\tDepuis la r\u00e9conciliation entre Isra\u00ebl et la Turquie (coup de fil sympa de Netanyahou \u00e0 Erdogan le 22 mars, excuses pour l’attaque de la flotille de la paix en mai 2010, excuses accept\u00e9es), l’id\u00e9e turque d’une Grande Turquie a envahi les commentateurs en Turquie, surtout des commentateurs proches d’Erdogan, exactement comme le fait une ivresse. Il s’agit par cons\u00e9quent du reflet fid\u00e8le de l’ivresse qui tient effectivement sous son empire les dirigeants turcs, essentiellement Erdogan et son ministre Davutoglu. Mais cette ivresse-l\u00e0, qu’on pourrait qualifier de syndrome du printemps (sans qualificatif n\u00e9cessaire d’arabe, les Turcs \u00e9tant de la partie), n’est pas sp\u00e9cifique aux Turcs<\/p>\n<\/p>\n
\t Il y eut donc d’abord les excuses de Netanyahou \u00e0 Erdogan. D’une fa\u00e7on g\u00e9n\u00e9rale, elles ont \u00e9t\u00e9 pr\u00e9sent\u00e9es en Turquie comme une victoire incontestable de la susdite Turquie. (Certains commentaires \u00e9mettent parfois des r\u00e9serves, comme celui de Kadri Gursel, du quotidien Hurriyet<\/em>, le 26 mars 2013<\/a> : \u00abThe normalization step between Israel and Turkey has been taken only because Turkey has moderated its tough stance.<\/em>\u00bb.) Netanyahou a agi essentiellement sous la pression d’Obama, qui voulait obtenir quelque chose qui puisse \u00eatre vue comme propre sur soi, de fa\u00e7on \u00e0 pouvoir \u00eatre v\u00e9hicul\u00e9e par le syst\u00e8me de la communication comme un r\u00e9sultat diplomatique notable, voire a diplomatic breakthrough<\/em>, \u00e0 l’issue de son voyage en Isra\u00ebl et alentour. Le triomphe turc a donc \u00e9t\u00e9 particuli\u00e8rement peu appr\u00e9ci\u00e9 par les Isra\u00e9liens DEBKAFiles<\/em> r\u00e9sumait ce constat le 23 mars 2013<\/a>, en expliquant par ailleurs les raisons pour lesquelles c’\u00e9tait bien plus la Turquie qui avait besoin de cette r\u00e9conciliation, qu’Isra\u00ebl. Dans cette citation, on a le r\u00e9cit de l’intervention de Netanyahou dans une grotesque mise en sc\u00e8ne faite pour complaire \u00e0 Sa Majest\u00e9 Obama tr\u00f4nant devant Air Force One<\/em> et, surtout, la tonalit\u00e9 des r\u00e9actions isra\u00e9liennes \u00e0 l’attitude turque (soulign\u00e9es par nous en gras).<\/p>\n<\/p>\n \t\u00abIsraeli Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu granted the Turkish Prime Minister Tayyip Erdogan a face-saver for ending their three-year rift out of willingness to crown US President Barack Obama’s three-day visit with an impressive diplomatic breakthrough. He swallowed Israel and its army’s pride and, at the airport, with Obama looking on, picked up the phone to Erdogan and apologized for the killing by Israeli soldiers of nine Turkish pro-Palestinian activists in 2010 aboard the Mavi Marmara, which was leading a flotilla bound on busting the Israeli blockade of the Hamas-ruled Gaza Strip. The crowing comment by Turkish Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu – Turkey’s basic demands have been met; we got what we wanted was<\/em> out of place, spiteful and ill-mannered<\/em><\/strong>.\u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n \t Un journaliste turc au cuir tann\u00e9 par l’exp\u00e9rience montre effectivement une certaine retenue dans la description de cette r\u00e9conciliation, triomphale du point de vue turc Voici les quelques consid\u00e9rations que nous propose H\u00fcsn\u00fc Mahalli, dans Al-Akhbar<\/em>, le 26 mars 2013<\/a> :<\/p>\n<\/p>\n \t\u00abErdogan and his foreign minister Ahmet Davutoglu wanted to leave behind all these complex calculations by strengthening their alliance with the US. This meant a reconciliation with Tel Aviv, according to the conditions set during US Secretary of State John Kerry’s latest visit to Ankara. This could be the reason behind last week’s backtracking by Erdogan on his former statements on Zionism, announcing that he had not meant what he said and that he is neither against Judaism nor Zionism, but opposed to the policies of Israel concerning the rights of Palestinians.