\tIl est vrai que les \u00e9v\u00e9nements au Moyen-Orient, avec le d\u00e9sordre tournoyant autour de la Syrie, ont cr\u00e9\u00e9 une situation in\u00e9dite pour Isra\u00ebl : la possibilit\u00e9, pour la premi\u00e8re fois de son histoire, de n’\u00eatre pas au centre d’un soubresaut majeur dans la r\u00e9gion, voire de n’en \u00eatre concern\u00e9 en rien, en un mot, tr\u00e8s inhabituel pour Isra\u00ebl, d’\u00eatre neutre. C’est ce qu’exprime Guy Bechor, sur le le site<\/a> Gplanet<\/em>, le 31 mars : \u00abFor the first time in our history we are not the point, we are the spectators.<\/em>\u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n \tC’est une argumentation assez rare pour qu’on s’y attache, surtout venant d’un commentateur, Guy Bechor<\/a>, notamment consultant pour l’arm\u00e9e et la police isra\u00e9liennes, et pour le minist\u00e8re des affaires \u00e9trang\u00e8res, qui devrait \u00eatre plut\u00f4t class\u00e9 parmi les nationalistes intransigeants. Bechor adopte une attitude compl\u00e8tement isolationniste et d\u00e9sengag\u00e9e, estimant qu’Isra\u00ebl n’a rien \u00e0 faire ni \u00e0 gagner dans le conflit syrien, n’a rien \u00e0 faire ni \u00e0 gagner d’un rapprochement avec la Turquie qui servirait la Turquie d’abord et risquerait justement d’impliquer Isra\u00ebl dans le d\u00e9sordre syrien. Bechor estime simplement : si les chiites et les sunnites veulent s’entretuer, laissons-les faire parce que ni les uns ni les autres n’aiment Isra\u00ebl et aucune alliance avec l’un ou l’autre groupe n’est d’un quelconque int\u00e9r\u00eat pour Isra\u00ebl. Signalons que dans le cours de son raisonnement, Bechor mentionne deux possibilit\u00e9s qu’il a l’air de tenir comme probables et qui promettraient, \u00e0 leur tour, des prolongements d\u00e9stabilisants : l’accord d’Erdogan avec les Kurdes de Turquie, pour les d\u00e9tourner d’une alliance avec la Syrie, qui se paie d\u00e9j\u00e0 d’une certaine autonomie, se paiera au prix fort pour la Turquie, par une s\u00e9paration du pays kurde de la Turquie. D’autre part, Bechor tient pour in\u00e9vitable une guerre entre la Turquie et l’Iran D’une fa\u00e7on g\u00e9n\u00e9rale, Bechor exprime un tr\u00e8s fort sentiment de d\u00e9fiance \u00e0 l’encontre de la Turquie, existant dans la communaut\u00e9 de s\u00e9curit\u00e9 nationale isra\u00e9lienne ; mais ce sentiment de d\u00e9fiance se transforme finalement en une sorte de rejet g\u00e9n\u00e9ral, de frustration, y compris avec le soi-disant alli\u00e9 \u00e9ternel (les USA, certes), qui enfante une sorte d’isolationnisme psychologique remarquable On ne parle m\u00eame plus de la menace nucl\u00e9aire iranienne et de l’attaque isra\u00e9lienne n\u00e9cessaire, pas un mot<\/strong> de ce qui a \u00e9t\u00e9 le leitmotiv isra\u00e9lien depuis des ann\u00e9es, signe de la profondeur du bouleversement que cr\u00e9e la guerre syrienne.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n \tNous donnons des extraits importants de ce texte, qui nous para\u00eet au moins tr\u00e8s significatif, sinon d’une situation, certainement d’un \u00e9tat d’esprit.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n \t\u00abI deliberated last weekend what I ought to say about the Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu’s surprising phone call of apology to the aggressive, rude and impulsive leader of Turkey. I also want for there to be reconciliation and for us to have friends in the region. After all, endless wars are tiring, and warring with everyone is doubly tiring. The apology relieves the pressure on us, it supposedly distances the Turks from the Iranians, it opens up economic-military or energy possibilities in the future. There is no question that Obama liked this; it gave him the sense that he had created a regional axis of Israel-Turkey-Jordan and maybe the Palestinian Authority as well. That, unfortunately, is not the case, however, even though it may appear to be so, and the dangers that are liable to be lurking for us could prove to be strategic. We have no interest in joining such a Sunni axis, which is not in our interest. It might be in the US’s interest, but not ours.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n \t\u00bb1. We have succeeded in steering clear of the turmoil in Syria, which is worsening, for two years. Our renewed close ties with Turkey are liable to suck us into a world war between the Sunnis and the Shiites, and between Russia and the United States. We have succeeded in refraining from playing any role in this conflict because we are neither Sunnis nor Shiites, and we haven’t back any side. So why should we start doing this now?