&rsquo;une catastrophe de la sorte dont peu&hellip;&nbsp;<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"","ping_status":"","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"neve_meta_sidebar":"","neve_meta_container":"","neve_meta_enable_content_width":"","neve_meta_content_width":0,"neve_meta_title_alignment":"","neve_meta_author_avatar":"","neve_post_elements_order":"","neve_meta_disable_header":"","neve_meta_disable_footer":"","neve_meta_disable_title":"","footnotes":""},"categories":[21],"tags":[2748,3678,15228,15616,3621,9859,3871,12224],"class_list":["post-73700","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-breves-de-crise","tag-allemagne","tag-castro","tag-cloud","tag-computing","tag-confiance","tag-daniel","tag-nsa","tag-snowden"],"jetpack_featured_media_url":"","_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/73700","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=73700"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/73700\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=73700"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=73700"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=73700"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}