fantasy-narrative<\/em> du bloc BAO, et sur la situation russe, et sur l’\u00e9v\u00e9nement du vol MH17 aussit\u00f4t apr\u00e8s sa survenue. Nous citons l’introduction de cette analyse et le passage correspondant \u00e0 la destruction de MH17. (La r\u00e9\u00e9valuation dont il est question dans le premier paragraphe cit\u00e9 ne porte certainement pas sur les jugements de Poutine d\u00e9sign\u00e9 comme dictateur et sur la menace que la Russie ferait peser sur ses voisins, qui restent dans le cadre d’un point de vue raisonnable selon le Friedman-Syst\u00e8me, donc toujours valable. La r\u00e9\u00e9valuation porte sur la puissance du pouvoir de Poutine, sa chute prochaine \u00e9ventuelle, \u00e0-la-Krouchtchev en octobre 1964, et jusqu’\u00e0 sa rationalit\u00e9 m\u00eame [Poutine ne serait-il pas un peu fou ?]. Il s’agit donc, comme \u00e0 l’habitude chez Friedman, d’une vue g\u00e9opolitique pr\u00e9sent\u00e9e comme audacieuse, mais strictement \u00e0 l’int\u00e9rieur des normes de la pens\u00e9e-Syst\u00e8me. R\u00e9trospectivement, deux mois apr\u00e8s ce texte, on peut appr\u00e9cier ce qu’il en est de sa justesse objective, et bien s\u00fbr de sa convenance quasi-servile par rapport au Syst\u00e8me.)<\/p>\n<\/p>\n\t\u00abThere is a general view that Vladimir Putin governs the Russian Federation as a dictator, that he has defeated and intimidated his opponents and that he has marshaled a powerful threat to surrounding countries. This is a reasonable view, but perhaps it should be re-evaluated in the context of recent events.<\/em> […] <\/p>\n<\/p>\n\t\u00bbIf no Ukrainian uprising occurred, Putin’s strategy was to allow the government in Kiev to unravel of its own accord and to split the United States from Europe by exploiting Russia’s strong trade and energy ties with the Continent. And this is where the crash of the Malaysia Airlines jet is crucial. If it turns out as appears to be the case that Russia supplied air defense systems to the separatists and sent crews to man them (since operating those systems requires extensive training), Russia could be held responsible for shooting down the plane. And this means Moscow’s ability to divide the Europeans from the Americans would decline. Putin then moves from being an effective, sophisticated ruler who ruthlessly uses power to being a dangerous incompetent supporting a hopeless insurrection with wholly inappropriate weapons. And the West, no matter how opposed some countries might be to a split with Putin, must come to grips with how effective and rational he really is…<\/em>\u00bb <\/p>\n<\/p>\n\tAinsi, \u00e0 la lumi\u00e8re de ce qu’est en g\u00e9n\u00e9ral ce personnage de Friedman, le texte sur Soljenitsyne reste \u00e0 la fois, cinq ans plus tard, \u00e9trange, absolument irrationnel selon sa pens\u00e9e courante (de Friedman), et d’une certaine fa\u00e7on \u00e9tonnamment et extraordinairement juste, comme s’il lui avait \u00e9t\u00e9 inspir\u00e9 d’ailleurs que de sa propre pens\u00e9e courante avec sa psychologie d’am\u00e9ricaniste enferm\u00e9e dans le cadre-Syst\u00e8me. Friedman \u00e9tait-il visit\u00e9 et \u00e9clair\u00e9 lorsqu’il \u00e9crivit cette ode \u00e0 Soljenitsyne et, d’une certaine fa\u00e7on, \u00e0 la vertu transcendantale des \u00e2mes collectives ? Le myst\u00e8re demeure, et pour en faire mieux saisir le poids nous avons choisi de publier \u00e0 nouveau notre texte du 6 ao\u00fbt 2008, les citations de Friedman et nos commentaires, pour en faciliter la lecture, \u00e9ventuellement pour forcer \u00e0 la lecture telle ou telle main trop paresseuse pour cliquer sur le lien. (Le texte fut mis en ligne le 6 ao\u00fbt 2008 \u00e0 18H11.)<\/p>\n
\u00ab Bravo Friedman (George, pas Thomas) \u00bb<\/h3>\n<\/p>\n