<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n \t\u00bbBy doing so we will be automatically perceived by the Shiite axis as having taken a side, that of the Sunnis, and we have no interest in doing that. Both sides are hostile to us to almost the same degree. Security or intelligence cooperation with Turkey will also be viewed as taking sides and there is liable to be a military reaction to this.<\/em> Why are we even getting into this mess? The best thing is to sit on the sidelines. We have no reason to join this war, which will never end. For the first time in our history we are not the point, we are the spectators. Why get involved?<\/em><\/strong><\/p>\n<\/p>\n \t\u00bbA war between Turkey and Iran is only a question of time, and the flame is growing higher. This is not our game at all, so why are we disturbing our enemies from hanging themselves? Why are we letting them mess with us instead of with themselves?<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n \t\u00bb2. It is not clear why we have to play with the cards that Erdogan dealt usin other words, why play his games of honor, constant apologies and insults, like in the mafia? Were we so desperate that we had to meet his distorted conditions? Including compensation and the diktats regarding Gaza? The more Turkey insisted on its demands, the more Erdogan’s image became perceived by the West as being inflexible and extremist, someone to beware of, certainly not someone to bring into the European Union. By apologizing we have helped repair with our own hands his image and we have strengthened his claim of being morally in the right.<\/em> []<\/p>\n<\/p>\n \t\u00bb4. In fact, this increases his foothold in the Palestinian issue, which he will not let go off now, and this is mainly in order to direct Turkish attention outward, away from Turkey’s own problems and troubles. What are their troubles? Not long ago we wrote an entire article about this, although on the Kurdish matter, there has been a turnabout: Erdogan succeeded in getting the PKK to his side from Assad’s side, at the price of recognizing some sort of Kurdish autonomy in Turkey. And maybe, in the more distant futurethere will also be separation. That is a very high price. At the celebrations over the agreement with Erdogan by a million Kurds in Turkey no one raised the Turkish flagonly they Kurdish flagwhich infuriated Erdogan.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n \t\u00bbThere is nothing like wallowing in the Palestinian matter to divert attention outward. Secretary of State John Kerry is a case in point: as if there were no North Korea, China and Japan,Iran, Syria or Salafist Africa. There are the Palestinians, at the instructions of his boss. Obviously this is an imaginary agenda, but where else can Kerry go? Who else will receive him in a Middle East that has completely changed? Luckily there are the Palestinians.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n \t\u00bbAs for President Barack Obama, who visited Israel: with candor and selective generosity, he succeeded in disarming us, and the proof is in the Turkish matter. He realized that the best way to buy the Israeli is to give him recognition and selective support; in exchange for this, the Israeli will give everything. The Israeli suffers so much from alienation and global condemnation that for a friend who touches the right buttons and makes the right gestures, he will even prostrate himself. This was the method employed by Anwar Sadat, who came to Jerusalem. Generosity, say the Chinese, is the greatest enemy because there is nobody who can refuse generosity to themselves, piercing their armor.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n \t\u00bbWe are the rejected kid in the class, who in return for a little attention from the popular kid, is willing to give everything. In other words, we’ve been duped, big time.<\/em><\/strong><\/p>\n<\/p>\n \t\u00bb5. The Israeli apology strengthens Erdogan at home, ahead of the presidential elections next year. With the help of the legal Kurdish party in parliament, he plans to move Turkey to a presidential system and, with Israel’s help, to win. Then we’ll be stuck with him for more years to come. The Israeli apology was cast in Turkey as an act of capitulation, as another victory for the big boss, who is seen as not compromising on his principles, although in the Israeli view, he definitely displayed flexibility. Erdogan is trying to prove that he was even able to meddle in Israeli politics, that it was he who distanced Lieberman and the right wing. There is no end to his victories, in the best tradition of regional-Nasrallah imagination.