\tLa Turquie a sign\u00e9 avec le secr\u00e9taire g\u00e9n\u00e9ral de l’Organisation de Coop\u00e9ration de Shanghai (OCS), bas\u00e9e sur le partenariat entre la Chine et la Russie et comprenant actuellement six membres, un accord instituant la Turquie partenaire de dialogue dans cette organisation. Cela signifie que la Turquie peut d\u00e9sormais suivre les d\u00e9lib\u00e9rations de l’OCS, et cela peut n’\u00eatre qu’un premier pas vers une participation plus large sinon compl\u00e8te. Son statut (qu’elle partage avec la Bi\u00e9lorussie et le Sri Lanka) est n\u00e9anmoins inf\u00e9rieur \u00e0 celui d’observateur qui a \u00e9t\u00e9 octroy\u00e9 \u00e0 l’Inde, \u00e0 la Mongolie, \u00e0 l’Iran au Pakistan et \u00e0 l’Afghanistan.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n
\tNous avons largement \u00e9voqu\u00e9 les conditions, parfois inattendues ou incertaines, bien souvent contradictoires ou antagonistes, qui ont conduit la Turquie \u00e0 ce rapprochement avec l’OCS, dans nos textes du 30 juillet 2012<\/a> et du 2 f\u00e9vrier 2013<\/a>. Cette \u00e9volution sp\u00e9cifique est si inattendue, par rapport \u00e0 ce qui semble \u00eatre l’\u00e9volution g\u00e9n\u00e9rale de la Turquie depuis 2011, qui la place dans des situations parfois de confrontation avec la Russie, la Chine, voire avec l’Iran (crise syrienne, question des antimissiles BMDE), que cette possibilit\u00e9 de rapprochement de l’OCS avait souvent \u00e9t\u00e9 \u00e9voqu\u00e9e comme une plaisanterie (ce qu’elle \u00e9tait para\u00eet-il, au d\u00e9part, lorsque Erdogan en parla \u00e0 Poutine le 25 juillet 2012). Dans nos commentaires, nous pr\u00e9sentions la chose par rapport \u00e0 ces diverses circonstances contradictoires et autres interf\u00e9rences, essentiellement comme un miroir du d\u00e9sordre et de l’absence de sens des relations internationales, et nous conservons sans aucun doute cette interpr\u00e9tation, tout en admettant qu’il y a une r\u00e9elle logique constructive et sens\u00e9e pour la Turquie \u00e0 chercher \u00e0 entrer dans l’OCS, par exemple beaucoup plus que dans son soutien des rebelles anti-Assad. (Le d\u00e9sordre \u00e9tant pour une part importante impos\u00e9 par les exigences de la politique-Syst\u00e8me<\/a>, dont l’objet exclusif est la d\u00e9structuration et la dissolution, et par les r\u00e9actions erratiques des directions politiques inf\u00e9od\u00e9es au Syst\u00e8me.)<\/p>\n<\/p>\n \tUn texte de Reuters du 26 avril 2013<\/a> pr\u00e9sente l’accord sign\u00e9 dans la capitale du Kazakhstan. Le ministre turc des affaires \u00e9trang\u00e8res Davutoglu, signataire de l’accord, y est pr\u00e9sent\u00e9 comme enthousiaste : \u00abDavutoglu, upbeat and smiling, stressed however that this status was just the beginning. I hope at the next summit in (the Kyrgyz capital) Bishkek we will be present, as well as at ministerial meetings, Davutoglu said. This is the beginning of a long way, walking together, hand in hand and shoulder to shoulder.<\/em>\u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n \tOn cite ici principalement l’article de Semih Idiz, dans Al-Monitor Turkey Pulse<\/em>, le 30 avril 2013<\/a>. Semih Idiz reprend les diverses circonstances contradictoires qui rendent cette adh\u00e9sion turque tr\u00e8s inhabituelle et peu commune. Bien entendu, nous les avons d\u00e9j\u00e0 \u00e9voqu\u00e9es, et leur rappel rend compte effectivement de la complexit\u00e9 du d\u00e9sordre du monde dans notre temps.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n \t\u00abAfter waiting for two years, Turkey finally became a dialogue partner of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) last week, thus moving a step closer to fulfilling a desire by Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan to one day becoming a full member of what is predominantly a security bloc that some argue is not only a counterbalance to NATO but also provides Ankara with an alternative to its stalled European Union membership bid.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n \t\u00bbForeign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu hailed the development as a historic day, adding, With this choice, Turkey is declaring that our destiny is the same as the destiny of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization countries. He was speaking in Almaty, the commercial capital of Kazakhstan, during a joint press conference with SCO Secretary-General Dmitry Mezentsev on April 26, after signing the memorandum of understanding making Turkey’s dialogue partnership official. Turkey will be part of a family, which is composed of the countries which lived together not for centuries for millennia, Davutoglu added, according to Reuters, going on to say, This is the beginning of a long way, walking together, hand in hand and shoulder to shoulder.