{"id":75112,"date":"2013-07-23T07:22:33","date_gmt":"2013-07-23T07:22:33","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/2013\/07\/23\/la-catastrophe-us-et-cool-comme-bho-au-moyen-orient\/"},"modified":"2013-07-23T07:22:33","modified_gmt":"2013-07-23T07:22:33","slug":"la-catastrophe-us-et-cool-comme-bho-au-moyen-orient","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/2013\/07\/23\/la-catastrophe-us-et-cool-comme-bho-au-moyen-orient\/","title":{"rendered":"La catastrophe US (et cool<\/em>, comme BHO) au Moyen-Orient"},"content":{"rendered":"

La catastrophe US (et cool<\/em>, comme BHO) au Moyen-Orient<\/h3>\n<\/p>\n

\tUn excellent rapport de McClatchy.News<\/em> a paru le 20 juillet 2013<\/a> sur le r\u00f4le g\u00e9n\u00e9ral des USA au Moyen-Orient, particuli\u00e8rement pour ce qui concerne leurs relations avec leurs alli\u00e9s arabes et la situation de ces derniers.. Ce rapport g\u00e9n\u00e9ral confortera certainement ceux qui jugent que la strat\u00e9gie profonde des USA est d’instaurer le d\u00e9sordre partout (par cons\u00e9quent, au Moyen-Orient et ailleurs \u00e9galement, y compris et m\u00eame surtout aux USA, de Washington \u00e0 Detroit). <\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tCette conception d’une strat\u00e9gie profonde (le qualificatif profonde est magique dans ce cas, pour donner du cr\u00e9dit \u00e0 la th\u00e8se), consistant \u00e0 dire qu’on organise le contraire de ce que sa politique voudrait qu’on organise comme ruse supr\u00eame et gagnante, est un mod\u00e8le d\u00e9j\u00e0 utilis\u00e9, us\u00e9 et, dirait-on, authentifi\u00e9 par les \u00e9v\u00e9nements. Il fut utilis\u00e9 dans les ann\u00e9es 1980 (et est encore ressorti \u00e0 telle ou telle occasion) pour qualifier la politique de l’URSS (Gorbatchev) \u00e0 partir de 1985 comme une ruse supr\u00eame du KGB, consistant \u00e0 organiser la liquidation de la puissance de l’URSS, d’abord par ses satellites abandonnant le communisme sous la pouss\u00e9e de Gorbatchev, puis abandonnant le communisme au terme de la bataille Gorbatchev-Eltsine, puis livrant le pays \u00e0 l’encan du capitalisme sauvage US, pour faire croire que l’URSS (Russie entretemps) n’\u00e9tait plus l’ennemi principal, pour, enfin, mieux frapper l’Occident ainsi endormie. Effectivement, le complet effondrement d’une puissance est le meilleur moyen de faire croire \u00e0 l’ennemi que cette puissance n’existe plus, ruse supr\u00eame de l’inversion, dire et faire le vrai pour faire passer la ruse… D’un plus grand int\u00e9r\u00eat que de juger la justesse rationnelle de cette analyse, par exemple au vu des \u00e9v\u00e9nements actuels, est de juger la psychologie de ceux qui d\u00e9veloppent cette sorte de th\u00e9ories.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tFaudrait-il ranger le t\u00e9moignage du g\u00e9n\u00e9ral Dempsey devant le S\u00e9nat dans la cat\u00e9gorie de cette strat\u00e9gie profonde ? Apr\u00e8s avoir d\u00e9clar\u00e9 que les militaires travaillaient \u00e0 la demande de l’administration sur l’option d’une intervention en Syrie comme ils le font d’une fa\u00e7on continue sans que l’administration ne le leur demande, lors d’une pr\u00e9c\u00e9dente audition (voir le Guardian<\/em> du 19 juillet<\/a>), provoquant ainsi un renouveau de sp\u00e9culations d’une attaque US tandis que le monde (et la Russie, ce qui donnerait une pi\u00e8tre appr\u00e9ciation de sa diplomatie) avait para\u00eet-il son attention sollicit\u00e9e par la crise Snowden\/USA, Dempsey est revenu hier sur le sujet (Guardian, du 23 juin 2013<\/a>). Jamais le pr\u00e9sident du comit\u00e9 des chefs d’\u00e9tat-major des forces arm\u00e9es n’a pris une position aussi d\u00e9favorable \u00e0 cette option, s’adressant \u00e0 des s\u00e9nateurs de la commission des forces arm\u00e9es qui ont r\u00e9cemment appel\u00e9 \u00e0 une invasion de la Syrie. Encore de la strat\u00e9gie profonde…<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00abThe top US military officer warned senators on Monday that taking military action to stop the bloodshed in Syria was likely to escalate quickly and result in \u00ab\u00a0unintended consequences\u00a0\u00bb, representing the most explicit uniformed opposition to deeper involvement in another war in the Middle East.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00bbAlluding to the costly, bloody occupations of Iraq and Afghanistan, General Martin Dempsey, chairman of the joint chiefs of staff, said that once the US got involved militarily in the Syrian civil war, which the UN estimates to have killed about 93,000 people, deeper involvement is hard to avoid. We have learned from the past 10 years, however, that it is not enough to simply alter the balance of military power without careful consideration of what is necessary in order to preserve a functioning state, Dempsey wrote to senators John McCain and Carl Levin on Monday. We must anticipate and be prepared for the unintended consequences of our action.’