<\/em> <\/p>\n<\/p>\n \t\u00bb6. The phone call and the apology reinforce the sense that Israel and its prime minister can be pressured, which in the not distant future will lead to more pressure, maybe even American pressure. There is a sense that in his third term, Netanyahu wants to come across as a genial, conciliatory grandfather, without understanding that the conditions in the Middle East have only become more vicious and dangerous. This is not the image that should be projected outwardly at this time.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n \t\u00bb7. And finally, did anyone even say that there would be governmental or military cooperation with Turkey as a result of the reconciliation? Will Erdogan now change? And what will happen in the next round of fighting in the Gaza, when we will have to not only take Egypt into account, but also the Turks, whom we brought back into the ring with our own hands? This, of course, ties our hands, and the other side knows this. Nothing can be certain with a capricious, unpredictable country.<\/em> []<\/p>\n<\/p>\n \t\u00bbSince what is done cannot be undone, and since the harmful Israeli step has been taken (with no public debate), what can now be done? We can minimize the damage and confine it:<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n \t \u00bb Minimum involvement in the Syrian matter, that must be our strategic goal. Even if cooperation is proposed on the matter of chemical weapons, we must refuse and leave this to the Americans. This will be a trap to suck us inside. At a later stage our new friend will also ask us to attack Syria, since it is always preferable that Israeli soldiers get into trouble and take risks. The best is not to get involved at all. We have no interest in getting involved in the anticipated war between Turkey and Iran and Syria, or in the ethnic acts of revenge that are increasing.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n \t\u00bb Minimum military cooperation, technological cooperation and sales of advanced weapons. Turkey needs Israel for advanced technologies, which it could not obtain when the two countries had no connections. There are already some military analysts in Israel who are fantasizing about joint exercises with the Turkish army or with NATO. This is undesirable. We must not sell sensitive Israeli technology to Turkey because a person like Erdogan is unpredictable and tomorrow this could be turned against us. We’ve seen this happen before.<\/em> []<\/p>\n<\/p>\n \t\u00bb Remember that for the Turks, Israel is an instrument for achieving their goals, and act accordingly. Manage the relationship, there is no reason to be enemies, but also be cautious about overuse. Erdogan is not your friend, and we don’t feel like being his tool.<\/em>\u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n \tLe titre de l’article nous dit tout sur l’humeur : The Rejected Child<\/em>, une sorte de long g\u00e9missement \u00e0-la-Kalim\u00e9ro, personne ne nous aime, tout le monde veut se servir de nous, nous duper Il n’emp\u00eache, au-del\u00e0 de l’accueil caricatural, nous nous int\u00e9ressons \u00e0 cet article parce qu’il nous semble exprimer quelque chose d’important. Il y a cette situation unique, o\u00f9, pour la premi\u00e8re fois de son histoire, Isra\u00ebl n’est pas partie prenante dans un grand affrontement au Moyen-Orient. L’on \u00e9prouve l’impression que, loin de rassurer ce pays, cette situation l’irrite, le frustre, l’angoisse m\u00eame. D’o\u00f9 le titre : le gamin dont personne ne veut, et qui ne sait plus que faire Il nous semble que cette interpr\u00e9tation rejoint, par une autre voie, l’humeur cr\u00e9pusculaire, notamment sur l’avenir d’Isra\u00ebl, des chefs du Shin Bet<\/em> interview\u00e9s dans le formidable document The Gatekeepers<\/em> dont nous parlions dans notre F&C<\/em> du 23 mars 2013<\/a>. (C’est un signe qui ne trompe pas lorsqu’on conna\u00eet la rigueur dialectique, l’aust\u00e9rit\u00e9 et l’intransigeance doctrinale presque nihiliste de ce site trotskiste de voir WSWS.org<\/em> tresser des lauriers au r\u00e9alisateur Drod Moreh qui est tout de m\u00eame un ancien collaborateur d’Ariel Sharon, et m\u00eame aux six chefs du Shin Bet<\/em>, dans un article du 4 avril 2013<\/a>. WSWS.org<\/em> n’a pas l’habitude, lorsqu’il s’agit de gens