\tIgor Yourgens est un homme d’affaires et un des \u00e9conomistes lib\u00e9raux russes les plus respect\u00e9s. Il a \u00e9t\u00e9 un des plus proches conseillers de Medvedev pr\u00e9sident, notamment sur la question des droits de l’homme selon la conception lib\u00e9rale occidentale qui lie \u00e9troitement cette question \u00e0 l’\u00e9conomie lib\u00e9rale en en faisant son compl\u00e9ment vertueux. Yourgens a quitt\u00e9 son poste aupr\u00e8s de Medvedev en juin 2012, en expliquant son d\u00e9part par l’orientation prise avec le retour de Poutine selon une critique qui rencontre compl\u00e8tement le r\u00e9quisitoire-narrative<\/em> du bloc BAO (voir son interview du 28 juin 2012<\/a> au Los Angeles Times<\/em>). Tout cela est dit pour qu’on appr\u00e9cie Yourgens comme un des repr\u00e9sentants les plus respectables et les plus s\u00e9rieux de la tendance occidentaliste et lib\u00e9rale russe, celle qui veut int\u00e9grer la Russie dans la globalisation telle que la promeuvent les dirigeants-Syst\u00e8me du bloc BAO et le corporate power<\/em>. On jugera alors d’autant plus significatif l’article<\/a> qu’il a publi\u00e9 dans The National Interest<\/em> et qui est repris, en version abr\u00e9g\u00e9e, dans Russia Insider<\/em> le 13 octobre 2014<\/a>.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n \tNous en donnons des extraits concernant la situation qui est en train de s’\u00e9tablir en Russie avec la dynamique mise en route par la politique des sanctions qu’a suivie le bloc BAO depuis le rattachement de la Crim\u00e9e \u00e0 la Russie. (Il faut noter l’emploi que fait Yourgens de l’\u00e9tiquette n\u00e9o-conservatisme en l’accolant aux isolationnistes russes, qui constituent une branche du souverainisme national en Russie. Il s’agit d’un n\u00e9o-conservatisme dans un sens exactement contraire de la d\u00e9finition des neocons<\/em> US, qui sont internationalistes dans le sens de la d\u00e9structuration et de la dissolution qui accompagnent la globalisation. Sur ce n\u00e9o-conservatisme russe que nous qualifions d’antiSyst\u00e8me, voir notamment le 18 d\u00e9cembre 2013<\/a>.)<\/p>\n<\/p>\n \t\u00abRussia’s relations with the West entered a new and less-than-happy chapter earlier this year. U.S. and European economic sanctions are the defining and consistent feature of this new chapter, though Russia’s actual and potential responses are becoming increasingly important.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n \t\u00bbSo far, Russia’s internal diseases have harmed it much more than Western sanctions. Likewise, the sanctions do not undermine the stability of the Russian political regime. On the contrary, the personal sanctions contribute to the Putin-driven soft nationalization of the elites, and the state can more than make up for financial losses sustained by certain individuals and companies. For the elements of Russian society already dissatisfied with the Russian government, such sanctions are a bonus of sorts that adds to their satisfaction over the Crimea annexationRussia gets Crimea and despised elites are punished too.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n \t\u00bbMost importantly, beginning a new chapter is not the same as ending oneand it by no means preordains the final pages of the book. Perhaps ironically, the harder the West tries to isolate Russia, the more Western actions will strengthen forces inside the country that welcome isolation. This will make it increasingly difficult to find necessary cooperative solutions to current differences, and it is likely to increase costs on all sides.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n \t\u00bbRussia can live with sanctions for the short term. Oil exports still guarantee us a relatively steady flow of income, and hard currency and gold reserves remain at around $500 billion. But the sanctions will eventually hit hard. Both domestic forecasts and estimates from the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank put Russia’s GDP growth at 0.2%, with a probable recession looming. Restrictions on much needed Western investments and technology is a serious impediment.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n \t\u00bbNotwithstanding the increasing impact of sanctions, President Putin is not likely to change his policy approach under pressure. As Russia’s officials see it, the Iran sanctions and Cuba embargo demonstrate that such a situation can persist for quite some time, especially since Russia is a relatively large and wealthy country. With this in mind, the Putin government will not give in to Western sanctions, but will instead look for ways to minimize their impact on Russia and to ensure the survival of the current political and economic system in Russia. Domestically, Putin will try to rally the Russian elite and population around his idea that Russia is a besieged fortress. Although it may seem strange to Americans and Europeans, this may actually become an easier sell for Putin as sanctions become more severe, for two reasons.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n \t\u00bbFirst, tough sanctions will do real damage to Western-oriented internationalists inside Russia. Although there is a new generation of Russian business leaders and so-called global Russians who find Western values to be highly compatible with their mode of life, this group was relatively weak even before the Ukraine crisis. Sanctions have further reduced their voice in debates over Russia’s internal affairs. To stage a comeback, they will have to have some breathing spacesomething impossible under sanctions that reduce economic opportunities and distort Russia’s political climate. Under harsh and continuing sanctions, this new generation will become weaker and weaker. Russia’s Western-oriented economic elite cannot thrive in isolation from the rest of the world, and Western officials should take note of this.