1er octobre 2011<\/a>. L’article d\u00e9taille les diff\u00e9rences de r\u00e9actions entre le bloc BAO d’une part, le monde arabe qui est concern\u00e9 au premier chef par cet acte, d’autre part.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n\t\u00abUntil about two years ago, few in Yemen or the Arab world had heard of Anwar al-Awlaki, the American-born propagandist for Islamic radicalism whose death President Obama celebrated as a major blow against Al Qaeda.A dime-a-dozen cleric was one response, by Gregory Johnsen, a Princeton professor who studies Yemen. Another: I don’t think your average Middle Easterner knows who Anwar al-Awlaki is, said Emad Shahin, a scholar of political Islam at Notre Dame University.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n\t\u00bbWhile Western officials and commentators saw the end of Mr. Awlaki as another serious loss for Al Qaeda, a very different reception in the Middle East was the latest reminder of the disconnect between American aims and Arab perceptions. In a region transfixed by the drama of its revolts, Mr. Awlaki’s voice has had almost no resonance. I don’t think this will really get people’s interest, I can’t imagine why it would, said Shadi Hamid, director of research at the Brookings Doha Center. It seems totally irrelevant to how Arabs view the world right now. They don’t care about Awlaki.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n\t\u00bbIt is a remarkable feature in the Arab world these days how little Al Qaeda actually comes up in conversations. Even before the eruption of revolts and revolutions, a group that bore some responsibility for two wars and deepening American involvement from North Africa to Iraq was losing its significance. When Osama bin Laden died, his killing seemed more an epitaph for another era. As is often remarked, the events of Sept. 11 seem a historical note to much of an Arab population where three in five are younger than 30.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n\t\u00bbIn that atmosphere, many saw Mr. Awlaki’s death as an essentially American story: here was a man that American attention helped create, and its Hellfire missiles killed, in a campaign born out of American fears of homegrown militancy. What distinguished Mr. Awlaki was not his ideas or influence but his American upbringing, passport and perfectly idiomatic English. When the Obama administration and the U.S. media started focusing on him, that is when Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula pushed him to the fore, Mr. Johnsen said, referring to the group’s Yemeni branch. They were taking advantage of the free publicity, if you will. And any stature he has now in the Arab world is because of that.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n\t\u00bbAnother analyst, Michael Wahid Hanna, a fellow at the Century Foundation, echoed the idea that Mr. Awlaki’s fluency in English generated more interest about him. The U.S. focus on Awlaki was a function of his language abilities and their understanding of his role as a recruiter and propagandist. If recent events can be said to further marginalize violent rejectionists such as Bin Laden and Ayman al-Zawahri, then there is very little room for a virtual unknown such as Awlaki to command any serious attention.<\/em>\u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n\tIl est remarquable que la publicit\u00e9 dont a b\u00e9n\u00e9fici\u00e9 Awlaki, l’importance qui lui a \u00e9t\u00e9 accord\u00e9, etc., sont d’abord le fait, par exemple, de sa capacit\u00e9 linguistique en anglo-am\u00e9ricain (puisqu’il est citoyen US) : \u00ab What distinguished Mr. Awlaki was not his ideas or influence but his American upbringing, passport and perfectly idiomatic English.<\/em>\u00bb Cette histoire du dirigeant (citoyen US) d’al Qa\u00efda est donc parfaitement une \u00abAmerican story<\/em>\u00bb qui n’int\u00e9resse gu\u00e8re les Arabes en g\u00e9n\u00e9ral, non plus qu’al Qa\u00efda d’ailleurs, dont on se demande bien s’il existe au demeurant Mais oui, il existe tout de m\u00eame et sans aucun doute, pour les dirigeants de l’establishment<\/em> am\u00e9ricaniste et pour les hommes du Syst\u00e8me, et c’est bien l\u00e0 l’essentiel. L’assassinat d’Awlaki r\u00e9sume parfaitement toute l’histoire de la Guerre contre la Terreur, ramen\u00e9e en g\u00e9n\u00e9ral \u00e0 l’hypoth\u00e9tique al Qa\u00efda dont nul ne sait exactement ce dont il s’agit, guerre men\u00e9e par l’Am\u00e9rique, contre un Ennemi d’abord d\u00e9fini par l’Am\u00e9rique, pour lui convenir dans ses diverses ambitions phantasmatiques, ses conceptions exceptionnalistes, ses obsessions d’une psychologie malades, etc.