\tOn a d\u00e9j\u00e0 vu \u00e0 plus d’une reprise ce qu’on pouvait penser des observations de l’analyste et lobbyiste Loren B. Thompson, du Lexington Institute : pas grand’chose, sinon de la publicit\u00e9 pay\u00e9e \u00e0 grands frais lorsqu’il s’agit du JSF ; un peu plus, et m\u00eame parfois beaucoup plus lorsqu’il s’agit de questions plus vastes, plus pressantes, strat\u00e9giquement plus larges, \u00e0 propos desquelles les opinions des experts, y compris de m\u00eame opinion, sont largement divergentes. Pour ce dernier cas, on inscrira la crise ukrainienne, o\u00f9 les analyses de Thompson sont int\u00e9ressantes parce qu’entach\u00e9es d’aucune r\u00e9f\u00e9rence directe et cons\u00e9quences quelconque pour ses employeurs. La raison principale de cette position plus objective, ou disons plus d\u00e9nu\u00e9e d’argumentation int\u00e9ress\u00e9e, est bien que Thompson, qui est un expert objectivement qualifi\u00e9, consid\u00e8re cette crise comme particuli\u00e8rement dangereuse, et sans doute le premier cas incontestable de l’apr\u00e8s-Guerre froide o\u00f9 la possibilit\u00e9 d’une escalade menant \u00e0 un affrontement nucl\u00e9aire strat\u00e9gique entre les USA et la Russie existe r\u00e9ellement.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n
\tOn a pu lire cette d\u00e9marche de Thompson le 14 mars 2014<\/a>, o\u00f9 il rejetait toute possibilit\u00e9 d’engagement militaire US en Ukraine \u00e0 cause de cette possibilit\u00e9 d’affrontement nucl\u00e9aire, ce qui impliquait effectivement la possibilit\u00e9 th\u00e9orique d’un tel affrontement nucl\u00e9aire. Il s’agit de l’\u00e9tat d’esprit typiquement-Guerre froide, constat\u00e9 surtout chez une cat\u00e9gorie d’experts dont l’exp\u00e9rience initiale s’est forg\u00e9e dans les derni\u00e8res ann\u00e9es de la Guerre froide, lorsque la r\u00e8gle universelle de tout faire pour \u00e9viter la possibilit\u00e9 de l’affrontement nucl\u00e9aire pr\u00e9valait.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n \tMais voici une nouvelle chronique de Thompson o\u00f9 cette fois le danger d’une escalade nucl\u00e9aire n’est plus \u00e9voqu\u00e9e dans le sens n\u00e9gatif (il est impensable qu’on puisse envisager d’en arriver l\u00e0…), mais dans un sens beaucoup plus r\u00e9aliste : oui, cela peut arriver, et voici comment… Ce texte se trouve dans Forbes<\/em> le 25 avril 2014<\/a> (et sur le blog<\/em> du Lexington Institute, Early Warning<\/em>, le 25 avril 2014<\/a> \u00e9galement). Thompson d\u00e9taille les quatre voies possibles, selon lui, pouvant mener \u00e0 un conflit nucl\u00e9aire.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n \t\u00abSo improbable though it may seem, doctrine and capabilities exist on both sides that could lead to nuclear use in a confrontation over Ukraine. Here are four ways that what started out as a local crisis could turn into something much worse.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n \t\u00bbBad intelligence.<\/em><\/strong> As the U.S. has stumbled from one military mis-adventure to another over the last several decades, it has become clear that Washington isn’t very good at interpreting intelligence. Even when vital information is available, it gets filtered by preconceptions and bureaucratic processes so that the wrong conclusions are drawn. Similar problems exist in Moscow. For instance, the Cuban missile crisis of 1962 arose partly from Soviet leader Khrushchev’s assessment that President Kennedy was weaker than he turned out to be, and the U.S. Navy nearly provoked use of a nuclear torpedo by a Russian submarine during the blockade because it misjudged the enemy’s likely reaction to being threatened. It is easy to imagine similar misjudgments in Ukraine, which Washington and Moscow approach from very different perspectives. Any sizable deployment of U.S. forces in the region could provoke Russian escalation.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n \t\u00bbDefective signaling<\/em><\/strong>. When tensions are high, rival leaders often seek to send signals about their intentions as a way of shaping outcomes. But the meaning of such signals can easily be confused by the need of leaders to address multiple audiences at the same time, and by the different frames of reference each side is applying. Even the process of translation can change the apparent meaning of messages in subtle ways. So when Russian foreign minister Lavrov spoke this week (in English) about the possible need to come to the aid of ethnic Russians in eastern Ukraine, Washington had to guess whether he was stating the public rationale for an invasion, sending a warning signal to Kiev about its internal counter-terror campaign, or trying to accomplish some other purpose. Misinterpretation of such signals can become a reciprocal process that sends both sides up the ladder of escalation quickly, to a point where nuclear use seems like the logical next step.