{"id":74912,"date":"2013-03-29T17:57:33","date_gmt":"2013-03-29T17:57:33","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/2013\/03\/29\/les-armes-vers-la-syrie-et-leurs-vertus-inattendues\/"},"modified":"2013-03-29T17:57:33","modified_gmt":"2013-03-29T17:57:33","slug":"les-armes-vers-la-syrie-et-leurs-vertus-inattendues","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/2013\/03\/29\/les-armes-vers-la-syrie-et-leurs-vertus-inattendues\/","title":{"rendered":"Les armes vers la Syrie et leurs vertus inattendues"},"content":{"rendered":"<p><h3 class=\"titrebloc\">Les armes vers la Syrie et leurs vertus inattendues<\/h3>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\tNous continuons dans ce qui devrait devenir une rubrique, celle du d\u00e9sordre pr\u00e9c\u00e9dant les causes du d\u00e9sordre de ce m\u00eame <a href=\"http:\/\/www.dedefensa.org\/article-le_d_sordre_pr_c_dant_en_grandes_pompes_la_cause_du_d_sordre_29_03_2013.html\" class=\"gen\">29 mars 2013<\/a>,  comme on verra ci-dessous Il s&rsquo;agit de la cause sacro-sainte des livraisons d&rsquo;armes aux rebelles syriens, le S\u00e9same de la victoire assur\u00e9e.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\tDivers articles mettent en \u00e9vidence que de nombreuses armes ont \u00e9t\u00e9 et sont livr\u00e9es, et <strong>seront<\/strong> livr\u00e9es, encore plus nombreuses et performantes, aux rebelles syriens, pour enfin parvenir \u00e0 la victoire finale. Cette perspective pourrait \u00eatre r\u00e9sum\u00e9e par l&rsquo;annonce qu&rsquo;\u00e0 l&rsquo;ombre de ces livraisons d&rsquo;armes massives, on pr\u00e9pare la sixi\u00e8me attaque d\u00e9cisive des rebelles pour prendre Damas. Comme d&rsquo;habitude pour ces attaques surprises et d\u00e9cisives, tout nous est cont\u00e9 en d\u00e9tails sur la fa\u00e7on dont on compte s&rsquo;y prendre, un peu \u00e0 l&rsquo;image de ce qui menace chaque jour l&rsquo;Iran depuis huit ans.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\tIl y a un superbe article dans le New York <em>Times<\/em> du <a href=\"http:\/\/www.nytimes.com\/interactive\/2013\/03\/25\/world\/middleeast\/an-arms-pipeline-to-the-syrian-rebels.html?ref=middleeast&#038;_r=0\" class=\"gen\">25 mars 2013<\/a>, avec nombre de graphique repr\u00e9sentant les routes a\u00e9riennes de convoyage de l&rsquo;armement vers les rebelles. Il y a un tr\u00e8s long article d&rsquo;Associated Press, repris notamment par CBS.<em>News<\/em> le <a href=\"http:\/\/www.cbsnews.com\/8301-202_162-57576722\/ap-master-plan-underway-to-help-syria-rebels-take-damascus-with-u.s.-approved-airlifts-of-heavy-weapons\/\" class=\"gen\">29 mars 2013<\/a>, sous le titre explicite de \u00ab<em>Master plan underway to help Syria rebels take Damascus with U.S.-approved airlifts of heavy weapons<\/em>\u00bb.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\t Ce <a href=\"http:\/\/www.conflictsforum.org\/2013\/cfs-weekly-comment\/\" class=\"gen\">29 mars 2013<\/a>, dans sa rubrique hebdomadaire <em>Weekly Comments<\/em>, Conflicts Forum fait un commentaire \u00e9clair\u00e9 sur cette offensive d&rsquo;armement, au moins dans le champ du syst\u00e8me de la communication. Ces articles r\u00e9f\u00e9renc\u00e9s ci-dessus sont fort utiles pour la r\u00e9putation du pr\u00e9sident Obama \u00e0 Washington m\u00eame, et pour rattraper ce que certains pourraient penser de mal-intentionn\u00e9 \u00e0 l&rsquo;\u00e9gard, ou plut\u00f4t \u00e0 l&rsquo;encontre de sa politique syrienne.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\t\u00ab<em>In an officially-inspired New York Times article, the sheer scale of weapons transfers to the Syrian opposition throughout the last year and more, is made plain: almost daily heavy-lift cargo planes from Qatar and Jordan (at least one hundred and sixty flights), disgorging their cargos at airports in Turkey and Jordan: the weapons derive from procurement lines, opened by CIA and western intelligence, notably from Croatia and elsewhere in East Europe, and total, according to the NYT article  at a conservative estimate &#8211; some 3,500 tons.  Let us be clear: 3,500 tons is an enormously large amount of weapons.  The scale of this airlift simply dwarfs the massive weapons airlift mounted for the Afghan resistance in the 1980s.  