{"id":73805,"date":"2014-04-03T06:41:35","date_gmt":"2014-04-03T06:41:35","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/2014\/04\/03\/les-racines-profondes-de-la-politique-systeme\/"},"modified":"2014-04-03T06:41:35","modified_gmt":"2014-04-03T06:41:35","slug":"les-racines-profondes-de-la-politique-systeme","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/2014\/04\/03\/les-racines-profondes-de-la-politique-systeme\/","title":{"rendered":"Les racines profondes de la Politique-Syst\u00e8me"},"content":{"rendered":"<p><h3 class=\"titrebloc\">Les racines profondes de la Politique-Syst\u00e8me<\/h3>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\tOn sait que nous nommons Politique-Syst\u00e8me (voir le <em>Glossaire.dde<\/em> du <a href=\"http:\/\/www.dedefensa.org\/article-glossairedde_la_politique-syst_me__17_11_2012.html\" class=\"gen\">17 novembre 2012<\/a>), que nous avons \u00e9galement d\u00e9sign\u00e9 en r\u00e9f\u00e9rence aux USA o\u00f9 elle s&rsquo;est essentiellement d\u00e9velopp\u00e9e, et en r\u00e9f\u00e9rence \u00e0 Harlan Ullman qui a forg\u00e9 l&rsquo;expression, politique de l&rsquo;id\u00e9ologie et de l&rsquo;instinct (voir le <a href=\" http:\/\/www.dedefensa.org\/article-le_c_ur_du_sujet_29_05_2009.html\" class=\"gen\">29 mai 2009<\/a>), la politique de d\u00e9structuration et de dissolution engendr\u00e9e par le Syst\u00e8me. Cette politique, suscit\u00e9e par les idiots utiles <em>neocons<\/em>, se manifeste depuis 1989-1991 et, surtout, depuis 1999-2001, par l&rsquo;agression unilat\u00e9rale, l&rsquo;ill\u00e9galit\u00e9 dans le m\u00e9pris syst\u00e9matique des lois internationales, le viol constant des souverainet\u00e9s, l&#8217;emploi syst\u00e9matique de la force, et pour son soutien de communication une \u00e9norme carapace de virtualisme-<em>narrative<\/em> fond\u00e9e sur un mensonge qui est aussi bien une autosuggestion et une perception invertie du monde bas\u00e9e sur une faiblesse jusqu&rsquo;\u00e0 la pathologie de la psychologie.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\tEn g\u00e9n\u00e9ral, on fait remonter les origines op\u00e9rationnelles directes et, dirait-on, archiv\u00e9es, de cette politique-Syst\u00e8me, \u00e0 des conceptions th\u00e9oriques \u00e9labor\u00e9es au Pentagone, notamment \u00e0 partir d&rsquo;un document fameux du Pentagone (voir William Pfaff sur cette question le <a href=\"http:\/\/www.dedefensa.org\/article-notes_de_1992_sur_la_crise_am_ricaine_post-guerre_froide_23_11_2003.html\" class=\"gen\">23 novembre 2003<\/a>). Cela se fit sous l&rsquo;inspiration du secr\u00e9taire \u00e0 la d\u00e9fense d&rsquo;alors Dick Cheney et de quelques-uns de ses acolytes (Wolfowitz principalement). Le r\u00f4le de Cheney dans l&rsquo;\u00e9laboration de cette version am\u00e9ricaniste et quasi-st\u00e9r\u00e9otyp\u00e9e de la politique-Syst\u00e8me conduit Todd E. Pierce \u00e0 parler de cheneyisme pour d\u00e9signer cette doctrine. L&rsquo;int\u00e9r\u00eat du texte de Pierce, ancien major de l&rsquo;US Army qui a travaill\u00e9 dans la branche juridique de l&rsquo;arm\u00e9e, est notamment de nous exposer les <strong>racines profondes de cette politique<\/strong>, et non plus seulement l&rsquo;historique des manigances des <em>neocons<\/em> qui ne firent qu&rsquo;op\u00e9rationnaliser ce sentiment profond n\u00e9 dans le syst\u00e8me de la s\u00e9curit\u00e9 nationale US. Ainsi comprend-on mieux que cette pseudo-doctrine <em>neocon<\/em> ait eu et continue \u00e0 avoir un tel succ\u00e8s, parce qu&rsquo;elle est le faux-nez publicitaire et de relations publiques d&rsquo;une \u00e9volution fondamentale des USA achevant la transmutation de la direction de ce pays en ce v\u00e9hicule privil\u00e9gi\u00e9 de la politique-Syst\u00e8me qu&rsquo;on voit aujourd&rsquo;hui, parall\u00e8lement au triomphe du Syst\u00e8me dans sa main-mise totalitaire dans tous les domaines. On d\u00e9couvre donc dans ce texte de <em>ConsortiumNews<\/em>, du  <a href=\"http:\/\/consortiumnews.com\/2014\/04\/01\/were-all-cheneyites-now\/\" class=\"gen\">1er avril 2014<\/a>, les origines profondes de l&rsquo;op\u00e9rationnaliation de la politique-Syst\u00e8me, alias cheneyisme. On ne s&rsquo;\u00e9tonnera pas d&rsquo;y voir une analogie avec l&rsquo;\u00e9volution de l&rsquo;Allemagne de la d\u00e9faite de 1918 \u00e0 l&rsquo;installation du nazisme, suivant ainsi le chemin de l&rsquo;<a href=\"http:\/\/www.dedefensa.org\/article-g_nie_latin_et_germanisme_de_guglielmo_ferrero_1917_08_12_2008.html\" class=\"gen\">id\u00e9al de puissance<\/a> que nous identifions pour pr\u00e9senter la politique-Syst\u00e8me, avec la transformation de la pr\u00e9sidence en une sorte de dictature de s\u00e9curit\u00e9 nationale, essentiellement pour ces seules affaires de s\u00e9curit\u00e9 nationale ; pour le reste, le pr\u00e9sident \u00e9tant au contraire tr\u00e8s vuln\u00e9rable sinon paralys\u00e9 par le Congr\u00e8s sur nombre d&rsquo;affaires int\u00e9rieures et surtout budg\u00e9taires et financi\u00e8res, comme on le voit depuis l&rsquo;arrive d&rsquo;Obama ; cela fait de Washington ce curieux m\u00e9lange d&rsquo;autoritarisme quasiment dictatorial et de faiblesse presque impuissante, et cela promis \u00e0 durer sans changement pr\u00e9visible ni m\u00eame concevable, et constituant un handicap mortel pour cette puissance qui ne parvient et ne parviendra pas \u00e0 imposer un r\u00e9gime v\u00e9ritablement autoritaire. <\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\t\u00ab<em>Like many other extremist ideologies, Cheneyism grew out of defeat. In this case, the U.S. military defeat in Vietnam and the political defeat of Richard Nixon&rsquo;s administration where Cheney began his career in national politics. As occurred with Field Marshall Erich Ludendorff and a then obscure corporal named Adolf Hitler following Germany&rsquo;s defeat in World War I, a similar stab in the back legend was created by the U.S. military and political leaders after the Vietnam War. They never understood, as General Frederick Weyand did from the beginning, that the Vietnam War was unwinnable by the U.S. military.