Nous avons parl\u00e9 \u00e0 plusieurs reprises de l’entretien du 31 juillet entre Prince Bandar, le chef des SR saoudiens et personnage \u00e0 nombreuses faces machiav\u00e9liques, et le pr\u00e9sident russe Poutine, dans la r\u00e9sidence personnelle de Poutine ; mais chaque fois, de fa\u00e7on tangentielle et parcellaire. (Voir le 17 août 2013<\/a>, le 19 août 2013<\/a> et le 21 août 2013<\/a>.) Le quotidien libanais en langue arabe As Safir<\/em>, qui se r\u00e9v\u00e8le souvent d’excellente tenue dans les informations exclusives et semi-officielles qu’il publie et commente, a publi\u00e9 un article sur cet entretien. As Safir<\/em> publie un article tr\u00e8s complet sur cet entretien \u00e0 partir d’un \u00ab\u00a0rapport diplomatique\u00a0\u00bb (traduction en anglais dans Al Monitor.com<\/em>, le 22 août 2013<\/a>).<\/p>\n<\/p>\n L’article pr\u00e9sente d’abord les conditions de pr\u00e9parations de l’entretien, qui s’est d\u00e9roul\u00e9 au cours d’un d\u00e9placement hors des normes officielles, apr\u00e8s une intervention et une proposition t\u00e9l\u00e9phoniques du roi Abdoullah faites directement \u00e0 Poutine. Bandar (qui a vu aussi le chef du renseignement militaire russe, le g\u00e9n\u00e9ral Sergon) s’est pr\u00e9sent\u00e9 \u00e0 Poutine comme ayant inform\u00e9 les USA et certains pays europ\u00e9ens de son initiative, ajoutant d’une fa\u00e7on \u00e9nigmatique et originale, qu’on dirait bien dans sa mani\u00e8re \u00e0 quintuple face, que \u00ab\u00a0tout accord qui serait r\u00e9alis\u00e9 durant cet entretien serait non seulement un accord arabo-russe, mais aussi un accord am\u00e9ricano-russe\u00a0\u00bb. Cette affirmation, \u00e0 la fois audacieuse et extravagante, ne paraît pas \u00eatre du genre \u00e0 d\u00e9tendre l’atmosph\u00e8re dans le sens d’\u00e9tablir une confiance particuli\u00e8re, notamment dans le chef des Russes.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n L’entretien est pr\u00e9sent\u00e9 comme ayant \u00e9t\u00e9 tr\u00e8s agit\u00e9 (\u00ab\u00a0stormy meeting<\/em>\u00ab\u00a0), et effectivement certains passages montrent une rude franchise (voir ci-dessous la r\u00e9ponse de Poutine \u00e0 Bandar concernant les groupes terroristes tch\u00e9tch\u00e8nes). Nous publions ci-dessus quelques extraits s\u00e9lectionn\u00e9s de l’article, donc de ce qui est suppos\u00e9 \u00eatre la rencontre. Le premier extrait rend compte des grandes lignes des propositions de Bandar, notamment pour ce qui concerne le terrorisme, l’extr\u00e9misme musulman et la situation \u00e9gyptienne.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n «…Bandar told Putin, \u00ab\u00a0There are many common values and goals that bring us together, most notably the fight against terrorism and extremism all over the world. Russia, the US, the EU and the Saudis agree on promoting and consolidating international peace and security. The terrorist threat is growing in light of the phenomena spawned by the Arab Spring. We have lost some regimes. And what we got in return were terrorist experiences, as evidenced by the experience of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt and the extremist groups in Libya. … As an example, I can give you a guarantee to protect the Winter Olympics in the city of Sochi on the Black Sea next year. The Chechen groups that threaten the security of the games are controlled by us, and they will not move in the Syrian territory’s direction without coordinating with us. These groups do not scare us. We use them in the face of the Syrian regime but they will have no role or influence in Syria’s political future.\u00a0\u00bb<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n »Putin thanked King Abdullah for his greetings and Bandar for his exposition, but then he said to Bandar, \u00ab\u00a0We know that you have supported the Chechen terrorist groups for a decade. And that support, which you have frankly talked about just now, is completely incompatible with the common objectives of fighting global terrorism that you mentioned. We are interested in developing friendly relations according to clear and strong principles.