\tLe mois dernier, le rapport annuel du General Accounring Office donnait de bonnes nouvelles pour le JSF. Pour la premi\u00e8re fois, il \u00e9tait annonc\u00e9 que le prix probable de l’avion baissait de 7%. La nouvelle fut longuement acclam\u00e9e par la presse-Syst\u00e8me sp\u00e9cialis\u00e9e, sur des sites tels que Breaking Defense<\/em> et Defense One<\/em>. Lockheed Martin (LM) et le chef du JSF Program Office (JPO) du Pentagone, le g\u00e9n\u00e9ral de l’USAF Christopher Bogdan, surent profiter de cette occasion, qui impliquait le GAO avec sa bonne r\u00e9putation et sa rigueur comptable, et jusqu’alors toujours tr\u00e8s s\u00e9v\u00e8re pour le JSF ; ils annonc\u00e8rent de concert que le JSF, alias F-35, co\u00fbterait finalement autour de $75 millions l’exemplaire, loin des pr\u00e9visions qualifi\u00e9es de catastrophiques de $150\/$200 millions l’exemplaire. En passant, on nous rassura : si quelques probl\u00e8mes techniques subsistaient, notamment celui du d\u00e9veloppement et de l’int\u00e9gration du software<\/em> (question fondamentale pour l’avion, qui est totalement contr\u00f4l\u00e9 par son ensemble \u00e9lectronique), ils \u00e9taient en bonne voie d’\u00eatre r\u00e9solus.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n \tWinslow Wheeler, ancien fonctionnaire du Congr\u00e8s qui a \u00e9galement travaill\u00e9 au GAO, sp\u00e9cialiste du d\u00e9cryptage des labyrinthes bureaucratiques et financiers du Pentagone, intervient pour mettre les choses au point. Il le fait avec d’autant plus d’efficacit\u00e9 que le rapport annuel SAR (Selected Acquisition Reports<\/em>) du Pentagone qui vient d’\u00eatre publi\u00e9 la semaine derni\u00e8re donne, lui, une image particuli\u00e8rement grin\u00e7ante et pessimiste de l’\u00e9tat d’avancement du programme. Wheeler publie un long article, extr\u00eamement technique et pr\u00e9cis, dans CounterPunch<\/em> du 25-27 avril 2014<\/a>. Nous donnons deux extraits de cet article, qui permet de revenir \u00e0 la v\u00e9rit\u00e9 de la situation du JSF, avec la pr\u00e9cision embarrassante pour le GAO et sa r\u00e9putation d’int\u00e9grit\u00e9, que cet organisme (\u00e9quivalent US de la Cour des Comptes fran\u00e7aise) a accept\u00e9 sans v\u00e9rification semble-t-il des chiffres vieux de deux ans de la part de LM et du JPO du Pentagone. Le fait conduit \u00e0 \u00e9mettre quelques doutes sur la capacit\u00e9 et\/ou l’int\u00e9grit\u00e9 des analystes du GAO charg\u00e9s du dossier, ce qui signifierait \u00e9ventuellement que l’appareil de corruption v\u00e9nal et\/ou psychologique (psychologique surtout) aurait p\u00e9n\u00e9tr\u00e9 ce qui \u00e9tait jusqu’alors consid\u00e9r\u00e9 comme l’ultime forteresse d’int\u00e9grit\u00e9 dans l’observation de la gestion des productions du syst\u00e8me de l’am\u00e9ricanisme.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n \t\u00abLast week the Defense Department released its new Selected Acquisition Reports (SARs) on its major weapon programs. These annual reports are the Pentagon’s effort at definitive cost analysis; they come in two forms: the summary data on all 77 of DOD’s Major Defense Acquisition Programs (MDAPs) and separate reports on individual programs, such as the F-35-the latter put on-line without a pay wall by Breaking Defense.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n \t\u00bbAs in recent years, the release of new data on the F-35 provoked press coverage, some of it quite thorough in summarizing much the new data and what the top F-35 defender, F-35 program manager Lt. Gen. Christopher Bogdan, had to say about it all. However, there are some important points that did not get the attention they perhaps deserve, and one key point seems to have been generally missed.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n \t\u00bbAs the SARs and DOD’s summary of them made clear, the cost to acquire the F-35 has gone up compared to last year’s estimate. Page 6 of DOD’s summary of its SAR states that F-35 airframe costs increased +$3.1 billion (+1.0%) from $326.9 billion to $330.0 billion and costs for the separately accounted engine increased +$4.3 billion (+6.7%) from $64.3 billion to $68.6 billion.<\/em> […]<\/p>\n<\/p>\n \t\u00bbIn truth, the future of the F-35 program remains clouded, and most cloudy of all is the ultimate unit cost of the aircraft and the impact of that cost, as its reality unfolds, on existing and future buyers. As previously argued, there is good reason to think the real-world unit cost of F-35s, on average, will stay<\/em> much closer to the $200 million level<\/em><\/strong> than it does to the dubious predictions of Lockheed and Lt. Gen. Bogdan, such as $75 million each.