\tLe grand d\u00e9bat sur les preuves de l’attaque chimique, tout cela lourdement charg\u00e9 de divers guillemets, a commenc\u00e9 \u00e0 vive allure et a pris aussit\u00f4t une tournure mauvaise. Les documents officiels n’ont pas encore \u00e9t\u00e9 publi\u00e9s, mais diverses sources \u00e9videmment officieuses en ont laiss\u00e9 filtrer l’essentiel. Aux USA, c’est Noah Shachtman, de Foreign Policy<\/em>, qui les a publi\u00e9s en exclusivit\u00e9 le 27 ao\u00fbt 2013<\/a>. (Voir aussi, pour la documentation, le Guardian<\/em> du 28 ao\u00fbt 2013<\/a>).<\/p>\n<\/p>\n \tLe caract\u00e8re doublement sympathique de ces preuves telles qu’elles sont expos\u00e9es officieusement est 1) qu’elles sont d’origine isra\u00e9lienne alors qu’il s’agit essentiellement, sinon exclusivement d’\u00e9coutes t\u00e9l\u00e9phoniques ; et 2) qu’elles pr\u00e9sentent une version qui laissent beaucoup de coins et de recoins d’ombre, et qu’elles sont si compl\u00e8tement des preuves indirectes voire a contrario<\/em> qu’elles peuvent \u00eatre interpr\u00e9t\u00e9es de toutes les fa\u00e7ons possibles. La version officielle faisant d\u00e9j\u00e0 et devant faire rapidement l’objet d’une mar\u00e9e m\u00e9diatique dans la presse-Syst\u00e8me, on en donne ici une version non-officielle \u00e0 peine hostile (on n’a pas \u00e0 se forcer) \u00e0 la th\u00e8se officielle, selon Paul Joseph Watson, de Infowars.com<\/em> le 28 ao\u00fbt 2013<\/a>.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n \t\u00abIntercepted phone calls that will be presented by the Obama administration as proof that Bashar Al-Assad was behind last week’s chemical weapons attack in Syria actually suggest that the attack was not ordered by the Syrian government. Phone calls by the Syrian Ministry of Defense intercepted by Mossad and passed to the US reveal that Syrian government officials, exchanged panicked phone calls with a leader of a chemical weapons unit, demanding answers for a nerve agent strike that killed more than 1,000 people, in the hours after last week’s attack.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n \t\u00bbWhy would the Syrian Ministry of Defense be making panicked phone calls demanding answers about the attack if they had ordered it? The fact that the highest levels of the Syrian government apparently had no knowledge of the attack strongly suggests that they did not order it, with the worst case scenario being that the attack was the work of a Syrian officer overstepping his bounds, writes Foreign Policy’s Noah Shachtman.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n \t\u00bbWe don’t know exactly why it happened, a US intelligence official told Foreign Policy. We just know it was pretty fucking stupid.<\/em>\u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n \t Depuis, diverses sources ont largement substantiv\u00e9 cette impression de la fragilit\u00e9 \u00e9mouvante de ces preuves. Reprenant les expressions fameuses qui accompagn\u00e8rent l’affirmation de preuves indubitables de l’existence d’armes de destruction massive dans les mains sanglantes de Saddam, diverses sources officieuses US cit\u00e9es dans nombre de publications affirment que les preuves manufactur\u00e9es de la duplicit\u00e9 d’Assad sont tr\u00e8s, tr\u00e8s loin d’atteindre la perfection de production qui fut celles des preuves fabriqu\u00e9es pour confirmer l’\u00e9vidente culpabilit\u00e9 de Saddam. AP a diffus\u00e9 le 29 ao\u00fbt 2013<\/a> un rapport sur cet aspect des choses, indiquant qu’effectivement la qualit\u00e9 du travail avait notablement baiss\u00e9 depuis 2003. (\u00abHowever, multiple U.S. officials used the phrase not a slam dunk to describe the intelligence picture a reference to then-CIA Director George Tenet’s insistence in 2002 that U.S. intelligence showing Iraq had weapons of mass destruction was a slam dunk intelligence that turned out to be wrong.<\/em>\u00bb). Ainsi le d\u00e9lai (de mercredi \u00e0 vendredi au moins) concernant la publication du rapport officiel sur les preuves ressemble-t-il \u00e9trangement \u00e0 ce qu’il est : les premi\u00e8res fuites officielles (cat\u00e9gorie sp\u00e9ciales de fuites, faites par les autorit\u00e9s officielles qui luttent contre les fuites) ayant montr\u00e9 que ces preuves \u00e9taient fra\u00eechement accueillies, on s’est donn\u00e9 un peu de temps pour soigner leur manufacture, leurs atours, leur r\u00e9alisme, et ainsi les rendre un peu plus sexy<\/em>. Tout cela se fait convivialement, \u00e0 ciel ouvert, comme s’il n’\u00e9tait m\u00eame plus n\u00e9cessaire de dissimuler le processus d’arrangement de la chose, comme si l’on avait d\u00e9cid\u00e9 de travailler en pleine lumi\u00e8re du vertueux soleil de la v\u00e9rit\u00e9. On doit saluer la conscience professionnelle, presque d’un artisan de la Tradition ; car la v\u00e9rit\u00e9, voyez-vous, non seulement \u00e7a se fabrique mais \u00e7a se peaufine. Respect.