{"id":74431,"date":"2012-01-19T12:34:00","date_gmt":"2012-01-19T12:34:00","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/2012\/01\/19\/iran-meme-lestablishment-us-sinterroge-furieusement\/"},"modified":"2012-01-19T12:34:00","modified_gmt":"2012-01-19T12:34:00","slug":"iran-meme-lestablishment-us-sinterroge-furieusement","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/2012\/01\/19\/iran-meme-lestablishment-us-sinterroge-furieusement\/","title":{"rendered":"Iran : m\u00eame l&rsquo;<em>establishment<\/em> US s&rsquo;interroge furieusement"},"content":{"rendered":"<p><p>En fait de s&rsquo;interroger, c&rsquo;est bien plus que cela, si l&rsquo;on se r\u00e9f\u00e8re \u00e0 l&rsquo;article de Leslie Gelb, publi\u00e9 sur <em>Daily Beast<\/em> le <a href=\"http:\/\/www.thedailybeast.com\/articles\/2012\/01\/16\/leslie-h-gelb-think-before-acting-on-iran.html\" class=\"gen\">17 janvier 2012<\/a>, signal\u00e9 par John Glaser de <em>Antiwar.com<\/em> le <a href=\"http:\/\/www.antiwar.com\/blog\/2012\/01\/18\/even-the-establishment-doesnt-want-war-with-iran\/\" class=\"gen\">18 janvier 2012<\/a>, \u00e9galement comment\u00e9 par l&rsquo;ancien analyste de la CIA et sp\u00e9cialiste de l&rsquo;Iran Paul Pillar, le <a href=\"http:\/\/nationalinterest.org\/blog\/paul-pillar\/shooting-first-asking-questions-later-6380\" class=\"gen\">18 janvier 2012<\/a>, sur le site de <em>The National Interest<\/em>.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\tGelb d\u00e9nonce furieusement l&rsquo;actuelle pouss\u00e9e vers une guerre contre l&rsquo;Iran. Glaser met en \u00e9vidence l&rsquo;importance de cette intervention, en raison de l&rsquo;importance du personnage au sein de l&rsquo;<em>establishment<\/em> :<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\t\u00ab<em>Leslie Gelb, President Emeritus and Board Senior Fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations, has a piece at the Daily Beast which warns not just against starting a war with Iran, but against letting a bunch of ignorant, sloppy-thinking politicians and politicized foreign-policy experts draw red line&rsquo; ultimatums and march us hyperventilating into an unprovoked preemptive strike on Iran. His key point: in the past, Americans have had faith that their leaders knew what they were doing getting us into war, but history tells us they don&rsquo;t know shit.<\/em> []<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\t\u00bb<em>The whole thing is worth a read. I think it&rsquo;s noteworthy because it illustrates that even many of those firmly within the foreign policy establishment of imperial forever war are cautioning against the psychotic babble of warmongering politicians<\/em>\u00bb <\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\tLeslie Gelb est effectivement un personnage important de l&rsquo;<em>establishment<\/em>. Pillar r\u00e9sume bien cette qualification de Leslie Gelb, et l&rsquo;influence qui va avec au sein de l&rsquo;<em>establishment<\/em>, notamment sa position \u00e0 la t\u00eate du Council of Foreign Relations pendant plusieurs ann\u00e9es et les positions qu&rsquo;il y conserve : \u00ab<em>Gelb is well qualified to make such observations, based on his experience in directing the writing of the Pentagon Papers as well as his later work as a journalist, State Department official and president of the Council on Foreign Relations.<\/em>\u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\tDans son article, Gelb examine avec une plume impitoyable la fa\u00e7on dont l&rsquo;Am\u00e9rique \u00e9volue vers la guerre, emmen\u00e9e par ces politiciens ignorants des mati\u00e8res de politique ext\u00e9rieure et seulement pr\u00e9occup\u00e9s de leurs int\u00e9r\u00eats divers, \u00e9lectoraux et autres, et par la bande habituelle des fauteurs de guerre. Il pose les nombreuses questions que soul\u00e8vent aussi bien l&rsquo;affaire du d\u00e9troit d&rsquo;Ormouz que celle du nucl\u00e9aire iranien, et il rappelle divers pr\u00e9c\u00e9dents o\u00f9 une analyse rationnelle de divers conflits vinrent trop tard pour emp\u00eacher les USA de s&rsquo;y plonger, avec la d\u00e9faite au terme.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\t\u00ab<em> On the surface, the strait question is open and shut. If Tehran violates a fundamental principle of international law and closes an international waterway, that waterway must be reopened by whatever force necessary. My gut reaction is right there. But then the questions arise: Why does this burden fall almost entirely on the United States? What of the other states that buy and sell the Gulf oil that moves through the strait? How long will it take, and at what cost, to reopen the strait and keep it open? Is it necessary to attack shore targets to accomplish the job? How far ashore? And what of economic destruction and, above all, civilian casualties? Is such a military action likely to convince the Iranians that they must acquire nuclear weapons, or would it dissuade them? Would a U.S.