<\/em> […]<\/p>\n<\/p>\n \t\u00bbDavutoglu’s remark in Almaty suggesting a shared destiny with SCO members also carries overtones of this approach. But there are some serious fallacies here that have to be highlighted. Webster’s Dictionary defines the term to be shanghaied as a way of inducing another to do something through force or deceit.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n \t\u00bbThere is no force in Turkey becoming a dialogue partner of the SCO, of course. There may, however, be some deceit. To start off with, there is already an anomaly in the fact that Turkey is bidding for SCO membership when it has been a member of NATO for over 60 years…<\/em> […]<\/p>\n<\/p>\n \t\u00bbAnswering questions for the Anatolian News Agency in the city of Turkistan in Kazakhstan, on Monday<\/em> [April 29<\/em>], Davutoglu also underlined the fact that Turkey is the first SCO dialogue partner which is also a NATO member. Seeing no discrepancy in this, he said, The Cold War is finished. Turkey will not be a slave to the Cold War mentality.<\/em> […]<\/p>\n<\/p>\n \t\u00bbPointing out that the SCO has a deeply anti-Western DNA, Daniel Pipes, who is the president of the Philadelphia-based Middle East Forum, and an inveterate opponent of Erdogan and his Islamist Justice and Development Party (AKP), has argued that cozying up to the SCO fits [Erdogan’s] Islamist impulse to defy the West and to dream of an alternative to it.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n \t\u00bbEven allowing for Pipes’ often skewed anti-Islamic views it is true that Erdogan has on many occasions revealed deeply anti-Western sentiments, the most recent example coming after the French intervention in Mali. Anti-Western sentiment also scores political points in Turkey, especially among Islamist grass roots supporters and nationalists of all shades.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n \t\u00bbOne gets the feeling, in light of the facts mentioned above that make a shared destiny with the SCO quite difficult for Turkey, that the Turkish public may be being shanghaied in this case for political reasons. If, however, this is all being done for the sake of expanding Turkey’s economic options, one can understand that. But with references to shared destinies, there appears to be more than that involved here.<\/em>\u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n \tIl faut noter, avec cette derni\u00e8re citation de Daniel Pipes, la tr\u00e8s violente opposition des neocons<\/em> am\u00e9ricanistes \u00e0 cette \u00e9volution de la Turquie, comme \u00e0 la Turquie en g\u00e9n\u00e9ral. Un article commentant par avance l’accord du 26 avril rend compte de cette hostilit\u00e9 quasi-visc\u00e9rale, rencontrant certains milieux en Isra\u00ebl m\u00eame \n dedefensa.org<\/em><\/p><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":" Signature… La Turquie a un pied dans l’OCS La Turquie a sign\u00e9 avec le secr\u00e9taire g\u00e9n\u00e9ral de l’Organisation de Coop\u00e9ration de Shanghai (OCS), bas\u00e9e sur le partenariat entre la Chine et la Russie et comprenant actuellement six membres, un accord instituant la Turquie partenaire de dialogue dans cette organisation. Cela signifie que la Turquie peut… <\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"","ping_status":"","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"neve_meta_sidebar":"","neve_meta_container":"","neve_meta_enable_content_width":"","neve_meta_content_width":0,"neve_meta_title_alignment":"","neve_meta_author_avatar":"","neve_post_elements_order":"","neve_meta_disable_header":"","neve_meta_disable_footer":"","neve_meta_disable_title":"","_jetpack_memberships_contains_paid_content":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[14],"tags":[11273,3356,3737,8405,3110,4102,2730,5508,3867,2613],"class_list":["post-74963","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-ouverture-libre","tag-cso","tag-desordre","tag-erdogan","tag-ocs","tag-pipes","tag-politique-systeme","tag-russie","tag-shanghai","tag-syrie","tag-turquie"],"jetpack_featured_media_url":"","jetpack_sharing_enabled":true,"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/74963","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=74963"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/74963\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=74963"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=74963"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=74963"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}