9 f\u00e9vrier 2012<\/a>.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n\t\u00abIndia figured as Iran’s number one crude oil customer in January. That may be difficult to believe but it is indeed a statement of fact. Actually, India stepped up its imports of Iranian oil by 37.5 percent, which helped Iran offset a 50 percent cut in Chinese purchases resulting from a dispute in pricing. China now imports around 250000 barrels a day as against India’s 550000 barrels a day, according to a Wall Street Journal report.<\/em> <\/p>\n<\/p>\n\t\u00bbOf course, what stands out is that New Delhi’s Iran policy is crystallising. India will concentrate on its self-interests in a highly fluid regional security scenario without in the least being ideological about the winds of change blowing through that region. This is the message one gets. Indeed, the US-Iran standoff is primarily geopolitical and it doesn’t concern India, which is in any case not in the business of regime change’.<\/em> []<\/p>\n<\/p>\n\t\u00bbHowever, what Washington overlooks is that India’s economic relationship with Iran as such is also at stake here. Without oil imports, India-Iran trade virtually packs up. Delhi’s robust efforts to work out a reliable payment mechanism for the trade with Iran underscores that it intends to not only sustain the present level of trade but do all it can to boost the trade by stepping up India’s exports to Iran. The government is mounting a huge business delegation to Iran in end-February to explore the opportunities for tapping those sectors that are being vacated by the western countries following their embargo against Iran. It is a long-term approach that India is adopting, keeping in view the fact that Iran is a rich country potentially which offers a big market for India’s exports.<\/em> <\/p>\n<\/p>\n\t\u00bbThe new payment mechanism providing for 45% of Iranian oil to be settled for in Indian rupees opens up interesting possibilities. Of course, Iran has the option to leave the money in the Indian state-owned UCO Bank at an interest rate of 4% or so. But to obviate currency risks, Iran may perhaps prefer to use the money to import from India or to use India as a trading hub to buy from third countries. Iran also can invest the money in Indian bonds or equities, which Delhi might welcome. In sum, the payment mechanism acts as a catalyst to build up the momentum of economic ties as well as broadening and deepening the partnership.<\/em>\u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n\n
dedefensa.org<\/em><\/p><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"Inde et Iran vers un partenariat strat\u00e9gique L’excellent commentateur (ancien diplomate) indien M K Bhadrakumar pr\u00e9sente des perspectives nouvelles de renforcement cons\u00e9quent des relations commerciales entre l’Inde et l’Iran. Un accord vient d’\u00eatre sign\u00e9 entre les deux pays sur le r\u00e8glement du p\u00e9trole iranien par l’Inde. (\u00d4 surprise, observe M K Bhadrakumar, en janvier l’Inde… <\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"","ping_status":"","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"neve_meta_sidebar":"","neve_meta_container":"","neve_meta_enable_content_width":"","neve_meta_content_width":0,"neve_meta_title_alignment":"","neve_meta_author_avatar":"","neve_post_elements_order":"","neve_meta_disable_header":"","neve_meta_disable_footer":"","neve_meta_disable_title":"","footnotes":""},"categories":[14],"tags":[3378,2773,9606,14628],"class_list":["post-74488","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-ouverture-libre","tag-inde","tag-iran","tag-or","tag-poetrole"],"jetpack_featured_media_url":"","_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/74488","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=74488"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/74488\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=74488"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=74488"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=74488"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}