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n \t\u00bbThis new position was enough for US President Barack Obama to convince Israeli PM Benjamin Netanyahu to call Erdogan and apologize for the Israeli army’s actions against the Mavi Marmara ship in May 2010. But Netanyahu only gave verbal promises about lifting the siege on Gaza, which was the third fundamental condition set by Turkey for reconciliation with Israel.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n \t\u00bbHowever, these indicators are not the only reason for Israel’s apology to Turkey. Ankara does not hide its dire need for the support of the Jewish Lobby in the US, which had threatened to sabotage Erdogan’s visit to Washington at the end of this month unless he reconciles with Tel Aviv. It is expected that the reconciliation will be reinforced with a surprise visit to Ankara by Netanyahu very soon and before Erdogan’s visit to the US.<\/em>\u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n \t Quoi qu’il en soit des modalit\u00e9s des excuses isra\u00e9liennes, la presse turque fut aussit\u00f4t envahie de grandioses descriptions de l’avenir du Moyen-Orient sous la f\u00e9rule et l’inspiration d’Erdogan, y compris avec des cartes d\u00e9crivant la nouvelle situation, comme celle de Taha Akyol, le 25 mars, lors d’une \u00e9mission de la BBC. Depuis les cartes des neocons<\/em> largement diffus\u00e9es dans les ann\u00e9es 2002-2004 sur le nouveau Moyen-Orient redessin\u00e9 par la d\u00e9mocratie am\u00e9ricaniste, on a pris l’habitude de se lasser de cette sorte de repr\u00e9sentation \u00e0 la fois graphique, enfantine et hypoth\u00e9tique des grands \u00e9v\u00e9nements pr\u00e9par\u00e9s par des ma\u00eetres-cerveaux, ma\u00eetres du monde. Cette fois, donc, il s’agit du cerveau d’Erdogan, et l’article de B\u00fclent Kenes, r\u00e9dacteur-en-chef de Today’s Zamman<\/em>, du 26 mars 2013<\/a>, est significatif. Le quotidien est le premier de Turquie, et d\u00e9crit comme tr\u00e8s proche des milieux gouvernementaux. L’article d\u00e9crit une nouvelle Grande Turquie, \u00e9ventuellement une Grande Nation Sunnite puisqu’on y est, la cr\u00e9ation d’une nation kurde et l’\u00e9clatement de la Syrie et de l’Irak (ceci expliquant cela et l’ensemble \u00e9tant \u00e9videmment connect\u00e9 de causes en effets). Les circonstances, le th\u00e8me d\u00e9velopp\u00e9, la position du journal, tout indique donc qu’il s’agit d’un reflet tr\u00e8s pr\u00e9cis de la pens\u00e9e de la direction turque, Erdogan-Davutoglu. Voici l’entame et la conclusion de l’article<\/p>\n<\/p>\n \t\u00abThe region is changing at an incredible pace. It is as if the socio-political energy built up over the century is bursting in geopolitical volcanic eruptions. The artificial geopolitical straight jacket, tailored by France and England for the region in the wake of the First World War, is proving unfit. We are at the threshold, or even right in the middle of, a process where similar transformations will occur or are already occurring in the Middle East after more than 20 years since the end of the Cold War, which radically altered the political and strategic map of the world. The signs are everywhere that a new Middle East is emerging. But what sort of Middle East? Will it be The New Middle East described by Shimon Peres in his book written in the 1990s? Or will it be a Middle East with completely different dynamics and effects?<\/em> []<\/p>\n<\/p>\n \t\u00bbIt is possible that the Kurdish entities in Iraq and Syria may be one of the founding elements of the New Turkey, which may come to adopt a federal character through radical changes to its political and administrative system. In the end, the emerging conditions, circumstances and alliances of the New Middle East in the making may leave no choice to Iraqi and Syrian Kurds other than to collaborate with Turkey to establish a common future and share a common fate. Furthermore, this may put Turkey in a position where it has to confront Iran and the wider Arab world, and also trigger existential concerns in Israel, thereby making these two countries in need of each other once again. I think it wouldn’t be an overstatement to suggest that Israel’s apology and Turkey’s eagerness to normalize its ties with Israel should be seen within the context of this scenario. What do you think?