tels que ces dirigeants de Shin Bet<\/em> de 1980 \u00e0 2011, de qualificatifs ou de remarques tels que extraordinary and revelatory<\/em>, remarkable<\/em>, unusual degree of candor<\/em>, anxiety about Israel’s prospects<\/em> C’est autant pour la qualit\u00e9 du documentaire et pour la sinc\u00e9rit\u00e9 des anciens chefs du Shin Bet<\/em>, mais surtout pour l’impression \u00e9prouv\u00e9e \u00e0 propos du sentiment en Isra\u00ebl m\u00eame, d’une nature d\u00e9cid\u00e9ment cr\u00e9pusculaire.) <\/p>\n<\/p>\n \tAinsi l’impression g\u00e9n\u00e9rale qu’on retire de cet article est une sorte de fatalit\u00e9 pleine de d\u00e9senchantement et de rancur frustr\u00e9e d’Isra\u00ebl, loin des rodomontades sur l’Iran et le reste, comme une sorte de d\u00e9couragement sans fin devant une terrible absence de perspective, devant une situation de plus en plus incompr\u00e9hensible et incontr\u00f4lable. En fonction du sujet abord\u00e9, la rancur s’adresse sp\u00e9cialement au Turc Erdogan, per\u00e7u comme un manipulateur d’Isra\u00ebl, qui peut entra\u00eener ce pays dans des aventures inconsid\u00e9r\u00e9es, en Syrie notamment, avec son caract\u00e8re incontr\u00f4lable et son absence de retenue ; mais ce jugement pourrait valoir pour tout le monde, y compris, et comment, pour Obama lui-m\u00eame, peut-\u00eatre le plus dangereux de tous avec son allure de manipulateur souriant : \u00abwith candor and selective generosity, he succeeded in disarming us<\/em>\u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n \tDu coup, Bechor frappe et frappe encore sur le clou : il faut \u00e0 tout pris \u00e9viter de ce laisser entra\u00eener dans ce d\u00e9sordre, dans ce g\u00e2chis, dans ce bordel (mess<\/em>), le chaos syrien, o\u00f9 les explications les plus assur\u00e9es se perdent dans la confusion (On peut lire dans ce rapport de UPI du 4 avril 2013<\/a> combien cette \u00e9trange guerre syrienne pr\u00e9tendument faite pour pr\u00e9parer une victoire sunnite et participer \u00e0 l’\u00e9tablissement d’une force sunnite se transforme de plus en une bataille entre les deux factions de la r\u00e9bellion originellement per\u00e7ue comme une partie d’une force sunnite unifi\u00e9e : \u00abAs Syria’s civil war grinds on, major differences are emerging between Islamist and secular rebel forces, raising fears that the defining conflict will be a showdown between these forces rather than battling the Damascus regime…<\/em>\u00bb). Dans ce cadre, m\u00eame le flamboyant et furieux Netanyahou tend \u00e0 perdre son allure de parano\u00efaque obs\u00e9d\u00e9 et apocalyptique, pour se transformer en une sorte de p\u00e9p\u00e8re politique assez m\u00e9diocre, magouilleur politicien de la pire tradition, capitulard et incapable d’\u00e9viter les pi\u00e8ges qui lui sont tendus par ses pr\u00e9tendus amis (Obama, Erdogan).<\/p>\n<\/p>\n \tCurieuse impression, ou plut\u00f4t impression d’\u00e9poque o\u00f9 une analyse, qui rencontre tout de m\u00eame bien des perspectives dans le m\u00eame sens, nous fait appara\u00eetre ce pays (Isra\u00ebl), pour une fois hors de son r\u00f4le habituel \u00e0 la fois de d\u00e9stabilisateur sans piti\u00e9 et de cible honnie, dans une occurrence o\u00f9 il pourrait se tenir hors du grand d\u00e9sordre qui balaye la r\u00e9gion, curieuse impression alors de ressentir cette atmosph\u00e8re d\u00e9pressive, cr\u00e9pusculaire, sans v\u00e9ritable espoir que le repli sur soi, sans perspective, sans rien. Au reste et pour revenir \u00e0 l’essentiel qui est l’autonomie originelle des grands courants de bouleversement, les \u00e9v\u00e9nements eux-m\u00eames pourraient trancher contre cette option du repli plaid\u00e9e par Bechor, tels qu’ils se pr\u00e9cipitent depuis quelques jours \u00e0 peine, avec la situation sur le Golan. Les Syriens d’Assad semblent engag\u00e9s dans un retrait de leurs meilleures forces tandis que circulent des rumeurs selon lesquelles des pays ou les pays participant \u00e0 la force d’interposition de l’ONU (le contingent UNDOF) pourraient retirer leurs contingents. Cela laisserait ainsi \u00e0 d\u00e9couvert cette fronti\u00e8re strat\u00e9gique isra\u00e9lienne pour l’\u00e9ventuelle installation, sans doute d\u00e9j\u00e0 en cours, de rebelles islamistes anti-Assad qui ont aussi pour objectif d’harceler Isra\u00ebl. L’Observer<\/em> de ce 7 avril 2013<\/a> signale cette \u00e9volution :<\/p>\n<\/p>\n \t\u00abThe Syrian government has withdrawn large numbers of troops from the Golan Heights in a move that has cast doubt over the future of a UN peacekeeping force on the strategically vital plateau and increased the risk of an intervention by Israel in the conflict. Western diplomats said the Syrian redeployments near the Golan ceasefire line were the most significant in 40 years, with at least several thousand soldiers thought to have been moved in recent weeks to battle fronts closer to Damascus. Rebel groups have moved into the vacuum, and Israel fears that jihadists will use the area as a staging ground for attacks on territory it controls.