{"id":74424,"date":"2012-01-17T05:11:53","date_gmt":"2012-01-17T05:11:53","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/2012\/01\/17\/la-guerre-des-drones-fatalite-autodestructrice\/"},"modified":"2012-01-17T05:11:53","modified_gmt":"2012-01-17T05:11:53","slug":"la-guerre-des-drones-fatalite-autodestructrice","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/2012\/01\/17\/la-guerre-des-drones-fatalite-autodestructrice\/","title":{"rendered":"La guerre des drones<\/em>, fatalit\u00e9 autodestructrice"},"content":{"rendered":"

La guerre des drones<\/em>, fatalit\u00e9 autodestructrice<\/h3>\n<\/p>\n

\tLa guerre des drones<\/em> (UAS et UCAS pour Unmanned\/ Unmanned Combat air Vehicles) est devenue une tendance inarr\u00eatable des forces arm\u00e9es US, et une tendance qu’on doit qualifier, sans \u00e9tonnement particulier, d’autodestructrice. (Sans \u00e9tonnement puisque le drone<\/em> repr\u00e9sente une avanc\u00e9e de la surpuissance du technologisme, et que l’autodestruction n’est plus tr\u00e8s loin dans ce cas.) L’excellent Nick Turse analyse, pour Tom Engelhardt dans TomDispatch.com<\/em> du 16 janvier 2012<\/a>, le \u00abDrone Disaster<\/em>\u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tTurse a explor\u00e9 les donn\u00e9es du Pentagone sur l’emploi des drones<\/em> depuis 2001, \u00e0 travers des donn\u00e9es officielles obtenues gr\u00e2ce au Freedom Information Act. Son article est truff\u00e9 de r\u00e9f\u00e9rences officielles et autres et lui permettent d’aboutir \u00e0 la conclusion que le drone<\/em> est devenue l’arme de pr\u00e9dilection des forces arm\u00e9es, de la strat\u00e9gie g\u00e9n\u00e9rale des USA, voire de la politique ext\u00e9rieure elle-m\u00eame, cette politique achevant ainsi de se transformer en une politique ext\u00e9rieure compl\u00e8tement militaris\u00e9e et automatis\u00e9e. Actuellement, autour de 7.500 drones<\/em> de tous les types sont employ\u00e9s par les divers services arm\u00e9es, CIA, etc., y compris avec des pilotes appartenant au personnel des contractants civils qui fabriquent ces engins, ce qui revient \u00e0 confier l’acte de la guerre, dans sa conception, sa r\u00e9alisation et sa d\u00e9cision, \u00e0 du personnel hors de tous les engagements fondamentaux des forces arm\u00e9es. La conclusion de Nick Turse propose l’id\u00e9e d’une catastrophe g\u00e9n\u00e9rale, et dans ses processus, et dans ses r\u00e9sultats techniques et psychologiques. <\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00abOver the last decade, the United States has increasingly turned to drones in an effort to win its wars. The Air Force investigation files examined by TomDispatch suggest a more extensive use of drones in Iraq than has previously been reported. But in Iraq, as in Afghanistan, America’s preeminent wonder weapon failed to bring the U.S. mission anywhere close to victory. Effective as the spearhead of a program to cripple al-Qaeda in Pakistan, drone warfare in that country’s tribal borderlands has also alienated almost the entire population of 190 million. In other words, an estimated 2,000 suspected or identified guerrillas (as well as untold numbers of civilians) died. The populace of a key American ally grew ever more hostile and no one knows how many new militants in search of revenge the drone strikes may have created, though the numbers are believed to be significant.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00bbDespite a decade of technological, tactical, and strategic refinements and improvements, Air Force and allied CIA personnel watching computer monitors in distant locations have continually failed to discriminate between armed combatants and innocent civilians and, as a result, the judge-jury-executioner drone assassination program is widely considered to have run afoul of international law.