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n \t\u00bbSecond, the F-35 acquisition cost increases revealed by the new SARs come as a major embarrassment to the Government Accountability Office that pronounced in a report released just last month that DOD SAR data showed F-35 acquisition costs coming down, not going up. As previously explained, GAO’s report used two year old data, thanks to the agency’s ponderous report writing process and the fact that the analysts and manager assigned to the report used a stunningly superficial analytical methodology. Not a single news article I read on the new SAR data recalled GAO’s miss-call of the acquisition cost vector.<\/em>\u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n \tWheeler attaque \u00e9galement, avec une certaine jubilation ironique, certaines projections du Pentagone, inspir\u00e9es par le JPO. Ces projections annoncent \u00e9galement un co\u00fbt de l’avion en baisse \u00e0 partir d’une projection sur le co\u00fbt entier du programme, c’est-\u00e0-dire d’ici \u00e0 2065. Le Pentagone est connu pour faire des projections r\u00e9guli\u00e8rement fausses sur des p\u00e9riodes de 6 mois \u00e0 un an, notamment avec des erreurs sur l’inflation, etc. Mais voil\u00e0 qu’il pr\u00e9tend donner une projection juste sur une p\u00e9riode de 51 ans, ce qui repr\u00e9sente un extraordinaire tour de magie, mais une magie si d\u00e9licieusement optimiste puisque, finalement, en 2065, il fera meilleur vivre que dans 6 mois ou un an… La narrative<\/em> bureaucratique n’a pas de fronti\u00e8res temporelles, et plus ses pr\u00e9visions \u00e0 court terme se r\u00e9v\u00e8lent fausses, plus elles se reportent sur des pr\u00e9visions \u00e0 tr\u00e8s long terme, imaginant ainsi que l’addition vertigineuse de p\u00e9riodes de court terme faussaires finira par donner un tr\u00e8s long terme conforme \u00e0 ses vux. <\/p>\n<\/p>\n \t\u00bbWe already know DOD manipulates its own inflation prognostications for both its own budget history and for short term future predictions in the five-year Future Year Defense Program (FYDP). It stretches credulity past the breaking point to assert that the cost of a weapon program will be some precise lesser amount 30 years from now because someone has readjusted inflation and labor cost predictions.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n \t\u00bbIn fact, in past inflation predictions for specific on-coming fiscal years (those just months ahead) DOD has proven inaccurate not just in the amount inflation has grown or declined but whether it has grown or declined. If they cannot even get the vector right a few months ahead, what business do they have asserting they can know it precisely 30 years from now? It is quite preposterous.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n \t\u00bbAnd yet, here we are, asked to believe that the cost of F-35 O&S will be, as DOD tells us, decreased $96.8 billion (-8.7%) from $1,113.3 billion to $1,016.5 billion by the time the program is done in 2065…<\/em>\u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n \tParall\u00e8lement, Russia Today<\/em> s’int\u00e9resse lui aussi au JSF. Conscient de sa mission internationaliste et am\u00e9ricaniste mise en \u00e9vidence par l’ectoplasme-secr\u00e9taire d’\u00c9tat fort r\u00e9cemment (voir le 25 avril 2014<\/a>), RT s’est fait un devoir de suivre le JSF. RT s’int\u00e9resse plut\u00f4t \u00e0 une conjonction int\u00e9ressante US Navy-Boeing, ce 25 avril 2014<\/a>. Les deux parties sont li\u00e9es, parce que l’US Navy essaie par tous les moyens discrets de se d\u00e9barrasser du JSF, tandis que Boeing, fournisseur principal de la marine (la famille des F\/A-18) lance une attaque f\u00e9roce contre le JSF, qu’il juge compl\u00e8tement inad\u00e9quat pour seulement survivre dans l’environnement de guerre probable. Bien entendu, Boeing a ses int\u00e9r\u00eats, et comment ! Il propose \u00e0 la Navy, ce que la Navy a commenc\u00e9 \u00e0 faire, de commander plus de EA-18G Growler<\/em>, version de guerre \u00e9lectronique de la famille F\/A-18, seul capable selon lui (Boeing) d’assurer un environnement acceptable pour les avions de combat. (Ce serait alors des F\/A-18 standard, puisque l’on n’aurait plus besoin des caract\u00e9ristiques de guerre \u00e9lectronique, stealth<\/em> et autres, \u00e0 la fois affreusement co\u00fbteuses et pour certaines jug\u00e9es inefficaces, int\u00e9gr\u00e9es dans l’avion.) <\/p>\n<\/p>\n \t\u00abAs the price of the Pentagon’s most expensive weapons endeavor ever soars even further, critics are calling into question the cost and capabilities of the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter program.<\/em> […] On Friday this week, Military.com reported that the US Navy has not only decided to drop the number of Lockheed Martin-made F-35s it plans on purchasing from 69 to 36, but that 22 new EA-18G Growlers built by Boeing have been added to a list of unfunded priorities.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n \t\u00bbReporters Kris Osborn and Michael Hoffman wrote for the website that Boeing has worked not so quietly this past year to offer the Navy an escape hatch from the costly Joint Strike Fighter program. According to their report, since at least last summer Boeing has been urging the Navy to buy more F\/A-18 Super Hornets and Growlers as concerns continue to emerge about the F-35.