patchwork<\/em> que constituent les rebelles libyens. Leurs divisions sont nombreuses, affectent les unit\u00e9s militaires elles-m\u00eames, les dirigeants, les r\u00e9gions, etc.`<\/p>\n<\/p>\n\tMalgr\u00e9 une bien curieuse r\u00e9serve, ou bien r\u00e9v\u00e9latrice sur la situation s\u00e9curitaire de Tripoli (\u00abAnd although the transition so far has been surprisingly orderly almost no looting and little violence<\/em>\u00bb), l’article donne la mesure des tr\u00e8s grandes difficult\u00e9s qui attendent les rebelles libyens pour trouver l’unit\u00e9, la coordination et la coop\u00e9ration qui sont n\u00e9cessaires pour mettre en place les bases d’un nouveau r\u00e9gime. La question \u00e9tant bien s\u00fbr de savoir si leur r\u00e9volution et le changement de r\u00e9gime n’ont pas r\u00e9veill\u00e9 les tendances autonomistes naturelles du pays.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n\tA noter aussi, dans la deuxi\u00e8me partie de la citation, l’allusion pr\u00e9cise au r\u00f4le du Quatar comme acteur majeur de la r\u00e9volte. C’est un point tr\u00e8s in\u00e9dit, tr\u00e8s nouveau et qui, au lieu d’appara\u00eetre, comme le dit la narrative<\/em> du bloc BAO, comme un facteur d’\u00e9largissement de la soi-disant coalition, est en r\u00e9alit\u00e9 un facteur de d\u00e9sordre de plus qui jette une lumi\u00e8re \u00e9trange sur la susdite et soi-disant coalition.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n\t\u00abFighters from the western mountain city of Zintan control the airport. The fighters from Misurata guard the central bank, the port and the prime minister’s office, where their graffiti has relabeled the historic plaza Misurata Square. Berbers from the mountain town Yafran took charge of the city’s central square, where they spray-painted Yafran Revolutionaries.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n\t\u00bbA week after rebels broke into Col. Muammar el-Qaddafi’s former stronghold, much of its territory remains divided into fiefs, each controlled by quasi-independent brigades representing different geographic areas of the country. And the spray paint they use to mark their territory tells the story of a looming leadership crisis in the capital, Tripoli.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n\t\u00bbThe top civilian officials of the Libyan rebels’ Transitional National Council now styling itself as a provisional government to be based in the capital are yet to arrive, citing personal safety concerns even as they pronounce the city fully secure.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n\t\u00bbThere are growing hints of rivalry among the various brigades over who deserves credit for liberating the city and the influence it might bring. And attempts to name a military leader to unify the bands of fighters have instead exposed divisions within the rebel leadership, along regional lines but also between secularists and Islamists.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n\t\u00bbThey were all signs, one influential member of the council said, that point to a continuing power vacuum in the civilian leadership of the Libyan capital. But the jockeying for power also illustrates the challenge a new provisional government will face in trying to unify Libya’s fractious political landscape.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n\t\u00bbThe country was little more than a loose federation of regions and tribes before Colonel Qaddafi came to power. His reliance on favoritism and repression to maintain control did little to bridge Libya’s regional, ethnic and ideological divisions. Nor did the rebels who ousted Colonel Qaddafi ever organize themselves into a unified force. Rebels from the western mountains, the mid-coastal city of Misurata and the eastern city of Benghazi each fought independently, and often rolled their eyes in condescension at one another.<\/em> []<\/p>\n<\/p>\n\t\u00bbEarly steps toward unifying the brigades under a common command have brought out latent divisions among rebel leaders. Some became apparent when a fighter named Abdel Hakim al-Hasadi, sometimes known as AbdelHakim Belhaj, was named commander of a newly formed Tripoli Military Council.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n\t\u00bbSeveral liberals among the rebel leadership council complained privately that Mr. Hasadi had been a leader of the disbanded Libyan Islamist Fighting Group, which rebelled against Colonel Qaddafi in the 1990s. Some said they feared it was the first step in an attempt at an Islamist takeover. They noted that Mr. Hasadi was named commander by the five battalions of the so-called Tripoli Brigade, rather than by any civilian authority. And they complained about the perceived influence of Qatar, which helped train and equip the Tripoli Brigade and also finances Al Jazeera. This guy is just a creation of the Qataris and their money, and they are sponsoring the element of Muslim extremism here, another council member from the western region said. The revolutionary fighters are extremely unhappy and surprised. He is the commander of nothing!<\/em>\u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n\n
dedefensa.org<\/em><\/p><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"La mosa\u00efque de Tripoli Cet article du New York Times, du 30 ao\u00fbt 2011, donne une excellent image de l’\u00e9tonnant patchwork que constituent les rebelles libyens. Leurs divisions sont nombreuses, affectent les unit\u00e9s militaires elles-m\u00eames, les dirigeants, les r\u00e9gions, etc.` Malgr\u00e9 une bien curieuse r\u00e9serve, ou bien r\u00e9v\u00e9latrice sur la situation s\u00e9curitaire de Tripoli (\u00abAnd… <\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"","ping_status":"","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"neve_meta_sidebar":"","neve_meta_container":"","neve_meta_enable_content_width":"","neve_meta_content_width":0,"neve_meta_title_alignment":"","neve_meta_author_avatar":"","neve_post_elements_order":"","neve_meta_disable_header":"","neve_meta_disable_footer":"","neve_meta_disable_title":"","_jetpack_memberships_contains_paid_content":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[14],"tags":[11081,5581,3090,11341,6902,11040],"class_list":["post-74024","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-ouverture-libre","tag-cnt","tag-division","tag-influence","tag-islamiste","tag-libye","tag-quatar"],"jetpack_featured_media_url":"","jetpack_sharing_enabled":true,"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/74024","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=74024"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/74024\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=74024"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=74024"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=74024"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}