-led naval action in the strait make it more likely that Israel would use this as cover to launch a full-scale attack against Iranian nuclear facilities? And would this broader action trigger Iranian retaliation against both Israel and the United States? There are no hard and fast answers to most of these queries. And yes, some military plans would be aired partially to Tehran&rsquo;s advantage. Nevertheless, their being raised and addressed gives Americans a much clearer sense of what they&rsquo;re getting intoand, more, compels Congress and the executive branch to think much harder about their intended actions. Often, administrations don&rsquo;t answer the toughest questions themselves until they have to, until it&rsquo;s too late.<\/em>\u00bb []<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\t\u00bb<em>The Senate Foreign Relations Committee or some public commission has to pose the tough questions here: Do we really know enough to hit and destroy the key underground targets? If not, why go ahead? How long will it take for Tehran to rebuild the facilities and make them less vulnerable? What&rsquo;s the potential for collateral damage on oil prices and lives? If Washington doesn&rsquo;t use force, will Israel go it alone, and will Tehran regard this as a quasi-American attack anyway? If Iran actually acquired nukes, why wouldn&rsquo;t prospects of an overwhelming Israeli or American attack in a crisis deter it? Iranian leaders haven&rsquo;t acted like crazy Hitlers. They&rsquo;ve been pretty cautious, forever issuing threats and making trouble behind the scenes, which suggests they&rsquo;re deterrable. Would war on Iran trigger worldwide terrorist attacks? Is it in the overall interests of the United States, given our worldwide security needs and economic weaknesses, to enter another war? And don&rsquo;t fool yourselves, this would be war.<\/em> []<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\t\u00bb<em>Senator J. William Fulbright&rsquo;s brilliant hearings on Vietnam and the James Baker\/Lee Hamilton Iraq Study Group both came far too late to save us. But there&rsquo;s still time now for a full-scale, nonpartisan, and systematic examination of policy. Don&rsquo;t let the usual hawks stop us with the argument that we&rsquo;d be giving away too much information and signaling weakness to the enemy. What we&rsquo;d truly be giving away if we heeded these hawks is not our military plans, but our constitutional and democratic rights to freely and openly debate whether our sons and daughters once again must fight and die.<\/em>\u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\tCette intervention est importante parce que Gelb est ce qu&rsquo;il est, avec l&rsquo;influence qu&rsquo;il a et ainsi de suite. Sa forme d&rsquo;intervention ressemble, dans l&rsquo;esprit de la chose, \u00e0 celle de Brent Scowcroft et de James Baker, qui conduisit \u00e0 la mise en place du Iraq Study Group en 2006 (que Gelb cite justement), qui fut la principale r\u00e9volte de tout un courant de l&rsquo;<em>establishment<\/em> contre la folie de la guerre irakienne. La situation strat\u00e9gique et belliciste est bien entendu diff\u00e9rente, puisqu&rsquo;il n&rsquo;y a pas d&rsquo;engagement en Iran comme il y avait un engagement en Irak en 2006 quand le groupe fut constitu\u00e9, mais la similitude se trouve effectivement dans la duplication de la situation dans l&rsquo;<em>establishment<\/em>. Il y a toutes les chances pour que Gelb s&rsquo;engage, avec un tel article qui est bien plus pol\u00e9mique qu&rsquo;analytique, dans une action qui a le soutien d&rsquo;une partie non n\u00e9gligeable de l&rsquo;<em>establishment<\/em>, celle qui fait des comptes, mesure l&rsquo;effondrement de l&rsquo;influence et de la puissance US dans le monde, et qui s&rsquo;effraie des cons\u00e9quences terribles d&rsquo;un tel \u00e9ventuel conflit avec l&rsquo;Iran. Cela, sans aucun doute, constitue le point principal caract\u00e9risant, du point de vue politique, l&rsquo;intervention de Leslie Gelb.