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n \t\u00bbSecond, the isolationists around Putin who do not see their future in the wider world are already numerically and emotionally stronger than are modernizers and progressivesand this problem will get worse the longer the sanctions last. That is why the actions already taken by the West have caused a surge of enthusiasm among Russian isolationists. Kremlin efforts to mobilize their support in order to strengthen the political order will further empower them. Neo-conservative Russian isolationists are already influential around President Putin. In the absence of any visible carrots from the West, using the stick endlessly will only strengthen the neo-conservative segment of the Russian elite and population. Russia today is far from the Iranian situation, where the supreme leader decided to avoid selecting a belligerent president to make negotiations possible. In Russia, the current situation can persist for a relatively long time, although the country already feels a strain on its budget and public expenditures.<\/em>\u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n \t Yourgens d\u00e9crit donc les effets absolument contre-productifs<\/strong>, de son point de vue qui favorise la coop\u00e9ration avec le bloc BAO, de la politique des sanctions suivie par ce bloc BAO. Dans l’extrait ci-dessus, il a d\u00e9crit les effets int\u00e9rieurs. Il d\u00e9veloppe \u00e9galement le volet ext\u00e9rieur, en d\u00e9crivant des effets \u00e9galement catastrophiques, toujours de son point de vue qui favorise la coop\u00e9ration avec le bloc BAO, qui est de pousser la Russie hors de l’influence du bloc, vers le rapprochement avec la Chine, avec les BRICS, etc., en devenant de facto<\/em> la dynamique constitutive d’un bloc \u00e0 tendance antiSyst\u00e8me. Yourgens d\u00e9taille notamment ce que pourrait \u00eatre une politique russe de riposte de cette sorte, avec le plan Glaziev, du nom du conseiller \u00e9conomique du pr\u00e9sident Poutine, qui est un v\u00e9ritable plan de guerre contre le bloc BAO (voir notamment le 19 juin 2014<\/a> et le 11 ao\u00fbt 2014<\/a>). Yourgens termine par le constat \u00e9vident que la Russie est trop grande pour \u00eatre compl\u00e8tement isol\u00e9e et que, par cons\u00e9quent, la politique des sanctions n’aboutit qu’\u00e0 son semi-isolement agressif qui exacerbe et renforce la riposte russe anti-bloc BAO, c’est-\u00e0-dire le contraire du r\u00e9sultat recherch\u00e9… \u00abThe primary effect of international sanctions is partial or complete isolation of the sanctioned nation. Russia is too big to isolate completely, however, and partial isolation is likely to have unintended consequences that contradict U.S. and European intent in imposing sanctions. Should the West strengthen isolationist forces in Russia and provide incentives for Russia’s pivot away from the West toward China, Latin America, and Africa? This is up to Washington and Brussels.<\/em>\u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n \t Parall\u00e8lement, on observe un d\u00e9veloppement discret mais certain d’une dynamique allant dans le sens que d\u00e9crit d’une plume d\u00e9sol\u00e9e Igor Yourgens. C’est surtout au niveau de la structure financi\u00e8re et de la politique de d\u00e9dollarisation que se manifestent ces nouvelles, et c’est du dirigeant de la seconde banque russe, la VTB, que viennent ces pr\u00e9cisions. Non seulement Andrei Kostine estime que la Russie peut r\u00e9aliser sa compl\u00e8te d\u00e9dollarisation en 2-3 ans, mais encore il montre combien cette op\u00e9ration est d\u00e9sirable, n\u00e9cessaire, avantageuse, m\u00eame consid\u00e9r\u00e9e hors des circonstances politiques (crise ukrainienne, politique des sanctions). Kostine juge que l’ancienne direction de la Banque Centrale russe acceptait la domination du dollar, non par n\u00e9cessit\u00e9, mais par complaisance pour le syst\u00e8me, tandis que la nouvelle direction est d’un avis diff\u00e9rent ; et, selon cette appr\u00e9ciation, estime Kostine, une perc\u00e9e est tr\u00e8s probable, tr\u00e8s rapidement … (Dans Russia Today<\/em>, le 2 octobre 2014<\/a>.)<\/p>\n<\/p>\n \t\u00abTwo to three years would be enough time for Russia to switch to international settlements to the ruble, Andrey Kostin, head of Russia’s second-biggest bank VTB, said. Two to three years is enough, not only to launch [settlements in rubles], but also to complete these mechanisms. But much will depend on how banks will cope with the task, Kostin said in an interview with Izvestia newspaper. Kostin first put forward the idea of switching to national currencies in international settlements about a decade ago, which means a move to the ruble shouldn’t be considered a counter-sanction measure. I did not find understanding in this matter with the previous leadership of the Central Bank<\/em> [10 years ago<\/em>]. They believed that since the dollar works, we shouldn’t do anything, and settlements in rubles will just bring additional risks. Under the new leadership the position of the Central Bank changed. I think that<\/em> soon we will achieve a major breakthrough<\/em><\/strong>, Kostin said.<\/em>\u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n \t Un autre domaine fondamental, c’est le syst\u00e8me SWIFT. On sait que l’exclusion de la Russie de SWIFT est envisag\u00e9e par les partisans les plus extr\u00eames de la politique des sanctions, comme une option d\u00e9cisive, une option nucl\u00e9aire. Kostine observe que cette mesure serait effectivement nucl\u00e9aire mais dans un sens extr\u00eamement dommageable non pour la Russie seule mais pour toute coop\u00e9ration avec la Russie. Du coup, l’on retrouve la logique d\u00e9nonc\u00e9e par Yourgens : la Russie ne serait par isol\u00e9e stricto sensu<\/em>, mais compl\u00e8tement coup\u00e9e du bloc BAO, y compris dans des domaines aussi fondamentaux que la lutte contre le terrorisme et le d\u00e9sarmement nucl\u00e9aire, et, par cons\u00e9quent, d\u00e9cisivement pouss\u00e9e \u00e0 continuer \u00e0 s’ouvrir au reste du monde pour former ce fameux bloc antiSyst\u00e8me…<\/p>\n<\/p>\n