\t\u00ab Il est bon de pouvoir signaler de la part d’un homme qui est manifestement Am\u00e9ricain et am\u00e9ricaniste, une si forte et belle compr\u00e9hension, voire une si r\u00e9elle bienveillance teint\u00e9e de nostalgie (nostalgie, peut-\u00eatre, que l’am\u00e9ricanisme ne soit pas de la m\u00eame sorte?), de ce que repr\u00e9sente Soljenitsyne () en fait d’\u00e2me russe. C’est le cas de Friedman, George pas Thomas, le directeur de la soci\u00e9t\u00e9 d’analyse Stratfor. Son texte du 5 ao\u00fbt (), sur Solzhenitsyn and the Struggle for Russia’s Soul<\/em>, est un mod\u00e8le du genre, de compr\u00e9hension, une compr\u00e9hension paradoxale de la part d’un sp\u00e9cialiste de la g\u00e9opolitique r\u00e9aliste, du r\u00f4le et de la dimension spirituelle d’Alexandre Soljenitsyne dans la trag\u00e9die incroyable qu’a connue la Russie au XX\u00e8me si\u00e8cle, et dans la r\u00e9surrection possible de Mother Russia<\/em>.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n\t\u00bb Friedman situe parfaitement l’importance de Soljenitsyne, qui est li\u00e9e \u00e0 une r\u00e9alit\u00e9 qui est celle de la nation russe. Il indique bien comment Soljenitsyne a fait un travail de d\u00e9structuration (celui de l’imposture communiste, en exposant par ses \u00e9crits les souffrances dont cette imposture est la cause) et un travail de restructuration parall\u00e8le (celui de l’\u00e2me russe, en exposant par ses \u00e9crits l’aspect commun et collectif de cette souffrance commune engendr\u00e9e par l’imposture); ce travail de restructuration ne peut s’accomplir en tant que tel qu’en identifiant et en d\u00e9non\u00e7ant l’autre adversaire d\u00e9structurant, l’imposture lib\u00e9rale et individualiste, qui prosp\u00e8re sur les ruines du communisme, en s’affirmant comme une imposture peut-\u00eatre plus perverse encore dans son universalit\u00e9 accomplie que celle qu’elle remplace.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n
\t\u00bbThere are many people who write history. There are very few who make history through their writings. Alexander Solzhenitsyn, who died this week at the age of 89, was one of them. In many ways, Solzhenitsyn laid the intellectual foundations for the fall of Soviet communism. That is well known. But Solzhenitsyn also laid the intellectual foundation for the Russia that is now emerging. That is less well known, and in some ways more important.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n\t\u00bb Ce qui est remarquable dans le texte de Friedman, c’est qu’un homme qui s’est manifest\u00e9 souvent comme profond\u00e9ment am\u00e9ricaniste puisse si bien exposer la puissance du concept spirituel de nation (l’\u00e2me russe) en marquant pourtant combien ce concept est \u00e9tranger \u00e0 l’am\u00e9ricanisme. (C’est pourquoi nous parlerions de nostalgie \u00e0 propos de son commentaire: on a bien plus d’une fois la sensation, \u00e0 la lecture de ce texte, que Friedman regrette que les conceptions et la psychologie am\u00e9ricanistes, si \u00e9trang\u00e8res \u00e0 la vision de Soljenitsyne, n’en soient pas au contraire impr\u00e9gn\u00e9es.) Son analyse de l’action de Soljenitsyne, action involontaire autant que volontaire, est remarquable pour un sp\u00e9cialiste de la g\u00e9opolitique, en ridiculisant in fine l’importance accord\u00e9e aux notions de force et de pression brutale qui caract\u00e9risent si grandement la politique am\u00e9ricaniste. La description que fait Friedman de la convergence entre les conceptions de Soljenitsyne et l’\u00e9volution actuelle de la Russie marque effectivement sa compr\u00e9hension de l’importance du ph\u00e9nom\u00e8ne qu’il d\u00e9crit, notamment en avan\u00e7ant l’id\u00e9e que Soljenitsyne n’a fait que d\u00e9crire et repr\u00e9senter une force puissante, promise \u00e0 rejaillir, qui est la r\u00e9surgence de la Russie traditionnelle par sa propre dynamique de l\u00e9gitimit\u00e9 ([T]he traditional Russia that Solzhenitsyn celebrated is emerging, more from its own force than by political d\u00e9cisions<\/em>). C’est, indirectement, une formidable critique de la psychologie am\u00e9ricaniste et une critique aussi forte de la modernit\u00e9 dans sa phase grim\u00e9e en postmoderne (Friedman serait-il un anti-moderne?).<\/p>\n<\/p>\n\t\u00bb Think now of the Russia that Prime Minister Vladimir Putin and President Dmitri Medvedev are shaping. The Russian Orthodox Church is undergoing a massive resurgence, the market is submitting to the state, free expression is being tempered and so on. We doubt Putin was reading Solzhenitsyn when reshaping Russia. But we do believe that Solzhenitsyn had an understanding of Russia that towered over most of his contemporaries. And we believe that the traditional Russia that Solzhenitsyn celebrated is emerging, more from its own force than by political decisions.