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n \t Les premi\u00e8res fuites concernant ces preuves viennent du magazine allemand Focus<\/em>. Ensuite, elles ont transit\u00e9 par la presse isra\u00e9lienne, avant d’appara\u00eetre dans la presse US. La presse isra\u00e9lienne les pr\u00e9sente victorieusement comme des preuves indubitables, en m\u00eame temps qu’une ode \u00e0 la gloire des capacit\u00e9s de renseignement et d’\u00e9coutes isra\u00e9liennes. Il s’agit d’une op\u00e9ration d’une unit\u00e9 de l’IDF (Israel Defense Force<\/em>), et non du Mossad<\/em> comme pr\u00e9sent\u00e9 par Watson ; il s’agit de l’unit\u00e9 de renseignement connue sous son seule num\u00e9ro : 8200.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n \tVoici un exemple de pr\u00e9sentation, \u00e0 la fois de l’action de l’unit\u00e9 8200 et de la fa\u00e7on dont les Isra\u00e9liens informent les pays du bloc BAO, et affirment leur ma\u00eetrise dans cet aspect de la phase paroxystique de lza crise syrienne. Il s’agit d’extraits d’un article de Yossi Yehoshua, de Yedioth Ahronoth<\/em>, le 27 ao\u00fbt 2013. <\/p>\n<\/p>\n \t\u00abThe strike on the Assad regime in Syria, if it takes place, will be led by the US. But the US did not get to this point on its own: the German weekly Focus reported yesterday that the IDF’s 8200 intelligence unit was listening to the Syrian leadership during the lethal chemical weapons attack last week in which hundreds were killed, and it was Israel that relayed the incriminating information to the West.<\/em> []<\/p>\n<\/p>\n \t\u00bbAn Israeli delegation arrived in Washington yesterday whose members included Director of the Political-Security Staff in the Defense Ministry Maj. Gen. (res.) Amos Gilad, Director of Planning Branch Maj. Gen. Nimrod Shefer and IDF Intelligence Research Department Director Brigadier General Itai Brun. They are expected to show their counterparts the most updated intelligence.<\/em> […]<\/p>\n<\/p>\n \t\u00bbIt was reported yesterday that a high-ranking Washington official said that there was only little doubt about the Assad’s regime use of chemical weapons. It can be assessed that the source of most of the information that the US has about Syria is Israeli, as is the information about the targets for a possible attack.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n \t\u00bbThe 8200 unit has significantly upgraded its capabilities over the last few years and it is capable of portraying the best snapshot of the situation for the decision-makers in Israel, and in the world. It was for good reason that Director of Military Intelligence Maj. Gen. Aviv Kochavi left for meetings in the US and Europe to share the findings with his counterparts.<\/em>\u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n \t Il faut \u00e9videmment saluer l’exploit de l’unit\u00e9 8200 comme l’on se doit de saluer tout ce qui concerne la vaillante arm\u00e9e isra\u00e9lienne, dont les exploits sont \u00e9videmment innombrables. D’autre part, l’on sait que les Russes poss\u00e8dent des canaux encrypt\u00e9s passant par leurs propres satellites, et il est \u00e9ventuellement surprenant que l’usage de ces canaux n’ait pas \u00e9t\u00e9 envisag\u00e9 pour prot\u00e9ger les communications syriennes, \u00e0 moins que cela ait \u00e9t\u00e9 fait et que rien ne r\u00e9siste \u00e0 l’unit\u00e9 8200. Enfin et surtout pour notre propos, il ne faut certainement pas se priver de s’interroger sur le fait de l’absence de la NSA dans la partie. On sait qu’un satellite de renseignement et de t\u00e9l\u00e9communication US passe au-dessus de Damas toutes les heures et que toutes les communications de la direction syrienne sont activement suivies par la NSA, comme vous et moi. Il s’agissait pourtant d’une bonne occasion de montrer que le monstre sert \u00e0 quelque chose, contrairement \u00e0 tout ce qui a \u00e9t\u00e9 dit de diffamatoire \u00e0 son propos. Peut-\u00eatre le rapport officiel corrigera-t-il le tir pour rehausser le standing de l’Agence qui travaille pour l’\u00e9ternit\u00e9.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n \t D’autres font une autre connexion \u00e0 propos de la NSA, et notamment de cette absence constat\u00e9e jusqu’ici … Cette absence est \u00e9galement \u00e9vidente au niveau de la crise Snowden\/NSA qui, en quatre-cinq jours, a disparu de nos vigilants \u00e9crans-radar, et l’on s’en en inqui\u00e8te. Justin Raimondo y distingue une intention d\u00e9lib\u00e9r\u00e9e, le 25 ao\u00fbt 2013<\/a>.