\tOn observera que nombre d’articles de journaux, en Isra\u00ebl, se concentrent d\u00e9sormais sur la formation du nouveau gouvernement sous la direction de Netanyahou, et, notamment et essentiellement, en pr\u00e9sence d’un parti (Yesh Atid<\/em>) dont le pr\u00e9sident Yair Lapid se pr\u00e9sente comme un r\u00e9formiste social, un adversaire de l’extr\u00e9misme religieux, d’une certaine fa\u00e7on comme un de ces n\u00e9o-contestataires qu’on pourrait envisager de placer un peu en-dehors du syst\u00e8me politique courant alors qu’ils s’y font tout de m\u00eame une place, un pied en-dedans, un pied en-dehors, hors de toutes les consid\u00e9rations tactiques et supputations de manuvres diverses, hors de toutes les appr\u00e9ciations sur les orientations sp\u00e9cifiques, nationales, etc. (Il s’agit de cette cat\u00e9gorie contestataire nouvelle, illustr\u00e9e par le couple [!] M\u00e9lanchon-Marine Le Pen en France, par Tsipras en Gr\u00e8ce, etc., l\u00e0 encore, sans pr\u00e9juger de la validit\u00e9 du classement, de la valeur du projet, de la sinc\u00e9rit\u00e9 du personnage, etc., l’essentiel \u00e9tant l’effet de communication.) Bien entendu, l’int\u00e9r\u00eat du cas Lapid est que son parti est le vainqueur inattendu des \u00e9lections en apparaissant sur la sc\u00e8ne politique avec 19 si\u00e8ges, et avec un programme qui, avec son aspect socio-\u00e9conomique, ne fait en rien l’affaire de Netannyahou.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n \tAinsi, les enjeux de politique ext\u00e9rieure qui paraissaient la seule chose essentielle dans la perception qu’on avait d’Isra\u00ebl se nuancent-ils d\u00e9sormais d’une dimension int\u00e9rieure importante, pour Isra\u00ebl, encore. C’est, par exemple, l’id\u00e9e persistante que l’attaque isra\u00e9lienne en Syrie a beaucoup \u00e0 voir avec les pressions que Netanyahou exerce sur Lapid. On a d\u00e9j\u00e0 vu (le 5 f\u00e9vrier 2013<\/a>) une appr\u00e9ciation dans ce sens En voici une autre, de Mazal Mualem, journaliste isra\u00e9lien, pour Al-Monitor Israel Pulse<\/em>, le 4 f\u00e9vrier 2013<\/a>. <\/p>\n<\/p>\n \t\u00abThe attack in Syria that, according to foreign sources, was carried out by Israel in the middle of last week<\/em> [Jan. 29<\/em>], is expected to fill an important role in Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s Sisyphean efforts to establish as broad a coalition as possible, including Yesh Atid Chairman Yair Lapid, the ultra-Orthodox and if possible Habayit Hayehudi Chairman Naftali Bennett, too.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n \t\u00bbIn fact, anyone who kept track of the prime minister’s announcements last week, even before the assault in Syria, can easily identify the connection Netanyahu makes between Assad’s loss of control in Syria and a possible solution to his own personal political headache.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n \t\u00bbAt the opening of the government’s first post-election meeting, three days before the attack in Syria, Netanyahu chose to issue a warning regarding the danger of losing control of the tremendous weaponry in the territory of the neighboring state. The Middle East does not wait for election results, he said solemnly, facing the television cameras, and concluded his words with a vow to take action to establish a wide government to cope with these kinds of challenges.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n \t\u00bbNetanyahu’s raising of the security threat at the top of the agenda is not, of course, a coincidence. It is directed mainly at Lapid’s ears, at all 19 of his mandates. In other words, Netanyahu is trying to tell him that yes, middle-class hardships are important, but we have here additional burning issues that we must address first otherwise, the price of housing is the last thing that the middle class will worry about.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n \t\u00bbPlease do not misunderstand: I am not saying here that the attack in Syria, if Israel is really behind it, is a Netanyahu spin to solve his political troubles, due to the bleak election results from his point of view. Nevertheless, once it happened and was publicized, it seems that Netanyahu does not intend to squander this opportunity to bring Lapid into his government.