<\/em>\u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tOn peut ainsi revenir \u00e0 l’analyse de McClatchy.News<\/em>. Malgr\u00e9 les tr\u00e8s \u00e9pisodiques pouss\u00e9es de fi\u00e8vre belliqueuse de l’administration Obama \u00e0 l’encontre de la Syrie, qui sont pure posture de circonstance pour la plus minable tactique int\u00e9rieure \u00e0 laquelle se r\u00e9sume toute<\/strong> sa politique, le rapport de McClatchy.News<\/em> montre que la politique de cette administration en Syrie, en \u00c9gypte et ailleurs, malgr\u00e9 les manipulations et plans machiav\u00e9liques sans nombre, est fondamentalement organisatrice d’un d\u00e9sordre qui touche sp\u00e9cifiquement et presque exclusivement les amis des USA. (Entretemps, Assad se renforce, comme le britannique Cameron le reconna\u00eet lui-m\u00eame, ce 21 juillet 2013<\/a>, encore dans le Guardian<\/em>.) L’analyse de McClatchy.News<\/em> montre que la politique d’Obama au Moyen-Orient concerne les marges des citations r\u00e9elles, c’est-\u00e0-dire en aucun cas leur r\u00e9alit\u00e9 profonde (encore ce qualificatif). Disons qu’il s’agit de la version cool<\/em>, type-BHO, de la strat\u00e9gie profonde, profonde sur les marges… L’analyse de McCltachy vaut ample citation, \u00e9tant elle-m\u00eame bas\u00e9e sur des citations d’experts venant d’instituts du Moyen-Orient tr\u00e8s proches des USA et du bloc BAO, puisqu’il s’agit d’extension d’instituts US et britannique dans des pays amis du bloc bAO..<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00abSome of America’s closest Middle East allies, viewing U.S. policy as adrift, are competing for influence in the region’s trouble spots, producing discord that might get in the way of stable outcomes and take decades to put right, experts in the region say. Analysts blame the Obama administration, which they say still doesn’t have a strategy to deal with the aftershocks of the 2011 Arab Spring in particular the war in Syria and Egypt’s latest political upheaval. Instead, the U.S. aim appears to be to contain the crises and manage them at the margins, they say.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00bbWe are in a situation where the United States doesn’t want to lead. It has quite an effect on the region, said Salman Shaikh of the Brookings Institution in Doha, Qatar. In its place, regional powers such as Saudi Arabia, Turkey and Qatar are devising their own policies, but without coordination and often with different aims, he said. The Gulf states and the Turks thought they would own the Syrian problem in the early period of the uprising, said Emile Hokayem, a Bahrain-based analyst at the International Institute for Strategic Studies who’s just written a book about the Syrian war. Then they realized the limits of their power and begged for U.S. leadership, figuring the U.S. could harmonize the various approaches toward Syria and de-conflict them. But the United States wants only to manage the Middle East crises at the margins, he said. Both men spoke in telephone interviews.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00bbThe discord is on display in both Syria and Egypt. Saudi Arabia recently upstaged Qatar and helped force a shakeup in the leadership of the internationally recognized Syrian Opposition Coalition, displacing the power of delegates from the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood by adding liberal secular Syrians. The coalition was created last year at the behest of the United States to become a government in exile, prepared to step in should President Bashar Assad fall. But the U.S. has provided no funds to the group State Department officials have told McClatchy they think the coalition is too unstable to be counted on to spend the money wisely and senior members of the coalition say the United States gives widely inconsistent advice and doesn’t follow through on its pledges of support.<\/em> […]<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00bbThe Saudis and the Qataris have pursued distinctly different approaches to the Muslim Brotherhood in Syria and Egypt; the Saudis fear the Brotherhood as a pan-Arab movement determined to undermine the region’s monarchies, whereas Qatar sees the Brotherhood more opportunistically as a force that will bring results, Hokayem said.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00bbThe clearest example may be in Egypt. The Saudis refused to send financial support to the government of former President Mohammed Morsi, who rose to prominence through the Brotherhood. But Qatar committed $8 billion in aid and material support, and Turkey, governed by the Justice and Development Party, the Turkish equivalent of the Brotherhood, pledged $2 billion. Days after the Egyptian military overthrew Morsi early this month, the Saudis stepped in with $5 billion in various forms of aid for the military-backed interim government, and the United Arab Emirates and Kuwait added another $7 billion.