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n \t\u00bbLooming defeat<\/em><\/strong>. If military confrontation between Russia and NATO gave way to conventional conflict, one side or the other would eventually face defeat. Russia has a distinct numerical advantage in the area around Ukraine, but its military consists mainly of conscripts and is poorly equipped compared with Western counterparts. Whichever side found itself losing would have to weigh the drawbacks of losing against those of escalating to the use of tactical nuclear weapons. Moscow would have to contemplate the possibility of a permanent enemy presence near its heartland, while Washington might face the collapse of NATO, its most important alliance. In such circumstances, the use of only one of two tactical nuclear warheads to avert an outcome with such far-reaching consequences might seem reasonable especially given the existence of relevant capabilities and supportive doctrine on both sides.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n \t\u00bbCommand breakdown<\/em><\/strong>. Strategic nuclear weapons like intercontinental ballistic missiles are tightly controlled by senior military leaders in Russia and America, making their unauthorized or accidental use nearly impossible. That is less the case with nonstrategic nuclear weapons, which at some point in the course of an escalatory process need to be released to the control of local commanders if they are to have military utility. U.S. policy even envisions letting allies deliver tactical warheads against enemy targets. Moscow probably doesn’t trust its allies to that degree, but with more tactical nuclear weapons in more locations, there is a greater likelihood that local Russian commanders might have the latitude to initiate nuclear use in the chaos of battle. Russian doctrine endorses nuclear-weapons use in response to conventional aggression threatening the homeland, and obstacles to local initiative often break down once hostilities commence.<\/em>\u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n \tThompson n’\u00e9voque pas ces sc\u00e9narios d’une fa\u00e7on th\u00e9orique. Il les \u00e9voque parce qu’il juge qu’ils rencontrent des situations tr\u00e8s possibles dans le cours de la crise ukrainienne, sinon d’ores et d\u00e9j\u00e0 illustr\u00e9es par divers incidents. Ainsi poursuit-il apr\u00e8s avoir \u00e9voqu\u00e9 le dernier sc\u00e9nario, montrant qu’il s’int\u00e9resse moins \u00e0 leur aspect th\u00e9orique qu’\u00e0 la r\u00e9alit\u00e9 concr\u00e8te qu’ils pourraient recouvrir… \u00abWhen you consider all the processes working to degrade restraint in wartime poor intelligence, garbled communication, battlefield setbacks, command attenuation, and a host of other influences it seems reasonable to consider that a military confrontation between NATO and Russia might in some manner escalate out of control, even to the point of using nuclear weapons.<\/em>\u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n \tL’int\u00e9r\u00eat essentiel de ce texte par rapport au pr\u00e9c\u00e9dent que nous avions comment\u00e9, se trouve justement dans la comparaison entre les deux. Dans le premier, Thompson \u00e9voque la possibilit\u00e9 d’une escalade jusqu’au nucl\u00e9aire comme une possibilit\u00e9, mais comme une possibilit\u00e9 qu’on devait juger comme quasiment impensable, c’est-\u00e0-dire faisant tout ce qui importe pour que cela soit impossible. Dans le second, Thompson observe implicitement que l’escalade vers le nucl\u00e9aire est devenue une possibilit\u00e9, et cela notamment \u00e0 cause d’\u00e9l\u00e9ments concrets qu’on rel\u00e8ve sur le terrain de la crise, justement divis\u00e9s en quatre cas diff\u00e9rents de faiblesses des participants \u00e0 cette crise, permettant un d\u00e9rapage vers le nucl\u00e9aire. (Selon notre appr\u00e9ciation, le premier cas, particuli\u00e8rement, est tout \u00e0 fait possible, le renseignement US s’\u00e9tant montr\u00e9 extr\u00eamement m\u00e9diocre jusqu’ici dans cette crise, bien plus m\u00e9diocre que le renseignement russe, malgr\u00e9 ce que dit Thompson, qui renvoie pour les exemples de mauvais renseignement russe \u00e0 la crise de Cuba de 1962, du temps o\u00f9 c’\u00e9tait l’URSS qui \u00e9tait en jeu, pas la Russie, et avec une direction tr\u00e8s divis\u00e9e au contraire de la direction actuelle qui est institutionnellement tr\u00e8s stable. Par ailleurs, comme on le lit, Thompson ne nie absolument pas la m\u00e9diocrit\u00e9 du renseignement US, et l\u00e0, dans les conditions actuelles, dans la p\u00e9riode ouverte en 2001.)<\/p>\n<\/p>\n