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n\t\u00bb Solzhenitsyn served Western purposes when he undermined the Soviet state. But that was not his purpose. His purpose was to destroy the Soviet state so that his vision of Russia could re-emerge. When his interests and the West’s coincided, he won the Nobel Prize. When they diverged, he became a joke. But Solzhenitsyn never really cared what Americans or the French thought of him and his ideas. He wasn’t speaking to them and had no interest or hope of remaking them. Solzhenitsyn was totally alien to American culture. He was speaking to Russia and the vision he had was a resurrection of Mother Russia, if not with the czar, then certainly with the church and state. That did not mean liberalism; Mother Russia was dramatically oppressive. But it was neither a country of mass murder nor of vulgar materialism.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n\t\u00bb It must also be remembered that when Solzhenitsyn spoke of Russia, he meant imperial Russia at its height, and imperial Russia’s borders at its height looked more like the Soviet Union than they looked like Russia today. August 1914′ is a book that addresses geopolitics. Russian greatness did not have to express itself via empire, but logically it should something to which Solzhenitsyn would not have objected.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n\t\u00bb Solzhenitsyn could not teach Americans, whose intellectual genes were incompatible with his. But it is hard to think of anyone who spoke to the Russian soul as deeply as he did. He first ripped Russia apart with his indictment. He was later ignored by a Russia out of control under former President Boris Yeltsin. But today’s Russia is very slowly moving in the direction that Solzhenitsyn wanted. And that could make Russia extraordinarily powerful. Imagine a Soviet Union not ruled by thugs and incompetents. Imagine Russia ruled by people resembling Solzhenitsyn’s vision of a decent man.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n\t\u00bb Solzhenitsyn was far more prophetic about the future of the Soviet Union than almost all of the Ph.D.s in Russian studies. Entertain the possibility that the rest of Solzhenitsyn’s vision will come to pass. It is an idea that ought to cause the world to be very thoughtful.<\/em> \u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<\/p>\n
\tMis en ligne le 1er octobre 2014 \u00e0 05H02<\/p><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"
Comment Friedman (George) voyait l’avenir en russe Un ami de dedefensa.org nous disait donc, entre deux consid\u00e9rations sur l’Ukraine-en-cours, \u00eatre retomb\u00e9 r\u00e9cemment, \u00e0 l’occasion de rangements, sur un texte ancien (pensez, 2008) de Friedman, George, de Stratfor, par le gros Thomas du New York Times, sur l’avenir de la Russie. C’\u00e9tait \u00e0 l’occasion de la… <\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"","ping_status":"","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"neve_meta_sidebar":"","neve_meta_container":"","neve_meta_enable_content_width":"","neve_meta_content_width":0,"neve_meta_title_alignment":"","neve_meta_author_avatar":"","neve_post_elements_order":"","neve_meta_disable_header":"","neve_meta_disable_footer":"","neve_meta_disable_title":"","_jetpack_memberships_contains_paid_content":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[2],"tags":[7715,3253,1268,8516,4194,916,2884,4033,3160,1296],"class_list":["post-75536","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-bloc-notes","tag-ame","tag-americanisme","tag-friedman","tag-geopolitique","tag-nation","tag-poutine","tag-russe","tag-soljenitsyne","tag-stratfor","tag-ukraine"],"jetpack_featured_media_url":"","jetpack_sharing_enabled":true,"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/75536","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=75536"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/75536\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=75536"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=75536"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=75536"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}