Un ph\u00e9nom\u00e8ne int\u00e9ressant, comme tout ce qui nous vient des USA, bien s\u00fbr, se d\u00e9veloppe \u00e0 Washington, ajoutant au d\u00e9sordre extraordinaire qui caract\u00e9rise la crise iranienne. (Ce dernier constat, en introduction, nous donnera \u00e9galement notre conclusion…) Les bruits de botte divers, et de plus en plus souvent mena\u00e7ants et surr\u00e9alistes \u00e0 la fois, qui caract\u00e9risent la crise du c\u00f4t\u00e9 du bloc BAO, suscitent d\u00e9sormais une opposition s\u00e9rieuse dans l’establishment<\/em> washingtonien. La chose est partie de l’article de Leslie Gelb (voir le 19 janvier 2012<\/a>). Elle s’est remarquablement amplifi\u00e9e ces dix derniers jours jusqu’\u00e0 atteindre l’allure d’une tendance fondamentale qui p\u00e8se lourd, d\u00e9sormais, \u00e0 c\u00f4t\u00e9 du r\u00e9flexe-Syst\u00e8me de la guerre \u00e0 tout prix et en d\u00e9pit de tout.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n \tJim Lobe en fait un compte-rendu minutieux ce \t\u00abOn the pages of The New Republic, Kenneth Pollack, a former top CIA analyst at the Brookings Institution whose 2002 book, The Threatening Storm: The Case for Invading Iraq, was cited frequently by liberal hawks before the war, argued not only against any further escalation, but also suggested that the sanctions track on which the Barack Obama administration and the European Union have increasingly relied was proving counterproductive <\/em>[]<\/p>\n<\/p>\n \t\u00bbMeanwhile, another influential liberal hawk, Princeton Prof. Anne-Marie Slaughter, argued in project-syndicate.org that the West and Iran were playing a dangerous game of chicken and that the West’s current course leaves Iran’s government no alternative between publicly backing down, which it will not do, and escalating its provocations. The more publicly the West threatens Iran, the more easily Iranian leaders can portray America as the Great Satan to parts of the Iranian population that have recently been inclined to see the U.S. as their friend, wrote Slaughter, who stepped down as director of the policy planning office under Secretary of State Hillary Clinton. It is time for cooler heads to prevail with a strategy that helps Iran step back, she added, suggesting that the aborted Turkish-Brazilian 2010 effort at mediation between the P5+1 and Iran be revived<\/em> [] <\/p>\n<\/p>\n \t\u00bbYet another Iraq hawk, New York Times columnist Bill Keller, attacked the Foreign Affairs article, assuring his readers that Kroenig’s former colleagues at the Pentagon were pretty appalled by his article, which combines the alarmist worst case of the Iranian nuclear threat with the rosiest best case of America’s ability to make things better.<\/em> []<\/p>\n<\/p>\n \t\u00bbIndeed, in a reply to Kroenig entitled Not Time to Attack Iran, Colin Kahl, who had also just left the Pentagon at the end of December after two years as the head of Middle East policy, argued that Kroenig’s picture of a clean, calibrated conflict is a mirage. Any war with Iran would be a messy and extraordinarily violent affair, with significant casualties and consequences.<\/em> []<\/p>\n<\/p>\n \t\u00bbIndeed, much of Kahl’s analysis was subsequently backed up by Gen. Michael Hayden (ret.), who, as the head of the Central Intelligence Agency during George W. Bush’s second term, could hardly be called a liberal. According to the Cable’ blog on foreign policy.com, Hayden, who served as the head of the Pentagon’s National Security Agency from 1999 to 2005, told a small group convened at the Center for National Interest last week that top Bush national security officials had concluded that a military strike on Iran’s nuclear facilities whether by Israel or the U.S. would be counter-productive. The Israelis, he reportedly said, aren’t going to (attack Iran) They can’t do it, it’s beyond their capacity. They only have the ability to make this (problem of Iran’s nuclear program) worse.