{"id":75261,"date":"2013-10-19T11:00:25","date_gmt":"2013-10-19T11:00:25","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/2013\/10\/19\/netanyahou-sans-drone-contre-liran\/"},"modified":"2013-10-19T11:00:25","modified_gmt":"2013-10-19T11:00:25","slug":"netanyahou-sans-drone-contre-liran","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/2013\/10\/19\/netanyahou-sans-drone-contre-liran\/","title":{"rendered":"Netanyahou sans drone contre l’Iran…"},"content":{"rendered":"

Netanyahou sans drone contre l’Iran…<\/h2>\n<\/p>\n

\tNous donnons ici des extraits de deux textes de Richard Silverstein, sur son site RichardSilverstein.com<\/em>, sur une situation particuli\u00e8rement int\u00e9ressante de la flotte des drones isra\u00e9liens qui seraient appel\u00e9s \u00e0 jouer un r\u00f4le central dans toute attaque d’Isra\u00ebl contre l’Iran. Silverstein est un commentateur respect\u00e9 et cr\u00e9dit\u00e9 de bonnes sources d’information, dans la presse antiSyst\u00e8me de l’internet. Il fut le cr\u00e9ateur d’un des premiers sites juifs progressistes aux USA, Tihun Alam<\/em>, en 2003, puis d’un autre, Israel Palestine Forum<\/em>. Toutes ces activit\u00e9s montrent l’orientation progressiste de Silverstein, r\u00e9solument critique de la politique agressive d’Isra\u00ebl sous la direction du Likoud<\/em>, partisan d’une entente isra\u00e9lo-palestinienne, etc. Silverstein a \u00e9galement publi\u00e9 dans des m\u00e9dias de la presse-Syst\u00e8me (Huffington Post<\/em>, Guardian<\/em>, Haaretz<\/em>, Forward<\/em>, Los Angeles Times<\/em>, American Conservative<\/em>).<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tDans ces deux textes du 13 octobre 2013<\/a> et du 15 octobre 2013<\/a>, Silverstein d\u00e9taille la situation des drones isra\u00e9liens que les Iraniens parviennent d’une fa\u00e7on r\u00e9p\u00e9t\u00e9e et malgr\u00e9 des modifications de modernisation, \u00e0 intercepter et \u00e0 contr\u00f4ler. Les d\u00e9tails sont tr\u00e8s nombreux et viennent d’une source dont Silverstein ne peut assurer de la compl\u00e8te v\u00e9racit\u00e9, mais \u00e0 qui il donne un cr\u00e9dit important. (Il y a \u00e9galement des d\u00e9tails sur le d\u00e9ploiement de drones isra\u00e9liens dans des pays \u00e9trangers, notamment l’Arabie et l’Azerba\u00efdjan, et des d\u00e9tails \u00e9galement sur la connexion Arabie-Isra\u00ebl.) Les tentatives faites, d’une fa\u00e7on assez chaotique, par un site (Fresh<\/em>) proche des milieux de s\u00e9curit\u00e9 nationale isra\u00e9liens pour discr\u00e9diter ses informations semblent indiquer que Silverstein n’a pas tort de faire confiance \u00e0 sa source.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tCette situation isra\u00e9lienne est particuli\u00e8rement inqui\u00e9tante selon Silverstein, parce que les drones ont \u00e0 remplir, en cas d’attaque isra\u00e9lienne de l’Iran, la mission vitale de l’annihilation de la d\u00e9fense a\u00e9rienne iranienne. S’ils ne peuvent mener \u00e0 bien cette mission, comme cela para\u00eet le cas, une attaque isra\u00e9lienne conventionnelle de l’Iran est quasiment impossible \u00e0 cause des risques consid\u00e9rables qui seraient alors pris. Cette situation est jug\u00e9e tr\u00e8s dangereuse par Silverstein, dans la mesure o\u00f9 Netanyahou reste obs\u00e9d\u00e9 par l’attaque de l’Iran, qu’il est aujourd’hui abandonn\u00e9 par les USA sur ce terrain, et que la seule issue dans ce cas pour attaquer tout de m\u00eame serait l’utilisation du nucl\u00e9aire tactique contre l’Iran. Bien entendu, les textes de Silverstein sugg\u00e8rent, ou confirment, la puissance des capacit\u00e9s de guerre \u00e9lectronique de l’Iran.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tVoici des extraits des deux textes, essentiellement celui du 13 octobre, avec confirmation, avec des pr\u00e9cisions suppl\u00e9mentaires, dans celui du 15 octobre.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t Le 13 octobre 2013<\/a>. Dans ce texte, Silverstein reprend deux pr\u00e9c\u00e9dents textes qu’il a publi\u00e9s sur ce m\u00eame sujet avec notamment le d\u00e9tail de la destruction de quatre drones isra\u00e9liens par les Iraniens, pour les compl\u00e9ter d’une mani\u00e8re substantielle. <\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00abRegular readers will recall that in the post about the drone failures I quoted an anonymous Israeli source who appeared quite knowledgeable about Israel’s UAV program. The same source has offered a new report that is even more alarming than the first one he sent. He says that Iran’s Revolutionary Guards, operating out of the Bekaa Valley, have so compromised Israel’s drone fleet that it cannot be used for the critical mission Israel has set for them: to disable Iran’s air defenses as preparation for an IAF assault on Iranian targets, including its nuclear program. Without UAV capability, Israel must use conventional means to knock out Iran’s anti-aircraft systems. That would be too costly considering distance and other technical challenges. All this leads to the possible conclusion that if Bibi attacks Iran he would have to consider very seriously using a nuclear weapon (or as the source calls it, BVR tactical nukes’).