{"id":75073,"date":"2013-07-01T05:38:23","date_gmt":"2013-07-01T05:38:23","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/2013\/07\/01\/lhistoire-damour-entre-leurope-et-la-nsa\/"},"modified":"2013-07-01T05:38:23","modified_gmt":"2013-07-01T05:38:23","slug":"lhistoire-damour-entre-leurope-et-la-nsa","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/2013\/07\/01\/lhistoire-damour-entre-leurope-et-la-nsa\/","title":{"rendered":"L&rsquo;histoire d&rsquo;amour entre l&rsquo;Europe et la NSA"},"content":{"rendered":"<p><h2 class=\"common-article2\">L&rsquo;histoire d&rsquo;amour entre l&rsquo;Europe et la NSA<\/h2>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\tWayne Madsen, qui fut analyste pour la NSA pendant douze ans (1985-1997) avant de passer au journalisme dissident, donne une longue interview au site <em>PrivacySurgeon.org<\/em>, le <a href=\"http:\/\/www.privacysurgeon.org\/blog\/incision\/former-nsa-contractor-warns-of-murky-interception-arrangements\/\" class=\"gen\">29 juin 2013<\/a>, o\u00f9 il d\u00e9nonce l&rsquo;hypocrisie de l&rsquo;Europe d\u00e9non\u00e7ant avec quelques colossaux effets de manche l&rsquo;espionnage \u00e9lectronique de la NSA chez elle, alors qu&rsquo;elle collabore plantureusement avec la NSA depuis des d\u00e9cennies. (A noter que ces observations diverses de Madsen, plus que des r\u00e9v\u00e9lations, sont reprises par le <em>Guardian<\/em> du <a href=\"http:\/\/www.guardian.co.uk\/world\/2013\/jun\/29\/european-private-data-america\" class=\"gen\">29 juin 2013<\/a>, type de connexion originale entre la presse-Syst\u00e8me,  ou disons malgr\u00e9 tout-Syst\u00e8me,  et un journaliste notablement et r\u00e9solument dissident.)<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\tVoici d&rsquo;importants extraits de cette intervention. Encore une fois, il ne s&rsquo;agit pas de r\u00e9v\u00e9lations mais d&rsquo;une collation de faits rendus publics mais en g\u00e9n\u00e9ral assez peu b\u00e9n\u00e9ficiaires de la publicit\u00e9 qu&rsquo;on donne d&rsquo;habitude aux d\u00e9monstrations foudroyantes d&rsquo;un BHL ou d&rsquo;un Fabius sur la n\u00e9cessit\u00e9 de soutenir les rebelles syriens, et du choeur des vierges folles, politiques et salonardes fran\u00e7aises en faveur de liens \u00e9troits avec notre grand ami, la Grande R\u00e9publique. Effectivement, il s&rsquo;agit bien d&rsquo;une grande amie, \u00e0 laquelle on ne peut pad refuser grand&rsquo;chose, en m\u00eame temps qu&rsquo;on en attend quelques miettes relev\u00e9es de sel et de poivre concernant les grands dangers qui menacent notre civilisation d\u00e9cid\u00e9ment tr\u00e8s entreprenante. Cet ensemble rassembl\u00e9 de diverse informations d\u00e9j\u00e0 publiques permet d&rsquo;ailleurs de comprendre combien cette structure de renseignement et de surveillance \u00e0 la fois commune et antagoniste a facilit\u00e9 la formation de ce que nous nommons <a href=\"http:\/\/www.dedefensa.org\/article-glossairedde_bloc_bao_10_12_2012.html\" class=\"gen\">le bloc BAO<\/a> et la mise en uvre de la <a href=\"http:\/\/www.dedefensa.org\/article-glossairedde_la_politique-syst_me__17_11_2012.html\" class=\"gen\">politique-Syst\u00e8me<\/a> que d\u00e9veloppe le bloc&#8230; (Les interventions \u00e0 la premi\u00e8re personne non attribu\u00e9es \u00e0 Wayne Madsen sont le fait de Simon Davies, animateur du site <em>PrivacySurgeon.org<\/em>.)<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\t\u00ab[<em>Wadsen is<\/em>]<em> particularly concerned about the sanctimonious outcry of political leaders who were feigning shock about recently disclosed spying operations such as PRISM while staying silent about their own role in global interception arrangements with the United States. I can&rsquo;t understand how Angela Merkel can keep a straight face  demanding assurances from Obama and the UK  while Germany has entered into those exact relationships. She&rsquo;s acting like inspector Reynaud in Casablanca: I&rsquo;m shocked  shocked  to find gambling going on here&#8230;&rsquo; I can&rsquo;t understand how Angela Merkel can keep a straight face  demanding assurances from Obama and the UK  while Germany has entered into those exact relationships.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\t\u00bb<em>Unlike the UK  which has expressed a mixed response to its government&rsquo;s involvement with US security  allegations of collusion with the NSA are likely to spark widespread anxiety and disbelief in Germany. However the writing was on the wall in the final report of a 2000 inquiry by the European Parliament that investigated global signals intelligence, recommendation 21 of which states: Germany and the United Kingdom are called upon to make the authorisation of further communications interception operations by US intelligence services on their territory conditional on their compliance with the ECHR<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\t\u00bb<em>German political parties at the time of the EP inquiry had fiercely lobbied against claims that their country had colluded with the NSA, forcing a minority EP finding that bluntly stated: The report by the Temporary Committee confirms the existence of the Echelon interception system which is administered by various countries, including the United Kingdom, a Member State of the European Union, with the cooperation of Germany. The Finish communications minister has likewise denounced the NSA&rsquo;s intelligence gathering, despite evidence that Finland routinely supplies signals intelligence data to the NSA through its own listening station outside Helsinki. Indeed across Europe political leaders have sought to reassure their citizens that the NSA&rsquo;s activities are intolerable, while staying mute about their own involvement in those operations.<\/em> [&#8230;]<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\t\u00bb<em>In view of the current practice of targeting the messenger instead of the message, I&rsquo;ll get one matter out of the way before we go any further. Some of Madsen&rsquo;s views have been  to put it mildly  controversial. His articles and books sometimes talk of clandestine arrangements at the highest levels of government. But those claims are old news  and are irrelevant to the question being addressed in this article. Madsen&rsquo;s disclosures in the realm of SIGINT have however have been persistently correct  often expressed years before they were confirmed through official publication. Madsen warned of ECHELON long before that system was confirmed, just as he warned of widespread unchecked NSA activity years before the emergence of PRISM. He has also been at the forefront of disclosures about specific NSA pograms such as the media intelligence operation FIRSTFRUIT, which covertly monitors journalists.