\tPour poursuivre en encha\u00eenant sur un cas pr\u00e9c\u00e9dent de notre Bloc-Notes<\/em> concernant notamment le Vice-Premier ministre isra\u00e9lien Meridor et des professeurs de droit de diverses opinions sur le cas de la l\u00e9galit\u00e9 de l’attaque hypoth\u00e9tique contre l’Iran (voir le 16 avril 2012<\/a>), il y a le cas du colonel Davis, de l’U.S. Army, et de son comportement de r\u00e9volte contre la narrative<\/em>-Syst\u00e8me Il s’agit, pour son cas, de la situation en Afghanistan et l’effet en a \u00e9t\u00e9 la production d’un rapport dans ce sens ; Davis y fait la remarque int\u00e9ressante qu’\u00e0 force de narratives<\/em> diverses, bien s\u00fbr toutes dans le m\u00eame sens mais avec des variations qui produisent un imbroglio kafka\u00efen, la v\u00e9rit\u00e9 est devenue m\u00e9connaissable<\/p>\n<\/p>\n \tThe Observer<\/em> du 15 avril 2012<\/a> donne des d\u00e9tails en m\u00eame temps que des observations diverses et fort int\u00e9ressantes du colonel Davis. On lira ces citations en ayant donc effectivement \u00e0 l’esprit les exemples et observations d\u00e9taill\u00e9es dans notre Bloc Notes<\/em> pr\u00e9c\u00e9dent, du 16 avril 2012<\/a>, car il s’agit de la m\u00eame veine que nous voulons explorer sous un autre angle. <\/p>\n<\/p>\n \t\u00abDavis believes people are not being told the truth and said so in a detailed report that he wrote after returning from his second tour of duty in the country. He had been rocketed, mortared and had stepped on an improvised explosive device that failed to explode. Soldiers he had met were killed and he was certain that a bloody disaster was unfolding. So he spoke out. It’s like I see in slow motion men dying for nothing and I can’t stop it, he said. It is consuming me from the inside. It is eating me alive.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n \t\u00bbDavis, 48, drew up two reports containing research and observations garnered from his last tour. He was not short of material. As part of his job he had criss-crossed the country, travelling 9,000 miles and talking to more than 250 people. He had built up a picture of a hopeless cause; a country where Afghan soldiers were incapable of holding on to American gains. US soldiers would fight and die for territory and then see Afghan troops let it fall to the Taliban. Often the Afghans actively worked with the Taliban or simply refused to fight. One Afghan police officer laughed in Davis’s face when asked if he ever tried to fight the enemy. That would be dangerous! the man said.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n \t\u00bbYet at the same time Davis saw America’s military chiefs, such as General David Petraeus, constantly speak about America’s successes, especially when working with local troops. So Davis compiled two reports: one classified and one unclassified. He sent both to politicians in Washington and lobbied them on his concerns. Then in February he went public by giving an interview to the New York Times and writing a damning editorial in a military newspaper. Then and only then did he tell his own army bosses what he had done.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n \t\u00bbDavis pulled no punches. His report’s opening statement read: Senior ranking US military leaders have so distorted the truth when communicating with the US Congress and American people in regards to conditions on the ground in Afghanistan that the truth has become unrecognisable.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n \t\u00bbThe report detailed an alarming picture of Taliban advances and spiralling violence. Afghan security forces were unwilling or unable to fight, or actively aiding the enemy. That picture was contrasted with repeated rosy statements from US military leaders. His classified version was far more damning, but it remains a secret. I am no WikiLeaks guy part two, Davis said. He foresees a simple and logical end point for Afghanistan civil war and societal collapse, probably long before the last US combat soldier is scheduled to leave. He says the Afghan army and police simply cannot cope and the US forces training and working with them know that, despite official pronouncements to the contrary. What I saw first hand in virtually every circumstance was a barely functioning organisation often co-operating with the insurgent enemy, Davis’s report said.