\u00a0\u00bb<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n »Bandar said that the matter is not limited to the kingdom and that some countries have overstepped the roles drawn for them, such as Qatar and Turkey. He added, \u00ab\u00a0We said so directly to the Qataris and to the Turks. We rejected their unlimited support to the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt and elsewhere. The Turks’ role today has become similar to Pakistan’s role in the Afghan war. We do not favor extremist religious regimes, and we wish to establish moderate regimes in the region. It is worthwhile to pay attention to and to follow up on Egypt’s experience. We will continue to support the<\/em> [Egyptian<\/em>] army, and we will support Defense Minister Gen. Abdel Fattah al-Sisi because he is keen on having good relations with us and with you. And we suggest to you to be in contact with him, to support him and to give all the conditions for the success of this experiment. We are ready to hold arms deals with you in exchange for supporting these regimes, especially Egypt.\u00a0\u00bb<\/em>»<\/p>\n<\/p>\n • Sur ce dernier point de l’affaire \u00e9gyptienne, la r\u00e9plique de Poutine, telle que rapport\u00e9e par l’article, va nettement dans le sens des indications donn\u00e9es par Bandar. (Il doit \u00eatre not\u00e9 que l’appr\u00e9ciation des Russes a sans doute notablement \u00e9volu\u00e9 depuis le 31 juillet, notamment avec les affrontements et les massacres du d\u00e9but du mois, puis la reprise en main assez \u00e9vidente de la situation par l’arm\u00e9e, d’autant plus \u00e9vidente apr\u00e8s l’\u00e9chec de la mobilisation des Fr\u00e8res Musulmans, hier au Caire. Il est \u00e9vident que le spectre de la guerre civile est aujourd’hui tr\u00e8s \u00e9loign\u00e9.)<\/p>\n<\/p>\n «Putin gave his country’s position on the Arab Spring developments, especially about what has happened in Libya, saying, \u00ab\u00a0We are very concerned about Egypt. And we understand what the Egyptian army is doing. But we are very cautious in approaching what’s happening because we are afraid that things may slide toward an Egyptian civil war, which would be too costly for the Egyptians, the Arabs and the international community. I wanted to do a brief visit to Egypt. And the matter is still under discussion.\u00a0\u00bb<\/em>»<\/p>\n<\/p>\n • L\u00e0 où le d\u00e9saccord fut le plus flagrant, c’est sur les questions syrienne et iranienne. Les propositions saoudiennes, consistaient \u00e0 \u00ab\u00a0acheter\u00a0\u00bb une nouvelle politique russe en Syrie (abandon d’Assad) et en Iran (opposition au programme nucl\u00e9aire). Poutine a rejet\u00e9 les deux propositions, rendant caducs du m\u00eame coup les diverses propositions d’avantages \u00e9conomiques, p\u00e9troliers, d’investissements saoudiens en Russie, etc., avanc\u00e9es par Bandar. Des \u00e9chos de cet aspect d'\u00a0\u00bbachat\u00a0\u00bb de la politique russe avaient \u00e9t\u00e9 diffus\u00e9es par diverses sources, notamment par le site d’opposition en Russie des commentateurs Sergei Chargunov and Zakhar Prilepine, Svobodnaya Press<\/em> (URL du site, en russe : http:\/\/www.svpressa.ru\/<\/a>). Le journaliste Vassili Vankov avait interview\u00e9 Viacheslav Tetekine, membre de la commission de la d\u00e9fense de la Douma<\/em>, le 11 août 2013, en lui demandant d’assumer que les informations qui avaient commenc\u00e9 \u00e0 filtrer \u00e9taient fond\u00e9es. Sur les propositions de Bandar d'\u00a0\u00bbacheter\u00a0\u00bb un changement de la politique russe, Tetekine avait r\u00e9pondu :<\/p>\n<\/p>\n «I simply proceed from the assumption that such information might well not correspond to reality. If, on the other hand, we assume that it is reliable, it is undoubtedly unbecoming for any country to sell its allies. I do not rule out the Saudis, and the Americans at their backs, indeed having dangled a \u00ab\u00a0carrot\u00a0\u00bb before our leadership. But Russia is not a state that could afford to \u00ab\u00a0jump\u00a0\u00bb at such a cheap enticement. This would not simply mean a loss of prestige but of our clout and influence in the world. That such things occurred at the start of the 1990s is another matter. When our foreign policy was \u00ab\u00a0steered\u00a0\u00bb by Mr Kozyrev, who not without malice was called not \u00ab\u00a0minister of foreign affairs of Russia\u00a0\u00bb but \u00ab\u00a0minister of foreign affairs for Russia\u00a0\u00bb. It would for the present leadership be entirely unseemly to bite at such lures. From the perspective of Russia’s strategic interests, we cannot afford to resemble a commercial enterprise prepared to trade our interests at a reasonable price.<\/em>»<\/p>\n<\/p>\n Il faut noter qu’apr\u00e8s la r\u00e9plique de Poutine rejetant la sorte d'\u00a0\u00bbarrangement\u00a0\u00bb que Bandar proposait sur la Syrie, l’article observe : «As soon as Putin finished his speech, Prince Bandar warned that in light of the course of the talks, things were likely to intensify, especially in the Syrian arena…<\/em>» Cette remarque peut apr\u00e8s tout prendre une signification particuli\u00e8re, disons concernant les dons de proph\u00e9tisme de Prince Bandar, relativement aux \u00ab\u00a0\u00e9v\u00e9nements\u00a0\u00bb en Syrie ces trois derniers jours (controverse autour de l’attaque chimique, menace d’attaque du bloc BAO).