<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00bbHe notes the latest sabotage of an Israeli drone occurred during Israel’s semi-secret war games over Greece simulating an attack on Iran. Imagine the drama and frustration of preparing for this momentous battle and the key element of your initial attack phase is neutralized.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00bbAnother mind-blowing claim of this report is that Israel is collaborating with Saudi Arabia on a possible attack on Iran: that IDF personnel are stationed on Saudi soil and that Israeli drones which would attack Iran are based there. Note that Saudi Arabia’s intelligence chief, Prince Bandar, recently made a secret trip to Israel. What might be so important that it would require such an extraordinary trip (no senior Saudi official has ever visited Israel as far as I know)? Stationing Israeli personnel and armaments on Saudi soil and coordinating a potential attack on Iran warrant that.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00bbBefore reading this, note that Israel’s Harpy UAVs are built to (among other things) attack air defenses. I’ve done some minor editing of the message below for clarity and comprehension’s sake): The real story behind the Israeli UAV crash landing into the Mediterranean Sea, last week off the shores of Ashdod, is more complicated and worrisome than I first told you.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00bbLast Wednesday (October 9th), the IAF conducted a long-range exercise to rehearse the executing of an attack on Iran. The opening move on behalf of the IAF calls for a large-scale drone strike against Iranian air-defense batteries in the vicinity of the different Iranian main targets.<\/em> [….]<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00bbThe drones are<\/em> [] to be launched from a few countries located to the north and west of Iran. That is due to<\/em> [the<\/em>] UAV’s range and number of targets. I think they are talking about Turkmenistan, Azerbaijan and Saudi Arabia. The location in Saudi Arabia is the city of Khafji. A few of my colleagues, have been there recently. The Heron UAV is<\/em> [tasked with<\/em>] intelligence coverage and relay services and the Hermes 450 and Harpy dronesprovide weapon delivery. Although the Heron has the ability to carry its own weapon systems, the required [payload for this mission exceeds its capacity]; the plan calls for the use of the Hermes and Harpy UAVs as the main weapon delivery-systems.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00bbAll three UAVs (Heron, Hermes 450 and Harpy) share the same guidance system. On January 28th 2012, a Heron UAV crashedoutside of Tel-Nof Air-Base in the center of Israel. The formal cover up story in the news was that its wing broke off. The real story was that the Control Center lost control over the UAV and someone’ else flew the UAV and mistakenly crashed it. Electronic evidence led to an Iranian Revolutionary Guard (IRG) unit stationed in the Bek’aa Valley in Lebanon. The IAF decided to decommission the entire Heron fleet for 8 months. During this time, Israel Air Industries (IAI) allocated a team of 50 engineers to secure the guidance system and make it un-hackable.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00bbLast Tuesday, when the Hermes was deliberately brought down, it was during the final phases of testing the new guidance system. The disappointment in Israel is huge. Electronic analysis carried as part of a post-mortemled to the same IRG compound in the Bak’aa Valley and to another unit stationed near Beirut.<\/em> […]<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00bb[The<\/em>] situation is very dangerous at the moment, since there is no real option<\/em> [for<\/em>] eliminating the Iranian air-defense batteries using UAV’s. Other conventional means bear too much risk.