<\/em> [&#8230;]<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\t\u00bb<em>Madsen named seven EU countries that have been substantially engaged in communications intelligence gathering alongside the US. These are Britain, Denmark, the Netherlands, France, Germany, Spain, and Italy. Those seven countries have formal second and third party status under the NSA&rsquo;s signals intelligence agreements, and are contractually bound to the US.<\/em> <\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\t\u00bb<em>Under international intelligence agreements  most of which remain secret  nations are categorised according to their trust level. In the western world the US is defined as First Party while the UK, Canada, Australia and New Zealand are Second Party (trusted relationships). All others are third party (less trusted) or fourth party (secret) relationships. Madsen named seven EU countries that have been substantially engaged in communications intelligence gathering alongside the US. These are Britain, Denmark, the Netherlands, France, Germany, Spain, and Italy. Madsen warned that the public were being intentionally confused by the utterances of politicians. Spain and Germany had the same deal as GCHQ and NSA at [the spy station] Bude, Cornwall with their Project TEMPORA, tapping the TAT14 cable between Denmark and Germany, Netherlands, France, UK and US.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\t\u00bb<em>He outlined the significant extent of signals intelligence operations in Europe, cautioning that the public needed to be made aware of the scale of these activities. The Danes have an NSA listening post at Aflandshage, outside Copenhagen and the Finns provide 4th Party feed to NSA from the Santahamina facility outside Helsinki. The Swedish FRA also sends 4th Party SIGINT<\/em> [<em>signals intelligence<\/em>] <em>to NSA and has done so since the Cold War.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\t\u00bb<em>Bundesnachrictendienst (BND) and Spanish CESID jointly operated an undersea cable tapping station at Conil called Operation Delikatesse. The station tapped the cables linking Spain to the Canaries, other Mediterranean nations, Africa, and BND turned over operation of the station to CESID in1992 but like all these arrangements, German intelligence personnel likely remained for support. NSA did the same with its Turkish SIGINT stations, turning over operation of Sinop on the Black Sea, for example, to Turkey&rsquo;s MIT intelligence organization. The tapping facility, on Camino de los Militares in Conil is near the Telefonica satellite ground station.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\t\u00bb<em>Some of this activity was mentioned during the 2000 EP inquiry, but the specific contractual relationships with the NSA were not made clear. The European Parliament&rsquo;s inquiry was triggered by revelations that the NSA was conducting a global SIGINT operation known as ECHELON. Despite finding that the spying activity across Europe was vast and persistent, no further action was taken by the parliament. Governments have chosen to keep the public in the dark about it. They don&rsquo;t understand that the days when they could get away with a conspiracy of silence are over.<\/em> [&#8230;]<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\t\u00bb<em>Madsen also expressed anger over the NSA&rsquo;s hypocrisy over Edward Snowden. Snowden is being roundly condemned by many who say he had no authority or right to provide the public with details of NSA snooping. But what right or authority did NSA director, General Keith Alexander, have to provide information on NSA surveillance at five meetings of the global Bilderberg Conference  two in Virginia and one meeting each in Greece, Spain and Switzerland? Alexander claims he is protecting the American people from a constantly changing number of terrorist attacks. In fact, he is providing information to elites on the methods NSA uses to spy on labor, student, religious and progressive organizations. When Alexander leaks to the elites, he&rsquo;s thanked. When Snowden does it, he&rsquo;s called a traitor and a coward.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p>\n<p class=\"signature\"><em>dedefensa.org<\/em><\/p><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>L&rsquo;histoire d&rsquo;amour entre l&rsquo;Europe et la NSA Wayne Madsen, qui fut analyste pour la NSA pendant douze ans (1985-1997) avant de passer au journalisme dissident, donne une longue interview au site PrivacySurgeon.org, le 29 juin 2013, o\u00f9 il d\u00e9nonce l&rsquo;hypocrisie de l&rsquo;Europe d\u00e9non\u00e7ant avec quelques colossaux effets de manche l&rsquo;espionnage \u00e9lectronique de la NSA chez&hellip;&nbsp;<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"","ping_status":"","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"neve_meta_sidebar":"","neve_meta_container":"","neve_meta_enable_content_width":"","neve_meta_content_width":0,"neve_meta_title_alignment":"","neve_meta_author_avatar":"","neve_post_elements_order":"","neve_meta_disable_header":"","neve_meta_disable_footer":"","neve_meta_disable_title":"","_jetpack_memberships_contains_paid_content":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[14],"tags":[3428,398,4811,3871,12224,4999,1205],"class_list":["post-75073","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-ouverture-libre","tag-echelon","tag-europe","tag-madsen","tag-nsa","tag-snowden","tag-surveillance","tag-transatlantique"],"jetpack_featured_media_url":"","jetpack_sharing_enabled":true,"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/75073","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=75073"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/75073\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=75073"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=75073"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=75073"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}