<\/em> []<\/p>\n<\/p>\n \t\u00bbThe victory party of Yesh Atid held on Saturday night in Kibbutz Netzer Sereni, at the same time as the official ceremony in which Netanyahu received the mandate to assemble a government, provided much ammunition for Netanyahu’s entourage. The news broadcasts gave extensive coverage to showing Lapid on stage with a guitar, dressed in black like a rock star, while he performed the Beatles’ hit, With a Little Help from my Friends (not a bad rendition at all). This earned him the nickname of the singer in Netanyahu’s entourage. With all due respect to Lapid’s Woodstock Festival, said one of the prime minister’s people scornfully, we have a state here beset by with many problems that need to be addressed. But despite all the spins and tricks, it seems that \u00ab\u00a0the singer evinces toughness in the unofficial coalition negotiations taking place over recent days.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n \t\u00bbBut this is just the beginning. The public pressure on Lapid is expected to increase as the coalition negotiations advance. It will be interesting to see whether under these circumstances, Lapid, who was elected to promote a civil economic agenda, will avoid falling into the security-spin honey-trap, the one which many good men have fallen into before.<\/em>\u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n \tUn autre article sur le m\u00eame site Al Monitor Israel Pulse<\/em>, de Nadav Perry le 4 f\u00e9vrier 2013<\/a>, reprend le cas Lapid en le mettant en situation par rapport \u00e0 son engagement contre les ultra-orthodoxes juifs, et, par cons\u00e9quent, le dilemme que Netanyahou affronte en voulant former un gouvernement avec Lapid et<\/strong> les ultra-orthodoxes. Cet article permet d’explorer plus avant un des principaux probl\u00e8mes int\u00e9rieurs, \u00e0 la fois religieux et social, qui se pr\u00e9cise de plus en plus nettement en Isra\u00ebl. (On doit se rappeler qu’un ancien chef du Mossad<\/em>, Ephraim Halevy, avait d\u00e9clar\u00e9 en novembre 2011 [voir le 4 novembre 2011<\/a>] que le v\u00e9ritable probl\u00e8me existentiel d’Isra\u00ebl n’est pas l’Iran, mais vient du dedans [\u00abIsrael’s true existential danger comes from within<\/em>\u00bb], et qu’il s’agit des extr\u00e9mistes religieux juifs qui disposent d’un statut compl\u00e8tement \u00e0 part, tant pour leur position sociale que pour leur refus de servir dans l’arm\u00e9e isra\u00e9lienne.)<\/p>\n<\/p>\n \t\u00abAlmost all political analysis and commentary dealing with Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu ask the same question: Is he finally ready to cross the Rubicon? In other words, has he finally reached the stage in his political evolution when he’ll abandon personal survival and immediate benefit in favor of advancing greater goals?<\/em> []<\/p>\n<\/p>\n \t\u00bbMeanwhile, it seems that Netanyahu is not only undecided about where he is headed, but also oblivious to the very need for making such a decision at such an early stage. His public announcements about a wide coalition, and his refusal to forsake his pact with the ultra-Orthodox parties, testify to the fact that he is still imprisoned in the thought-process of old politics. He still thinks that the right job and the right word can buy everyone. As the coalition negotiations advance, he will likely come to understand that attempts to bind Lapid with the ultra-Orthodox and the right-wing HaBayit HaYehudi party, are doomed to failure. Then he will finally have to decide, once and for all, where he is heading.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n \t\u00bbTen years ago, after the 2003 elections, Ariel Sharon faced a similar dilemma. On the one hand, there was a natural partnership with the ultra-Orthodox parties; on the other hand, an invigorated secular party called Shinui, led by the late Tommy Lapid, had registered substantial gains in the elections. Sharon chose Shinui and created a rupture with the ultra-Orthodox. But Netanyahu is made of different stuff. It is clear to him that in the present system of elections, the pact with the ultra-Orthodox is Likud’s safest stock, allowing him to form a government time after time. If the right-ultra-Orthodox bloc suddenly turns into the right-wing bloc only, the ultra-Orthodox parties can flirt with the left. Likud would lose its golden egg that ensures its regime time after time. Netanyahu is not willing to pay this steep price certainly not out of his own free will.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n \t\u00bbIn light of all this, Netanyahu faces two choices: either Lapid will compromise, fold and sacrifice his principles for a government job or not. As it seems now, Lapid won’t act this way, and Netanyahu’s moment of truth will arrive. Maybe this time, he will be compelled to cross the Rubicon after all.