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00bbIsrael is being pushed<\/em> [to<\/em>] launch BVR<\/em> [Beyond Visual Range<\/em>] tactical nukes as the main way to attack Iran. I don’t know if you read Bib’s comparisons, but the lunatic is comparing himself to Churchill, and with Israel’s isolation growing I fear he’s losing it and will attack. Ronen Shoval, one of Bibi’s proxies, published an op-ed calling for a tactical nuclear attack, Shoval would have never stated that without Bibi’s specific instruction.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00bbTo be very clear, I do not know the source’s identity. I have done as much due diligence as I can to verify the information he offered. I have not been able to debunk or discredit it. But since I don’t know the source, I can’t confirm its authenticity. All that being said, anyone who derides this report without seriously weighing its substance will look awfully stupid if Bibi does decide to do the Slim Pickens’ and take a ride on an ICBM to Natanz.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t Dans son texte du 15 octobre 2013<\/a>, Silverstein confirme le pr\u00e9c\u00e9dent en y ajoutant des pr\u00e9cisions. Ce m\u00eame texte contient les pr\u00e9cisions sur la fa\u00e7on dont le site isra\u00e9lien Fresh<\/em> a tent\u00e9 de discr\u00e9diter ses informations.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00abThe Israeli source who conveyed to me the crisis in Israel’s drone fleet has added that the Iranians have hacked Azerbaijan’s Israeli-made drone fleet as well: Using<\/em> [a nearly identical drone<\/em>] to the fallen Hermes 450, several months ago IAF<\/em> [] drones also failed in Azerbaijan.<\/em> [They were<\/em>] using the Azery Hermes control units with some temporary modifications<\/em> [paralleling those of<\/em>] Israeli drones signals. The training exercise failed after similar concerns of successful Iranian penetration were raised.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00bbIran’s media even crowed about the failure. It could put a dent in the billions of dollars Azerbaijan’s dictator is spending on Israeli military hardware and depress (ever so slightly) the revenue forecast for Israel’s weapons industry.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00bbThe Azeri failure means that virtually none of the drones Israel has stationed in countries like Saudi Arabia, Turkmenistan, Azerbaijan and elsewhere are likely to be able to attack Iran should Israel decide to do so. As this source wrote in my last published post, this means that Israel cannot neutralize Iran’s anti-aircraft systems using its drone force as it had planned to do. While Israel may have other means to try to do this, it was relying on its drones to do the primary heavy-lifting…<\/em>\u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\n

dedefensa.org<\/em><\/p><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

Netanyahou sans drone contre l’Iran… Nous donnons ici des extraits de deux textes de Richard Silverstein, sur son site RichardSilverstein.com, sur une situation particuli\u00e8rement int\u00e9ressante de la flotte des drones isra\u00e9liens qui seraient appel\u00e9s \u00e0 jouer un r\u00f4le central dans toute attaque d’Isra\u00ebl contre l’Iran. Silverstein est un commentateur respect\u00e9 et cr\u00e9dit\u00e9 de bonnes sources… <\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"","ping_status":"","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"neve_meta_sidebar":"","neve_meta_container":"","neve_meta_enable_content_width":"","neve_meta_content_width":0,"neve_meta_title_alignment":"","neve_meta_author_avatar":"","neve_post_elements_order":"","neve_meta_disable_header":"","neve_meta_disable_footer":"","neve_meta_disable_title":"","_jetpack_memberships_contains_paid_content":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[14],"tags":[2932,6410,2645,4580,15356,2773,3004,15160,5797],"class_list":["post-75261","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-ouverture-libre","tag-drone","tag-electronique","tag-guerre","tag-harpy","tag-heron","tag-iran","tag-nucleaire","tag-silverstein","tag-uav"],"jetpack_featured_media_url":"","jetpack_sharing_enabled":true,"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/75261","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=75261"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/75261\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=75261"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=75261"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=75261"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}