<\/em> […]<\/p>\n<\/p>\n \t\u00bbMike Gibbons is the vice president for Boeing’s Super Hornet and Growler programs, and has good reason to talk down the F-35safter all, less money to Lockheed Martin likely means more for his firm. Regardless, Gibbons told Osborn and Hoffman that the F-35 is no longer as advanced of a stealth craft as once claimed, and is not as effective as the Growler when it comes to countering a wide spectrum of air defense systems. The density of the threat is getting more complex and more difficult. The electromagnetic spectrum is getting more complex and more difficult and requires more of what the Growler provides in electronic attack and electronic awareness. Only the Growler has this capability, Gibbons told the website.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n \t\u00bbRussia and China, Gibbons added, have developed air defense systems that put the F-35’s stealth technology to the test. And if those capabilities should improve, then the Pentagon’s widely-touted weapons program may be no match for the offensive capabilities of foreign militaries. Advocates for Growlers say that those aircraft can outsmart some of that stealth-defying technology, but the ability to actually stay hidden may soon be slipping away from the DOD altogether.<\/em>\u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n \tDans cette derni\u00e8re affaire, avec la complicit\u00e9 Navy-Boeing, on comprend \u00e9videmment que Boeing joue son jeu en tant que membre \u00e9minent du Syst\u00e8me. Mais il acquiert pour cette circonstance un r\u00f4le antiSyst\u00e8me appr\u00e9ciable en se situant comme critique d\u00e9vastateur du JSF, \u00e0 la plus grande satisfaction de la Navy qui utilise cette action pour son propre int\u00e9r\u00eat, \u00e9galement antiSyst\u00e8me puisque qu’anti-JSF. (En effet, dans ce rangement, et compte tenu du contexte et de l’importance consid\u00e9rable du programme, le JSF figure comme la production la plus d\u00e9vastatrice du Syst\u00e8me, et son affaiblissement, voire sa chute catastrophique, serait un coup s\u00e9v\u00e8re port\u00e9 au Syst\u00e8me… Par cons\u00e9quent, Boeing et la Navy, membres \u00e9minents du Syst\u00e8me, sont effectivement antiSyst\u00e8me.)<\/p>\n<\/p>\n \tOn observera que les arguments op\u00e9rationnels d\u00e9velopp\u00e9s par Boeing et implicitement accept\u00e9s par la Navy (commande suppl\u00e9mentaire de Growler<\/em> aux d\u00e9pens du JSF) tombent \u00e9videmment \u00e0 point, et leur d\u00e9veloppement n’est bien entendu pas un hasard. Les deux entit\u00e9s profitent de la crise ukrainienne, qui rend brutalement concevable la possibilit\u00e9 d’une confrontation op\u00e9rationnelle de haute intensit\u00e9, pour d\u00e9velopper une critique op\u00e9rationnelle du JSF. La possibilit\u00e9 d’un affrontement avec la Russie n’est d\u00e9sormais plus une vision th\u00e9orique, et l’argument des formidables capacit\u00e9s russes en mati\u00e8re de d\u00e9fense a\u00e9rienne joue d\u00e9sormais tr\u00e8s largement en faveur de la ligne Boeing-Navy. Effectivement, la crise ukrainienne, v\u00e9ritablement multiple et aux effets innombrables, est promise \u00e0 jouer un r\u00f4le important dans le destin du JSF.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n <\/p>\n \tMis en ligne le 28 avril 2014 \u00e0 05H21<\/p><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":" JSF : mise \u00e0 jour de la catastrophe Le mois dernier, le rapport annuel du General Accounring Office donnait de bonnes nouvelles pour le JSF. Pour la premi\u00e8re fois, il \u00e9tait annonc\u00e9 que le prix probable de l’avion baissait de 7%. La nouvelle fut longuement acclam\u00e9e par la presse-Syst\u00e8me sp\u00e9cialis\u00e9e, sur des sites tels que… <\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"","ping_status":"","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"neve_meta_sidebar":"","neve_meta_container":"","neve_meta_enable_content_width":"","neve_meta_content_width":0,"neve_meta_title_alignment":"","neve_meta_author_avatar":"","neve_post_elements_order":"","neve_meta_disable_header":"","neve_meta_disable_footer":"","neve_meta_disable_title":"","footnotes":""},"categories":[2],"tags":[15766,3192,12007,15767,4248,15765,8208,3319,5297,3411,1296,4995,11418],"class_list":["post-73849","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-bloc-notes","tag-a-18g","tag-boeing","tag-bogdan","tag-coput","tag-gao","tag-growler","tag-jpo","tag-navy","tag-sar","tag-stealth","tag-ukraine","tag-wheeler","tag-winslow"],"jetpack_featured_media_url":"","_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/73849","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=73849"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/73849\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=73849"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=73849"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=73849"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}