\tHarlan Ullman d\u00e9veloppe, le 8 ao\u00fbt 2013<\/a> pour UPI, une proposition enti\u00e8rement bas\u00e9e sur la logique du pire. Il s’agit de l’\u00e9tat du Pentagone, de la dynamique de la s\u00e9questration, et de l’\u00e9volution des forces arm\u00e9es des USA dans les dix ann\u00e9es qui viennent. Ullman s’exprime sans pincettes, comme il a l’habitude de faire, par exemple lorsqu’il remarque que la meilleure chose qui soit arriv\u00e9e ces derniers jours est le d\u00e9part en vacances du Congr\u00e8s puisque, pendant ce temps, son action n’aggrave pas la situation \u00e0 Washington (\u00abPerhaps the best thing that happened to the United States last week was Congress abandoning Washington for a 5-week break deferring all the major issues and problems.<\/em>\u00bb)… En attendant, \u00e0 son retour de vacances, probl\u00e8mes, blocages et impasses seront toujours l\u00e0, empil\u00e9s, plus pressants que jamais (\u00abWill anything improve when Congress returns? The answer isn’t reassuring<\/em>\u00bb). Bref, Ullman, a enfourch\u00e9 son th\u00e8me favori qui est la crise sans fin du pouvoir washingtonien, en y ajoutant son exp\u00e9rience d’expert dans les mati\u00e8res strat\u00e9giques puisqu’il fit une carri\u00e8re dans l’U.S. Navy (c’est \u00e0 lui qu’est attribu\u00e9e la paternit\u00e9 de la doctrine<\/a> Shock & Awe<\/em>).<\/p>\n<\/p>\n \tUllman d\u00e9taille la crise budg\u00e9taire que la s\u00e9questration a d\u00e9clench\u00e9e, sp\u00e9cifiquement dans le cas du Pentagone. Il estime que cette crise doit affecter le Pentagone dans une mesure consid\u00e9rable dans les prochaines ann\u00e9es, en se r\u00e9f\u00e9rant \u00e0 des r\u00e8gles \u00e9conomiques et financi\u00e8res strictes. On peut effectivement admettre cette approche dans la mesure o\u00f9, justement, la s\u00e9questration impose un cadre l\u00e9gislatif rigide, interdisant le moindre arrangement bureaucratique et politicien du type de ceux qui ont jusqu’ici fonctionn\u00e9 entre le Pentagone et le Congr\u00e8s. Cette rigidit\u00e9 est effectivement tout ce qui fait la particularit\u00e9 sans pr\u00e9c\u00e9dent de la s\u00e9questration pour des entit\u00e9s de la puissance et de l’importance du Pentagone. Ullman qualifie justement la s\u00e9questration d’\u00e9p\u00e9e de Damocl\u00e8s qui conduit le Pentagone \u00e0 une situation catastrophique, concr\u00e8tement la n\u00e9cessit\u00e9 de doubler les d\u00e9penses de d\u00e9fense dans les dix ans s’il voulait maintenir les forces arm\u00e9es \u00e0 leur niveau actuel, alors que la s\u00e9questration induit au contraire une r\u00e9duction d’au moins 10% (de 25% pour certains) des d\u00e9penses de d\u00e9fense sur la m\u00eame dur\u00e9e (voir le 5 ao\u00fbt 2013<\/a>).<\/p>\n<\/p>\n \t\u00abBut, the effect of the financial Damoclean Sword can be made more obvious. The banking Rule of 10 explains why. Money deposited at an annual interest rate of 7 percent doubles every 10 years; at 10 percent, it doubles every seven years. Conversely, money that declines annually at 7 percent is cut in half in 10 years and at 10 percent in seven. The annual costs of defense to maintain current capability amount to about 7 percent because of the exploding expense of people active, reserves and retirees medical care and advanced weapons systems, plus inflation that is about 3 percent.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n \t\u00bbConclusion: Despite appeals to cut waste and inefficiency that achieve little, by the end of this decade, in gross terms, the Rule of 10 (or seven) means doubling defense spending to maintain the current force or cutting the current force by about half.<\/em>\u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n \tUllman termine en se demandant comment les \u00e9v\u00e9nements vont progresser. C’est l\u00e0, esp\u00e8re-t-il, que l’\u00e9p\u00e9e de Damocl\u00e8s de la s\u00e9questration pourrait faire son effet apr\u00e8s tout, en for\u00e7ant<\/strong> la chose (le Pentagone) aux d\u00e9cisions draconiennes que n\u00e9cessite son \u00e9tat… Ce qu’il d\u00e9veloppe est bien cette logique du pire. Observant que le Pentagone se trouve d’ores et d\u00e9j\u00e0 (avant m\u00eame la s\u00e9questration, d’ailleurs) dans l’\u00e9tat extraordinairement catastrophique o\u00f9 on le voit, compl\u00e8tement d\u00e9liquescent dans son oc\u00e9an de gaspillage et d’aberrations de gestion, impuissant \u00e0 se r\u00e9former, il juge que les conditions draconiennes qu’impose la s\u00e9questration donnent une occasion unique de forcer le Pentagone \u00e0 se r\u00e9former, et, pour ceux qui le dirigent, de se forcer eux-m\u00eames \u00e0 imposer sa r\u00e9forme au Pentagone. Les deux termes sont \u00e9videmment li\u00e9s et l’un ne va sans l’autre : il faut que le Pentagone soit en position o\u00f9 il ne peut faire autrement que se r\u00e9former (la s\u00e9questration met en place cette situation), mais il faut aussi qu’une direction soit en place qui ait la volont\u00e9 politique, le courage politique d’effectivement