{"id":74277,"date":"2011-11-26T11:30:14","date_gmt":"2011-11-26T11:30:14","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/2011\/11\/26\/moby-dick-en-tigre-de-papier-le-gout-de-la-catastrophe\/"},"modified":"2011-11-26T11:30:14","modified_gmt":"2011-11-26T11:30:14","slug":"moby-dick-en-tigre-de-papier-le-gout-de-la-catastrophe","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/2011\/11\/26\/moby-dick-en-tigre-de-papier-le-gout-de-la-catastrophe\/","title":{"rendered":"Moby Dick<\/em> en \u201ctigre de papier\u201d : le go\u00fbt de la catastrophe"},"content":{"rendered":"

Daniel Goure, du Lexington Institute, fait son devoir qui est de sonner en permanence l’alarme en ce qui concerne les r\u00e9ductions budg\u00e9taires qui vont affecter le Pentagone. Si l’on consid\u00e8re les faits (la comptabilit\u00e9, les effectifs, etc.) relativement<\/strong>, son alarme est justifi\u00e9e.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tDans ce texte du 23 novembre 2011<\/a>, sur le site Early Warning<\/em>, Goure prend comme point de comparaison la pr\u00e9c\u00e9dente p\u00e9riode de r\u00e9duction budg\u00e9taire du Pentagone. Il s’agit de la p\u00e9riode qui suivit imm\u00e9diatement la fin de la Guerre froide, lorsqu’on parlait, malgr\u00e9 la premi\u00e8re guerre du Golfe, des dividendes de la paix, passant par une r\u00e9duction du budget de la d\u00e9fense des USA, c’est-\u00e0-dire, les ann\u00e9es 1990.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00abThe last time defense spending went down the actual year-to-year declines were relatively modest; most of the savings came from the difference between planned expenditures and available resources. The actual decline in defense spending for the first year of the Reagan-Bush drawdown, FY 1990, compared to actual spending for FY 1989 was only $5 billion and the reduction compared to projected spending was some $20 billion. No one year experienced reductions greater than $10 billion. Contrast this approach with a now mandatory cut to the defense budget for FY 2013 of $57 billion compared to FY 2012 which itself was $26 billion lower than planned as a result of the first round of mandatory spending cuts for a total of $83 billion in reduced spending. As a result of sequestration, the new FY 2013 defense budget will be over $100 billion less than what the Pentagon projected for its future defense spending just one year ago. Oh yes, lest we forget, DoD has already absorbed over $400 billion in cuts as a result of the force structure and procurement decisions taken by former Secretary of Defense Robert Gates.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00bbThe last time defense spending went down it came after a defense buildup which included a significant increase in acquisition. The Pentagon had been able to modernize its fleets of tactical fighters, strategic bombers, surface combatants, nuclear attack submarines and armored combat vehicles. Under Reagan the military was buying some 240 F-16s a year, more than all DoD’s aircraft purchases in 2011. Over the past decade, for example, the Air Force’s inventory of aircraft has actually declined by some 15 percent even as the average age has increased. The Pentagon essentially has lived off the Reagan build up for the last quarter century and now faces a procurement bow wave that it cannot avoid.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00bbThe last time defense spending went down the military had capacity it could shed, albeit only at the cost of extra wear and tear on the residual force. The Army went down by almost 60 percent from 18 divisions to 10, the Air Force by around 50 percent, from 36 wings to 20 and the Navy by nearly 40 per cent, from 546 to 298 ships. At the same time, however, the number of missions the military participated in went up four fold. This time around, cuts would reduce the Army to 4 divisions, the Air Force to 10 wings and the Navy to around 200 ships. However, the demands on that military, excluding Iraq and Afghanistan, have risen further under this Administration than its predecessors back to the Clinton Administration. Today there are even U.S. troops in Uganda. The U.S. military has taken increased responsibility for dealing with large-scale humanitarian problems at home and abroad. Regardless of who occupies the White House, this nation maintains a global foreign and security policy and wants a military that can support it.