{"id":75540,"date":"2014-10-02T12:13:02","date_gmt":"2014-10-02T12:13:02","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/2014\/10\/02\/fantasy-narrative-washington-syrie-fsa\/"},"modified":"2014-10-02T12:13:02","modified_gmt":"2014-10-02T12:13:02","slug":"fantasy-narrative-washington-syrie-fsa","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/2014\/10\/02\/fantasy-narrative-washington-syrie-fsa\/","title":{"rendered":"Fantasy-narrative<\/em> Washington-Syrie-FSA"},"content":{"rendered":"

Fantasy-narrative<\/em> Washington-Syrie-FSA<\/h4>\n

La crise ukrainienne a fait passer l’exercice de la communication du bloc BAO de la narrative<\/em> \u00e0 la fantasy narrative<\/em>. (Voir notre texte du 1er septembre 2014<\/a> pour l’intronisation de cette cat\u00e9gorie [fantasy<\/em>] de la narrative<\/em>.) Cette nouvelle avanc\u00e9e de la communication atteint d\u00e9sormais la Syrie, dans le cadre de la guerre contre Daesh<\/em> comme dernier d\u00e9veloppement strat\u00e9gique washingtonien.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tC’est Robert Parry qui met la chose en \u00e9vidence, en observant que Washington se mobilise aujourd’hui pour renforcer les rebelles syriens mod\u00e9r\u00e9s (la FSA, ou Free Syrian Army<\/em>) que l’on consid\u00e8re comme une force pouvant affronter avec succ\u00e8s les djihadistes de Daesh<\/em>, et \u00e9ventuellement, l’arm\u00e9e d’Assad qui reste un homme \u00e0 abattre, sans aucun doute pour les neocons<\/em> (voir Parry encore, le 29 septembre 2014<\/a>). Mais en m\u00eame temps qu’on se mobilise pour cette r\u00e9sistance mod\u00e9r\u00e9e anti-Daesh<\/em>\/anti-Assad, on va partout r\u00e9p\u00e9tant que cette r\u00e9sistance mod\u00e9r\u00e9e anti-Daesh<\/em>\/anti-Assad est une fantasy<\/em>, totalement inexistante, totalement inefficace, etc., chose par ailleurs vraie, \u00e0 partir des \u00e9quipements US d\u00e9j\u00e0 envoy\u00e9s qui ont permis \u00e0 ces groupes de devenir des centres de corruption mafieuse. (Selon un officier de renseignement d’un pays arabe impliqu\u00e9 dans les contacts avec la FSA, jusqu’\u00e0 maintenant, la FSA est une sorte de mafia … Les gens en Syrie en ont assez de cette mafia. Il n’y a aucune structure. Il n’y a rien du tout.)<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t… Quoi qu’il en soit, en avant et au galop. On arme et on finance la FSA, et on esp\u00e8re qu’elle aura successivement la peau de Daesh<\/em> et de Assad, que le ciel redeviendra bleu, que les petits oiseaux chanteront dans les arbres et que Poutine fera all\u00e9geance. De toutes les fa\u00e7ons, on est \u00e0 Washington et l’on s’en fout … Extraits du texte sur la fantasy-narrative<\/em>, de Robert Parry, le 1er septembre 2014<\/a> sur ConsortiumNews<\/em>.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00abWhat does it say when the capital of the world’s most powerful nation anchors a major decision about war in what every thinking person acknowledges is a fantasy even the principal policymaker and a top advocate for foreign interventions? It might suggest that the U.S. government has completely lost its bearings or that political opportunism now so overwhelms rationality that shortsighted expediency determines life-or-death military strategies. Either way, it is hard to see how the current U.S. policy toward Iraq, Syria and the larger Middle East can serve American national interests or translate into anything but more misery for the people of the region.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00bbOfficial Washington’s most treasured fantasy today is the notion that a viable moderate opposition exists in Syria or could somehow be created. That wish-upon-a-star belief was the centerpiece of congressional action last month on a $500 million plan by President Barack Obama to train and arm these moderate rebels to combat Islamic State terrorists who have been plundering large swaths of Syria and Iraq and also take on the Syrian army.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00bbYet, as recently as August, President Barack Obama publicly declared that trust in these moderates was a fantasy that was never in the cards as a workable strategy. Then, on Wednesday, David Ignatius, national security columnist for the neoconservative Washington Post and a prominent booster of U.S. interventionism, reported from a rebel staging area in Reyhanli, Turkey, the same reality in nearly the same language. The problem is that the moderate opposition’ that the United States is backing is still largely a fantasy, Ignatius wrote, noting that the greatest challenge would be to coordinate the ragtag brigades of the Free Syrian Army into a coherent force that can fill the vacuum once the extremists are driven out.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00bbIgnatius quoted Syrian rebel commander Hamza al-Shamali, a top recipient of American support including anti-tank missiles, as saying, At some point, the Syrian street lost trust in the Free Syrian Army, the U.S.-backed rebel force that was the armed wing of the supposedly moderate opposition to President Bashar al-Assad. Ignatius added: Shamali explains that many rebel commanders aren’t disciplined, their fighters aren’t well-trained and the loose umbrella organization of the FSA lacks command and control. The extremists of the Islamic State and Jabhat al-Nusra have filled the vacuum. Now, he says, the question every Syrian has for the opposition is: Are you going to bring chaos or order?’<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00bbAccording to Ignatius, Shamali said he rejected a proposal to merge the FSA’s disparate brigades because we refuse to repeat failed experiments. He argued that an entirely new Syrian national army would be needed to fight both the Islamist radicals and Assad’s military. But even the sympathetic Ignatius recognized that the FSA’s biggest problem has been internecine feuding. Over the past two years, I’ve interviewed various people who tried to become leaders, such as: Abdul-Jabbar Akaidi, Salim Idriss and Jamal Maarouf. They all talked about unifying the opposition but none succeeded.<\/em>\u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

\tMis en ligne le 2 octobre 2014 \u00e0 12H07<\/p><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

Fantasy-narrative Washington-Syrie-FSA La crise ukrainienne a fait passer l’exercice de la communication du bloc BAO de la narrative \u00e0 la fantasy narrative. (Voir notre texte du 1er septembre 2014 pour l’intronisation de cette cat\u00e9gorie [fantasy] de la narrative.) Cette nouvelle avanc\u00e9e de la communication atteint d\u00e9sormais la Syrie, dans le cadre de la guerre contre… <\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"","ping_status":"","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"neve_meta_sidebar":"","neve_meta_container":"","neve_meta_enable_content_width":"","neve_meta_content_width":0,"neve_meta_title_alignment":"","neve_meta_author_avatar":"","neve_post_elements_order":"","neve_meta_disable_header":"","neve_meta_disable_footer":"","neve_meta_disable_title":"","_jetpack_memberships_contains_paid_content":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[21],"tags":[4202,16055,15114,4463,4321,3216,4464,3867,1296],"class_list":["post-75540","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-breves-de-crise","tag-assad","tag-fantasy","tag-fsa","tag-ignatius","tag-narrative","tag-neocon","tag-parry","tag-syrie","tag-ukraine"],"jetpack_featured_media_url":"","jetpack_sharing_enabled":true,"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/75540","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=75540"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/75540\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=75540"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=75540"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=75540"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}