27 ao\u00fbt 2013<\/a>, est plut\u00f4t favorable \u00e0 la politique officielle US. Il tient pour assur\u00e9 que le chimique a \u00e9t\u00e9 utilis\u00e9 par Assad. Son analyse est ainsi d’autant plus inint\u00e9ressante puisqu’elle n’est nullement marqu\u00e9e par une tendance \u00e0 plut\u00f4t peindre une situation d\u00e9favorable \u00e0 une entreprise de prise de contr\u00f4le de la situation, surtout des \u00e9l\u00e9ments rebelles disparates, ce qui est le but des USA et du bloc BAO.)<\/p>\n<\/p>\n\tPlusieurs \u00e9l\u00e9ments sont \u00e0 mettre en exergue.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n
\t La continuelle radicalisation des rebelles, par la pr\u00e9pond\u00e9rance sans cesse grandissante des groupes islamistes type-al Qa\u00efda, qui am\u00e8ne m\u00eame certains groupes mod\u00e9r\u00e9s \u00e0 se rapprocher des islamistes malgr\u00e9 les consignes de leurs dirigeants, r\u00e9percutant les ordres de Washington \u00e0 cet \u00e9gard. Ce dernier point est capital parce qu’il met en question toute la politique US depuis que la pr\u00e9sence pr\u00e9pond\u00e9rante des islamistes a \u00e9t\u00e9 admise. La politique de Washington \u00e9tait d’\u00e9loigner les mod\u00e9r\u00e9s de cette tendance, de les armer lourdement, de les constituer en une force autonome capable d’\u00e9quilibrer, voire de surpasser les forces islamiques au sein de la r\u00e9bellion. Il semble bien que ce soit le contraire qui se produise, avec l’int\u00e9gration grandissante de ce qui reste de forces mod\u00e9r\u00e9es dans les rangs islamistes. <\/p>\n<\/p>\n
\t Le constat d’une analyste qui vient d’effectuer un voyage d’\u00e9tude en Syrie, qui est particuli\u00e8rement int\u00e9ressant. Selon ce constat, les forces r\u00e9guli\u00e8res syriennes ont de plus en plus tendance \u00e0 s’appuyer sur des milices, ou \u00e0 se constituer en milices, sous l’impulsion et souvent l’encadrement de cadres iIraniens ou de membres du Hezbollah, et souvent aussi avec des Iraniens et des membres du Hezbollah \u00e0 l’int\u00e9rieur de ces milices pour en contr\u00f4ler les structures. Ainsi les structures des forces soutenant le r\u00e9gime se rapprochent de celles des rebelles, ce qui leur permettrait \u00e9ventuellement de mieux les affronter. A contrario<\/em>, cela tendrait \u00e0 diminuer le r\u00f4le des forces r\u00e9guli\u00e8res syriennes, dans tous les cas dans leurs structures traditionnelles d’arm\u00e9e lourdement \u00e9quip\u00e9e (blind\u00e9s, armes lourdes, etc.). Cette \u00e9volution tendrait \u00e0 les rendre moins vuln\u00e9rables \u00e0 des interventions \u00e9trang\u00e8res du type des frappes chirurgicales envisag\u00e9es par les USA contre des infrastructures.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n\t Dans la logique de cette \u00e9volution, il appara\u00eet que le r\u00f4le du Hezbollah et surtout de l’Iran ne cesse de grandir, jusqu’\u00e0 constituer des r\u00e9seaux de pouvoir influant tr\u00e8s fortement sur la direction syrienne. Ce fait pourrait m\u00eame poser \u00e0 terme un probl\u00e8me \u00e0 la direction syrienne et \u00e0 Assad. Dans tous les cas, ce dernier \u00e9l\u00e9ment t\u00e9moigne de l’implication grandissante de l’Iran, par cons\u00e9quent de l’\u00e9largissement du conflit non par sa g\u00e9ographie n\u00e9cessairement mais par l’\u00e9volution des structures qui s’affrontent et de la nationalit\u00e9 et de l’orientation des forces qui s’y trouvent engag\u00e9es.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n
\t\u00ab… But the biggest disaster to befall the country may not be the alleged use of chemical weapons by Syrian President Bashar al Assad, an incident now being investigated by a team of United Nations inspectors. Rather, its the continued fracturing of Syrian fighters a development that threatens any hope for reconstruction once the fighting dies down that is sparking such concern and caution about the two-year civil war.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n\t\u00bbIn a video statement released on Aug. 22, the five front-line commanders from the opposition-backed Supreme Military Council announced they were abandoning the group and choosing instead to work with any group willing to fight Assad. They tendered their resignation while sitting in front of the black flag of Jabhat al Nusra, a key opposition group with growing ties to al Qaeda in Iraq implying they have rejected U.S. demands not to work with jihadists.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n\t\u00bbThe council, formed in December 2012, was meant to consolidate the various rebel factions into a unified command structure. It never really worked the SMC had little legitimacy, and the chains of command to each front were only as good as the individual commanders leading them. Though it had the potential to serve as a check on the radicalization of the opposition movement, that potential now seems further away than ever before.