Les affirmations de Robert Parry concernant les pr\u00e9cisions de sources sur la connaissance de la CIA de la situation des forces ukrainiennes lors de la destruction du vol MH17 (voir le 21 juillet 2014<\/a>) jouent un r\u00f4le important dans l’actuel d\u00e9bat dans cette crise. On ajoutera, concernant Parry, des pr\u00e9cisions sur sa qualit\u00e9 de journaliste, pour mieux mesurer le cr\u00e9dit qu’on peut lui accorder. C’est notamment Paul J. Watson qui les apporte sur Infowars.com<\/em>, le 21 juillet 2014<\/a> :<\/p>\n<\/p>\n «Award winning former Associated Press reporter Robert Parry has been told by an intelligence source that the United States is in possession of satellite imagery which shows that Ukrainian troops were responsible for the shoot down of Malaysian Airlines Flight 17.<\/em> […] Although the establishment press has attempted to deride any questioning of the official narrative that Ukrainian rebels were responsible for the incident by invoking the tired \u00ab\u00a0conspiracy theory\u00a0\u00bb pejorative, Parry can hardly be dismissed as a crank given his key role in covering the Iran-Contra scandal for the Associated Press and Newsweek. Indeed, Parry’s investigative work on intelligence matters, for which he was awarded the George Polk Award, suggests that the information provided by his source is worthy of serious attention.<\/em>»<\/p>\n<\/p>\n Dans un nouvel article de ConsortiumNews<\/em>, le 21 juillet 2014<\/a>, Parry, tout en r\u00e9it\u00e9rant les informations sur la CIA venues de sa source, donne d’autres appr\u00e9ciations. Il implique le r\u00f4le-Syst\u00e8me de Kerry qui mesure la qualit\u00e9 du personnage, sa dialectique sophistique et faussaire interdisant tout d\u00e9bat fond\u00e9 sur les informations disponibles, et il (Parry) fait le m\u00eame parall\u00e8le que nous faisions avec l’affaire du chimique syrien du 21 août 2013. Cette d\u00e9marche impose le terrorisme d’une situation de groupthinking<\/em>, ou virtualisme<\/a>, qui \u00e9tait d\u00e9j\u00e0 clairement identifi\u00e9e par John Hamre, apr\u00e8s l’attaque de l’Irak (voir le 30 septembre 2003<\/a>).<\/p>\n<\/p>\n «During his five rounds of appearances on Sunday talk shows, Kerry did what a judge might condemn as \u00ab\u00a0prejudicing the case\u00a0\u00bb or \u00ab\u00a0poisoning the jury pool.\u00a0\u00bb In effect, Kerry made a fair \u00ab\u00a0trial\u00a0\u00bb almost impossible, what a bar association might cite in beginning debarment proceedings against prosecutor Kerry.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n »But what Kerry did was actually much worse. He essentially dictated the outcome of an inquiry that risks pushing the world into a new and dangerous Cold War. With his didactic – all-tell-no-show – presentation of the \u00ab\u00a0evidence,\u00a0\u00bb Kerry made any objective assessment of the actual evidence nearly impossible, certainly for U.S. government investigators and even for many international officials whose jobs often depend on the goodwill of the United States.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n »If you were, say, a U.S. intelligence analyst sifting through the evidence and finding that some leads went off in a different direction, toward the Ukrainian army, for instance, you might hold back on your conclusions knowing that crossing senior officials who had already pronounced the verdict could be devastating to your career. It would make a lot more sense to just deep-six any contrary evidence.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n »Indeed, one of the lessons from the disastrous Iraq War was the danger of enforced \u00ab\u00a0group think\u00a0\u00bb inside Official Washington. Once senior officials have made clear how they want an assessment to come out, mid-level officials scramble to make the bosses happy…<\/em> […] Kerry’s TV performance recalled his rush to judgment in blaming the Syrian government for a still-mysterious sarin gas attack last Aug. 21. In both instances, the Secretary of State stitched together circumstantial evidence around the repeated refrain, \u00ab\u00a0we know.\u00a0\u00bb<\/em>»<\/p>\n<\/p>\n Il faut encore signaler l’initiative des militaires russes, qui ont pr\u00e9sent\u00e9 un puissant dossier technique introduisant nombre d’\u00e9l\u00e9ments nouveaux dans l’affaire du MH17, notamment la pr\u00e9sence d’un avion de combat ukrainien Su-25 aupr\u00e8s du Boeing 777 du vol MH17 dans les moments pr\u00e9c\u00e9dant la destruction. (Voir notamment Russia Today<\/em> le 21 juillet 2014<\/a>, Saker of the Vineyard<\/em> le 21 juillet 2014<\/a>, et surtout, extr\u00eamement document\u00e9 et bien comment\u00e9, ZeroHedge.com<\/em> le 21 juillet 2014<\/a>.)<\/p>\n<\/p>\n Mis en ligne le 22 juillet 2014 \u00e0 05H19<\/p><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":" Quelques mots sur Parry (et Kerry, et MH17) Les affirmations de Robert Parry concernant les pr\u00e9cisions de sources sur la connaissance de la CIA de la situation des forces ukrainiennes lors de la destruction du vol MH17 (voir le 21 juillet 2014) jouent un r\u00f4le important dans l’actuel d\u00e9bat dans cette crise. On ajoutera, concernant… <\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"","ping_status":"","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"neve_meta_sidebar":"","neve_meta_container":"","neve_meta_enable_content_width":"","neve_meta_content_width":0,"neve_meta_title_alignment":"","neve_meta_author_avatar":"","neve_post_elements_order":"","neve_meta_disable_header":"","neve_meta_disable_footer":"","neve_meta_disable_title":"","footnotes":""},"categories":[21],"tags":[15938,3104,4315,4144,855,15927,4464,2730,5390,3867,1296],"class_list":["post-75414","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-breves-de-crise","tag-chiomique","tag-cia","tag-groupthinking","tag-hamre","tag-kerry","tag-mh17","tag-parry","tag-russie","tag-su-25","tag-syrie","tag-ukraine"],"jetpack_featured_media_url":"","_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/75414","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=75414"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/75414\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=75414"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=75414"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=75414"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}