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\t\u00bb<em>Instead, political leaders such as Presidents Lyndon Johnson and Richard Nixon along with strategically challenged Flag Officers, the likes of General William Westmoreland and Admiral U. S. Grant Sharp Jr., held that the U.S. would have won if the will to fight hadn&rsquo;t been lost by the American people. They blamed this on the media and the resultant dissent to the war. Consequently, it became a priority of the U.S. government to control access to information in future wars through censorship and secrecy, to ensure public support through carefully crafted propaganda, and to keep a close eye on any potential dissenters, with various forms of detention available to suppress a disruptive opposition or to stop the dissemination of embarrassing state secrets.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\t\u00bb<em>However, even these benighted officials recognized that the U.S. Constitution was an obstacle to the wartime authoritarianism that they aspired to entrench in the U.S. political system. They saw the exigencies of war  even the undeclared kind  as shoving the Constitution aside.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\t\u00bb<em>The fountainhead for this ideology was the Office of Legal Counsel&rsquo;s opinion written by William Rehnquist in 1970, Re: The President and the War Power: South Vietnam and the Cambodian Sanctuaries (the so-called Rehnquist Memo). This memo asserted the right of the U.S. to wage preemptive war on the thinnest of grounds. This political viewpoint was internalized by many military officers and some political officials, including Cheney, notwithstanding their oath to defend the Constitution. The consequences are evident today in the hyper-secrecy and information control policies adopted since 2001 and the arguments by the likes of Cheney for even harsher authoritarian policies.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\t\u00bb<em>On Sept. 25, 2001, just two weeks after the 9\/11 terrorist attacks, John Yoo, a lawyer who worked for President George W. Bush&rsquo;s Office of Legal Counsel, summarized the concept of unconstrained presidential power. It has long been the view of this Office that the Commander-in-Chief Clause is a substantive grant of authority to the President, Yoo wrote. The power of the President is at its zenith under the Constitution when the President is directing military operations of the armed forces, because the power of Commander in Chief is assigned solely to the President. As support, Yoo cited the Rehnquist Memo.<\/em>\u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><\/p>\n<p><p>\tMis en ligne le 3 avril 2014 \u00e0 06H41<\/p><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>Les racines profondes de la Politique-Syst\u00e8me On sait que nous nommons Politique-Syst\u00e8me (voir le Glossaire.dde du 17 novembre 2012), que nous avons \u00e9galement d\u00e9sign\u00e9 en r\u00e9f\u00e9rence aux USA o\u00f9 elle s&rsquo;est essentiellement d\u00e9velopp\u00e9e, et en r\u00e9f\u00e9rence \u00e0 Harlan Ullman qui a forg\u00e9 l&rsquo;expression, politique de l&rsquo;id\u00e9ologie et de l&rsquo;instinct (voir le 29 mai 2009), la&hellip;&nbsp;<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"","ping_status":"","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"neve_meta_sidebar":"","neve_meta_container":"","neve_meta_enable_content_width":"","neve_meta_content_width":0,"neve_meta_title_alignment":"","neve_meta_author_avatar":"","neve_post_elements_order":"","neve_meta_disable_header":"","neve_meta_disable_footer":"","neve_meta_disable_title":"","_jetpack_memberships_contains_paid_content":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[2],"tags":[1294,15722,2631,5863,2778,1104,1131,4102,2779,1010,1448],"class_list":["post-73805","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-bloc-notes","tag-cheney","tag-cheneyisme","tag-de","tag-dictature","tag-ideal","tag-neocons","tag-pfaff","tag-politique-systeme","tag-puissance","tag-vietnam","tag-wolfowitz"],"jetpack_featured_media_url":"","jetpack_sharing_enabled":true,"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/73805","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=73805"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/73805\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=73805"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=73805"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=73805"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}