La situation \u00e0 la fronti\u00e8re mexicaine des USA, pour ce qui concerne la guerre de la drogue, d\u00e9montre d’une fa\u00e7on frappante, au niveau incontestable des op\u00e9rations, la validit\u00e9 de la critique de Ron Paul de la politique ext\u00e9rieure de ces m\u00eames USA (la fameuse politique-Syst\u00e8me<\/a> de l’id\u00e9ologie et de l’instinct). Une nouvelle de AOL Defense<\/em>, le 7 mars 2012<\/a> le montre tr\u00e8s pr\u00e9cis\u00e9ment.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n \tIl s’agit du constat fait par le g\u00e9n\u00e9ral Fraser, de l’USAF, commandant le Southern Command, de l’inefficacit\u00e9 des interceptions d’avions affr\u00e9t\u00e9s par des trafiquants de drogue et qui passe la fronti\u00e8re Mexique-USA pour introduire de la drogue aux USA. Un seul vol sur trois, parmi ceux dont les forces US ont connaissance, est intercept\u00e9 par manque de moyens, parce que ces moyens (des avions de surveillance et de rep\u00e9rage MC-12 Liberty<\/em>, de l’USAF) sont actuellement d\u00e9ploy\u00e9s en Afghanistan. Une situation similaire existe au niveau naval.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n \t\u00bbThe U.S. military command covering South America intercepts only about a third of the drug shipments and other illegal traffic that it knows about, because it and allied nations simply lack the assets to intercept most of the suspect boats and aircraft that their intelligence identifies, locates, and tracks. That shortfall in interception results in part from a shrinking U.S. Navy and the diversion of Air Force reconnaissance assets to the war zone in Afghanistan. We intercept about 33 percent of what we know is out there, and that’s just a limitation on the number of assets, said Air Force Gen. Douglas Fraser, chief of the U.S. Southern Command, at a breakfast with reporters this morning. And, Fraser admitted, that percentage is \u00ab\u00a0going down… More is getting through.
The withdrawal of U.S. forces from Iraq and, after 2014, Afghanistan may free up some aircraft and boats for drug interdiction, Fraser said. But the limitations on what some partner nations can do are more intractable and any improvement in American capabilities is at the mercy of increasingly tight budgets and a possible sequester.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n \t\u00bbAt sea, Fraser explained, the U.S. Navy is retiring the smaller ships that have traditionally been the mainstay of drug interdiction patrols, the aging and increasingly expensive to operate Perry-class frigates, while their much-delayed replacement, the Littoral Combat Ships, is just beginning to enter service. We ‘ll see a gap in the numbers of those types of ships, Fraser said. So we’re working with the Navy to see what other types of vessels and capability that’s coming back from Iraq might be available, particularly small craft that have been used for river patrol and offshore patrol in the Gulf. Such boats could boost the U.S. fleet’s own interception capability but also, and perhaps more importantly, some could be transferred to friendly countries that are currently short on assets to intercept drug boats moving through their own territorial waters. (Fraser focused on Navy vessels and did not specifically address the Coast Guard, which does contribute some ships to Southern Command operations).<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n \t\u00bbSimilarly, in the air, Fraser is eyeing the Air Force’s MC-12 \u00ab\u00a0Liberty\u00a0\u00bb reconnaissance planes (pictured above). \u00ab\u00a0I do see opportunities for MC-12 [in South America],\u00a0\u00bb he said. \u00ab\u00a0I think it’s a great capacity\u00a0\u00bb — so attractive, in fact, that some nations in the region are converted planes captured from drug traffickers into similar surveillance platforms. Currently, \u00ab\u00a0we’re not getting any of that,\u00a0\u00bb he said, because all the MC-12s are busy in the war zone, but as U.S. forces draw down, he said, \u00ab\u00a0we will put a demand for those systems. Southern Command might even get more access to the Air Force’s celebrated Global Hawk’ high-altitude drones. Currently, we have access to occasional Global Hawk missions, Fraser said, but most of them are, again, busy over Afghanistan.