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00bbIn addition, drone warfare seems to be creating a sinister system of embedded economic incentives that may lead to increasing casualty figures on the ground. In some targeting programs, staffers have review quotas — that is, they must review a certain number of possible targets per given length of time, The Atlantic’s Joshua Foust recently wrote of the private contractors involved in the process. Because they are contractors, he explains, their continued employment depends on their ability to satisfy the stated performance metrics. So they have a financial incentive to make life-or-death decisions about possible kill targets just to stay employed. This should be an intolerable situation, but because the system lacks transparency or outside review it is almost impossible to monitor or alter.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00bbAs flight hours rise year by year, these stark drawbacks are compounded by a series of technical glitches and vulnerabilities that are ever more regularly coming to light. These include: Iraqi insurgents hacking drone video feeds, a virulent computer virus infecting the Air Force’s unmanned fleet, large percentages of drone pilots suffering from \u00ab\u00a0high operational stress,\u00a0\u00bb a friendly fire incident in which drone operators killed two U.S. military personnel, increasing numbers of crashes, and the possibility of an Iranian drone-hijacking, as well as those more than 70 catastrophic mishaps detailed in Air Force accident investigation documents.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00bbOver the last decade, a more-is-better mentality has led to increased numbers of drones, drone bases, drone pilots, and drone victims, but not much else. Drones may be effective in terms of generating body counts, but they appear to be even more successful in generating animosity and creating enemies.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00bbThe Air Force’s accident reports are replete with evidence of the flaws inherent in drone technology, and there can be little doubt that, in the future, ever more will come to light. A decade’s worth of futility suggests that drone warfare itself may already be crashing and burning, yet it seems destined that the skies will fill with drones and that the future will bring more of the same.<\/em>\u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tIl est incontestable que les forces arm\u00e9es US se robotisent avec une rapidit\u00e9 extraordinaire, montrant par l\u00e0 qu’il s’agit de la tendance majeure et fondamentale de ce syst\u00e8me militariste et belliciste. Dans son texte, Turse cite un article de Danger Room<\/em> du 9 janvier 2012<\/a> sur le nombre des drones<\/em> (7.500) et la signification de ce nombre, compar\u00e9s aux un peu plus de 10.000 avions employ\u00e9s par les militaires, de tous les types, jusqu’aux plus vieux, y compris l’un ou l’autre C-47 Dakota<\/em> conserv\u00e9s dans des versions sp\u00e9ciales :<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00abTo be fair, lots of those drones are tiny flying spies, like the Army’s Raven, that could never accommodate even the most diminutive pilot. (Specifically, the Army has 5,346 Ravens, making it the most numerous military drone by far.) But in 2005, only five percent of military aircraft were robots, a report by the Congressional Research Service notes. Barely seven years later, the military has 7,494 drones. Total number of old school, manned aircraft: 10,767 planes.<\/em>\u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tIl s’agit d’une tendance effectivement irr\u00e9sistible qui d\u00e9personnalise compl\u00e8tement la fonction et la substance m\u00eame de l’avion militaire, ou du v\u00e9hicule a\u00e9rien en g\u00e9n\u00e9ral. Le fait que certains drones<\/em> soient confi\u00e9s \u00e0 des contractants civils a une toute autre signification que l’emploi de forces de combat non-militaires (contractants civils, type mercenaires), car il s’agit de tout un processus militaire technologique et op\u00e9rationnel qui \u00e9chappe \u00e0 l’autorit\u00e9 op\u00e9rationnelle, depuis sa mise en uvre \u00e0 partir du territoire nationale jusqu’\u00e0 son utilisation qui entra\u00eene en g\u00e9n\u00e9ral la mort d’\u00eatres humains et de destructions sous la forme d’une agression en g\u00e9n\u00e9ral ill\u00e9gale, dans des pays \u00e9trangers et qui ne sont pas en guerre avec les USA, pur acte de piraterie