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n \t\u00ab…The shouting is about taking the NSA story off the front pages for a while and drowning out the rising voices of civil libertarian protest. Edward Snowden’s revelations of a wide-ranging years-long domestic spying operation threatens Obama’s presidency. It also threatens the leadership of the two parties, who are confronted with a grassroots rebellion on both sides of the aisle and have only just barely managed to contain it. Official Washington has been shaken to its already pretty flimsy foundations by the scandal and there’s nothing like another war to take everyone’s mind off the fact that they’re shredding the Fourth Amendment.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n \t\u00bbIndeed, a little kinetic action in Syria affords them the opportunity to tear the Constitution into even tinier pieces by going to war without even bothering to consult Congress, and without much of anyone outside Rand Paul, Justin Amash, and a few others (all Republicans, by the way) making a fuss about it.<\/em>\u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n \t Ce n’est pas l’avis de Glenn Greenwald, qui nous annonce, dans un tr\u00e8s court article, qu’il profite de ce r\u00e9pit que lui donne la phase paroxystique actuelle de la crise syrienne pour travailler plus \u00e0 son aise \u00e0 ses prochains chapitres du feuilleton Snowden\/NSA. Greenwald est plus que jamais l’homme de la crise Snowden\/NSA et son probl\u00e8me, c’est tout de m\u00eame d’arriver \u00e0 parler d’autre chose dans sa chronique qui a pour sujet toutes les turpitudes du Syst\u00e8me en g\u00e9n\u00e9ral. A la place de Raimondo, nous ne serions pas si inquiets ; vu l’habilet\u00e9 \u00e9bouriffante du Syst\u00e8me pour ses op\u00e9rations de communication, il est tr\u00e8s probable qu’on reparlera de la NSA. (Dans le Guardian<\/em>, le 28 ao\u00fbt 2013<\/a>, sous le titre \u00abOngoing NSA work<\/em>\u00bb.)<\/p>\n<\/p>\n \t\u00abFor the past seven-plus years, I’ve written more or less every day. That pattern has obviously changed over the last three months, during which time my posting has been more infrequent. That’s because I’ve been prioritizing my work on these NSA documents and articles, which take a fair amount of time to process, report and then write. I’m currently working on several NSA\/GCHQ stories at once right now that I expect to be published shortly, so daily writing will likely not resume for a couple more weeks or so.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n \t\u00bbI’ll try to post something new here at least once every 3 days, if for no other reason than to ensure that the comment section remains open…<\/em>\u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n <\/p>\n \tMis en ligne le 30 ao\u00fbt 2013 \u00e0 07H02<\/p><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":" O\u00f9 \u00e9tait la NSA ? Que devient la NSA ? Le grand d\u00e9bat sur les preuves de l’attaque chimique, tout cela lourdement charg\u00e9 de divers guillemets, a commenc\u00e9 \u00e0 vive allure et a pris aussit\u00f4t une tournure mauvaise. Les documents officiels n’ont pas encore \u00e9t\u00e9 publi\u00e9s, mais diverses sources \u00e9videmment officieuses en ont laiss\u00e9 filtrer… <\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"","ping_status":"","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"neve_meta_sidebar":"","neve_meta_container":"","neve_meta_enable_content_width":"","neve_meta_content_width":0,"neve_meta_title_alignment":"","neve_meta_author_avatar":"","neve_post_elements_order":"","neve_meta_disable_header":"","neve_meta_disable_footer":"","neve_meta_disable_title":"","footnotes":""},"categories":[2],"tags":[12398,4202,5819,6944,857,5675,3871,6427,5818,3867,4072],"class_list":["post-75182","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-bloc-notes","tag-12398","tag-assad","tag-dunk","tag-greenwald","tag-irak","tag-mossad","tag-nsa","tag-preuves","tag-slam","tag-syrie","tag-tenet"],"jetpack_featured_media_url":"","_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/75182","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=75182"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/75182\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=75182"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=75182"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=75182"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}