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\tD&rsquo;un autre c\u00f4t\u00e9, on doit aussi remarquer que, paradoxalement, les conditions g\u00e9n\u00e9rales pr\u00e9valant aujourd&rsquo;hui alors que se d\u00e9veloppe, ou se poursuit simplement cette crise iranienne, sont tr\u00e8s diff\u00e9rentes de celles qui pr\u00e9valaient en 2006, alors que se poursuivait la guerre en Irak. On a l&rsquo;impression que Gelb d\u00e9crit une situation beaucoup plus folle dans ses tenants et aboutissants, notamment du c\u00f4t\u00e9 des directions et des influences \u00e0 Washington. Il ne suffit pas d&rsquo;accuser, d&rsquo;une fa\u00e7on g\u00e9n\u00e9rale, les politiciens compl\u00e8tement ignorants et la bande habituelle des fauteurs de guerre pour mieux situer le probl\u00e8me, car ces accusations ne font en fait que r\u00e9sumer d&rsquo;une mani\u00e8re un peu plus polic\u00e9e le d\u00e9sordre extraordinaire qui r\u00e8gne \u00e0 Washington, aussi bien qu&rsquo;entre les divers pays concern\u00e9s, \u00e0 propos de cette affaire iranienne. En lisant le texte de Gelb, on ne peut s&rsquo;interdire de l&rsquo;impression qu&rsquo;il d\u00e9crit une machinerie folle, que plus personne ne contr\u00f4le,  le Syst\u00e8me et rien d&rsquo;autre, bien entendu, en train de poursuivre son \u00e9volution suicidaire d&rsquo;une dynamique de surpuissance se transformant en une dynamique autodestructrice ; on a l&rsquo;impression que ce que Gelb nous d\u00e9crit finalement, c&rsquo;est beaucoup moins la folie d&rsquo;une \u00e9ventuelle attaque contre l&rsquo;Iran que la folie de la situation \u00e0 Washington qui accouche, notamment, de ce monstre qu&rsquo;est la rh\u00e9torique enivr\u00e9e d&rsquo;une attaque contre l&rsquo;Iran. (Il suffit de lire la plaidoirie de la pr\u00e9sidente de la commission des relations ext\u00e9rieures de la Chambre, Ileana Ros-Lehtinen d\u00e9non\u00e7ant comme une absurdit\u00e9 meurtri\u00e8re la possibilit\u00e9 de reprendre des n\u00e9gociations avec l&rsquo;Iran [sur AFP\/<em>Spacewar.com<\/em>, le <a href=\"http:\/\/www.spacewar.com\/reports\/US_says_Iran_feeling_heat_after_Russia_criticism_999.html\" class=\"gen\">18 janvier 2012<\/a>] pour mesurer le degr\u00e9 de volatilit\u00e9, d&rsquo;irresponsabilit\u00e9 hyst\u00e9rique et d&rsquo;incontr\u00f4labilit\u00e9 de la situation washingtonienne.)<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\tDe ce point de vue, l&rsquo;intervention de Gelb, aussi bien intentionn\u00e9e soit-elle du point de vue de l&rsquo;<em>establishment<\/em> et des mod\u00e9r\u00e9s qui pensent qu&rsquo;il vaut mieux \u00e9viter un conflit parce que les risques sont trop grands pour les USA, ne fera qu&rsquo;accentuer le d\u00e9sordre entre les diff\u00e9rentes fractions. La situation est si d\u00e9sordonn\u00e9e et si fluctuante d&rsquo;un extr\u00eame \u00e0 l&rsquo;autre qu&rsquo;on trouvera sans doute rapidement une ligne de critique pour mettre sur le m\u00eame plan Gelb et ce qu&rsquo;il repr\u00e9sente, et Ron Paul,  alors que les diff\u00e9rences entre eux sont si fondamentales,  pour les accuser d&rsquo;\u00eatre munichois et tra\u00eetres vendus aux Iraniens. Cela, en retour, ne fera que renforcer plus encore la d\u00e9termination des adversaires d&rsquo;une attaque, et rien ne sera encore r\u00e9solu. Il est difficile de concevoir ce qui peut changer cet extr\u00e9misme dans tous les sens du d\u00e9sordre de Washington, sans pourtant avancer en aucune fa\u00e7on que l&rsquo;issue de la guerre en est l&rsquo;in\u00e9vitable aboutissement.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><\/p>\n<p><p>\tMis en ligne le 19 janvier 2012 \u00e0 12H34<\/p><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>En fait de s&rsquo;interroger, c&rsquo;est bien plus que cela, si l&rsquo;on se r\u00e9f\u00e8re \u00e0 l&rsquo;article de Leslie Gelb, publi\u00e9 sur Daily Beast le 17 janvier 2012, signal\u00e9 par John Glaser de Antiwar.com le 18 janvier 2012, \u00e9galement comment\u00e9 par l&rsquo;ancien analyste de la CIA et sp\u00e9cialiste de l&rsquo;Iran Paul Pillar, le 18 janvier 2012, sur&hellip;&nbsp;<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"","ping_status":"","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"neve_meta_sidebar":"","neve_meta_container":"","neve_meta_enable_content_width":"","neve_meta_content_width":0,"neve_meta_title_alignment":"","neve_meta_author_avatar":"","neve_post_elements_order":"","neve_meta_disable_header":"","neve_meta_disable_footer":"","neve_meta_disable_title":"","_jetpack_memberships_contains_paid_content":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[2],"tags":[11460,3356,5734,4118,3763,14569,4142,2773,14570,3961,13583,9975,14571,3248],"class_list":["post-74431","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-bloc-notes","tag-dautodestruction","tag-desordre","tag-dynamique","tag-establishment","tag-gelb","tag-glaser","tag-group","tag-iran","tag-iraq","tag-john","tag-leslie","tag-ormouz","tag-study","tag-washington"],"jetpack_featured_media_url":"","jetpack_sharing_enabled":true,"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/74431","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=74431"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/74431\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=74431"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=74431"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=74431"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}