<\/em>\u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n \tEnfin, pour compl\u00e9ter ce dossier, on citera Assaf Golan, dans le journal<\/a> Makor Rishon<\/em>, proche du mouvement d’implantation et des extr\u00e9mistes religieux, le 6 f\u00e9vrier 2013. L’article ne parle de rien de moins que d’une guerre civile, o\u00f9 les 10% d’extr\u00e9mistes religieux deviennent des opprim\u00e9s que le reste de la population veut d\u00e9truire, tout cela en recourant \u00e0 des analogies du r\u00e9cit biblique.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n \t\u00abThe issue of equality in sharing the burden, which the various parties are now focused on in the framework of the coalition negotiations, is to a great extent one of Israeli society’s bleeding wounds. It is clear to any reasonable person that the current situation, in which an entire sector in the country neither goes to work nor takes part in defending the country, is wrong. Moreover, from an economic standpoint, Israel is drawing near a point in which it will not be able to sustain Haredi society.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n \t\u00bbRegrettably, however, it seems that instead of trying to resolve this painful issue properly, the Israeli politicians are happier to continue riding this issue and exploiting it for their own political gain. After all, without establishing a genuine dialogue with the leaders of the Haredi public, this issue will never truly be resolved. Rather, it is liable to explode in the face of Israeli society and severely damage the delicate fabric of Israeli society.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n \t\u00bbEven worse, instead of creating either a solution or a process that will lead to a solution, it seems that unilateral action by a government without Haredim is liable to send Israel spiraling into civil war. There are many Israelis who either out of despair or hatred of the otherin this case, the Harediwant precisely such a war to erupt. But a situation in which 10% of the Israeli population becomes persecuted and, from a legal standpoint, criminals, will be the beginning of the end of the entire State of Israelas happened at the end of the Second Temple period and also during the First Temple period when the kingdoms of Judea and Israel weakened one another in endless battles and bloodshed<\/em>\u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n \tNous avons laiss\u00e9 une place importante \u00e0 des extraits de presse pour documenter ce cas particuli\u00e8rement int\u00e9ressant pour Isra\u00ebl, qui est la rencontre d’une dynamique manifestement inspir\u00e9e par l’air du temps (dito<\/em>, le temps de la crise g\u00e9n\u00e9rale), avec le succ\u00e8s de Lapid, la question des religieux extr\u00e9mistes et la position de Netanyahou dans ce contexte. Il s’agit d’une part de la question g\u00e9n\u00e9rale de la structure d’Isra\u00ebl et des particularismes li\u00e9s \u00e0 la religion et \u00e0 la sp\u00e9cificit\u00e9 de cet \u00c9tat, heurtant les n\u00e9cessit\u00e9s \u00e9conomiques et sociales ; d’autre part de la position et de la solidit\u00e9 d’une structure politique, essentiellement repr\u00e9sent\u00e9e par Netanyahou, qui est marqu\u00e9e par la corruption g\u00e9n\u00e9ralis\u00e9e, ses liens avec des r\u00e9seaux douteux proches du crime organis\u00e9e sinon int\u00e9gr\u00e9s dans le crime organis\u00e9. C’\u00e9tait ce que nous d\u00e9signions d\u00e9j\u00e0 en 2009 (le 12 janvier 2009<\/a>) comme la situation d’un Isra\u00ebl proche de devoir \u00eatre consid\u00e9r\u00e9 comme un \u00c9tat failli.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n \tBien entendu, ces divers probl\u00e8mes internes d’Isra\u00ebl ne sont pas nouveaux mais ils sont n\u00e9cessairement exacerb\u00e9s par les conditions de la crise g\u00e9n\u00e9rale du Syst\u00e8me. D’une part, l’\u00e9tat d’affrontement g\u00e9n\u00e9ral et la politique ultra-belliciste de Netanyahou, avec les questions palestinienne, iranienne et maintenant syrienne ; d’autre part, les conditions socio-\u00e9conomiques dans un pays qui a compl\u00e8tement int\u00e9gr\u00e9 les normes du n\u00e9olib\u00e9ralisme et qui, comme toujours dans ce cas, se d\u00e9veloppe dans une structure de corruption extr\u00eame, avec les connexions entre le monde politique et les forces de l’argent, y compris du crime organis\u00e9. Le cas int\u00e9ressant de cette \u00e9lection