Deux mesures pr\u00e9cis\u00e9es hier et entr\u00e9es dans une phase d\u00e9cisive devraient contribuer puissamment \u00e0 poursuivre la transformation de la crise iranienne dans ce que nous nommons la crise haute (voir le 3 f\u00e9vrier 2012<\/a>). Ces deux mesures concernent l’embargo p\u00e9trolier, ou contre-embargo pr\u00e9ventif de l’Iran contre l’UE, et l’expulsion des banques et \u00e9tablissements financiers iraniens du r\u00e9seau international de transferts bancaire SWIFT.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n \t Dans le premier cas, PressTV.com<\/em> annonce, le 15 f\u00e9vrier 2012<\/a>, que l’Iran interrompt ses livraisons de p\u00e9trole \u00e0 six pays de l’UE (l’Espagne, la France, la Gr\u00e8ce, la Hollande, l’Italie et le Portugal). On trouve, dans ces six pays, les quatre les plus \u00e9conomiquement affaiblis (Espagne, Gr\u00e8ce, Italie, Portugal) et certains tr\u00e8s d\u00e9pendants du p\u00e9trole iranien, et deux des pays les plus en pointe dans l’imposition de l’embargo europ\u00e9en sur le p\u00e9trole iranien. La mesure iranienne est accompagn\u00e9e de l’annonce que le p\u00e9trole iranien continuera \u00e0 \u00eatre livr\u00e9 aux pays europ\u00e9ens qui garantissent leur paiement selon des contrats \u00e0 long terme, exigence qui impliquerait un renoncement \u00e0 l’embargo europ\u00e9en contre le p\u00e9trole iranien. (Le flou accompagne largement ces diverses mesures, concernant le fait m\u00eame<\/a> de leur op\u00e9rationnalit\u00e9 autant que, pour aller \u00e0 un cas plus sp\u00e9cifique, concernant l’accueil fait par l’Iran \u00e0 des demandes secr\u00e8tes<\/a> de certains pays est europ\u00e9ens. Reste acquis l’impact psychologique et politique des perspectives ouvertes par ces mesures.)<\/p>\n<\/p>\n \t Dans le second cas, il s’agit de l’annonce que les USA et l’UE travaillent \u00e0 l’exclusion des \u00e9tablissements bancaires iraniens du r\u00e9seau SWIFT, r\u00e9seau international de transactions bancaires \u00e9tabli en Belgique et regroupant plus de 10.000 \u00e9tablissements bancaires de 210 opays. Cette mesure sera impos\u00e9e \u00e0 SWIFT par une r\u00e9gulation de l’UE, laquelle poursuit et compl\u00e8te des pressions US dans ce sens, selon notamment le Wall Street Journal<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n \t\u00ab[A]formal ruling by EU financial regulators on SWIFT is expected by late February or early March, and the SWIFT’s board is expected to comply. Yes,<\/em> [it’s a<\/em>] done deal <\/em>[It<\/em>] should be explicitly confirmed by the end of February, or early March, said a European official. Earlier this month, SWIFT released a statement saying, We are working with US and EU authoritiesto find the right multilateral legal framework which will enable SWIFT to address the issues.<\/em>\u00bb <\/p>\n<\/p>\n \tUn auteur US, Charles Gray, s’attachant au seul aspect US de la question (une loi pr\u00e9par\u00e9e par le S\u00e9nat) d’ores et d\u00e9j\u00e0 largement r\u00e9gl\u00e9e par la d\u00e9cision europ\u00e9enne, explique comment cette d\u00e9cision va d\u00e9structurer le syst\u00e8me financier international de transaction, essentiellement aux d\u00e9pens de l’efficacit\u00e9 et de la rapidit\u00e9 du syst\u00e8me financier global sur lequel repose le syst\u00e8me liberal, et le Syst\u00e8me en g\u00e9n\u00e9ral En d’autres mots, le but de la d\u00e9globalisation (ou, plus improprement, d\u00e9mondialisation) recherch\u00e9 par des hommes politiques tels que que Arnaud Montebourg, ne n\u00e9cessite aucune politique particuli\u00e8re ; il suffit de laisser faire le Syst\u00e8me. (Charles Gray, le 15 f\u00e9vrier 2012<\/a>, pour Global Times<\/em>.) <\/p>\n<\/p>\n \t\u00abA bill recently prepared by the US Senate that intends to force the Society for Worldwide Interbank Financial Telecommunication (SWIFT) to expel Iranian banks and financial institutions from the organization has dramatically expanded already unprecedented moves to isolate the Iranian regime. While the US hopes that expanded sanctions will force Iran to abandon its suspected nuclear ambitions, the ultimate outcome of this move may be more damaging to the global economic order than the US expects<\/em> []<\/p>\n<\/p>\n \t\u00bbHowever, by blocking Iranian access to SWIFT, the US will drastically widen the scope of these sanctions, not simply in Iran, but all over the world. Nations that do not agree with the US position or sanctions will find this move making it difficult or impossible for their own businesses to effectively deal with Iran.<\/em> <\/p>\n<\/p>\n \t\u00bbIn effect, if this becomes reality, the economic and foreign policy of nearly every nation on the planet may find itself hijacked by US demands. For many nations, this will appear to be an intolerable infringement upon their sovereignty. The most important long-term consequence of these sanctions may be the damage done to the international banking system. SWIFT provides a vital service, essentially serving as the circulatory system for international banking and financial systems.<\/em> []<\/p>\n<\/p>\n \t\u00bbIf SWIFT is used against Iran today, there is nothing to prevent it from being used against other nations tomorrow. Certainly, there are those in the US Congress who would not mind striking at Cuba’s or Venezuela’s banking systems via SWIFT. This keystone of international commerce could find itself pushed this way and that, as nation after nation attempts to force it to support their own political campaigns and sanctions.<\/em> <\/p>\n<\/p>\n \t\u00bbFor private companies, the specter of suddenly finding themselves unable to do business or retrieve savings and investments in other nations, should the political wind blow against them, would certainly result in increased financial uncertainty. The ultimate outcome might be a complete fragmentation of the international financial order, as nations develop their own replacements for SWIFT.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n \t\u00bbThis would make the smooth conduct of international business vastly more difficult and expensive to carry out, and would create yet another drag on an already weak world economy. It would also create a powerful disincentive for businesses or banks to take part in multi-national financial ventures, drastically reducing the capital available for investment or development.<\/em> <\/p>\n<\/p>\n \t\u00bbThis unilateral decision by the US creates a dangerous precedent, not simply for Iran, but for any nation that depends on international commerce. Ironically, it is the US that potentially has the most to lose from the fragmentation of the SWIFT network, which makes this move by Congress all the more foolish. Yet US politicians continue to push the idea, oblivious to the threat their actions are posing, not simply to Iran, but to the entire world<\/em>\u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n