authoritative<\/em>, c’est-\u00e0-dire comme l’une des meilleures sources priv\u00e9es d’\u00e9valuation des questions de s\u00e9curit\u00e9 selon les crit\u00e8res anglo-saxons. Dans ce contexte, le cr\u00e9dit qu’on peut accorder \u00e0 l’\u00e9valuation doit tenir compte de la tendance d’un tel groupe de favoriser la politique anglo-saxonne (du bloc BAO) d’intervention en faveur des rebelles, donc de chercher \u00e0 favoriser l’\u00e9valuation d’une situation justifiant cette politique d’intervention en minorisant l’importance des groupes djihadistes. En fonction de ces r\u00e9serves, le r\u00e9sultat est significatif.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n\tL’\u00e9valuation refl\u00e8te une situation tr\u00e8s complexe avec l’\u00e9clatement de la r\u00e9bellion en un millier de groupes, avec les diverses graduations du djihadisme, etc., et aboutit essentiellement \u00e0 la conclusion que les forces rebelles qui sont acceptables selon les crit\u00e8res du bloc BAO constituent un quart \u00e0 un tiers au maximum des effectifs de la r\u00e9bellion. D’autre part, ces forces ne sont pas les plus efficaces et, selon diverses sources, certaines d’entre elles envisagent de coop\u00e9rer, ou coop\u00e8rent effectivement avec les forces r\u00e9guli\u00e8res syriennes contre les djihadistes. Dans tous les cas, les affrontements entre rebelles convenables (selon les ciri\u00e8res BAO) et les djihadistes sont de plus en plus nombreux, tout cela compliquant encore plus la situation sur terrain, en Syrie m\u00eame. Cette complication est un lieu commun de cette guerre, mais une appr\u00e9ciation pr\u00e9cise permet de mieux encore en appr\u00e9hender la pression qu’elle fait peser sur la situation. <\/p>\n<\/p>\n
\t\u00abOpposition forces battling Bashar al-Assad’s regime in Syria now number around 100,000 fighters, but after more than two years of fighting they are fragmented into as many as 1,000 bands.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n\t\u00bbThe new study by IHS Jane’s, a defence consultancy, estimates there are around 10,000 jihadists who would include foreign fighters fighting for powerful factions linked to al-Qaeda. Another 30,000 to 35,000 are hardline Islamists who share much of the outlook of the jihadists, but are focused purely on the Syrian war rather than a wider international struggle. There are also at least a further 30,000 moderates belonging to groups that have an Islamic character, meaning only a small minority of the rebels are linked to secular or purely nationalist groups.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n\t\u00bbThe stark assessment, to be published later this week, accords with the view of Western diplomats estimate that less than one third of the opposition forces are palatable to Britain, while American envoys put the figure even lower. Fears that the rebellion against the Assad regime is being increasingly dominated by extremists has fuelled concerns in the West over supplying weaponry that will fall into hostile hands. These fears contributed to unease in the US and elsewhere over military intervention in Syria.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n\t\u00bbCharles Lister, author of the analysis, said: \u00ab\u00a0The insurgency is now dominated by groups which have at least an Islamist viewpoint on the conflict. The idea that it is mostly secular groups leading the opposition is just not borne out.<\/em> […] Two factions linked to al-Qaeda, Jabhat al-Nusra and the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) also know as the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Shams (ISIS) have come to dominate among the more extremist fighters, Mr Lister said. Their influence has risen significantly in the past year. Because of the Islamist make up of such a large proportion of the opposition, the fear is that if the West doesn’t play its cards right, it will end up pushing these people away from the people we are backing, he said. If the West looks as though it is not interested in removing Assad, moderate Islamists are also likely to be pushed further towards extremists.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n\t\u00bbThough still a minority in number, ISIL has become more prominent in rebel-held parts of Syria in recent months. Members in northern Syria have sought to assert their dominance over the local population and over the more moderate rebel Free Syrian Army (FSA). The aim of moderate rebel fighters is the overthrow of their country’s authoritarian dictator, but jihadist groups want to transform Syria into a hard-line Islamic state within a regional Islamic caliphate. These competing visions have caused rancour which last week erupted into fighting between ISIL and two of the larger moderate rebel factions.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n\n
dedefensa.org<\/em><\/p><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"Les djihadistes en Syrie Depuis de nombreux mois, la pr\u00e9sence de groupes djihadistes en Syrie est l’objet de diverses pol\u00e9miques entre les diff\u00e9rents acteurs ext\u00e9rieurs de la crise. Ces pol\u00e9miques portent essentiellement sur le nombre de ces djihadistes relativement au mouvement rebelle en g\u00e9n\u00e9ral, leur activisme, leur position de force, etc. Tr\u00e8s r\u00e9cemment, un \u00e9pisode… <\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"","ping_status":"","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"neve_meta_sidebar":"","neve_meta_container":"","neve_meta_enable_content_width":"","neve_meta_content_width":0,"neve_meta_title_alignment":"","neve_meta_author_avatar":"","neve_post_elements_order":"","neve_meta_disable_header":"","neve_meta_disable_footer":"","neve_meta_disable_title":"","_jetpack_memberships_contains_paid_content":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[14],"tags":[3936,4202,12428,4529,4242,9863,3867],"class_list":["post-75210","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-ouverture-libre","tag-al","tag-assad","tag-djihadistes","tag-janes","tag-qaida","tag-rebellion","tag-syrie"],"jetpack_featured_media_url":"","jetpack_sharing_enabled":true,"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/75210","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=75210"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/75210\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=75210"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=75210"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=75210"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}