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n\tNous confirmons par cons\u00e9quent que l’Am\u00e9rique n’\u00e9volue pas sur la m\u00eame plan\u00e8te que les Arabes, que les vraies<\/strong> organisations non-gouvernementales arabes, interpr\u00e9t\u00e9es comme terroristes par les USA sans souci de ce qu’elles repr\u00e9sentent, que les vraies probl\u00e8mes qu’expriment ces actions que les m\u00eames USA jugent \u00eatre comme de pur terrorisme haineux (ils nous attaquent parce que nous aimons la libert\u00e9), etc. Par cons\u00e9quent, l’Am\u00e9rique poursuit une Guerre contre la Terreur pr\u00e9tendument par rapport au monde arabe, contre le monde arabe \u00e9ventuellement, pour certains, pour d\u00e9mocratiser le monde arabe pour d’autres, tout cela qui n’a rien, absolument rien \u00e0 voir avec le monde arabe. Tout le bloc BAO (les Europ\u00e9ens essentiellement) suivent aveugl\u00e9ment cette voie, les pays europ\u00e9ens ayant une exp\u00e9rience et une accointance culturelle avec le monde de la M\u00e9diterran\u00e9e (Espagne, France, Italie) perdant toute cette pr\u00e9cieuse exp\u00e9riences qui leur ferait comprendre le monde arabe, au nom d’une croisade d\u00e9mocratique high tech<\/em> du bloc BAO par rapport \u00e0 un monde arabe qui n’existe pas.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n\tLe bloc BAO, sous la direction fantasmagorique des USA, \u00e9volue dans un monde sans la moindre parcelle de v\u00e9rit\u00e9, d’une consistance compl\u00e8tement invent\u00e9e, fabriqu\u00e9e. Le terrorisme tel qu’il est repr\u00e9sent\u00e9 dans cette narrative<\/em> est \u00e9galement pure invention dans la dimension qui lui est allou\u00e9e, dans l’importance qui lui est donn\u00e9e. Tout cela, qui \u00e9tait au d\u00e9part une repr\u00e9sentation offensive (une narrative<\/em> triomphante) pour imposer la contre-civilisation occidentale, est devenue une pi\u00e8tre narrative<\/em> d\u00e9fensive qu’on expose d\u00e9sesp\u00e9r\u00e9ment pour tenter de dissimuler la r\u00e9alit\u00e9 de la crise g\u00e9n\u00e9rale de la Chute (du Syst\u00e8me). Ces efforts sont \u00e9videmment aussi d\u00e9risoires que la crise g\u00e9n\u00e9rale de la Chute est immense et terrible. Comme toutes ces diverses \u00e9liminations, ou assassinats l\u00e9galis\u00e9s, de chefs du fantomatique al Qa\u00efda, sont salu\u00e9es en g\u00e9n\u00e9ral comme une \u00e9tape vers la grande victoire dans la Guerre de la Terreur, la seule question int\u00e9ressante qui subsiste est de savoir s’ils arriveront \u00e0 proclamer la victoire totale dans la Guerre de la Terreur avant que le Syst\u00e8me ne se soit totalement effondr\u00e9, ou si la Chute l’emportera de vitesse avant que le communiqu\u00e9 de victoire ait pu \u00eatre diffus\u00e9.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<\/p>\n
\tMis en ligne le 3 octobre 2011 \u00e0 09H38<\/p><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"
Il y a la c\u00e9l\u00e9bration grandiose et experte des directions politiques et strat\u00e9giques du bloc BAO de la mort d’Anouar el-Awlaki. Il s’agit en r\u00e9alit\u00e9 de l’assassinat l\u00e9gal, au Yemen, de ce citoyen US devenu para\u00eet-il un des dirigeants d’al Qa\u00efda, par une machine tueuse, sans pilote mais avec missile Hellfire, qui semble le moyen… <\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"","ping_status":"","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"neve_meta_sidebar":"","neve_meta_container":"","neve_meta_enable_content_width":"","neve_meta_content_width":0,"neve_meta_title_alignment":"","neve_meta_author_avatar":"","neve_post_elements_order":"","neve_meta_disable_header":"","neve_meta_disable_footer":"","neve_meta_disable_title":"","footnotes":""},"categories":[2],"tags":[3936,11545,10900,6039,2631,2645,2622,4242,3744],"class_list":["post-74110","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-bloc-notes","tag-al","tag-awkali","tag-bao","tag-bloc","tag-de","tag-guerre","tag-la","tag-qaida","tag-terreur"],"jetpack_featured_media_url":"","_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/74110","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=74110"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/74110\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=74110"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=74110"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=74110"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}