<\/em>\u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n \tCette situation rencontre \u00e9videmment des pr\u00e9occupations plus g\u00e9n\u00e9rales des militaires, qui se trouvent press\u00e9s par le manque de moyens, par la crise budg\u00e9taire, par des engagements tr\u00e8s co\u00fbteux et improductifs, et \u00e0 tout cela s’ajoutant de nouvelles menaces de guerre. Le sentiment qui r\u00e8gne chez eux est r\u00e9percut\u00e9 avec force par l’ancien parlementaire Lee Hamilton, qui fut et reste (dans ses nouvelles fonctions \u00e0 l’universit\u00e9 de l’Indiana) tr\u00e8s proche des militaires. (Voir Politico.com<\/em>, le 7 mars 2012<\/a>.) :<\/p>\n<\/p>\n \t\u00abThe military is often cautious about commitments of military power, former Rep. Lee Hamilton (D-Ind.) said in an interview. They see the difficulty of this situation from a military standpoint, not only the attack itself but sustaining the attack over a period of days, if not weeks. A very powerful factor here is what the Pentagon now calls persistent conflict or endless war. We have, in effect, been at war for 10 years, at least since 9\/11. Hamilton, now director of the Center on Congress at Indiana University, said the military is very worried about what they’re confronting with budget cuts and are just not anxious to take on another war.<\/em>\u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n \tLa situation de la puissance militaire US est aujourd’hui absolument similaire<\/strong> \u00e0 celle de la puissance militaire sovi\u00e9tique dans les ann\u00e9es 1980, avec la r\u00e9tention des moyens, des conflits destructeurs, des r\u00e9ductions budg\u00e9taires, etc. Mais, \u00e0 la diff\u00e9rence de l’URSS, la direction des USA, dans sa composante establishment<\/em>, continue \u00e0 privil\u00e9gier \u00e0 tout prix les engagements militaires ext\u00e9rieurs les plus aventureux, les plus inf\u00e9conds, les plus dommageables, sur la s\u00e9curit\u00e9 int\u00e9rieure. (L’exemple de la guerre de la drogue tel qu’il est illustr\u00e9 ici est particuli\u00e8rement r\u00e9v\u00e9lateur. Pas une fois depuis 2001, cette situation n’a figur\u00e9 comme une priorit\u00e9, que ce soit dans les administrations successives ou au Congr\u00e8s, malgr\u00e9 plusieurs alertes inqui\u00e9tantes et le danger potentiel tr\u00e8s grave que cette guerre fait peser sur l’\u00e9quilibre US, notament dans les \u00c9tats du Sud.)<\/p>\n<\/p>\n \tCertes, on r\u00e9torquera que cela n’a pas emp\u00each\u00e9 l’effondrement de l’URSS mais, dans la perspective cet effondrement a r\u00e9ussi \u00e0 pr\u00e9server la puissance russe centrale, apr\u00e8s un redressement douloureux. Dans le cas US, les perspectives sont beaucoup plus inqui\u00e9tantes car le dispositif actuel et les priorit\u00e9s, tout en n’apportant aucune satisfaction ext\u00e9rieure, et m\u00eame des avatars suppl\u00e9mentaires et des menaces graves, conduit principalement \u00e0 menacer la structure int\u00e9rieure des USA d’une fa\u00e7on bien plus radicale que dans le cas de l’URSS. La menace devient donc celle d’un \u00e9clatement des structures, si des \u00c9tats constitutifs de l’Union estiment que leur propre s\u00e9curit\u00e9 est menac\u00e9e \u00e0 cause de l’incurie du centre.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n <\/p>\n \tMis en ligne le 9 mars 2012 \u00e0 12H12<\/p><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":" La situation \u00e0 la fronti\u00e8re mexicaine des USA, pour ce qui concerne la guerre de la drogue, d\u00e9montre d’une fa\u00e7on frappante, au niveau incontestable des op\u00e9rations, la validit\u00e9 de la critique de Ron Paul de la politique ext\u00e9rieure de ces m\u00eames USA (la fameuse politique-Syst\u00e8me de l’id\u00e9ologie et de l’instinct). Une nouvelle de AOL Defense,… <\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"","ping_status":"","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"neve_meta_sidebar":"","neve_meta_container":"","neve_meta_enable_content_width":"","neve_meta_content_width":0,"neve_meta_title_alignment":"","neve_meta_author_avatar":"","neve_post_elements_order":"","neve_meta_disable_header":"","neve_meta_disable_footer":"","neve_meta_disable_title":"","_jetpack_memberships_contains_paid_content":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[2],"tags":[3236,2604,14691,7021,2645,3897,2913,2943,3194,2949,963],"class_list":["post-74564","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-bloc-notes","tag-afghanistan","tag-des","tag-drogues","tag-eclatement","tag-guerre","tag-hamilton","tag-les","tag-mexique","tag-pentagone","tag-secession","tag-urss"],"jetpack_featured_media_url":"","jetpack_sharing_enabled":true,"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/74564","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=74564"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/74564\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=74564"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=74564"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=74564"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}