pousser \u00e0 cette r\u00e9forme. On en revient alors \u00e0 cette condition du courage politique, donc \u00e0 la situation de la direction-Syst\u00e8me de Washington. Bien… Si Ullman d\u00e9veloppe effectivement sa logique du pire, l’on sent tout de m\u00eame, selon l’habitude qu’on a des sentiments dominants chez ce personnage, que lui aussi se force \u00e0 proposer un terme encourageant. A force de d\u00e9velopper la logique du pire, dans une situation o\u00f9 il n’y a aucune place pour une autre logique, on en arrive \u00e0 manquer de conviction pour proposer quelque chose qui ne soit pas le pire. <\/p>\n<\/p>\n \t\u00abWhat can be done? A cynic or pragmatist experienced in U.S. politics might say nothing. But doing nothing won’t defend the nation.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n \t\u00bbDesperate times call for desperate measures. U.S. Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel has demonstrated his courage in battle and in the Senate. The uniformed senior military leadership and the people they lead have repeatedly demonstrated bravery in war and in peace. Now, political courage is essential.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n \t\u00bbWhen Congress returns, the Pentagon must show in specific terms the stark choices it and the American people face regarding the size and shape of the future military with sequestration and the ludicrous requirement to take all cuts equally across all programs as if we can build 90 percent of a ship, bullet, missile or rifle. The purpose isn’t to seek more money for defense. Indeed, given the struggling U.S. economy and the looming debt ceiling, budget and other financial issues this year, defense spending is likely to be further reduced. When interest rates rise, which they will, budgets will be slashed to reflect the increases in non-discretionary spending.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n \t\u00bbThe purpose is to produce a range of force options at likely projected levels of defense spending rather than wishful thinking that somehow Congress will save the day, which it won’t. Congress and the public can draw their own conclusions about the consequences.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n \t\u00bbHere, if we don’t spend much more money, the two basic choices are keeping a larger but less prepared and probably unready force OR accepting a much smaller but highly capable force. The driving assumptions for both choices are that global or very large regional wars are unlikely for some time and can be deterred or avoided through cleverer strategies, more rigorous assessments of dangers, greater reliance on allies and partners and polices to reconstitute and rebuild capabilities when and if needed. The second choice ensures greater likelihood of success for forces deployed in harm’s way.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n \t\u00bbSuch a stark presentation will shock and stun many. Critics will claim this approach is overly pessimistic while aiding our adversaries by underscoring our weaknesses. And large reductions will be painful. If we are, however, to prevent the condition of financial national insecurity from emasculating defense, truth, realism, candor and objectivity are essential. Without them, we may scrape by. But don’t count on that.<\/em>\u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n \n dedefensa.org<\/em><\/p><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":" La logique du pire, ou la sauvegarde par la s\u00e9questration Harlan Ullman d\u00e9veloppe, le 8 ao\u00fbt 2013 pour UPI, une proposition enti\u00e8rement bas\u00e9e sur la logique du pire. Il s’agit de l’\u00e9tat du Pentagone, de la dynamique de la s\u00e9questration, et de l’\u00e9volution des forces arm\u00e9es des USA dans les dix ann\u00e9es qui viennent. Ullman… <\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"","ping_status":"","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"neve_meta_sidebar":"","neve_meta_container":"","neve_meta_enable_content_width":"","neve_meta_content_width":0,"neve_meta_title_alignment":"","neve_meta_author_avatar":"","neve_post_elements_order":"","neve_meta_disable_header":"","neve_meta_disable_footer":"","neve_meta_disable_title":"","_jetpack_memberships_contains_paid_content":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[14],"tags":[9391,3194,11367,8174],"class_list":["post-75155","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-ouverture-libre","tag-harlan","tag-pentagone","tag-sequestration","tag-ullman"],"jetpack_featured_media_url":"","jetpack_sharing_enabled":true,"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/75155","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=75155"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/75155\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=75155"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=75155"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=75155"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}