<\/em>\u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n \t What do we think<\/em> ? Bof La description des lendemains turcs qui chantent implique \u00e9norm\u00e9ment de conditions et d’acceptations tacites, sinon d’encouragements de la part de divers protagonistes, voisins, etc., dont nombre ont les dents longues et leurs propres id\u00e9es. Elle implique la participation active des Kurdes, lesquels n’ont pas montr\u00e9 grand enthousiasme ces derniers jours. Le Weekly Comment<\/em> de l’institut Conflicts Forum de Beyrouth, du 29 mars 2013<\/a>, remet certaines perspectives en ordre, en y introduisant les petits calculs qui se cachent souvent derri\u00e8re les grandes manifestations th\u00e9\u00e2trales<\/p>\n<\/p>\n \t\u00abTurkey’s Acceptance of an Israeli apology, and the PKK Peace Process<\/em><\/strong>: These two events are not unconnected to the angry divisions within the anti-Assad camp, described above: there is presently a surfeit of hubris in the Arab world over who is the leader of the Sunni world: with Erdogan, the Emir of Qatar and the Saudi king all claiming the title. Erdogan and the Emir, though suspicious of each other, nonetheless are bound by a common interest in seeing the Muslim Brotherhood come to power in the region. They believe that it is they who should be directing and stage-managing President Assad’s downfall, in the wider interests of the MB coming to power. Ranged against them are Saudi Arabia and the Emirates, who reject this claim, to insist that it is they, rather, who should manage the overthrow of President Assad, but in the interests of the MB not coming to power. President Obama seems undecided who to anoint, but Washington, over recent months, has noticeably cooled towards Turkey’s stewardship of the northern front against Syria. (The US Ambassador in Ankara has publicly criticised Turkish facilitation of the al-Nusra Front, which the US regards as an al-Qae’da offshoot). This drift by the US away from Erdogan, has caused anxiety in Ankara, and the sense was that this strategic relationship needed to be repaired. Erdogan is due to visit Washington shortly, but the lobby’ (AIPAC) has been threatening to disrupt the smooth running of Erdogan’s DC visit, to protest at his anti-Israeli rhetoric. Erdogan’s somewhat triumphant acceptance of Netanyahu’s apology (which has irritated the Israelis considerably), is hoped to allow Turkey to again become central in the US calculations on Syria, and central to the future of the Kurds<\/em>\u00bb <\/p>\n<\/p>\n \tD\u00e9cid\u00e9ment, que reste-t-il de la politique triomphante d’Erdogan, jusqu’\u00e0 l’\u00e9t\u00e9 2011<\/a> ? Il semble y avoir une d\u00e9rive imp\u00e9tueuse et inarr\u00eatable vers une sorte de climat de m\u00e9galomanie parcourue de schizophr\u00e9nies et parano\u00efas diverses, qui caract\u00e9rise aujourd’hui l’\u00e9tat d’esprit g\u00e9n\u00e9ral au Moyen-Orient, notamment des dirigeants du camp musulman alli\u00e9 au bloc BAO. A croire que la pens\u00e9e-Syst\u00e8me et bloqu\u00e9e du bloc BAO ne cesse d’infecter tout ce qu’elle touche, mais c’est tout cru, sinon tout vu, d’ailleurs. Il en r\u00e9sulte que l’hubris<\/em> r\u00e8gne, ajoutant au d\u00e9sordre des situations celui des esprits et des ambitions et cr\u00e9ant un climat de d\u00e9stabilisation g\u00e9n\u00e9rale dans cette r\u00e9gion qui fut consid\u00e9r\u00e9e longtemps comme si fragile pour qu’on p\u00fbt envisager d’y susciter le moindre changement ; et une d\u00e9stabilisation g\u00e9n\u00e9rale qui, de plus en plus syst\u00e9matiquement, prend la libert\u00e9 de se retourner tr\u00e8s souvent contre les d\u00e9stabilisateurs eux-m\u00eames, par cons\u00e9quent elle aussi anim\u00e9 d’un caract\u00e8re de tr\u00e8s profond d\u00e9sordre par rapport \u00e0 elle-m\u00eame et \u00e0 l’orientation qu’on lui donne.