<\/p>\n<\/p>\n • Un \u00e9l\u00e9ment particulier doit \u00e9galement retenir l’attention, qui est ce que Poutine aurait affirm\u00e9 \u00e0 propos des relations entre la Russie et la Turquie, notamment dans la perspective d’une visite d’Erdogan en Russie en septembre. Il est notable que, sur ce point, Poutine montre une grande souplesse d’interpr\u00e9tations et de perspective de ses relations avec la Turquie et \u00ab\u00a0son ami Erdogan\u00a0\u00bb, malgr\u00e9 la Syrie et alors que la Turquie traverse elle-m\u00eame une crise \u00e0 la fois interne et externe.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n «Regarding the Turkish issue, Putin spoke of his friendship with Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan; \u00ab\u00a0Turkey is also a neighboring country with which we have common interests. We are keen to develop our relations in various fields. During the Russian-Turkish meeting, we scrutinized the issues on which we agree and disagree. We found out that we have more converging than diverging views. I have already informed the Turks, and I will reiterate my stance before my friend Erdogan, that what is happening in Syria necessitates a different approach on their part. Turkey will not be immune to Syria’s bloodbath. The Turks ought to be more eager to find a political settlement to the Syrian crisis. We are certain that the political settlement in Syria is inevitable, and therefore they ought to reduce the extent of damage. Our disagreement with them on the Syrian issue does not undermine other understandings between us at the level of economic and investment cooperation. We have recently informed them that we are ready to cooperate with them to build two nuclear reactors. This issue will be on the agenda of the Turkish prime minister during his visit to Moscow in September.\u00a0\u00bb<\/em>»<\/p>\n<\/p>\n Ce \u00ab\u00a0document diplomatique\u00a0\u00bb sur la rencontre Poutine-Bandar permet \u00e9videmment d’avancer consid\u00e9rablement dans la d\u00e9finition de l’importance de cette rencontre, de ses faux-semblants et de ses r\u00e9alit\u00e9s. On arrive ais\u00e9ment \u00e0 la conclusion qu’un seul sujet domine cette rencontre, où l’on peut trouver une entente possible entre la Russie et l’Arabie \u00e9chappant aux manœuvres diverses, et c’est bien entendu l’Égypte. Il est manifeste que les deux pays ont une vision commune de la situation \u00e9gyptienne, et des int\u00e9r\u00eats communs dans une \u00e9volution de cette situation favorable aux militaires et en opposition aux Fr\u00e8res Musulmans. Il faut noter qu’en se r\u00e9f\u00e9rant \u00e0 la situation syrienne, ce sont les Russes qui sont le plus \u00e0 l’aise : l’intervention des militaires \u00e9gyptiens se justifie en bonne partir par les projets de Morsi d’engager l’Égypte contre Assad. La position de l’arm\u00e9e se fait sentir sur la situation de l’opposition syrienne, comme le rapportait le 17 août 2013<\/a> Hurriyet Daily News<\/em> (quotidien turc), qui a interrog\u00e9 le repr\u00e9sentant de l’opposition syrienne en Turquie, Khaled Khoja. Le quartier-g\u00e9n\u00e9ral de la Coalition Nationale Syrienne (SNC en anglais) doit \u00eatre transf\u00e9r\u00e9 d’Egypte en Turquie alors que les mouvements des opposants syriens sont contr\u00f4l\u00e9s et limit\u00e9s, et que nombre de ces opposants quittent la Turquie («\u00ab\u00a0Just a few days before the coup, a meeting on Syria took place in Cairo. Morsi had said they would freeze diplomatic relations with the Bashar al-Assad regime. Right after the coup, this decision was overturned and the new regime said they would upgrade relations with Syria,\u00a0\u00bb Khoja said.<\/em>»)<\/p>\n<\/p>\n Certains n’h\u00e9sitent plus \u00e0 lier cette \u00e9volution de l’Égypte, les intentions russes \u00e0 cet \u00e9gard, \u00e9ventuellement la convergence de la Russie avec l’Arabie, avec la nouvelle pol\u00e9mique en Syrie autour d’une attaque chimique. C’est le cas de M K Bhadrakumar, sur Asia Times<\/em> le 22 août 2013<\/a>.