The US purpose in leaking this disclosure is made plain in the article: the US President has not been standing idly-by&rsquo; (as alleged); Petraeus was the airbridge&rsquo;s mastermind all along, and the weapons naturally only were going to vetted opposition groups&rsquo; (that is to say, the article&rsquo;s key purpose was to deny that the US has been guilty of inadvertently arming al-Qaeda).  There is however, another significance that can be attributed to this revelation  and that is: the sheer military failure of the western-sponsored opposition, given the scale of the weapons-supply that it is now admitted has been reaching these armed groups  for the last year and a half.  The only military success that the opposition has to show at this point, is the holding of the relatively small northern town of Raqa&rsquo;a  and that was taken by the al-Qae&rsquo;da aligned al-Nusra Front, which refuses to allow the western sponsored groups to enter the town, as they might be more interested in looting than fighting. Otherwise, as Alex Thomson from Channel Four notes, the mainstream armed opposition is now mostly occupied with haphazard mortar firings onto Damascus, killing civilians: It is hard to build any other case than that the rebel tactic here is pure terror and demoralisation. If the [rebels] think they are going after military targets, then the above list from the past three days can only prove they are lethally incompetent.  In short, as most commentators have long suspected, and has now been confirmed, Syria is already awash with weapons.  Will the latest Arab League resolution authorising its member states to arm the opposition make any difference? Will the loud demands from the UK and France for the EU to lift the arms embargo change the course of the conflict?  This seems unlikely now that it has been confirmed that the airlift has already been underway for nearly a year and a half. (And as per Afghanistan and Libya, these weapons too will be washing around the region for a long time hence.) It is clear that we are seeing another upsurge of weapons entering Syria and the prospect of yet another (the 6th) attempt to take Damascus.<\/em>\u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\t Une autre indication sur des livraisons d&rsquo;armes vient de <em>DEBKAFiles<\/em> du <a href=\"http:\/\/www.debka.com\/article\/22857\/Saudi-heavy-weapons-supply-to-Syrian-rebels-breaks-up-Arab-summit-in-uproar\" class=\"gen\">28 mars 2013<\/a>. Elle porte sur l&rsquo;intention des Saoudiens de faire convoyer vers la Syrie, depuis la Croatie via la Turquie, des armes lourdes de type lance-roquettes mont\u00e9s sur camions, de tr\u00e8s fort calibre (220mm) et \u00e0 tr\u00e8s longue port\u00e9e (70 km), des syst\u00e8mes MLRS <em>Smerch<\/em> et 9K57 <em>Hurricane<\/em> d&rsquo;origine russe. Les Saoudiens veulent en \u00e9quiper les groupes qu&rsquo;ils parrainent pour leur permettre de prendre des avantages d\u00e9cisifs, notamment, esp\u00e8rent-ils, la base a\u00e9rienne de Nairab pr\u00e8s d&rsquo;Alep. <em>DEBKAFiles<\/em> pr\u00e9cise que Nairab est une importante base de transit de mat\u00e9riels russes et iraniens et que des menaces contre cette base ont d\u00e9j\u00e0 amen\u00e9 des avertissements russes lanc\u00e9s aux rebelles que des forces sp\u00e9ciales russes <em>Spetsnaz<\/em> pourraient y \u00eatre d\u00e9ploy\u00e9es. Si les syst\u00e8mes incrimin\u00e9s arrivent en Syrie, on pourrait envisager qu&rsquo;une riposte russe est donc probable. Il y a de la logique impliquant un certain ordre de l&rsquo;affrontement, m\u00eame dans le d\u00e9sordre des armes.