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00bbThe Persian Gulf countries can provide some legitimacy, some regional cover to the military for overthrowing Morsi, but they don’t have the strategic vision, the expertise . . . the democratic vision that would lead to an inclusive political scene in Egypt, Hokayem said, preferring one side over the other. In their competition and their machinations, the regional players are making a mess of it, Shaikh said. They should have come together with a series of actions to stabilize the country. But we’re not in that situation. The simple fact is that the Emiratis, the Kuwaitis . . . jumped on the chance to do one over on the guys that the Turks and the Qataris were supporting.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00bbSince Morsi was toppled July 3, Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan and his senior aides have called almost daily for Morsi’s reinstatement, leading Egypt’s new rulers to issue a diplomatic protest. Tensions between Saudi Arabia and Turkey and the United Arab Emirates and Turkey are huge, Hokayem said. Shaikh predicted that the competition in the end of the day will come back to haunt them, for an unstable Egypt is not good for any of them.<\/em> […]<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00bbBut the country that’s suffering the most from what Shaikh calls a policy that is adrift is Syria, where the country’s civil war has claimed more than 100,000 lives on both sides. A leading figure in the opposition coalition’s new Saudi-backed civilian leadership says the U.S. has a policy of vagueness.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00bbIn principle, the United States backs the coalition, said Fayez Sara, a writer and journalist who’s now a member of the coalition’s political committee. However, he said, until now, no money has been received from the U.S. When the U.S. offers advice, it is inconsistent, he said in an interview. In the morning, they say, Unite.’ In the afternoon, it’s Fight terror groups.’ In the evening, they say, Work for a political settlement with the regime.’ <\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00bbHe said there was a contradiction in the U.S. message, which declared on one hand that Assad must go and on the other demands of Assad’s opponents that You have to arrive at some sort of agreement with him. Sara says that when he points this out to U.S. officials, he receives different responses. Some say, You’re right, and others just walk away, he said. The Americans have, for now, abandoned the Syrian situation to its fate, he said. They will not take on the political or moral responsibility. They may come back to it. But it will be much more difficult when they do.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tHokayemsaid the Obama administration had defined its policies in the region in terms of avoiding another Iraq. But Syria has already overtaken Iraq in terms of its humanitarian, regional and strategic significance, he said. Syria is going to be the defining issue of the decade in the region, he said, and the Obama administration may soon get the worst of both worlds. We’re going to see an Assad surviving in a weakened fashion, more dependent on Iran and Hezbollah, with no strategic gain, Hokayem said. There will be a range of radical groups, whose identity we don’t know, which will be very difficult to contain. Shaikh agreed. I don’t think we’ve got a grip on this, he said. The legacy of that is quite, quite devastating in the future.<\/em>\u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

\tMis en ligne le 23 juillet 2013 \u00e0 07H19<\/p><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

La catastrophe US (et cool, comme BHO) au Moyen-Orient Un excellent rapport de McClatchy.News a paru le 20 juillet 2013 sur le r\u00f4le g\u00e9n\u00e9ral des USA au Moyen-Orient, particuli\u00e8rement pour ce qui concerne leurs relations avec leurs alli\u00e9s arabes et la situation de ces derniers.. Ce rapport g\u00e9n\u00e9ral confortera certainement ceux qui jugent que la… <\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"","ping_status":"","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"neve_meta_sidebar":"","neve_meta_container":"","neve_meta_enable_content_width":"","neve_meta_content_width":0,"neve_meta_title_alignment":"","neve_meta_author_avatar":"","neve_post_elements_order":"","neve_meta_disable_header":"","neve_meta_disable_footer":"","neve_meta_disable_title":"","footnotes":""},"categories":[2],"tags":[3259,11165,9550,3090,8173,7556,6208,4102,4859,3867,2613],"class_list":["post-75112","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-bloc-notes","tag-arabie","tag-dempsey","tag-egypte","tag-influence","tag-intervention","tag-mcclatchy","tag-obama","tag-politique-systeme","tag-qatar","tag-syrie","tag-turquie"],"jetpack_featured_media_url":"","_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/75112","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=75112"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/75112\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=75112"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=75112"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=75112"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}