<\/em>\u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n \tBref, la guerre contre l’Iran n’est pas une balade facile \u00e0 vendre, malgr\u00e9 les couleurs exaltantes que lui trouve la cohorte des pro-guerres. Les arguments d\u00e9velopp\u00e9s par les adversaires d’un conflit sont tous connus et \u00e9vidents, avec tout de m\u00eame l’heureuse surprise de voir la r\u00e9apparition dans la m\u00e9moire historique r\u00e9cente de l’initiative Br\u00e9sil-Turquie de la fin du printemps 2010, qui avait \u00e9t\u00e9 compl\u00e8tement enfouie dans une sorte de rubrique des non-\u00e9v\u00e9nements dans les analyses officielles. (Rappel de cette affaire par Anne-Marie Slaughter, qui vient du d\u00e9partement d’Etat.)<\/p>\n<\/p>\n \tPour le reste, nous voulons dire d’une fa\u00e7on plus fondamentale, cette pouss\u00e9e d’opposition \u00e0 la guerre en Iran n’a pas de grande signification logique ni d’effet coh\u00e9rent \u00e0 faire esp\u00e9rer, simplement parce qu’il n’y a aucune logique dans cette affaire mais un immense d\u00e9sordre, et qu’un tel d\u00e9sordre n’est certainement pas un r\u00e9ceptacle accueillant pour un effet coh\u00e9rent. Tout au plus, mais ce n’est pas rien, apr\u00e8s tout, peut-on attendre que l’entr\u00e9e en sc\u00e8ne d’un parti antiguerre sur la sc\u00e8ne de l’establishment<\/em> washingtonien rende l’issue de ce d\u00e9sordre monumental encore plus incertaine, encore plus insaisissable, encore plus floue… On peut m\u00eame avancer l’hypoth\u00e8se qu’au terme d’un certain degr\u00e9 d’intensit\u00e9 et d’agitation de d\u00e9sordre, duquel cette intervention des antiguerres nous rapproche peut-\u00eatre d\u00e9cisivement, on pourrait envisager une situation o\u00f9 il n’y aurait plus d’issue du tout \u00e0 attendre dans cette crise iranienne, dans sa dimension washingtonienne, que cette crise s’installerait d\u00e9finitivement dans le cadre plus vaste de la crise multiforme de l’am\u00e9ricanisme, contribuant d’une fa\u00e7on notablement efficace \u00e0 l’acc\u00e9l\u00e9ration de la dissolution du pouvoir am\u00e9ricaniste, et de la chute du syst\u00e8me de l’am\u00e9ricanisme en g\u00e9n\u00e9ral par cons\u00e9quent. On sait qu’un n\u00e9o-s\u00e9cessionniste du Maine, Thomas Naylor, avait estim\u00e9<\/a> qu’une guerre contre l’Iran serait un des deux ou trois sc\u00e9narios possibles menant \u00e0 la dislocation et \u00e0 l’effondrement de l’empire ; sans r\u00e9futer cette th\u00e8se en aucune fa\u00e7on, et m\u00eame en la renfor\u00e7ant apr\u00e8s tout, on pourrait avancer au del\u00e0 et dire qu’une guerre contre l’Iran sans guerre r\u00e9elle contre l’Iran, simplement par le d\u00e9sordre qu’engendre sa seule perspective au sein du Syst\u00e8me, pourrait apr\u00e8s tout suffire \u00e0 la phase finale de la Chute (celle du Syst\u00e8me), avec la dislocation de l’empire. <\/p>\n<\/p>\n <\/p>\n \tMis en ligne le 28 janvier 2012 \u00e0 13H41<\/p><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":" Un ph\u00e9nom\u00e8ne int\u00e9ressant, comme tout ce qui nous vient des USA, bien s\u00fbr, se d\u00e9veloppe \u00e0 Washington, ajoutant au d\u00e9sordre extraordinaire qui caract\u00e9rise la crise iranienne. (Ce dernier constat, en introduction, nous donnera \u00e9galement notre conclusion…) Les bruits de botte divers, et de plus en plus souvent mena\u00e7ants et surr\u00e9alistes \u00e0 la fois, qui caract\u00e9risent… <\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"","ping_status":"","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"neve_meta_sidebar":"","neve_meta_container":"","neve_meta_enable_content_width":"","neve_meta_content_width":0,"neve_meta_title_alignment":"","neve_meta_author_avatar":"","neve_post_elements_order":"","neve_meta_disable_header":"","neve_meta_disable_footer":"","neve_meta_disable_title":"","_jetpack_memberships_contains_paid_content":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[2],"tags":[4721,3008,2863,2773,2819,1094,5769,9339],"class_list":["post-74459","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-bloc-notes","tag-affairs","tag-antiguerres","tag-foreign","tag-iran","tag-jim","tag-lobe","tag-pro-guerre","tag-washingtonien"],"jetpack_featured_media_url":"","jetpack_sharing_enabled":true,"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/74459","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=74459"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/74459\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=74459"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=74459"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=74459"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}