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n\t\u00bbIt’s really sad to see, Elizabeth O’Bagy, a senior research analyst at the Institute for the Study of War who just returned from a research trip to Syria, told Defense One. Islamic movements are taking over the council and people feel they can’t fight back. The Syrian resistance has become increasingly radicalized over the last two years. Especially in Aleppo, but also in the rebel-controlled North, you see the Islamic State of Iraq taking over local councils entirely, she says, referring to the official name for al Qaeda’s branch in Iraq.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n\t\u00bbThe SMC is nominally led by Salim Idriss, who chairs its Joint Staff. It never really exercised its power, said Kirk Sowell, CEO of Uticensis Risk Services and an Arabic language researcher. They failed to remove troublesome commanders from Aleppo and Dira, but they could have become a kind of Defense Ministry. Yet this recent defection of its top leaders, Sowell says, shows that not only does Idriss lack authority over his own commanders, but that the SMC is a total non-entity inside Syria.<\/em> […}<\/p>\n<\/p>\n\t\u00bbIn the video, SMC spokesman Fatih Hassun, the commander of the Homs Front, repeatedly uses the phrase majusi to describe the enemy. It is the most sectarian way of framing the conflict, Sowell said, as it turns the war into a Sunni-vs-Shia battle.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n\t\u00bbWhile the UN continues to inspect the chemical attack, while dodging sniper fire, yet another worrying development is taking hold among the regime forces. The regime is evolving into a variety of militia-like forces, O’Bagy said. I was amazed when I was in Aleppo that the regime largely withdrew from the city and relied instead on local militia groups. These militias consist of both local fighters and foreign fighters, mostly from Hezbollah and Iran. I am amazed at how many pro-regime militias have Farsi-speaking advisers with them, she said. Iran is heavily influencing the regime’s decision-making process.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n\t\u00bbComplicating matters is the growing presence of Iranian fighters at Assad’s chemical weapons facilities. In a February 2009 report, Janes Defense Weekly detailed an agreement between Damascus and Tehran to upgrade Syria’s chemical weapons. It’s unclear whether Iran had any say in the most recent chemical attack, but there are growing reports that Iranian fighters are guarding Syria’s chemical weapons facilities. As the world ponders what comes next for Syria, the involvement of Iran and Hezbollah weighs heavily. And the prospect of more direct involvement by Tehran has many analysts worried. Moreover, the increasing radicalization by Syrian rebel groups, including the SMC’s decision to work directly with the local al Qaeda branch, bodes poorly for any future scenario.<\/em>\u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n\n
dedefensa.org<\/em><\/p><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"Syrie : fragmentation et radicalisation Un texte d’un ancien analyste de renseignement du Pentagone devenu journaliste ind\u00e9pendant, Joshua Foust, apporte des pr\u00e9cisions tr\u00e8s int\u00e9ressantes sur l’\u00e9volution de la situation sur le terrain en Syrie, ind\u00e9pendamment de la crise actuelle autour du chimique. Cette \u00e9volution est tr\u00e8s rapide et radicale. Elle pourrait d’ailleurs s’en trouver acc\u00e9l\u00e9r\u00e9e… <\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"","ping_status":"","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"neve_meta_sidebar":"","neve_meta_container":"","neve_meta_enable_content_width":"","neve_meta_content_width":0,"neve_meta_title_alignment":"","neve_meta_author_avatar":"","neve_post_elements_order":"","neve_meta_disable_header":"","neve_meta_disable_footer":"","neve_meta_disable_title":"","_jetpack_memberships_contains_paid_content":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[14],"tags":[3936,4202,4472,11341,4242,12395,3867],"class_list":["post-75177","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-ouverture-libre","tag-al","tag-assad","tag-hezbollah","tag-islamiste","tag-qaida","tag-ran","tag-syrie"],"jetpack_featured_media_url":"","jetpack_sharing_enabled":true,"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/75177","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=75177"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/75177\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=75177"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=75177"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=75177"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}