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n «This is the second thing. The tectonic plates in the geopolitics of the Middle East were beginning to show some movement in recent weeks over developments in Egypt. The disharmony amongst the erstwhile allies who were until recently collaborating over the Syria project was becoming too obvious to be papered over. <\/em> […]<\/p>\n<\/p>\n » But the most sensational part of the realignment is the nascent proximity between Russia on the one hand and Saudi Arabia and its GCC allies (especially the United Arab Emirates) on the other hand in their shared antipathy toward Muslim Brotherhood. At the very least, the Syrian chemical weapon controversy puts a sudden break on the incipient moves of a \u00ab\u00a0reset\u00a0\u00bb in the political alignments in the Middle East. The Western powers have circled the wagons and their restive Arab allies – Saudi Arabia, in particular – are being told to stay put, with the signal that the Syrian project is work in progress. The heart of the matter is that the West simply cannot afford a regional ascendance by Russia, China and Iran. Nor is the West comfortable with the increasingly maverick ways in which its regional allies are behaving…<\/em>»<\/p>\n<\/p>\n Bien entendu, ces diverses appr\u00e9ciations et supputations ne prennent pas en compte la menace tr\u00e8s s\u00e9rieuse d’une attaque a\u00e9rienne du bloc BAO, avec les USA \u00e9ventuellement comme maître d’œuvre, contre la Syrie. Une telle possibilit\u00e9, si elle se concr\u00e9tisait, conduirait tr\u00e8s probablement \u00e0 d’autres \u00e9v\u00e9nements en cascade et obligerait \u00e0 une r\u00e9\u00e9valuation compl\u00e8te de la situation. Le plus int\u00e9ressant \u00e0 cet \u00e9gard, dans le cadre des diverses consid\u00e9rations qui ont \u00e9t\u00e9 faites durant et autour de la rencontre Poutine-Bandar, est de savoir quelle serait l’\u00e9volution de l’Egypte si, par exemple, une telle intervention ayant eu lieu, elle aurait pour effet de renforcer le camp des islamistes radicaux en Syrie et ailleurs par voie de cons\u00e9quence. Les militaires \u00e9gyptiens pourraient \u00eatre conduits \u00e0 changer leurs priorit\u00e9s, d’autant que la r\u00e9duction du camp des Fr\u00e8res semble s’av\u00e8rer plus rapide que pr\u00e9vu ; pour l’instant, la priorit\u00e9 des militaires concerne effectivement la stabilisation de la situation int\u00e9rieure mais les deux prolongements additionn\u00e9s (les FM plus vite r\u00e9duits et des changements explosifs de situation en Syrie) pourraient les conduire \u00e0 conclure que les questions de politique de s\u00e9curit\u00e9 ext\u00e9rieure prennent le pas sur l’int\u00e9rieur. La remarque de DEBKAFiles<\/em> que nous rapportions le 21 août 2013<\/a> pourrait impliquer une situation pr\u00e9occupante pour les Isra\u00e9liens plus rapidement que pr\u00e9vu : «On Saturday, Aug. 17, El-Sisi remarked \u00ab\u00a0This is no time to attack the US and Israel, because our first priority is to disband the Muslim Brotherhood.\u00a0\u00bb Jerusalem found this remark alarming rather than comforting, noting that he made no promises about the future.<\/em>»<\/p>\n<\/p>\n Mis en ligne le 24 août 2013 \u00e0 10H57<\/p><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":" De Poutine-Bandar \u00e0 l’Égypte et \u00e0 la Syrie Nous avons parl\u00e9 \u00e0 plusieurs reprises de l’entretien du 31 juillet entre Prince Bandar, le chef des SR saoudiens et personnage \u00e0 nombreuses faces machiav\u00e9liques, et le pr\u00e9sident russe Poutine, dans la r\u00e9sidence personnelle de Poutine ; mais chaque fois, de fa\u00e7on tangentielle et parcellaire. (Voir le… <\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"","ping_status":"","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"neve_meta_sidebar":"","neve_meta_container":"","neve_meta_enable_content_width":"","neve_meta_content_width":0,"neve_meta_title_alignment":"","neve_meta_author_avatar":"","neve_post_elements_order":"","neve_meta_disable_header":"","neve_meta_disable_footer":"","neve_meta_disable_title":"","_jetpack_memberships_contains_paid_content":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[2],"tags":[5667,5474,3903,9550,3737,11025,2774,3758,916,2730,12156,12319,3867,2613],"class_list":["post-75169","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-bloc-notes","tag-bandar","tag-bhadrakumar","tag-chimique","tag-egypte","tag-erdogan","tag-freres","tag-israel","tag-musulmans","tag-poutine","tag-russie","tag-safir","tag-sisi","tag-syrie","tag-turquie"],"jetpack_featured_media_url":"","jetpack_sharing_enabled":true,"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/75169","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=75169"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/75169\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=75169"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=75169"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=75169"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}