MK Bhadrakumar, qui retrouve toute sa verve, ne cache pas que le nouveau Premier ministre indien Modi est peut-\u00eatre un nouvel homme du destin pour l’Inde, successeur dans l’esprit de Mahatma Gandhi, et pour la politique de non-alignement, du Premier ministre Nehru dans les ann\u00e9es 1950. L’entr\u00e9e de l’Inde comme membre \u00e0 part enti\u00e8re dans l’Organisation de Coop\u00e9ration de Shanghai en septembre prochain (en m\u00eame temps, notamment, que le Pakistan et l’Iran, voir le 5 ao\u00fbt 2014<\/a>) est la marque centrale de cette c\u00e9l\u00e9bration de MK Bhadrakumar, dans deux longs textes d’analyse de Strategic-Culture.org<\/em>, les 7 ao\u00fbt 2014<\/a> et 8 ao\u00fbt 2014<\/a> respectivement, dont voici la conclusion…<\/p>\n<\/p>\n \t\u00abThe intellectual challenge today lies in reinterpreting the idea of non-alignment in tune with the spirit of our times, which is characterized by multipolarity in international politics, so as to meet India’s needs in the coming period as an emerging power. That is also what Jawaharlal Nehru would have expected Prime Minister Modi to do as his worthy successor presiding over India’s tryst with destiny at a crucial juncture in world politics. All things considered, therefore, India’s SCO membership would signify that the Modi government is charioting India toward a new world order where the country’s political and diplomatic options will multiply.<\/em>\u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n \tBien entendu, ce grand \u00e9v\u00e9nement pour l’Inde est d’abord un grand \u00e9v\u00e9nement international dans une p\u00e9riode d’exceptionnelle tension et d’un bouleversement syst\u00e9mique qui marque la fin d’une \u00e9poque, sinon d’une civilisation (notre contre-civilisation) avec la mise en cause d’un Syst\u00e8me global. Il se place au cur de la crise bouillonnante de l’Ukraine, crise m\u00e9tahistorique fondamentale au cur du continent eurasiatique, et avec une intensit\u00e9 jamais vue dans le champ de la guerre du syst\u00e8me de la communication. (\u00abTo be sure, Russia would be immensely pleased and a sigh of relief is audible in Moscow. A Russian pundit estimated that India’s admission into the SCO, which has been a long-cherished goal for Moscow, will pave the way for the grouping to hold itself out as a centre of power in world politics.<\/em>\u00bb)<\/p>\n<\/p>\n \tPour MK Bhadrakumar, l’\u00e9largissement du SCO, en poids strat\u00e9giques (quatre puissances nucl\u00e9aires regroup\u00e9es), en extension g\u00e9ographique (d\u00e9sormais jusqu’\u00e0 l’extr\u00eame pointe occidentale de l’extension du sous-continent indien), d\u00e9taillent un formidable revers pour la grande strat\u00e9gie des USA et du bloc BAO, avec l’installation d’un concurrent g\u00e9opolitique direct de l’OTAN.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n \t\u00abDuring his visit to New Delhi last week, United States Secretary of State John Kerry was asked at a media interaction where India would stand in Washington’s scheme of things as regards its recent sanctions against Russia. Kerry accepted that he was disappointed but appeared resigned to India’s stance. We would obviously welcome India joining in with us with respect to that [sanctions]. But it is up to them. It is India’s choice.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n \t\u00bbIt does not need much ingenuity to figure out that the SCO is taking the decision to admit India at a defining moment in the post-cold war era politics. The US is pursuing a dual containment policy toward Russia and China, the two prime movers of the SCO. The US, on the other hand, has been assiduously wooing India as a strategic ally. From the American viewpoint, therefore, India’s SCO membership literally caps the trajectory of US-Indian strategic partnership. The message is clear: India is unavailable as a counterweight’ against China or as a silent partner to isolate’ Russia.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n \t\u00bbIndia being a major power in Asia, its policy of non-alignment’ takes the wind out of the US’ rebalance strategy. India has also recognized that Russia’s interests in Ukraine are legitimate. On a more fundamental plane, it needs to be noted that if the SCO has often been called NATO of the East’, it was not without reason although the grouping is far from a military alliance in the classic sense.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n \t\u00bbThe heart of the matter is that the SCO has disallowed a security vacuum appearing in Central Asia, which the NATO could have used as an alibi to step in. Put differently, so long as the SCO is around, NATO’s eastward expansion beyond the Caucasus runs into formidable obstacles. That is to say, SCO challenges the US strategy to project the NATO as the global security organization that bypasses the United Nations as the provider of security. This is precisely why the US has opposed the SCO and did all it could to debunk the grouping.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n \t\u00bbWith the admission of India, Pakistan, Iran and Mongolia, SCO will be transforming into a regional grouping that all but matches NATO in political and strategic reach. This development constitutes a major setback for the US’ regional strategies. For one thing, an expanded SCO provides strategic depth’ for Russia and the US and European Union’s sanctions against Russia will be rendered even more toothless.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n \t\u00bbBesides, it significantly weakens the American hand in the negotiations vis-\u00e0-vis Iran; it weakens the US’ pivot’ strategy in Asia; it diminishes the US’ capacity to dictate terms to Afghanistan (or Pakistan); and, it holds far-reaching potential to destroy the primacy of the US dollar that is, if and when the integration within the SCO gains traction.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n \t\u00bbThe stunning geopolitical reality cannot escape world attention namely, that by the end of this year, the SCO will have as members 4 nuclear powers plus one threshold power’. To be sure, SCO will be stepping out of Central Asia and not only vetting its toes in the Indian Ocean and the Persian Gulf but walking into the centre stage of world politics. It is entirely conceivable that at some point sooner rather than later the SCO countries may contemplate having an energy club’ and trading in their national currencies, creating banking institutions to fund intra-regional projects and moving toward preferential trade regimes. India is already showing interest to have a PTA with the Customs Union of Russia, Kazakhstan and Belarus…<\/em>\u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n <\/p>\n \tMis en ligne le 9 ao\u00fbt 2014 \u00e0 16H39<\/p><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":" Modi est-il un nouveau Nehru ? MK Bhadrakumar, qui retrouve toute sa verve, ne cache pas que le nouveau Premier ministre indien Modi est peut-\u00eatre un nouvel homme du destin pour l’Inde, successeur dans l’esprit de Mahatma Gandhi, et pour la politique de non-alignement, du Premier ministre Nehru dans les ann\u00e9es 1950. L’entr\u00e9e de l’Inde… <\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"","ping_status":"","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"neve_meta_sidebar":"","neve_meta_container":"","neve_meta_enable_content_width":"","neve_meta_content_width":0,"neve_meta_title_alignment":"","neve_meta_author_avatar":"","neve_post_elements_order":"","neve_meta_disable_header":"","neve_meta_disable_footer":"","neve_meta_disable_title":"","footnotes":""},"categories":[21],"tags":[5474,3378,2773,14492,15976,3004,8405,584,3379,2730,5508],"class_list":["post-75454","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-breves-de-crise","tag-bhadrakumar","tag-inde","tag-iran","tag-modi","tag-nerhu","tag-nucleaire","tag-ocs","tag-otan","tag-pakistan","tag-russie","tag-shanghai"],"jetpack_featured_media_url":"","_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/75454","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=75454"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/75454\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=75454"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=75454"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=75454"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}