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n \tLa Turquie et ses ambitions h\u00e9g\u00e9moniques s’inscrivent donc dans un contexte g\u00e9n\u00e9ral de d\u00e9sordre, particuli\u00e8rement dans les psychologies des dirigeants, \u00e9ventuellement avec l’aide des poings<\/a> lorsqu’il s’agit des Saoudiens et des Qatariens, et sous l’aile d’une politique US \u00e9vanescente et partag\u00e9e d’une fa\u00e7on chaque fois diff\u00e9rente entre la Maison-Blanche, le d\u00e9partement d’\u00c9tat, peut-\u00eatre le Pentagone \u00e0 mesure de l’installation de Hagel, et bien s\u00fbr le duo Congr\u00e8s-AIPAC. On finirait par croire que le courant le d\u00e9sordre pr\u00e9c\u00e9dant les causes du d\u00e9sordre prend \u00e9galement une dimension g\u00e9ographique pas loin d’\u00eatre invertie Aujourd’hui, le d\u00e9sordre psychologique est plus autour de la Syrie, dans la coalition anti-Assad, que dans le camp d’Assad en Syrie m\u00eame. A cet \u00e9gard, on doit \u00e9videmment ajouter les manuvres \u00e0 l’int\u00e9rieur du camp rebelle et la psychose islamistes des divers pays du bloc BAO. DEBKAFiles<\/em> signale (le 30 mars 2013<\/a>) que le bloc BAO fait \u00e9voluer son embargo des armes en songeant \u00e0 l’\u00e9tendre du seul Assad aux rebelles eux-m\u00eames, pour emp\u00eacher une revente aux islamistes des armes donn\u00e9es aux mod\u00e9r\u00e9s. Hier, on se battait pour lever l’embargo, aujourd’hui on se mobiliserait plut\u00f4t pour le resserrer Les nouvelles positions qui seraient acquises par les rebelles sur la fronti\u00e8re syro-jordanienne et syro-isra\u00e9lienne, variant selon les sources (DEBKAFiles<\/em> le 25 mars 2013<\/a> et Antiwar.com<\/em> le 30 mars 2013<\/a>), font craindre que des islamistes trouvent des bases sur ces fronti\u00e8res et menacent par cons\u00e9quent la Jordanie et Isra\u00ebl ; de l\u00e0 \u00e0 imaginer qu’Assad pourrait juger avantageux de laisser aux islamistes quelques points strat\u00e9giques sur les fronti\u00e8res sensibles de la Syrie pour exporter le d\u00e9sordre en pr\u00e9cipitant encore plus les psychologies de ses adversaires dans le susdit d\u00e9sordre.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n \tAinsi cohabitent \u00e9trangement, dans les pays coalis\u00e9s pour avoir raison de la Syrie, les ambitions les plus \u00e9chevel\u00e9es concernant une r\u00e9gion enti\u00e8re d\u00e9barrass\u00e9e de la Syrie, et les pulsions ext\u00e9rieures de d\u00e9sordre de la guerre syrienne venues de Syrie vers eux qui veulent s’en d\u00e9barrasser. Ce n’est finalement que rajouter du d\u00e9sordre au d\u00e9sordre, sans savoir rien de plus, toujours, du sort de sa cause originelle…<\/p>\n<\/p>\n <\/p>\n \tMis en ligne le 30 mars 2013 \u00e0 17H59<\/p><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":" Ivresse turque Depuis la r\u00e9conciliation entre Isra\u00ebl et la Turquie (coup de fil sympa de Netanyahou \u00e0 Erdogan le 22 mars, excuses pour l’attaque de la flotille de la paix en mai 2010, excuses accept\u00e9es), l’id\u00e9e turque d’une Grande Turquie a envahi les commentateurs en Turquie, surtout des commentateurs proches d’Erdogan, exactement comme le fait… <\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"","ping_status":"","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"neve_meta_sidebar":"","neve_meta_container":"","neve_meta_enable_content_width":"","neve_meta_content_width":0,"neve_meta_title_alignment":"","neve_meta_author_avatar":"","neve_post_elements_order":"","neve_meta_disable_header":"","neve_meta_disable_footer":"","neve_meta_disable_title":"","footnotes":""},"categories":[2],"tags":[2664,12043,9591,2631,11461,3737,9629,3516,2891,5788,2622,4194,2790,6157,4257,3867,2613],"class_list":["post-74913","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-bloc-notes","tag-alastair","tag-conflicts","tag-davutoglu","tag-de","tag-debka","tag-erdogan","tag-flotille","tag-forum","tag-grande","tag-islamistes","tag-la","tag-nation","tag-netanyahou","tag-paix","tag-sunnite","tag-syrie","tag-turquie"],"jetpack_featured_media_url":"","_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/74913","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=74913"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/74913\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=74913"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=74913"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=74913"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}