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\tEn attendant, toujours selon <em>DEBKAFiles<\/em> et selon des pr\u00e9cisions qui semblent confirm\u00e9es par ailleurs, le projet saoudien a provoqu\u00e9 au moins des affrontements tr\u00e8s s\u00e9v\u00e8res entre le groupe saoudien (Arabie-Jordanie-Eau) et le clan Qatar-Turquie. D&rsquo;abord, il a fallu des pressions tr\u00e8s s\u00e9v\u00e8res de Prince Bandar, chef des SR saoudiens et personnellement impliqu\u00e9 dans cette affaire, pour obtenir l&rsquo;accord de la Turquie pour le transit, avec menace de r\u00e9duire drastiquement les exportations turques en Arabie apr\u00e8s un premier refus de la Turquie. Ensuite, l&rsquo;affaire a provoqu\u00e9 \u00e0 la conf\u00e9rence de la Ligue Arabe de Doha du d\u00e9but de cette semaine des sc\u00e8nes invraisemblables jusqu&rsquo;\u00e0 l&rsquo;abracadabrantesque, semble-t-il, puisque nous conduisant jusqu&rsquo;\u00e0 un pugilat vrai de vrai \u00e0 huis \u00e0 peu pr\u00e8s clos entre princes saoudiens et princes qatariens. Le Qatar veut emp\u00eacher \u00e0 tout prix de telles livraisons, qui signifieraient l&rsquo;ascendant pris par les groupes de rebelles pro-Qatari (Fr\u00e8res Musulmans et islamistes) sur les groupes de rebelles pro-saoudiens, et les princes ont montr\u00e9 qu&rsquo;ils sont pr\u00eats \u00e0 faire le coup de poing pour cela. <em>DEBKAFiles<\/em> \u00e9crit :<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\t\u00ab<em>The news that Saudi Arabia was supplying Syrian rebels with heavy weapons stunned the Arab League summit taking place in Doha, Qatar this week, bringing it to a clamorous end, DEBKAfile&rsquo;s intelligence and Middle East sources reveal. Saudi and Qatari delegates were heard hurling shrill abuse at one another and exchanging blows in private meeting rooms down the corridors of the assembly hall. The conference proceedings were abruptly halted as Arab delegation members pitched in to separate them. A total blackout was quickly drawn down on the summit as it broke up in disarray.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\t\u00bb<em>The Saudi royal rulers and Qatar&rsquo;s Hamad bin Khalifa Al Thani have been at extreme loggerheads over the Syrian civil conflict. Riyadh  and Prince Bandar in particular  accuses the Qataris of conspiring to bring the Muslim Brotherhood to power in Damascus, including radical groups tied to Al Qaeda<\/em>\u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\tComme on voit, le d\u00e9sordre qui pr\u00e9c\u00e8de la cause du d\u00e9sordre n&rsquo;est pas si d\u00e9sordre que cela puisqu&rsquo;il s&rsquo;av\u00e8re que les armes ont au moins obtenu l&rsquo;effet de confrontation que cette sorte de chose est cens\u00e9e susciter. Il y a de la logique dans tout cela Si ce ne sont les rebelles c&rsquo;est donc leurs fr\u00e8res,  au moins les Saoudiens et les Qatariens, qui se battent entre eux.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><\/p>\n<p><p>\tMis en ligne le 29 mars 2013 \u00e0 17H49<\/p><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>Les armes vers la Syrie et leurs vertus inattendues Nous continuons dans ce qui devrait devenir une rubrique, celle du d\u00e9sordre pr\u00e9c\u00e9dant les causes du d\u00e9sordre de ce m\u00eame 29 mars 2013, comme on verra ci-dessous Il s&rsquo;agit de la cause sacro-sainte des livraisons d&rsquo;armes aux rebelles syriens, le S\u00e9same de la victoire assur\u00e9e. Divers&hellip;&nbsp;<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"","ping_status":"","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"neve_meta_sidebar":"","neve_meta_container":"","neve_meta_enable_content_width":"","neve_meta_content_width":0,"neve_meta_title_alignment":"","neve_meta_author_avatar":"","neve_post_elements_order":"","neve_meta_disable_header":"","neve_meta_disable_footer":"","neve_meta_disable_title":"","_jetpack_memberships_contains_paid_content":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[2],"tags":[6911,3259,12044,5667,12043,2665,12045,4795,3516,10040,8840,4859,3558,3045,3867],"class_list":["post-74912","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-bloc-notes","tag-arabe","tag-arabie","tag-arlmes","tag-bandar","tag-conflicts","tag-crooke","tag-damais","tag-doha","tag-forum","tag-ligue","tag-lourdes","tag-qatar","tag-saoudite","tag-sommet","tag-syrie"],"jetpack_featured_media_url":"","jetpack_sharing_enabled":true,"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/74912","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=74912"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/74912\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=74912"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=74912"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=74912"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}