{"id":74493,"date":"2012-02-13T06:00:57","date_gmt":"2012-02-13T06:00:57","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/2012\/02\/13\/liran-le-petrole-et-le-detroit-dormouz\/"},"modified":"2012-02-13T06:00:57","modified_gmt":"2012-02-13T06:00:57","slug":"liran-le-petrole-et-le-detroit-dormouz","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/2012\/02\/13\/liran-le-petrole-et-le-detroit-dormouz\/","title":{"rendered":"L&rsquo;Iran, le p\u00e9trole et le d\u00e9troit d&rsquo;Ormouz"},"content":{"rendered":"<p><h4>L&rsquo;Iran, le p\u00e9trole et le d\u00e9troit d&rsquo;Ormouz<\/h4>\n<p>Le <LIEN=http:\/\/www.presstv.ir\/detail\/225644.html>8 f\u00e9vrier 2012, <em>PressTV.com<\/em> a publi\u00e9 quelques observations d&rsquo;analystes experts des questions p\u00e9troli\u00e8res, \u00e0 propos de la situation de l&rsquo;alimentation en p\u00e9trole en cas de fermeture du d\u00e9troit d&rsquo;Ormouz, ou d&rsquo;entraves majeures provoquant une interruption de la navigation. On sait que le libre passage dans le d\u00e9troit d&rsquo;Ormouz est l&rsquo;un des points principaux d&rsquo;une riposte de l&rsquo;Iran en cas d&rsquo;attaque contre ce pays, pour provoquer une crise majeure de l&rsquo;alimentation mondiale et du prix du p\u00e9trole.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\tLe facteur op\u00e9rationnel principal de cette situation est la r\u00e9duction de livraison de p\u00e9trole \u00e0 cause de la situation g\u00e9n\u00e9rale dans la crise iranienne (embargo, op\u00e9rations militaires, etc.). Diverses hypoth\u00e8ses ont \u00e9t\u00e9 d\u00e9velopp\u00e9es autour de cette situation, notamment la possible augmentation de production de p\u00e9trole par l&rsquo;Arabie pour redresser la situation cr\u00e9\u00e9e, soit par l&#8217;embargo contre l&rsquo;Iran, soit par les suites d&rsquo;une attaque contre l&rsquo;Iran, soit par les deux. Cela suppose que des voies alternatives au d\u00e9troit d&rsquo;Ormouz soient trouv\u00e9es.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\tCe que veut montrer cette rapide analyse, c&rsquo;est que le d\u00e9troit d&rsquo;Ormouz reste n\u00e9cessairement le goulot d&rsquo;\u00e9tranglement de l&rsquo;alimentation en p\u00e9trole du Golfe, notamment par l&rsquo;extr\u00eame difficult\u00e9 de trouver justement des voies alternatives si cette voie de passage est entrav\u00e9e par une situation de conflit. La situation du d\u00e9troit d&rsquo;Ormouz resterait la clef de l&rsquo;ordre et du d\u00e9sordre dans l&rsquo;alimentation mondiale de p\u00e9trole. <\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\t\u00ab<em>Peter Sand, a chief shipping analyst at The Baltic and International Maritime Council, told Dow Jones that the use of longer alternate routes to carry oil shipments will increase transportation costs and cause oil to eventually reach the market at a time lag and in insufficient quantities.<\/em>  []<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\t\u00bb<em>Paul Domjan, advisor to Securing America&rsquo;s Future Energy (SAFE), an organization committed to combating US oil dependence, says most oil that could realistically be diverted through pipelines is 4.5 to 5 million bpd even in the best-case scenario. Even in that case, he added, there would still be an estimated shortfall of up to 13 million bpd in the market.<\/em> <\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\t\u00bb<em>Experts at Barclays Capital financial institution note that although alternative routes for crude exist, they are limited in capacity<\/em> [<em>and<\/em>] <em>in many cases aren&rsquo;t currently operating or operable, and generally engender higher transport costs and logistical challenges.<\/em> <\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\t\u00bb<em>One possible alternative is to use export terminal at the Red Sea port at Yanbu, where a pipeline carrying the Iraqi oil terminates, SAFE&rsquo;s Domjan said. He added, From there crude would either move through the congested Suez Canalor through the Gulf of Aden, which would be putting 2 million barrels of oil through the most pirate-infested part of Africa, the costs of protecting it would be massive. The remaining pipeline options, according to experts, are either deactivated, such as the Iraq-Turkey pipeline to the Mediterranean port of Ceyhan, or still hypothetical in the case of the Abu Dhabi pipeline.<\/em> <\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\t\u00bb<em>Coincidentally, the<\/em> [<em>only<\/em>] <em>oil exporting country that is in the best position to bypass the Strait<\/em> [<em>of Hormuz<\/em>] <em>is Iran, which has a pipeline network in place to enable the theoretical pumping of crude north to the Caspian Sea, from where there are plenty of options to export, Domjan said.<\/em>\u00bb <\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p>\n<p class=\"signature\"><em>dedefensa.org<\/em><\/p><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>L&rsquo;Iran, le p\u00e9trole et le d\u00e9troit d&rsquo;Ormouz Le 8 f\u00e9vrier 2012, PressTV.com a publi\u00e9 quelques observations d&rsquo;analystes experts des questions p\u00e9troli\u00e8res, \u00e0 propos de la situation de l&rsquo;alimentation en p\u00e9trole en cas de fermeture du d\u00e9troit d&rsquo;Ormouz, ou d&rsquo;entraves majeures provoquant une interruption de la navigation. On sait que le libre passage dans le d\u00e9troit&hellip;&nbsp;<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"","ping_status":"","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"neve_meta_sidebar":"","neve_meta_container":"","neve_meta_enable_content_width":"","neve_meta_content_width":0,"neve_meta_title_alignment":"","neve_meta_author_avatar":"","neve_post_elements_order":"","neve_meta_disable_header":"","neve_meta_disable_footer":"","neve_meta_disable_title":"","_jetpack_memberships_contains_paid_content":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[14],"tags":[7317,3259,5656,2773,9975,3600,3558],"class_list":["post-74493","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-ouverture-libre","tag-alimentation","tag-arabie","tag-experts","tag-iran","tag-ormouz","tag-petrole","tag-saoudite"],"jetpack_featured_media_url":"","jetpack_sharing_enabled":true,"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/74493","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=74493"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/74493\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=74493"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=74493"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=74493"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}