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n \t\u00bbThe document was also damning about the role of the US media in reporting the war. Ever since Vietnam, generals have slammed the press as a potential danger to military operations, but Davis’s report lambasted journalists for failing to question the official army line. He said the media were obsessed with getting access to military bases and generals and tempered reporting in order to maintain that situation. Most of the media just takes the talking points and repeats them, he said.<\/em>\u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n \tLorsque le colonel Davis, de l’U.S. Army, qui s’est r\u00e9volt\u00e9 contre la narrative<\/em>-Syst\u00e8me de la situation en Afghanistan et a produit un rapport dans ce sens d\u00e9clare : \u00abSenior ranking US military leaders have so distorted the truth when communicating with the US Congress and American people in regards to conditions on the ground in Afghanistan that the truth has become<\/em> unrecognisable.<\/em><\/strong>\u00bb, cela ne signifie pas, \u00e0 notre sens, que la r\u00e9alit\u00e9 est introuvable, mais qu’elle est m\u00e9connaissable chez les g\u00e9n\u00e9raux ; elle redevient reconnaissable, et m\u00eame \u00e9vidente par sa force, chez lui, Davis, qui a produit son rapport, lorsqu’il la pr\u00e9sente irr\u00e9futablement sous la forme de la v\u00e9rit\u00e9<\/strong> de la situation.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n \tEn effet, la r\u00e9alit\u00e9 a \u00e9volu\u00e9 du constat au concept \u00e0 cause de l’attaque constante de la narrative<\/em>, ou des narratives<\/em> tant le concept est changeant, et dans le cadre de l’effondrement de l’objectivit\u00e9<\/a>. La r\u00e9alit\u00e9 est donc devenue un concept \u00e9lastique et sans signification en lui-m\u00eame, \u00e9voluant entre deux lignes de plus en plus divergentes et que rien ne peut plus rapprocher. Ces deux lignes ne d\u00e9crivent pas des opinions divergentes mais bien des perceptions diff\u00e9rentes sous la pression de psychologies plus ou moins d\u00e9form\u00e9es (terroris\u00e9es<\/a>), donc des r\u00e9alit\u00e9s diff\u00e9rentes. La premi\u00e8re ligne est celle de la narrative<\/em> officielle en cours, qui se transforme, au-del\u00e0, bien au-del\u00e0 du simple mensonge, en une sorte de bloc inali\u00e9nable qui ne peut \u00eatre d\u00e9crit que comme un \u00e9v\u00e9nement absolument factice, rejetant toute relation n\u00e9cessaire avec la v\u00e9rit\u00e9 et \u00e9cartant toute enqu\u00eate \u00e0 ce propos, et pourtant continuant \u00e0 \u00eatre pr\u00e9sent\u00e9 par certains comme la seule v\u00e9rit\u00e9 concevable. Il s’agit certes de virtualisme tel que nous l’avons souvent d\u00e9fini, mais un virtualisme \u00e0 l’agonie<\/a> parce qu’il ne touche plus que les directions du Syst\u00e8me, et m\u00eame une fraction de l’opinion de ces directions. La seconde ligne est celle de la r\u00e9alit\u00e9-v\u00e9rit\u00e9, ou v\u00e9rit\u00e9 tout court d’une situation, avec souvent l’argument que la chose a \u00e9t\u00e9 v\u00e9rifi\u00e9e, qui est \u00e9videmment totalement diff\u00e9rente de la narrative<\/em>, qui vit de sa propre vie, y compris dans certains segments des directions politiques, y compris \u00e0 l’int\u00e9rieur<\/strong> de certaines personnes qui pratiquent par ailleurs la narrative<\/em> (cas de Dan Meridor<\/a>, au contraire du cas du colonel Davis qui a franchi le pas vers la seule r\u00e9alit\u00e9-v\u00e9rit\u00e9 en Afghanistan).<\/p>\n<\/p>\n