est que ces deux aspects des effets de la crise g\u00e9n\u00e9rale sur Isra\u00ebl ont peut-\u00eatre \u00e9t\u00e9 connect\u00e9s, avec le cas de l’attaque contre la Syrie, et m\u00eame si la chose est loin d’\u00eatre d\u00e9montr\u00e9e, y compris avec la mesure o\u00f9 se serait faite cette connexion, la possibilit\u00e9 qui est aujourd’hui envisag\u00e9e fait que tout se passe comme si la connexion \u00e9tait vraiment \u00e9tablie. (Effet du syst\u00e8me de la communication.) La situation socio-\u00e9conomique renvoie, elle, aux manifestations type-indign\u00e9s de l’\u00e9t\u00e9 dernier (voir notamment le 2 ao\u00fbt 2011<\/a>) ; elle tend \u00e0 lier, du point de vue de la perception dans le cadre du syst\u00e8me de la communication, cette perspective \u00e0 l’\u00e9mergence de Lipid et, l\u00e0 aussi, \u00e9tablit une connexion entre la situation int\u00e9rieure d’Isra\u00ebl et la crise g\u00e9n\u00e9rale. Enfin, \u00e0 cette lumi\u00e8re et dans le cadre de cette tension g\u00e9n\u00e9rale, la crise existentielle que constitue le cas des extr\u00e9mistes religieux peut elle-m\u00eame prendre un rythme d’une grande activit\u00e9 et d\u00e9montrer brutalement l’extr\u00eame faiblesse structurelle d’Isra\u00ebl. <\/p>\n<\/p>\n \tIl faut donc constater qu’Isra\u00ebl, malgr\u00e9 tous les efforts faits par sa direction politique pour cantonner son destin \u00e0 la seule perspective parano\u00efaque de la s\u00e9curit\u00e9, subit le sort commun de voir ses diverses activit\u00e9s et d\u00e9s\u00e9quilibres li\u00e9s entre eux, le tout renvoyant \u00e0 la crise g\u00e9n\u00e9rale du Syst\u00e8me. De ce point de vue, ces \u00e9lections sont importantes, d’autant qu’en m\u00eame temps qu’elles ont lieu et qu’est \u00e9tablie cette connexion, la gravit\u00e9 de la crise g\u00e9n\u00e9rale ne cesse chaque jour de s’imposer un peu plus. (Pour le cas isra\u00e9lien comme pour tant d’autres finalement, ceci explique cela, \u00e9videmment puisque la crise g\u00e9n\u00e9rale est un r\u00e9v\u00e9lateur.) La conclusion qu’on en tirera concerne finalement, beaucoup plus que le cas sp\u00e9cifique d’Isra\u00ebl, la confirmation sans cesse renforc\u00e9e de la force terrible, et terriblement d\u00e9stabilisatrice, de la crise g\u00e9n\u00e9rale que nous affrontons. Rien n’est \u00e9pargn\u00e9 par elle et sa g\u00e9n\u00e9ralisation, amplement d\u00e9montr\u00e9e, devient un caract\u00e8re absolu de l’\u00e9volution politique et m\u00e9tahistorique de l’\u00ab\u00e9poque<\/em>\u00bb (sens maistrien) que forment d’ores et d\u00e9j\u00e0 les quatre ann\u00e9es depuis la crise financi\u00e8re de l’automne 2008.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n <\/p>\n \tMis en ligne le 7 f\u00e9vrier 2013 \u00e0 18H10<\/p><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":" Entre la Syrie et la guerre civile On observera que nombre d’articles de journaux, en Isra\u00ebl, se concentrent d\u00e9sormais sur la formation du nouveau gouvernement sous la direction de Netanyahou, et, notamment et essentiellement, en pr\u00e9sence d’un parti (Yesh Atid) dont le pr\u00e9sident Yair Lapid se pr\u00e9sente comme un r\u00e9formiste social, un adversaire de l’extr\u00e9misme… <\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"","ping_status":"","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"neve_meta_sidebar":"","neve_meta_container":"","neve_meta_enable_content_width":"","neve_meta_content_width":0,"neve_meta_title_alignment":"","neve_meta_author_avatar":"","neve_post_elements_order":"","neve_meta_disable_header":"","neve_meta_disable_footer":"","neve_meta_disable_title":"","_jetpack_memberships_contains_paid_content":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[2],"tags":[4141,3756,4623,9392,2773,2774,11935,2790,11658,8684,3867,11210],"class_list":["post-74828","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-bloc-notes","tag-elections","tag-etat","tag-extremistes","tag-failli","tag-iran","tag-israel","tag-lipid","tag-netanyahou","tag-orthodoxes","tag-religieux","tag-syrie","tag-ultra"],"jetpack_featured_media_url":"","jetpack_sharing_enabled":true,"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/74828","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=74828"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/74828\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=74828"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=74828"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=74828"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}