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00bbThe last time defense spending went down the threat was receding. The Soviet Union was on its last legs, Iraq had been thrown out of Kuwait and America, to use then-JCS Chairman General Colin Powel’s words, was having trouble finding enemies. Today this is not the case. China is a rising military power. Russia has plans to modernize all branches of its military. North Korea, Iran and Syria<\/em> <\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00bbThe last time defense spending went down the United States was in an entirely different economic situation. Deficits were a small part of the overall federal budget. The United States was the world’s premier manufacturing nation. The defense industrial base included a significant number of large prime contractors in each major sector (ships, aircraft, vehicles, etc.). The baby boomers were approaching the height of their productive years. Today, the United States has lost nearly a third of its manufacturing jobs.<\/em> [] The future of this country as an industrial and technological power is uncertain, at best.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00bbThe last time defense spending went down, everything was different. So too will be the consequences of catastrophic reductions in defense spending. This time they could be, well, truly<\/em> catastrophic.<\/em><\/strong>\u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tNous parlons ici, effectivement, d’une analyse relative<\/strong>, c’est-\u00e0-dire sans tenir compte de la hauteur du budget actuel du Pentagone ; cette hauteur est ph\u00e9nom\u00e9nale malgr\u00e9 les r\u00e9ductions en cours ou \u00e0 venir, mais il s’agit d’un autre probl\u00e8me. Ce qui nous importe concerne les capacit\u00e9s op\u00e9rationnelles r\u00e9elles des forces arm\u00e9es US, en fonction des deux situations consid\u00e9r\u00e9es (les ann\u00e9es 1990 et la p\u00e9riode pr\u00e9sente). A cet \u00e9gard, l’analyse de Goure est incontestablement juste et particuli\u00e8rement impressionnante. Il est vrai que la situation de base \u00e0 partir de laquelle s’effectuent ou vont s’effectuer les r\u00e9ductions budg\u00e9taires actuelles est catastrophique par rapport \u00e0 celle des ann\u00e9es 1990, et le contexte strat\u00e9gique compl\u00e8tement boulevers\u00e9, dans le sens des exigences op\u00e9rationnelles beaucoup plus importants, \u00e9galement par rapport \u00e0 celui des ann\u00e9es 1990. De ce point de vue, le qualificatif de catastrophique<\/strong> pour la situation actuelle et pour les ann\u00e9es \u00e0 venir est compl\u00e8tement justifi\u00e9.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tLe nud fondamental de cette situation, et de ce qualificatif justifi\u00e9 de catastrophique, est bien entendu dans les exigences que la politique strat\u00e9gique de l’actuelle direction am\u00e9ricaniste s’impose \u00e0 elle-m\u00eame. Si l’on prend par exemple le seul r\u00e9seau des bases ext\u00e9rieures qu’entretient le Pentagone (plus ou moins un millier), on trouve un \u00e9l\u00e9ment absolument impond\u00e9rable de blocage d’une part importante des d\u00e9penses \u00e0 un tr\u00e8s haut niveau. La m\u00eame chose peut \u00eatre dite pour les op\u00e9rations ext\u00e9rieures. C’est-\u00e0-dire que la politique ext\u00e9rieure des USA emprisonne les forces arm\u00e9es dans des frais fixes, compl\u00e8tement improductifs pour ce qui concerne les bases, du point de vue de la dynamique op\u00e9rationnel puisqu’il s’agit d’\u00e9l\u00e9ments statiques. Il peut \u00eatre r\u00e9pondu qu’il s’agit de r\u00e9seaux essentiels \u00e0 la s\u00e9curit\u00e9 des USA, si l’on adopte le point de vue belliciste maximaliste implicite au Syst\u00e8me, mais ces r\u00e9seaux n’ont d’utilit\u00e9 d\u00e9cisive que s’ils sont renforc\u00e9s par une activit\u00e9 op\u00e9rationnelle dynamique qu’il devient de plus en plus impossible de financer \u00e0 moins de prendre des budgets sur les \u00e9quipements, sur le volume des forces, etc. ; mais ces \u00e9quipements et volumes des forces (extr\u00eamement on\u00e9reux, sinon