et banditisme. Dans cette chaine, les concepts de souverainet\u00e9 et de l\u00e9gitimit\u00e9 ont compl\u00e8tement<\/strong> disparu et, par cons\u00e9quent, les id\u00e9es d’autorit\u00e9 et de responsabilit\u00e9 publiques. Le corollaire, comme il est signal\u00e9 dans le texte, est que l’incitation principale pour ces actions de guerre devient l’int\u00e9r\u00eat priv\u00e9, la justification du salaire, etc. La guerre est privatis\u00e9e au-del\u00e0 de tout ce qui a \u00e9t\u00e9 con\u00e7u jusqu’ici, et repr\u00e9sente un mouvement convaincant d’abandon volontaire de souverainet\u00e9 et de l\u00e9gitimit\u00e9 de la puissance publique, dans l’acte le plus fondamental de cette puissance publique, selon un processus d\u00e9j\u00e0 largement identifi\u00e9 (voir notre F&C<\/em> du 2 novembre 2011<\/a>). Il est peu utile de rappeler toutes les cons\u00e9quences op\u00e9rationnelles et psychologiques catastrophiques de cette tendance, Turse et bien d’autres s’y emploient avec efficacit\u00e9, tandis que l’\u00e9vidence m\u00eame soutient leurs observations.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tOn observera qu’on se trouve l\u00e0 au terme du processus de surpuissance du syst\u00e8me du technologisme, lorsque tout<\/strong> le processus de la guerre \u00e0 l’\u00e9chelle globale et selon des principes d’intervention sans aucun frein politique et l\u00e9gal est ma\u00eetris\u00e9 par la technologie elle-m\u00eame. Le r\u00e9sultat catastrophique qui est constat\u00e9 par Turse, et encore, selon des documents officiels qui sont tr\u00e8s loin de tout nous dire \u00e0 ce propos, d’apr\u00e8s des sources officielles qui sont elles-m\u00eames bien loin de tout savoir de ces effets catastrophiques, implique sans l’ombre d’un doute que cette avanc\u00e9e du syst\u00e8me du technologisme est du type final, et qu’elle est directement transform\u00e9e, par ses effets, en processus d’autodestruction, \u00e0 mesure des destructions caus\u00e9es et de leurs effets fratricides et contre-productifs \u00e9vidents. La perspective est celle de lacc\u00e9l\u00e9ration non pas progressive, mais exponentielle de la tendance, rendant compte du total effondrement en cours du syst\u00e8me militariste de l’am\u00e9ricanisme, et du Syst\u00e8me lui-m\u00eame.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

\tMis en ligne le 17 janvier 2012 \u00e0 05H14<\/p><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

La guerre des drones, fatalit\u00e9 autodestructrice La guerre des drones (UAS et UCAS pour Unmanned\/ Unmanned Combat air Vehicles) est devenue une tendance inarr\u00eatable des forces arm\u00e9es US, et une tendance qu’on doit qualifier, sans \u00e9tonnement particulier, d’autodestructrice. (Sans \u00e9tonnement puisque le drone repr\u00e9sente une avanc\u00e9e de la surpuissance du technologisme, et que l’autodestruction n’est… <\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"","ping_status":"","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"neve_meta_sidebar":"","neve_meta_container":"","neve_meta_enable_content_width":"","neve_meta_content_width":0,"neve_meta_title_alignment":"","neve_meta_author_avatar":"","neve_post_elements_order":"","neve_meta_disable_header":"","neve_meta_disable_footer":"","neve_meta_disable_title":"","_jetpack_memberships_contains_paid_content":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[2],"tags":[4270,2932,2651,1381,11131,3014,4268,6843,11807,11808],"class_list":["post-74424","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-bloc-notes","tag-autodestruction","tag-drone","tag-du","tag-engelhardt","tag-surpuissance","tag-systeme","tag-technologisme","tag-turse","tag-uas","tag-ucas"],"jetpack_featured_media_url":"","jetpack_sharing_enabled":true,"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/74424","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=74424"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/74424\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=74424"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=74424"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=74424"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}