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n \t\u00bbMeanwhile, the United Nations observer force on the Golan Heights, Undof, finds itself in an ever more vulnerable position, with states whose peacekeepers comprise the mission known to be reconsidering their commitment, including the Austrians, who provide the largest individual contribution of troops.<\/em>\u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n \tL’humeur d\u00e9pressive restitu\u00e9e par Bechor peut effectivement concerner \u00e9galement, d’une fa\u00e7on involontaire, un tel prolongement qui constitue un engrenage conduisant \u00e0 l’engagement forc\u00e9 d’Isra\u00ebl \u00abinto this mess<\/em>\u00bb. (Et l’on pourrait aussi bien voir dans le red\u00e9ploiement des troupes d’Assad, outre des n\u00e9cessit\u00e9s op\u00e9rationnelles, une manuvre du pr\u00e9sident syrien pour placer Isra\u00ebl face \u00e0 une confrontation avec les rebelles islamistes)… D’une fa\u00e7on plus g\u00e9n\u00e9rale, et m\u00eame de la fa\u00e7on la plus g\u00e9n\u00e9rale possible qui est le seule acceptable pour embrasser le sens profond des \u00e9v\u00e9nements, et haussant alors le niveau du constat \u00e0 celui des perspectives plus g\u00e9n\u00e9rales, l’on retrouve le territoire impitoyable de la crise d’effondrement du Syst\u00e8me, \u00abIls ne mouraient pas tous, mais tous \u00e9taient frapp\u00e9s<\/em>\u00bb ; d’ailleurs, mourir, est-ce bien utile, puisqu’il suffit d’\u00eatre frapp\u00e9 pour passer de l’autre c\u00f4t\u00e9, dans l’entra\u00eenement de cette crise d’effondrement, et tout se passe alors comme si rien n’\u00e9tait plus possible, comme si l’on mourrait effectivement, ou plut\u00f4t comme si l’on se dissolvait dans le chef de l’\u00e9croulement de toutes les machinations et les manuvres \u00e9labor\u00e9es se fondant en un courant de d\u00e9sordre g\u00e9n\u00e9ral Il faudra bien accepter le fin mot de l’histoire, pour les uns et les autres et pour tous, que c’est le Syst\u00e8me qui se r\u00e9tracte, qui se r\u00e9ifie en son processus d’autodestruction, qui implose en se r\u00e9duisant dans le trou noir qui l’absorbe de plus en plus vite, et qui emporte tout puisqu’il est lui-m\u00eame la racine et la cause originelle de tout dans les situations pr\u00e9sentes.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n <\/p>\n \tMis en ligne le 8 avril 2013 \u00e0 05H47<\/p><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":" La solitude d\u00e9senchant\u00e9e et angoiss\u00e9e d’Isra\u00ebl Il est vrai que les \u00e9v\u00e9nements au Moyen-Orient, avec le d\u00e9sordre tournoyant autour de la Syrie, ont cr\u00e9\u00e9 une situation in\u00e9dite pour Isra\u00ebl : la possibilit\u00e9, pour la premi\u00e8re fois de son histoire, de n’\u00eatre pas au centre d’un soubresaut majeur dans la r\u00e9gion, voire de n’en \u00eatre concern\u00e9… <\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"","ping_status":"","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"neve_meta_sidebar":"","neve_meta_container":"","neve_meta_enable_content_width":"","neve_meta_content_width":0,"neve_meta_title_alignment":"","neve_meta_author_avatar":"","neve_post_elements_order":"","neve_meta_disable_header":"","neve_meta_disable_footer":"","neve_meta_disable_title":"","footnotes":""},"categories":[2],"tags":[4202,12066,3737,12067,11341,2774,2790,12068,3867,2613],"class_list":["post-74924","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-bloc-notes","tag-assad","tag-bechor","tag-erdogan","tag-golan","tag-islamiste","tag-israel","tag-netanyahou","tag-neutralite","tag-syrie","tag-turquie"],"jetpack_featured_media_url":"","_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/74924","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=74924"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/74924\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=74924"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=74924"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=74924"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}