catastrophiques comme le JSF) sont \u00e0 leur tour indispensables pour nourrir une activit\u00e9 op\u00e9rationnelle dynamique, et ainsi de suite, en un parfait cercle vicieux. De plus, les faiblesses de ces diff\u00e9rents postes sont si grandes aujourd’hui qu’il s’agit effectivement de catastrophe (Les chiffres fournis dans ce qui r\u00e9sulte de cette situation, dans le volume des forces, sont extraordinairement significatifs : en vingt ans, de 546 \u00e0 200 navires de guerre pour la Navy, de 18 \u00e0 4 divisions pour l’Army, de 36 \u00e0 10 escadres pour l’Air Force)<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tTout le monde (particuli\u00e8rement les chefs militaires) est conscient de cette situation. Cela implique qu’il va y avoir au Congr\u00e8s, tout au long de 2012, une formidable bataille pour tenter d’emp\u00eacher la r\u00e9duction automatique de $650 milliards sur 10 ans pour le Pentagone. Pour y arriver, certains pr\u00e9voient une loi sp\u00e9ciale, mais cette loi n’est concevable que dans le cadre d’un accord g\u00e9n\u00e9ral, don on voit mal comment on pourrait l’atteindre puisque la super commission n’a pu r\u00e9ussir \u00e0 mettre au point ; cet accord g\u00e9n\u00e9ral est n\u00e9cessaire parce qu’Obama a annonc\u00e9 qu’il mettrait son veto \u00e0 toute tentative d’emp\u00eacher les r\u00e9ductions automatiques s’il n’y avait pas cet accord g\u00e9n\u00e9ral. (De ce point de vue, la d\u00e9cadence totale du personnage Obama dans le client\u00e9lisme et l’activit\u00e9 politicienne la plus basse a ses c\u00f4t\u00e9s involontairement vertueux : aujourd’hui, Obama ne s’int\u00e9resse plus qu’\u00e0 sa r\u00e9\u00e9lection, c’est-\u00e0-dire qu’il n’acceptera pas que les r\u00e9ductions budg\u00e9taires \u00e9pargnent le Pentagone et pas les programmes sociaux puisque son \u00e9lectorat r\u00e9clame ses programmes sociaux.) Aujourd’hui, les partisans d’un privil\u00e8ge pour le Pentagone ne sont certainement pas assez nombreux pour passer outre \u00e0 un veto pr\u00e9sidentiel (il fait les deux tiers du Congr\u00e8s), et il n’est m\u00eame pas assur\u00e9 que le parti r\u00e9publicain puisse pr\u00e9senter un front uni \u00e0 cet \u00e9gard, avec la pr\u00e9sence des parlementaires Tea Party<\/em> qui sont d’abord int\u00e9ress\u00e9s par une r\u00e9duction de la dette.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00abThis time they could be, well, truly<\/em> catastrophic.<\/em><\/strong>\u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

\tMis en ligne le 26 novembre 2011 \u00e0 11H31<\/p><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

Daniel Goure, du Lexington Institute, fait son devoir qui est de sonner en permanence l’alarme en ce qui concerne les r\u00e9ductions budg\u00e9taires qui vont affecter le Pentagone. Si l’on consid\u00e8re les faits (la comptabilit\u00e9, les effectifs, etc.) relativement, son alarme est justifi\u00e9e. Dans ce texte du 23 novembre 2011, sur le site Early Warning, Goure… <\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"","ping_status":"","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"neve_meta_sidebar":"","neve_meta_container":"","neve_meta_enable_content_width":"","neve_meta_content_width":0,"neve_meta_title_alignment":"","neve_meta_author_avatar":"","neve_post_elements_order":"","neve_meta_disable_header":"","neve_meta_disable_footer":"","neve_meta_disable_title":"","_jetpack_memberships_contains_paid_content":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[2],"tags":[3540,1463,3285,5252,3342,3923,8334,5545,3194,3487],"class_list":["post-74277","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-bloc-notes","tag-capacites","tag-commission","tag-congres","tag-dette","tag-gore","tag-institute","tag-lexington","tag-operationnelles","tag-pentagone","tag-super"],"jetpack_featured_media_url":"","jetpack_sharing_enabled":true,"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/74277","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=74277"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/74277\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=74277"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=74277"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=74277"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}